Alfred North Whitehead - Process & Reality

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Copyright © 1978 by The Free Press

A Division of Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc.Copyright, 1929, by Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc.Copyright renewed 1957 by Evelyn Whitehead.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproducedor transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic ormechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by anyinformation storage and retrieval system, without permissionin writing from the Publisher.

The Free Press

**A Division of Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc.866 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022

Collier Macmillan Canada, Ltd.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 77-90011

Printed in the United States of America

printing number

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Whitehead, Alfred North, IB6I-I9V7.Process and reality.

(Gifford lectures ; 1927-28)

Includes index.

1. Cosmology—Addresses, essays, lectures.

2. Science—.Philosophy—Addresses, essays, lectures.

3. Organism (Philosophy)—Addresses, essays, lectures.I. Griffin, David II. Sherburne, Donald W.III. Title. IV. Series.

BD5H.W5 1978 113 77-90011

ISBN 0-02-93ll580-4 ^

EDITORS' PREFACE

Process and Reality, Whitehead's magnum opus, is one of the majorphilosophical works of the modern world, and an extensive body of sec-ondary literature has developed around it. Yet surely no significant philo-sophical book has appeared in the last two centuries in nearly so deplorablea condition as has this one, with its many hundreds of errors and withover three hundred discrepancies between the American (Macmillan) andthe English (Cambridge) editions, which appeared in different formatswith divergent paginations. The work itself is highly technical and far fromeasy to understand, and in many passages the errors in those editions weresuch as to compound the difficulties. The need for a corrected edition hasbeen keenly felt for many decades.

The principles to be used in deciding what sorts of corrections ought tobe introduced into a new edition of Process and Reality are not, however,immediately obvious. Settling upon these principles requires that one takeinto account the attitude toward book production exhibited by White-head, the probable history of the production of this volume, and the twooriginal editions of the text as they compare with each other and withother books by Whitehead. We will discuss these various factors to providebackground in terms of which the reader can understand the rationale forthe editorial decisions we have made.

Whitehead did not spend much of his own time on the routine tasksassociated with book production. Professor Raphael Demos was a youngcolleague of Whitehead on the Harvard faculty at the time, 1925, of thepublication of Science and the Modern World. Demos worked over themanuscript editorially, read the proofs, and did the Index for that volume.The final sentence of Whitehead's Preface reads: "My most gratefulthanks are due to my colleague Mr. Raphael Demos for reading the proofsand for the suggestion of many improvements in expression." After re-tiring from Harvard in the early 1960's, Demos became for four years acolleague at Vanderbilt University of Professor Sherburne and shared withhim his personal observations concerning Whitehead's indifference to theproduction process.

Bertrand Russellx provides further evidence of Whitehead's sense ofpriorities when he reports that Whitehead, in response to Russell's com-

1 Portraits from Memory (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956), p. 104.

plaint that he had not answered a letter, "justified himself by saying thatif he answered letters, he would have no time for original work/' Russellfound this justification "complete and unanswerable/'

In 1929, when Process and Reality was in production, the same sense ofpriorities was operative. Whitehead was sixty-eight years old, and he stillhad major projects maturing in his mind: Adventures of Ideas, Modes ofThought, and numerous articles and lectures were still to come. "Originalwork," fortunately, continued to take precedence in his life over humdrumdetails and trivia. Unfortunately, however, 1929 found Demos in England(working with Russell). As best we can determine at this time, no onewith both a familiarity with Whitehead's thought and an eye for detailundertook to shepherd Process and Reality through the production process—Demos, in particular, was never aware that anyone else from the philo-sophical community had worked on the manuscript or proofs. Whitehead'sonly personal acknowledgment in the Preface is to "the constant encourage-ment and counsel which I owe to my wife."

An examination of the available evidence, including the discrepanciesbetween the two original editions and the types of errors they contained,has led us to the following reconstruction of the production process and ofthe origin of some of the types of errors.

First, to some extent in conjunction with the preparation of his GiffordLectures and to some extent as an expansion and revision of them,2 White-head prepared a hand-written manuscript. Many of the errors in the finalproduct, such as incorrect references, misquoted poetry, other faulty quo-tations, faulty and inconsistent punctuation, and some of the wrong andmissing words, surely originated at this stage and were due to Whitehead'slack of attention to details. In addition, the inconsistencies in formal mat-ters were undoubtedly due in part to the fact that the manuscript wasquite lengthy and was written over a period of at least a year and a half.

Second, a typist (possibly at Macmillan) prepared a typed copy for theprinter. The errors that crept into the manuscript at this stage seem to in-clude, besides the usual sorts of typographical errors, misreadings of White-head's somewhat difficult hand.3 For example, the flourish initiatingWhitehead's capital "H" was sometimes transcribed as a "T," so that"His" came out "This," and "Here" came out "There." Also, not only theregular mistranscription of "Monadology" as "MonodoZogy," but alsoother mistranscriptions, such as "transmuted" for "transmitted" and"goal" for "goad," probably occurred at this stage. (Professor Victor Lowe

2 See Victor Lowe, "Whitehead's Gifford Lectures/' The Southern journal ofPhilosophy, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Winter, 1969-70), 329-38.

3 For samples of his handwriting, see the letters published in Alfred NorthWhitehead: Essays on His Philosophy, ed. George L. Kline (New York: Pren-tice-Hall, 1963), p. 197; and The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, ed.Paul Arthur Schilpp, 2nd ed. (New York: Tudor Publishing, 1951), pp. 664-65.

has reported an incident which, whether or not it involved a misreading ofWhitehead's handwriting, provided—as Lowe says—a bad omen for whatwould happen to the book: "On April 11, 1928, Kemp Smith received thiscable from Whitehead: title gifford lectures is process and reality

SYLLOBUS FOLLOWING SHORTLY BY MAIL WHITCHCAD."4 )

Third, it appears that Macmillan set type first and that Cambridge setits edition a bit later, using either a copy of the typed manuscript or, morelikely, a copy of Macmillan's proof sheets. There are a large number oferrors which the two editions had in common, a large number in the Mac-millan edition which were not in the Cambridge edition, and some few inthe latter which were not in the former. Their distribution and their char-acter suggest the following observations: Macmillan provided poor proof-reading; the Cambridge editor did a much more rigorous job of catchingtypographical errors; the Cambridge editor also initiated certain sorts ofeditorial changes, which primarily involved punctuation, though these werenot consistently applied throughout the entire text; finally, the types oferrors unique to the Cambridge edition seem not to be due to carelessness,but to deliberate attempts to make the text more intelligible—attemptswhich fell short of their goal because the Cambridge editor did not under-stand Whitehead's technical concepts.

There is independent evidence that Whitehead himself saw proofs.Lowe has published a letter from Whitehead to his son, dated August 12,1929, which reads in part: "At last I have got through with my GiffordLectures—final proofs corrected, Index Printed, and the last correctionsput in/'5 The deplorable state of the text, plus Whitehead's lack ofenthusiasm for this sort of work, make it virtually certain that he did notdo much careful proofreading, Lowe reports6 that Whitehead, after dis-cussions with C. I. Lewis, decided to change the adjectival form of "cate-gory" from "categorical" to "categoreal" and made this change throughoutthe galleys. We strongly suspect that Whitehead's work on the proofs waslimited for the most part to very particular, specific corrections of this sort.

It would have been useful in the preparation of this corrected edition tohave had Whitehead's manuscript and/or typescript. Unfortunately, allefforts to locate them have been unsuccessful—both are probably no longerextant. We do have some corrections, additions, and marginalia whichWhitehead himself added to his Cambridge and Macmillan copies. Inaddition there is a one-page list entitled "Misprints" (evidently given toWhitehead by someone else) with an endorsement in Whitehead's hand-writing: "Corrections all inserted." This data was given to us by Lowe,who is writing the authorized biography of Whitehead and has been givenaccess to family materials, and to whom we express our deep appreciation.

4 Lowe, op. cii.y 334, fn. 14.

*Ibid., 338.

Q Ibid., fn. 19; as Lowe reports, he received this information from H. N. Lee.

Finally, in 1966 Lowe was allowed by Mrs. Henry Copley Greene to see atypescript of Part V, which was inscribed: "Rosalind Greene with his loveFrom Alfred Whitehead Oct. 12, 1928." This typescript had some correc-tions in Whitehead's hand on it; Lowe reports that, with one exception,the published texts contained these corrections (e.g., the capitalization of'Creature' and 'Itself' in the last paragraph).

It was on the basis of the above evidence and interpretations that wearrived at the principles that guided our editorial work in regard to boththe more trivial and the more significant issues.

The most difficult and debatable editorial decisions had to be made,ironically, concerning relatively trivial matters, especially those involvingpunctuation. We tried to steer a middle course between two unacceptableextremes.

On the one hand, the editors of a "corrected edition" might have intro-duced into the text all the changes which they would have suggested to astill-living author. The obvious problem with this alternative is that, sincethe author is no longer living, he would have no chance to veto these "im-provements" as being inconsistent with his own meaning or stylistic prefer-ences.

On the other hand, to avoid this problem the editors might have decidedto remove only the most obvious and egregious errors, otherwise leavingthe text as it was. One problem with this alternative is that this importantwork would again be published without benefit of the kind of careful edi-torial work Whitehead had every right to expect—work which the Cam-bridge editor began but did not carry out consistently. Another problem isthat there are over three hundred divergencies between the two originaleditions. In these places it is impossible simply to leave the text as it was—a choice must be made. And clearly, in most of these places the Cambridgepunctuation is preferable and must be followed—it would be totally irre-sponsible to revert to Macmillan's punctuation. But once Cambridge'spunctuation has been followed in these places, the question arises, Howcould one justify accepting Cambridge's improvements in these instancesand yet not make similar improvements in parallel passages?

Accordingly, in trying to steer a middle course between these two ex-tremes we decided that the most responsible plan of action would be totake the changes introduced bv the Cambridge editor (which, of course,were made during Whitehead's life-time and could have been vetoed in hispersonal copies) as precedents for the kinds of changes to be carried outconsistently. A prime example is provided by the fact that Cambridgedeleted many, but not all, of the commas which often appeared betweenthe subject and the verb in Macmillan. However, we left some other ques-tionable practices (e.g., the frequent use of a semicolon where grammaticalrules would call for a comma) as they were, primarily because Cambridgedid not provide sufficient precedents for changes, even though we would

Editors' Preface ix

ourselves have suggested changes to Whitehead had we been editing thisbook in 1929,

Working within these guidelines, the editors have sought to produce atext that is free not only of the hundreds of blatant errors found in theoriginal, especially in the Macmillan edition, but also free of many of theminor sorts of inconsistencies recognized and addressed to some extent bythe Cambridge editor.

It is in the matter of the more significant corrections involving wordchanges that editors must guard against the possibility that interpretativebias might lead to textual distortions. There were three factors whichhelped us guard against this possibility. First, we drew heavily upon a sub-stantial amount of previous work, coordinated by Sherburne, in which thesuggested corrigenda lists of six scholars were collated and then circulatedamong eight scholars for opinions and observations. The publication of theresults of these discussions,7 plus the lengthy discussions that preceded andfollowed it, have established a consensus view about many items whichprovided guidance. Second, in their own work the two editors approachWhitehead's thought from different perspectives and focus their workaround different sorts of interests. Third, we used the principle that nochanges would be introduced into the text unless they were endorsed byboth editors.

We note, finally, that there can be no purely mechanical guidelines toguarantee objectivity and prevent distortion. Ultimately, editors must relyupon their own judgment, their knowledge of their texts, and their com-mon sense. Recognizing this, we accept full responsibility for the decisionswe have made.

Besides the issues discussed above, there were other editorial decisionsto be made. There were substantial differences of format between the twooriginal editions. Cambridge had a detailed Table of Contents at the be-ginning of the book, whereas Macmillan had only a brief listing of majordivisions at the beginning with the detailed materials spread throughoutthe book as "Abstracts" prior to each of the five major Parts of the volume.Primarily because it is a nuisance to locate the various sections of thisanalytic Table of Contents in Macmillan, we have followed Cambridge inthis matter. We have also followed the Cambridge edition in setting offsome quotations and have let it guide us in regard to the question as towhich quotations to set off (the Macmillan edition did not even set offpage-length items).

Since most of the secondary literature on Process and Reality gives pagereferences to the Macmillan edition, we considered very seriously the pos-sibility of retaining its pagination in this new edition. For several technical

7 Donald W, Sherburne, "Corrigenda for Process and Reality" in Kline, ed.,op. cit, pp. 200-207.

x Editors' Preface

reasons this proved impractical. Consequently, we have inserted in thistext, in brackets, the page numbers of the Macmillan edition, except in theTable of Contents.

In regard to certain minor differences between the texts, some of whichreflect American vs. British conventions, we have followed Macmillan.Examples are putting periods and commas inside the quotation marks,numbering the footnotes consecutively within each chapter rather than oneach page, and writing "Section" instead of using the symbol "$."

Except for those matters, which simply reflect different conventions, wehave left a record of all of the changes which we have made. That is, in theEditors' Notes at the back of the book we have indicated all the diver-gencies (or, in a few cases, types of divergencies) from both original edi-tions, no matter how trivial, thereby giving interested scholars access toboth previous readings through this corrected edition. We have indicatedin the text, by means of single and double obelisks (f and i), the placeswhere these divergencies occur. The more exact meaning of these symbols,plus that of the single and double asterisks, is explained in the introductorystatement to the Editors' Notes.

The original editions had woefully inadequate Indexes. For this volume,Griffin has prepared a totally new, enormously expanded Index. Sincerethanks are due to Professor Marjorie Suchocki, who correlated the Indexitems to the pagination in this new edition, and to Professor Bernard M.Loomer, who many years ago prepared an expanded Index which was madeavailable to other scholars.

One other edition of Process and Reality has appeared which has not yetbeen mentioned. In 1969, The Free Press published a paperback edition.It should in no way be confused with the present corrected edition, pub-lished by the same company. The 1969 edition did not incorporate thecorrigenda which had been published by Sherburne; it added some new-errors of its own; it introduced yet another pagination without indicatingthe previous standard pagination; and it did not contain a new Index. Wewish to commend The Free Press for now publishing this corrected edition.

We acknowledge most gratefully the support of the Vanderbilt Uni-versity Research Council, which provided Sherburne with travel funds andreleased time to work on this project. We are also deeply indebted to theCenter for Process Studies, which has supported this project extensively,and in turn to both the Claremont Graduate School and the School ofTheology at Claremont, which give support to the Center. Finally, weexpress our warm appreciation to Rebecca Parker Beyer, who was a greathelp in comparing texts and reading proofs.

David Ray GriffinCenter for Process Studies

Donald W. SherburneVanderbilt University

PREFACE

[v]* These lectures are based upon a recurrence to that phase of philo-sophic thought which began with Descartes and ended with Hume. Thephilosophic scheme which they endeavour to explain is termed the 'Phi-losophy of Organism/ There is no doctrine put forward which cannot citein its defence some explicit statement of one of this group of thinkers,or of one of the two founders of all Western thought, Plato and Aristotle.But the philosophy of organism is apt to emphasize just those elementsin the writings of these masters which subsequent systematizers have putaside. The writer who most fully anticipated the main positions of thephilosophy of organism is John Locke in his Essay, especiallyx in its laterbooks.

The lectures are divided into five parts. In the first part, the method isexplained, and thet scheme of ideas, in terms of which the cosmology is tobe framed, is stated summarily.

In the second part,* an endeavour is made to exhibit this scheme as ade-quate for the interpretation of the ideas and problems which form thecomplex texture of civilized thought. Apart from such an investigation thesummary statement of Part I is practically unintelligible. Thus Part II atonce gives meaning to the verbal phrases of the scheme by their use indiscussion, and shows the power of the scheme to put the various elementsof our experience into a consistent relation to each other. In order to ob-tain a reasonably complete account of human experience considered inrelation to the philosophical [vi\ problems which naturally arise, the groupof philosophers and scientists belonging to the seventeenth and eighteenthcenturies has been considered, in particular Descartes, Newton, Locke,Hume, Kant. Any one of these writers is one-sided in his presentation ofthe groundwork of experience; but as a whole they give a general presenta-tion which dominates the development of subsequent philosophy. I startedthe investigation with the expectation of being occupied with the exposi-tion of the divergencies from every member of this group. But a carefulexamination of their exact statements disclosed that in the main thephilosophy of organism is a recurrence to pre-Kantian modes of thought.These philosophers were perplexed by the inconsistent presuppositionsunderlying their inherited modes of expression. In so far as they, or their

1 Cf. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. IV, Ch. VI, Sect. 11.*

xi

successors, have endeavoured to be rigidly systematic, the tendency hasbeen to abandon just those elements in their thought upon which thephilosophy of organism bases itself. An endeavour has been made to pointout the exact points of agreement and of disagreement.

In the second part, the discussions of modern thought have been con-fined to the most general notions of physics and biology, with a carefulavoidance of all detail. Also, it must be one of the motives of a completecosmology to construct a system of ideas which brings t the aesthetic,moral, and religious interests into relation with those concepts of theworld which have their origin in natural science.

In the third and fourth parts, the cosmological scheme is developed interms of its own categoreal notions, and without much regard to othersystems of thought. For example, in Part II there is a chapter on the'Extensive Continuum/ which is largely concerned with the notions ofDescartes and Newton, compared with the way in which the organic phi-losophy must interpret this feature of the world. But in Part IV, this ques-tion is treated from the point of view of developing the detailed method[viz] in which the philosophy of organism establishes the theory of thisproblem. It must be thoroughly understood that the theme of these lec-tures is not a detached consideration of various traditional philosophicalproblems which acquire urgency in certain traditional systems of thought.The lectures are intended to state a condensed scheme of cosmologicalideas, to develop their meaning by confrontation with the various topicsof experience, and finally to elaborate an adequate cosmology in terms ofwhich all particular topics find theirt interconnections. Thus the unityof treatment is to be looked for in the gradual development of the scheme,in meaning and in relevance, and not in the successive treatment of par-ticular topics. For example, the doctrines of time, of space, of perception,and of causality are recurred to again and again, as the cosmology de-velops. In each recurrence, these topics throw some new light on thescheme, or receive some new elucidation. At the end, in so far as the enter-prise has been successful, there should be no problem of space-time, orof epistemology, or of causality, left over for discussion. The scheme shouldhave developed all those generic notions adequate for the expression of anypossible interconnection of things.

Among the contemporary schools of thought, my obligations to theEnglish and American Realists are obvious. In this connection, I shouldlike especially to mention Professor T. P. Nunn, of the University ofLondon. His anticipations, in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, ofsome of the doctrines of recent Realism, do not appear to be sufficientlywell known.

I am also greatly indebted to Bergson, William James, and John Dewey.One of my preoccupations has been to rescue their type of thought fromthe charge of anti-intellectualism, which rightly or wrongly has been asso-ciated with it. Finally, though throughout the main body of the work I

am in sharp disagreement with Bradley, the final outcome is after all notso greatly different. I am particularly indebted to his chapter on the nature[viii] of experience, which appears in his Essays on Truth and Reality.His insistence on 'feeling' is very consonant with my own conclusions.This whole metaphysical position is an implicit repudiation of the doctrineof Vacuous actuality/

The fifth part is concerned with the final interpretation of the ultimateway in which the cosmological problem is to be conceived. It answers thequestion, What does it all come to? In this part, the approximation toBradley is evident. Indeed, if this cosmology be deemed successful, it be-comes natural at this point to ask whether the type of thought involvedbe not a transformation of some main doctrines of Absolute Idealism ontoa realistic basis.

These lectures will be best understood by noting the following list ofprevalent habits of thought, which are repudiated, in so far as concernstheir influence on philosophy:

(i) The distrust of speculative philosophy.

(ii) The trust in language as an adequate expression of propositions.

(iii) The mode of philosophical thought which implies, and is impliedby, the faculty-psychology.

(iv) The subject-predicate form of expression.

(v) The sensationalist doctrine of perception.

(vi) The doctrine of vacuous actuality.

(vii) The Kantian doctrine of the objective world as a theoretical con-struct from purely subjective experience.

(viii) Arbitrary deductions in ex absurdo arguments.

(ix) Belief that logical inconsistencies can indicate anything else thansome antecedent errors.

By reason of its ready acceptance of some, or all. of these nine mythsand fallacious procedures, much nineteenth-century philosophy excludesitself from relevance to the ordinary stubborn facts of daily life.

The positive doctrine of these lectures is concerned with the becoming,the being, and the relatedness of 'actual entities/ An "actual entity' is ares vera in the [ix] Cartesian sense of that term;2 it is a Cartesian 'sub-stance/ and not an Aristotelian 'primary substance/ But Descartes re-tained in his metaphysical doctrine the Aristotelian dominance of thecategory of 'quality' over that of 'relatedness/ In these lectures 'relatedness'is dominant over 'quality/ All relatedness has its foundation in the re-latedness of actualities; and such relatedness is wholly concerned with theappropriation of the dead by the living—that is to say, with 'objective im-mortality' whereby what is divested of its own living immediacy becomes

21 derive my comprehension of this element in Descartes' thought from Pro-fessor Gilson of the Sorbonne. I believe that he is the first to insist on its im-portance. He is, of course, not responsible for the use made of the notion inthese lectures.

xiv Preface

a real component in other living immediacies of becoming. This is thedoctrine that the creative advance of the world is the becoming, the perish-ing, and the objective immortalities of those things which jointly con-stitute stubborn fact

The history of philosophy discloses two cosmologies which at differentperiods have dominated European thought, Plato's Timaeus,3 and thecosmology of the seventeenth century, whose chief authors were Galileo,Descartes, Newton, Locke. In attempting an enterprise of the same kind,it is wise to follow the clue that perhaps the true solution consists in afusion of the two previous schemes, with modifications demanded by self-consistency and the advance of knowledge. The cosmology explained inthese lectures has been framed in accordance with this reliance on thepositive value of the philosophical tradition. One test of success is ade-quacy in the comprehension of the variety of experience within the limitsof one scheme of ideas. The endeavour to satisfy this condition is illus-trated by comparing Chapters III, VII, and X of Part II, respectivelyentitled The Order of Nature/ The Subjectivist Principle/ and Trocess/with Chapter [x] V of Part III, entitled The Higher Phases of Experience/and with Chapter V of Part IV, entitled 'Measurement/ and with Chap-ter II of Part V. entitled 'God and thet World/ These chapters shouldbe recognizable as the legitimate outcome of the one scheme of ideasstated in the second chapter of Part I.

In these lectures I have endeavoured to compress the material derivedfrom years of meditation. In putting out these results, four strong impres-sions dominate my mind: First, that the movement of historical, andphilosophical, criticism of detached questions, which on the whole hasdominated the last two centuries, has done its work, and requires to besupplemented by a more sustained effort of constructive thought. Sec-ondly, that the true method of philosophical construction is to frame ascheme of ideas, the best that one can, and unflinchingly to explore theinterpretation of experience in terms of that scheme. Thirdly, that allconstructive thought, on the various special topics of scientific interest, isdominated by some such scheme, unacknowledged, but no less influentialin guiding the imagination. The importance of philosophy lies in itssustained effort to make such schemes explicit, and thereby capable ofcriticism and improvement.

There remains the final reflection, how shallow, puny, and imperfect areefforts to sound the depths in the nature of things. In philosophical dis-cussion, the merest hint of dogmatic certainty as to finality of statementis an exhibition of folly.

In the expansion of these lectures to the dimensions of the present book,

31 regret that Professor A. E. Taylor's Commentary on Plato's Timaeus wasonly published after this work was prepared for the press. Thus, with the excep-tion of one small reference, no use could be made of it. I am very greatly in-debted to Professor Taylor's other writings.

Preface xv

I have been greatly indebted to the critical difficulties suggested by themembers of my Harvard classes. Also this work would never have beenwritten without the constant encouragement and counsel which I owe tomy wife.

A. N. W.Harvard UniversityJanuary, 1929

CONTENTS

Editors' Preface v

Preface xi

PART ITHE SPECULATIVE SCHEME

Chapter I. Speculative Philosophy

SECTION

I. Speculative Philosophy; Coherent, Logical, Necessary System

of Ideas; Interpretation of Experience.II. Defects of Insight and of Language; Conditions for Observa-tion; Rigid Empiricism, Imagination, Generalization; Co-herence and Incoherence; Creativity, the Ultimate.

III. Rationalism and Dogmatism; Scheme as a Matrix, False and

True Propositions, Use of the Matrix; Experimental Adven-ture.

IV. Philosophy and Science, Grades of Generality; Dogmatic Influ-

ence of Mathematics; Progress of Philosophy.V. Defects of Language; Propositions and Their Background;Metaphysical Presupposition; Excessive Trust in Language;Metaphysics and Practice; Metaphysics and Linguistic Ex-pression.VI. Speculative Philosophy and Overambition; Overambition,Dogmatism and Progress; Interpretation and Metaphysics;The Higher Elements of Experience, Subjectivity and theMetaphysical Correction; Morality, Religion, Science, Con-nected by Philosophy; Contrast between + Religion and Sci-ence; Conclusion.

Chapter II. The Categoreal Scheme 18

I. Four Notions, namely, Actual Entity, Prehension, Nexus, theOntological Principle; Descartes and Locke; PhilosophyExplanatory of Abstraction, Not of Concreteness.II. The Four Sets of Categories; The Category of the Ultimate;

xvii

SECTION

Conjunction and Disjunction; Creativity, the Principle ofNovelty, Creative Advance; Togetherness, Concrescence;Eight Categories of Existence; Twenty-Seven Categories ofExplanation.

III. Nine Categoreal Obligations.

IV. Preliminary Notes; Complete Abstraction Self-Contradictory;

Principles of Unrest and of Relativity; Actual Entities neverChange; Perishing of Occasions and Their Objective Im-mortality; Final Causation and Efficient Causation; Mul-tiplicities; Substance.

Chapter III. Some Derivative Notions 31

I. Primordial Nature of God; Relevance, the Divine Ordering;Consequent Nature of God; Creativity and Its Acquirementof Character; Creatures, Objective Immortality, Appetition,Novelty, Relevance; Appetition and Mentality, ConceptualPrehensions, Pure and Impure Prehensions; Synonyms andAnalogies, namely, t Conceptual Prehension, Appetition, In-tuition, Physical Purpose, Vision, Envisagement.II. Social Order, Defining Characteristic, Substantial Form; Per-sonal Order, Serial Inheritance, Enduring Object; Corpus-cular Societies.

III. Classic Notion of Time, Unique Seriality; Continuity of Be-

coming, Becoming of Continuity, Zeno; Atomism and Con-tinuity; Corpuscular and Wave Theories of Light.

IV. Consciousness, Thought, Sense-Perception are Unessential Ele-

ments in an Instance of Experience.

PART IIDISCUSSIONS AND APPLICATIONS

Chapter I. Fact and Form 39

I. Appeal to Facts, European Tradition; Plato, Aristotle, Des-cartes, Locke, Hume, Kant; Intrinsic Reasonableness; Foot-notes to Plato; This Cosmology Platonic; ParticipatingForms; Divine Ordering; Ontological Principle; Facts theonly Reasons; Facts are Process; Prehension, Satisfaction.II. Rationalism a Faith, Adventure of Hope; Limits of Theory,Givenness,t Professor A. E. Taylor on Plato; Decision, the

SECTION

Ontological Principle; Entities and Process, Actual Entitiesand Decision; Stubborn Fact.

III. Platonic Form7 Idea, Essence, Eternal Object; Potentiality and

Givenness; Exclusiveness of the Given; Subject-Superject,Becoming and Being; Evaporation of Indeterrnination inConcrescence, Satisfaction Determinate and Exclusive; Con-crescence Dipolar; Potentiality, Givenness, Impossibility;Subsistence.

IV. Actual Occasions Internally Determined,! Externally Free;

Course of History not Necessary, No Perfection; EfficientCausation and Final Reaction; God's Primordial Freedom;Each Concrescence between Definite Free Initiation andDefinite Free Conclusion, the Former Macrocosmic, theLatter Microcosmic.V. Universals and Particulars, Unsuitable Terms with False Im-plication; Illustration from Descartes, also Hume; Des-cartes' Alternative Doctrine, Realitas Objective, Inspectio,Intuitio, Judicium; World not Describable in Terms of Sub-ject and Predicate. Substance and Quality, Particular andUniversal; Universal Relativity.VI. Locke's Essay,t Agreement of Organic Philosophy with It; Sub-stitute 'Experience7 for 'Understanding'; Ideas and Prehen-sions; Locke's Two Doctrines of Ideas, Ideas of ParticularThings; Representative Theory of Perception; Logical Sim-plicity and Genetic Priority not to be Identified; Substance,Exterior Things, Societies; Solidarity of the Universe.VII. Locke's Doctrine of Power, Power and Substance; CausalObjectification and Presentational Objectification; ChangeMeans Adventures of Eternal Objects; Real Essence,Abstract Essence; Doctrine of Organism and Generation ofActual Entities.

Chapter II. The Extensive Continuum 61

I. Continuum and Real Potentiality, Atomized by Actual Occa-sions; How the Continuum is Experienced, PresentationalImmediacy, Sensa; Real Chair and Chair-Image; ComplexIngression of Sensa.II. General Potentiality and Pxeal Potentiality; Standpoints ofActual Occasions, Determined by Initial Phase of SubjectiveAim; Extensive Relationships; The Epochal Theory ofTime, Zeno, William James.III. Newton's Scholium,

SECTION

IV. Newton's Scholium, Comparison with Philosophy of Organismand with Descartes; 'Withness of the Body/ Status of theBody in the Actual World; Ontological Status of Space forNewton, Descartes and the Organic Philosophy.V. Undifferentiated Endurance and the Passivity of Substance,Source of Errors.

VI. Summary.

Chapter III. The Order of Nature 83

I. Order and Givenness Contrasted; The Four Characteristicsof Order; Attainment of End, Lure of** Feeling; Causa Sui.II. 'Society' Defined, Defining Characteristic and Genetic Inher-itance; Environment,! Social and Permissive; Cosmic Epoch,Social Hierarchy.

III. Evolution of Societies, Decay, Chaos, the Timaeus, the Schol-

ium, Milton.

IV. Societies in this Cosmic Epoch; The Extensive Society, the

Geometric Society. Electromagnetic Society; Waves. Elec-trons, Protons.V. Enduring Objects, Corpuscular Societies, Structured Societies.VI. Stability, Specialization.

VII. Problem of Stabilization, Exclusion of Detail, Conceptual Ini-tiative, Life.VIII. Inorganic Apparatus for Life.IX. Life a Reaction against Society, Originality.X. Life and Food, Life in Empty Space, Catalytic Agent.XL Living Persons, Canalization of Life, Dominant Personalityonly Partial.

Chapter IV. Organisms and Environment 110

I. Reaction of Environment on Actual Occasions; Narrownessand Width, Dependent on Societies, Orderly Element;Chaos, Triviality, Orderliness, Depth; Triviality,! Vagueness,Narrowness, Width; Incompatibility, Contrast; Triviality,Excess of Differentiation; Vagueness, Excess of Identifica-tion; Nexus as One, Vagueness, Narrowness, Depth; Coor-dination % of Chaos, Vagueness, Narrowness, Width.II. Intensity, Narrowness; Philosophy of Organism, Kant, Locke.III. Sensa, Lowest Category of Eternal Objects, Definition; Sensa,Contrasts of, Intensity; Contrasts in High and Low Cate-gories, Patterns; Eternal Objects, Simplicity, Complexity;Sensa Experienced Emotionally.

SECTION

IV. Transmission, Diverse Routes, Inhibitions, Intensification;

Vector Character, Form of Energy; Physical Science.V. Environmental Data as in Perception; Visual Perception,Most Sophisticated Form; Originated by Antecedent Stateof Animal Body, Hume; Animal Body and External Envi-ronment, Amplifier.!

VI. Perception and Animal Body, Causal Efficacy.VII. Causal Efficacy, Viscera; Presentational Immediacy, DelusivePerceptions, Secondary Qualities, Extension, Withness ofBody; Hume, Kant.VIII. Loci Disclosed by Perception; Contemporary Regions, CausalPast, Causal Future; Immediate Present, Unison of Becom-ing, Concrescent Unison, Duration; Differentiation betweenImmediate Present and Presented Duration; PresentedLocus.

IX. Presented Locus and Unison of Becoming; Presented Locus,Systematic Relation to Animal Body, Strains, Independenceof External Contemporary Happenings, Straight Lines,Measurement; Unison of Becoming, Duration.X. Summary.

Chapter V. Locke and Hume 130

I. Hume, Perceptions, Substance, Principle of Union; Ideas,

Copies of Impressions, Imaginative Freedom.II. Hume and 'Repetition/ Cause and Effect; Memory, Forceand Vivacity.

III. Time, Hume, Descartes, Independence of Successive Occa-

sions; Objective Immortality.

IV. Influence of Subject-Predicate Notion; Hume, Descartes,

Locke, Particular Existence.V. Hume and Locke, Process and Morphology; False Derivationof Emotional Feelings; Sensationalist Doctrine; Santayana.

Chapter VI. From Descartes to Kant 144

I. Descartes, Three Kinds of Substance: Extended, Mental,God's; Three Kinds of Change, of Accidents, Origination,Cessation; Accidental Relations, Representative Ideas; Un-essential Experience of External World.II. Locke, Empiricism, Adequacy, Inconsistency; Particular Exis-tent, Substance, Power; Relativity, Perpetually Perishing.

III. Analogy and Contrast with Philosophy of Organism.

IV. Hume and Process, Kant, Santayana.

V. Contrasted Procedures of Philosophy of Organism and Kant.

Chapter VII. The Subjectivist Principle 157

SECTION

I. The Subjectivist Principle and the Sensationalist Principle;The Sensationalist Doctrine Combines Both; Locke, Hume,Kant; Statement of the Principles; The Three Premisesfor the Subjectivist Principle; Philosophy of OrganismDenies the Two Principles and the Three Premises; Des-cartes; 'That Stone as Grey/ Substance and Quality, Organsof Sensation; Descartes' Subjectivist Modification; 'Percep-tion of that Stone as Grey'; Failure to Provide RevisedCategories; Hume.II. Knowledge, Its Variations, Vaguenesses; Negative Perceptionthe General Case, Consciousness is the Feeling of Negation,Novelty; Consciousness a Subjective Form, Only Present inLate Derivative Phases of Complex Integrations; Conscious-ness only Illuminates the Derivative Types of ObjectiveData, Philosophy Misled by Clearness and Distinctness.

III. Primitive Type of Physical Experience is Emotional; Vector

Transmission of Feeling, Pulses of Emotion, Wave-Length;Human Emotion is Interpreted Emotion, Not Bare Emo-tional Feeling.

IV. Decision Regulating Ingression of Eternal Objects, Old Meet-

ing New; The Three Phases of Feeling:! Conformal, Con-ceptual, Comparative; Eternal Objects and SubjectiveForms; Continuity of the Phases; Category of ObjectiveUnity.V. Reformed Subjectivist Principle is Another Statement of Prin-ciple of Relativity; Process is the Becoming of Experience;Hume's Principle Accepted, This Method only Errs inDetail; 'Law' for 'Causation' no Help; Modern PhilosophyUses Wrong Categories; Two Misconceptions:! (i) VacuousActuality, (ii) Inherence of Quality in Substance.

Chapter VIII. Symbolic Reference 168

I. Two Pure Modes of Perception, Symbolic Reference; Com-mon Ground, Integration, Originative Freedom, Error;Common Ground, Presented Locus, Geometrical Indistinct-ness in Mode of Causal Efficacy; Exceptions, Animal Body,Withness of Body.II. Common Ground, Common Sensa; Modern Empiricism,Make-Believe, Hume; Sensa Derived from Efficacy of Body;Projection.HI. Mistaken Primacy of Presentational Immediacy, Discussion,Causal Efficacy Primitive.

sectionIV, Further Discussion; Causation and Sense-Perception,V. Comparison of Modes; Integration in Symbolic Reference.VI. Principles of Symbolism, Language.

Chapter IX. The Propositions? 184

I. Impure Prehensions by Integration of Pure Conceptual andPure Physical Prehensions; Physical Purposes and Propo-sitions Discriminated; Theory, Not Primarily for Judgment,Lures for Feeling; Objective Lure; Final Cause; Generaland Singular Propositions; Logical Subjects, Complex Pred-icate; Propositions True or False; Lure to Novelty; Felt'Contrary' is Consciousness in Germ; Judgment and Enter-tainment; Graded Envisagement.II. Truth and Falsehood, Experiential Togetherness of Propo-sitions and Fact; Correspondence and Coherence Theory;Propositions True or False, Judgments Correct or Incor-rect or Suspended; Intuitive and Derivative Judgments;Logic Concerned with Derivative Judgments; Error.

III. Systematic Background Presupposed by Each Proposition; Re-

lations, Indicative Systems of Relations; Propositions andIndicative Systems; Illustration, Inadequacy of Words.

IV, Metaphysical Propositions; One and One Make Two,

V. Induction, Probability, Statistical Theory, Ground, Sampling,

Finite Numbers.VI. Suppressed Premises in Induction, Presupposition of Defi-nite Type of Actuality Requiring Definite Type of Envi-ronment; Wider Inductions Invalid; Statistical Probabilitywithin Relevant Environment.

VII. Objectification Samples Environment.*

VIII. Alternative Non-Statistical Ground; Graduated Appetitions,Primordial Nature of God; Secularization of Concept ofGod's Functions.

Chapter X. Process 208

I. Fluency and Permanence; Generation and Substance; Spa-tialization; Two Kinds of Fluency:! Macroscopic and Micro-scopic, from Occasion to Occasion and within Each Occa-sion.II. Concrescence, Novelty, Actuality; Microscopic Concrescence.III. Three Stages of Microscopic Concrescence; Vector Charac-ters Indicate Macroscopic Transition; Emotion, and Sub-jective Form Generally, is Scalar in Microscopic Origina-tion and is the Datum for Macroscopic Transition.

SECTION

IV. Higher Phases of Microscopic Concrescence.V. Summary.

PART IIITHE THEORY OF PREHENSIONS

Chapter I. The Theory of FEELiNGst 219

I. Genetic and Morphological Analysis; Genetic Considerationis Analysis of the Concrescence, the Actual Entity Forma-liter; Morphological Analysis is Analysis of the ActualEntity as Concrete, Spatialized, Objective AII. Finite Truth, Division into Prehensions; Succession of Phases,Integral Prehensions in Formation; Five Factors: Subject,Initial Data, Elimination, Objective Datum, SubjectiveForm; Feeling is Determinate.

III. Feeling Cannot be Abstracted from Its Subject; Subject, Aim

at the Feeler, Final Cause, Causa Sui.

IV. Categories of Subjective Unity, of Objective Identity, of

Objective Diversity.

V. Category of Subjective Unity; The One Subject is the FinalEnd Conditioning Each Feeling, Episode in Self-Produc-tion; Pre-established Harmony, Self-Consistency of a Prop-osition, Subjective Aim; Category of Objective Identity,One Thing has one R61e, No Duplicity, One Ground ofIncompatibility; Category of Objective Diversity, No Di-verse Elements with Identity of Function, Another Groundof Incompatibility.

VI. World as a Transmitting Medium; Explanation; Negative

Prehensions, with Subjective Forms.VII. Application of the Categories.VIII. Application (continued) A

IX. Nexus.

X. Subjective Forms; Classification of Feelings According to Data;Simple Physical Feelings, Conceptual Feelings, TransmutedFeelings; Subjective Forms not Determined by Data, Con-ditioned by Them.

XL Subjective Form, Qualitative Pattern, Quantitative Pattern; In-tensity; Audition of Sound.XII. Prehensions not Atomic, Mutual Sensitivity; Indefinite Num-ber of Prehensions; Prehensions as Components in the Sat-isfaction and Their Genetic Growth; Justification of the

section

Analysis of the Satisfaction, Eighth and Ninth Categoriesof Explanation.

Chapter II. The Primary Feelings 236

I. Simple Physical Feeling, Initial Datum is one Actual Entity,Objective Datum is one Feeling Entertained by that oneActual Entity; Act of Causation, Objective Datum theCause, Simple Physical Feeling the Effect; Synonymously'Causal Feelings'; Primitive Act of Perception, Initial Datumis Actual Entity Perceived, Objective Datum is the Per-spective, In General not Conscious Perception; Reason for'Perspective'; Vector Transmission of Feeling, Re-enaction,Conformal; Irreversibility of Time; Locke; Eternal ObjectsRelational, Two-Way R61e, Vector-Transference, Reproduc-tion, Permanence; Quanta of Feeling Transferred, Quantum-Theory in Physics, Physical Memory; Atomism, Continuity,Causation, Memory, Perception, Quality, Quantity, Ex-tension.II. Conceptual Feelings, Positive and Negative Prehensions; Cre-ative Urge Dipolar; Datum is an Eternal Object; Exclu-siveness of Eternal Objects as Determinants, Definiteness,Incompatibility.

III. Subjective Form of Conceptual Prehension is Valuation; Inte-

gration Introduces Valuation into Impure Feelings, Inten-siveness; Three Characteristics of Valuation: (i) MutualSensitivity of Subjective Forms, (ii) Determinant of Pro-cedure of Integration, (iii) Determinant of Intensive Em-phasis.

IV. Consciousness is Subjective Form; Requires Its Peculiar Da-

tum; Recollection, Plato, Hume; Conscious Feelings alwaysImpure, Requires Integration of Physical and ConceptualFeelings; Affirmation and Negative Contrast; Not all Im-pure Feelings Conscious.

Chapter III. The Transmission of Feelings 244

I. Ontological Principle, Determination of Initiation of Feeling;Phases of Concrescence; God, Inexorable Valuation, Sub-jective Aim; Self-Determination Imaginative in Origin, Re-enaction.II. Pure Physical Feelings, Hybrid Physical Feelings; Hybrid Feel-ings Transmuted into Pure Physical Feelings; DisastrousSeparation of Body and Mind Avoided; Hume's Principle,Hybrid Feelings with God as Datum.

section

III. Application of First Categoreal Obligation: Supplementary

Phase Arising from Conceptual Origination; Application ofFourth and Fifth Categoreal Obligations; ConceptualReversion; Ground of Identity, Aim at Contrast.

IV. Transmutation; Feeling a Nexus as One, Transmuted Physi-

cal Feeling; R61e of Impartial Conceptual Feeling in Trans-mutation, Category of Transmutation, Further Explana-tions; Conceptual Feelings Modifying Physical Feelings;Negative Prehensions Important.V. Subjective Harmony, the Seventh Categoreal Obligation.

Chapter IV. Propositions and Feelings 256

I. Consciousness, Propositional Feelings, Not Necessarily Con-scious; Propositional Feeling is Product of Integration ofPhysical Feeling with a Conceptual Feeling; Eternal ObjectsTell no Tales of Actual Occasions, Propositions are TalesThat Might be\ Told of Logical Subjects; Proposition, Trueor False, Tells no Tales about Itself, Awaits Reasons; Con-ceptual Feeling Provides Predicative Pattern, Physical Feel-ing Provides Logical Subjects, Integration; Indication ofLogical Subjects, Element of Givenness Required for Truthand Falsehood.II. Proposition not Necessarily Judged, Propositional Feelings notNecessarily Conscious; New Propositions Arise; PossiblePercipient Subjects within the 'Scope of a Proposition/

III. Origination of Propositional Feeling, Four (or Five) Stages,

Indicative Feeling, Physical Precognition, Predicative Pat-tern (Predicate), Predicative Feeling; Propositional FeelingIntegral of Indicative and Predicative Feelings.

IV. Subjective Forms of Propositional Feelings, Dependent on

Phases of Origination; Case of Identity of Indicative Feel-ing with the Physical Recognition, Perceptive Feelings;tCase of Diversity, Imaginative Feelings; Distinction notNecessarily Sharp-Cut; The Species of Perceptive Feelings:Authentic, Direct Authentic, Indirect Authentic, Unau-thentic; Tied Imagination.V. Imaginative Feelings, Indicative Feeling and Physical Recog-nition Diverse, Free Imagination; Subjective Form Dependson Origination, Valuation rather than Consciousness; Lureto Creative Emergence; Criticism of Physical Feelings,Truth, Critical Conditions.VI. Language, Its Functionjf Origination of the Necessary Trainof Feelings.

Chapter V. The Higher Phases of Experience 266

section

I. Comparative Feelings, Conscious Perceptions, Physical Pur-poses; Physical Purposes More Primitive than Proposi-tional Feelings.II. Intellectual Feelings, Integration of Propositional Feeling withPhysical Feeling of a Nexus Including the Logical Subjects;Category of Objective Identity, Affirmation-Negation Con-trast; Consciousness is a Subjective Form.

III. Belief, Certainty, Locke, Immediate Intuition.

IV. Conscious Perception, Recapitulation of Origin; Direct and

Indirect Authentic Feelings, Unauthentic Feelings; Trans-mutation; Perceptive Error, Novelty; Tests, Force andVivacity, Analysis of Origination; Tests Fallible.V. Judgment, Yes-Form, No-Form, Suspense-Form; In Yes-FormIdentity of Patterns, In No-Form Diversity and Incompati-bility, In Suspense-Formt Diversity and Compatibility; In-tuitive Judgment, Conscious Perception.VI. Affirmative Intuitive Judgment Analogous to Conscious Per-ception, Difference Explained; Inferential Judgment; Diver-gence from Locke's Nomenclature; Suspended Judgment.VII. Physical Purposes, Primitive Type of Physical Feeling; Retain-ing Valuation and Purpose, Eliminating Indeterminate-ness of Complex Eternal Object; Responsive Re-enaction;Decision.VIII. Second Species of Physical Purposes, Reversion Involved;Eighth Categoreal Obligation, Subjective Intensity; Imme-diate Subject, Relevant Future; Balance, Conditions forContrast; Reversion as Condition for Balanced Contrast;Rhythm, Vibration; Categoreal Conditions; Physical Pur-poses and Propositional Feelings Compared.

PART IVTHE THEORY OF EXTENSION

Chapter I. Coordinate Division 283

I. Genetic Division is Division of the Concrescence, CoordinateDivision is Division of the Concrete; Physical Time Arisesin the Coordinate Analysis of the Satisfaction; GeneticProcess not the Temporal Succession; Spatial and TemporalElements in the Extensive Quantum; The Quantum is theExtensive Region; Coordinate Divisibility; Subjective Unity

SECTION

Indivisible; Subjective Forms Arise from Subjective Aim;World as a Medium, Extensively Divisible; Indecision as toSelected Quantum.II. Coordinate Divisions and Feelings; Mental Pole IncurablyOne; Subjective Forms of Coordinate Divisions Depend onMental Pole, Inexplicable Otherwise; A Coordinate Divisionis a Contrast, a Proposition, False, but Useful Matrix.

III. Coordinate Division, the World as an Indefinite Multiplicity;

Extensive Order, Routes of Transmission; External Exten-sive Relationships, Internal Extensive Division, One BasicScheme; Pseudo Sub-organisms, Pseudo Super-organisms,Professor de Laguna's 'Extensive Connection/

IV. Extensive Connection is the Systematic Scheme Underlying

Transmission of Feelings and Perspective; Regulative Con-ditions; Descartes; Grades of Extensive Conditions, Dimen-sions.V. Bifurcation of Nature; Publicity and Privacy.VI. Classification of Eternal Objects; Mathematical Forms, Sensa.VII. Elimination of the Experient Subject, Concrescent Immediacy.

Chapter II. Extensive Connection 294

I. Extensive Connection, General Description.II. Assumptions, i.e., Postulates, i.e.,* Axioms and Propositionsfor a Deductive System.

III. Extensive Abstraction. Geometrical Elements, Points, Seg-

ments.

IV. Points, Regions, Loci; Irrelevance of Dimensions.

Chapter III. Flat Loci 302

I. Euclid's Definition of 'Straight Line/

II. Weakness of Euclidean Definition; Straight Line as ShortestDistance, Dependence on Measurement; New Definition ofStraight Lines, Ovals.

III. Definition of Straight Lines, Flat Loci, Dimensions.

IV. Contiguity.

V. Recapitulation.

Chapter IV. Strains 310

I. Definition of a Strain, Feelings Involving Flat Loci among theForms of Definiteness of Their Objective Data; 'Seat' of a

SECTION

Strain; Strains and Physical Behaviour; ElectromagneticOccasions Involve Strains.II. Presentational Immediacy Involves Strains; Withness of theBody, Projection, Focal Region; Transmission of BodilyStrains, Transmutation, Ultimate Percipient, Emphasis; Pro-jection of the Sensa, Causal Efficacy Transmuted in Pre-sentational Immediacy; Massive Simplification; Types ofEnergy; Hume; Symbolic Transference, Physical Purpose.

III. Elimination of Irrelevancies, Massive Attention to Systematic

Order; Design of Contrasts; Importance of ContemporaryIndependence; Advantage to Enduring Objects.

IV. Structural Systems, Discarding Individual Variations; Physi-

cal Matter Involves Strain-Loci.V. The Various Loci Involved :t Causal Past, Causal Future, Con-temporaries, Durations, Part of a Duration, Future of aDuration, Presented Duration, Strain-Locus.

Chapter V. Measurement 322

I. Identification of Strain-Loci with Durations only Approximate;Definitions Compared; Seat of Strain, Projectors; Strain-Loci and Presentational Immediacy.II. Strain-Locus Wholly Determined by Experient; Seat and Pro-jectors Determine Focal Region; Animal Body Sole Agentin the Determination; Vivid Display of Real Potentiality ofContemporary World; New Definition of Straight LinesExplains this Doctrine; Ways of Speech, Interpretation ofDirect Observation; Descartes' Inspectio. Realitas Objective,Judicium.

III. Modern Doctrine of Private Psychological Fields; Secondary

Qualities, Sensa; Abandons Descartes' Realitas Objectiva;Difficulties for Scientific Theory, AH Observation in Pri-vate Psychological Fields; Illustration, Hume; Conclusion,Mathematical Form, Presentational Immediacy in oneSense Barren, in Another Sense has Overwhelming Signifi-cance.

IV. Measurement Depends on Counting and on Permanence;

What Counted, What Permanent; Yard-Measure Perma-nent, Straight; Infinitesimals no Explanation; Approximationto Straightness, Thus Straightness Presupposed; InchesCounted, Non-Coincident; Modern Doctrine is Possibility ofCoincidence, Doctrine Criticized; Coincidence is Test ofCongruence, Not Meaning; Use of Instrument Presupposes

xxx Contents

section

Its Self-Congruence: Finally all Measurement Depends onDirect Intuition of Permanence of Untested Instrument;Theory of Private Psychological Fields Makes ScientificMeasurement Nonsense.V. Meaning of Congruence in Terms of Geometry of StraightLines; Systems of Geometry; Sets of Axioms: EquivalentSets, Incompatible Sets; Three Important Geometries :t El-liptic Geometry, Euclidean Geometry, Hyperbolic Geome-try; Two Definitions of a Plane; Characteristic Distinctionbetween the Three Geometries; Congruence Depends onSystematic Geometry.VI. Physical Measurement, Least Action, Presupposes GeometricalMeasurement; Disturbed by Individual Peculiarities; Phys-ical Measurement Expressible in Terms of DifferentialGeometry; Summary of Whole Argument.

PART VFINAL INTERPRETATION

Chapter I. The Ideal Opposites 337

I. Danger to Philosophy is Narrowness of Selection; Variety ofOpposites :t Puritan Self-Restraint and Aesthetic Joy, Sor-row and Joy; Religious Fervour and Sceptical Criticism,Intuition and Reason.II. Permanence and Flux, Time and Eternity.

III. Order as Condition for Excellence, Order as Stifling Excel-

lence; Tedium, Order Entering upon Novelty is Required;Dominant Living Occasion is Organ of Novelty for AnimalBody.

IV. Paradox:! Craving for Novelty, Terror at Loss; Final Religious

Problem; Ultimate Evil is Time as 'Perpetually Perishing';Final Opposites :t Joy and Sorrow, Good and Evil, Disjunc-tion and Conjunction, Flux and Permanence, Greatness andTriviality, Freedom and Necessity, God and the World;These Pairs Given in Direct Intuition, except the Last PairWhich is Interpretive.

Chapter II. God and the World 342

I. Permanence and Fiux, God as Unmoved Mover; Conceptionsof God:t Imperial Ruler, Moral Energy, Philosophical Prin-ciple.II. Another Speaker to Hume's Dialogues Concerningf Natural

Contents xxxi

SECTION

Religion; Primordial Nature Deficiently Actual, NeitherLove nor Hatred for Actualities, Quotation from Aristotle.

III. God's Nature Dipolar, Conceptual and Physical; This Physical

Nature Derived from the World; Two Natures Compared.

IV. God's Consequent Nature, Creative Advance Retaining Uni-

son of Immediacy, Everlastingness; Further Analysis, Ten-derness, Wisdom, Patience; Poet of the World, Vision ofTruth, Beauty, Goodness.V. Permanence and Flux, Relation of God to the World; Groupof Antitheses: God and the World Each the Instrument ofNovelty for the Other.VI. Universe Attaining Self-Expression of Its Opposites.VII. God as the Kingdom of Heaven; Objective Immortality At-taining Everlastingness, Reconciliation of Immediacy withObjective Immortality.

Index 353

Editors7 Notes 389

PARTITHE SPECULATIVE SCHEME

CHAPTER ISPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY

SECTION I

[4] This course of lectures is designed as an essay in Speculative Philos-ophy. Its first task must be to define 'speculative philosophy/ and to de-fend it as a method productive of important knowledge.

Speculative Philosophy is the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical,necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of ourexperience can be interpreted. By this notion of 'interpretation' I meanthat everything of which we are conscious, as enjoyed, perceived, willed,or thought, shall have the character of a particular instance of the generalscheme. Thus the philosophical scheme should be coherent, logical, and,in respect to its interpretation, applicable and adequate. Here 'applicable'means that some items of experience are thus interpretable, and 'ade-quate' means that there are no items incapable of such interpretation.

[5] 'Coherence,' as here employed, means that the fundamental ideas, interms of which the scheme is developed, presuppose each other so that inisolation they are meaningless. This requirement does not mean that theyare definable in terms of each other; it means that what is indefinable inone such notion cannot be abstracted from its relevance to the othernotions. It is the ideal of speculative philosophy that its fundamental no-tions shall not seem capable of abstraction from each other. In other words,it is presupposed that no entity can be conceived in complete abstractionfrom the system of the universe, and that it is the business of speculativephilosophy to exhibit this truth. This character is its coherence.

The term 'logical' has its ordinary meaning, including 'logical' con-sistency, or lack of contradiction, the definition of constructs in logicalterms, the exemplification of general logical notions in specific instances,and the principles of inference. It will be observed that logical notions mustthemselves find their places in the scheme of philosophic notions.

It will also be noticed that this ideal of speculative philosophy has itsrational side and its empirical side. The rational side is expressed by theterms 'coherent' and 'logical/ The empirical side is expressed by the terms'applicable' and 'adequate.' But the two sides are bound together byclearing away an ambiguity which remains in the previous explanation ofthe term 'adequate.' The adequacy of the scheme over every item does notmean adequacy over such items as happen to have been considered. It

means that the texture of observed experience, as illustrating the philo-sophic scheme, is such that all related experience must exhibit the sametexture. Thus the philosophic scheme should be 'necessary/ in the sense ofbearing in itself its own warrant of universality throughout all experience,provided that we confine ourselves to that which communicates with im-mediate matter of fact. But what does not so communicate is [6] unknow-able, and the unknowable is unknown;x and so this universality defined by'communication' can suffice.

This doctrine of necessity in universality means that there is an essenceto the universe which forbids relationships beyond itself, as a violation ofits rationality. Speculative philosophy seeks that essence.

SECTION II

Philosophers can never hope finally to formulate these metaphysicalfirst principles. Weakness of insight and deficiencies of language stand inthe way inexorably. Words and phrases must be stretched towards a gen-erality foreign to their ordinary usage; and however such elements of lan-guage be stabilized as technicalities, they remain metaphors mutely ap-pealing for an imaginative leap.

There is no first principle which is in itself unknowable, not to be cap-tured by a flash of insight. But, putting aside the difficulties of language,deficiency in imaginative penetration forbids progress in any form otherthat that of an asymptotic approach to a scheme of principles, only de-finable in terms of the ideal which they should satisfy.

The difficulty has its seat in the empirical side of philosophy. Our datumis the actual world, including ourselves; and this actual world spreads itselffor observation in the guise of the topic of our immediate experience. Theelucidation of immediate experience is the sole justification for anythought; and the starting-point* for thought is the analytic observation ofcomponents of this experience. But we are not conscious of any clear-cutcomplete analysis of immediate experience, in terms of the various detailswhich comprise its definiteness. We habitually observe by the method of -~difference. Sometimes we see an elephant, and sometimes we do not. Theresult is that an elephant, when present, is noticed. [7] Facility of observa-tion depends on the fact that the object observed is important whenpresent, and sometimes is absent. ^

The metaphysical first principles can never fail of exemplification. Wecan never catch the actual world taking a holiday from their sway. Thus,for the discovery of metaphysics, the method of pinning down thought tothe strict systematization of detailed discrimination, already effected byantecedent observation, breaks down. This collapse of the method of rigidempiricism is not confined to metaphysics. It occurs whenever we seek the

1 This doctrine is a paradox. Indulging in a species of false modesty, 'cautious'philosophers undertake its definition.

larger generalities. In natural science this rigid method is the Baconianmethod of induction, a method which, if consistently pursued, would haveleft science where it found it. What Bacon omitted was the play of afree imagination, controlled by the requirements of coherence and logic.The true method of discovery is like the flight of an aeroplane. It startsfrom the ground of particular observation; it makes a flight in the thin airof imaginative generalization; and it again lands for renewed observationrendered acute by rational interpretation. The reason for the success ofthis method of imaginative rationalization is that, when the method ofdifference fails, factors which are constantly present may yet be observedunder the influence of imaginative thought. Such thought supplies thedifferences which the direct observation lacks. It can even play with in-consistency; and can thus throw light on the consistent, and persistent,elements in experience by comparison with what in imagination is incon-sistent with them. The negative judgment is the peak of mentality. Butthe conditions for the success of imaginative construction must be rigidlyadhered to. In the first place, this construction must have its origin in thegeneralization of particular factors discerned in particular topics of humaninterest; for example, in physics, or in physiology, or in psychology, or inaesthetics, or in ethical beliefs, or in sociology, or in languages conceivedas storehouses of human experience. In [8] this way the prime requisite, thatanyhow there shall be some important application, is secured. The successof the imaginative experiment is always to be tested by the applicabilityof its results beyond the restricted locus from which it originated. In de-fault of such extended application, a generalization started from physics,for example, remains merely an alternative expression of notions appli-cable to physics. The partially successful philosophic generalization will,if derived from physics, find applications in fields of experience beyondphysics. It will enlighten observation in those remote fields, so that gen-eral principles can be discerned as in process of illustration, which inthe absence of the imaginative generalization are obscured by their per-sistent exemplification.

Thus the first requisite is to proceed by the method of generalizationso that certainly there is some application; and the test of some successis application beyond the immediate origin. In other words, some synop-tic vision has been gained.

In this description of philosophic method, the term 'philosophic gen-eralization' has meant 'the utilization of specific notions, applying to arestricted group of facts, for the divination of the generic notions whichapply to all facts/

In its use of this method natural science has shown a curious mixtureof rationalism and irrationalism. Its prevalent tone of thought has beenardently rationalistic within its own borders, and dogmatically irrationalbeyond those borders. In practice such an attitude tends to become a dog-matic denial that there are any factors in the world not fully expressible

in terms of its own primary notions devoid of further generalization. Sucha denial is the self-denial of thought.

The second condition for the success of imaginative construction is un-flinching pursuit of the two rationalistic ideals, coherence and logical per-fection.

Logical perfection does not here require any detailed [9] explanation. Anexample of its importance is afforded by the role of mathematics in the re-stricted field of natural science. The history of mathematics exhibits thegeneralization of special notions observed in particular instances. In anybranches of mathematics, the notions presuppose each other. It is a re-markable characteristic of the history of thought that branches of math-ematics,! developed under the pure imaginative impulse, thus controlled,finally receive their important application. Time may be wanted. Conicsections had to wait for eighteen hundred years. In more recent years, thetheory of probability, the theory of tensors, the theory of matrices arecases in point.

The requirement of coherence is the great preservative of rationalisticsanity. But the validity of its criticism is not always admitted. If we con-sider philosophical controversies, we shall find that disputants tend to re-quire coherence from their adversaries, and to grant dispensations to them-selves. It has been remarked that a system of philosophy is never refuted;it is only abandoned. The reason is that logical contradictions, except astemporary slips of the mind—plentiful, though temporary—are the mostgratuitous of errors; and usually they are trivial. Thus, after criticism, sys-tems do not exhibit mere illogicalities. They suffer from inadequacy andincoherence. Failure to include some obvious elements of experience inthe scope of the system is met by boldly denying the facts. Also while aphilosophical system retains any charm of novelty, it enjoys a plenaryindulgence for its failures in coherence. But after a system has acquiredorthodoxy, and is taught with authority, it receives a sharper criticism.Its denials and its incoherences are found intolerable, and a reaction setsin.

Incoherence is the arbitrary disconnection of first principles. In modernphilosophy Descartes' two kinds of substance, corporeal and mental, illus-trate incoherence. There is, in Descartes7 philosophy, no reason why thereshould not be a one-substance world, only corporeal, or [10] a one-substanceworld, only mental. According to Descartes, a substantial individual 're-quires nothing but itself in order to exist/ Thus this system makes a virtueof its incoherence. But,t on the other hand, the facts seem connected, whileDescartes' system does not; for example, in the treatment of the body-mind problem. The Cartesian system obviously says something that istrue. But its notions are too abstract to penetrate into the nature of things.

tThe attraction of Spinoza's philosophy lies in its modification of Des-cartes' position into greater coherence. He starts with one substance,

causa sui, and considers its essential attributes and its individualized modes,i.e., the 'affectiones substantial The gap in the system is the arbitrary in-troduction of the 'modes/ And yet, a multiplicity of modes is a fixedrequisite, if the scheme is to retain any direct relevance to the many oc-casions in the experienced world.

The philosophy of organism is closely allied to Spinoza's scheme ofthought. But it differs by the abandonment of the subject-predicate formsof thought, so far as concerns the presupposition that this form is a directembodiment of the most ultimate characterization of fact. The result isthat the 'substance-quality' concept is avoided; and that morphologicaldescription is replaced by description of dynamic process. Also Spinoza's'modes' now become the sheer actualities; so that, though analysis of themincreases our understanding, it does not lead us to the discovery of anyhigher grade of reality. The coherence, which the system seeks to preserve,is the discovery that the process, or concrescence, of any one actual entityinvolves the other actual entities among its components. In this way theobvious solidarity of the world receives its explanation.

In all philosophic theory there is an ultimate which is actual in virtueof its accidents. It is only then capable of characterization through itsaccidental"embodiments, and apart from these accidents is devoid of [11]actuality. In the philosophy of organism this ultimate is termed 'creativity';and God is its primordial, non-temporal accident.* In monistic philoso-phies, Spinoza's or absolute idealism, this ultimate is God, who is alsoequivalently termed 'The Absolute.' In such monistic schemes, the ulti-mate is illegitimately allowed a final, 'eminent' reality, beyond that ascribedto any of its accidents. In this general position the philosophy of organ-ism seems to approximate more to some strains of Indian, or Chinese,thought, than to western Asiatic, or European, thought. One side makesprocess ultimate; the other side makes fact ultimate.

SECTION Hit

In its turn every philosophy will suffer a deposition. But the bundleof philosophic systems expresses a variety of general truths about theuniverse, awaiting coordination and assignment of their various spheresof validity. Such progress in coordination is provided by the advance ofphilosophy; and in this sense philosophy has advanced from Plato onwards.According to this account of the achievement of rationalism, the chieferror in philosophy is overstatement. The aim at generalization is sound,but the estimate of success is exaggerated. There are two main forms ofsuch overstatement. One form is what I have termed,f elsewhere,2 the'fallacy of misplaced concreteness.7 This fallacy consists in neglecting thedegree of abstraction involved when an actual entity is considered merely

2 Cf. Science and the Modem World, Ch. III.

so far as it exemplifies certain categories of thought. There are aspects ofactualities which are simply ignored so long as we restrict thought to thesecategories. Thus the success of a philosophy is to be measured by its com-parative avoidance of this fallacy, when thought is restricted within itscategories.

The other form of overstatement consists in a false estimate of logicalprocedure in respect to certainty, and in respect to premises. Philosophyhas been haunted by the unfortunate notion that its method is dogmati-cally to indicate premises which are severally clear, distinct, and [12] cer-tain; and to erect upon those premises a deductive system of thought.

But the accurate expression of the final generalities is the goal of dis-—cussion and not its origin. Philosophy has been misled by the example ofmathematics; and even in mathematics the statement of the ultimatelogical principles is beset with difficulties, as yet insuperable.3 The verifi-cation of a rationalistic scheme is to be sought in its general success, andnot in the peculiar certainty, or initial clarity, of its first principles. Inthis connection the misuse of the ex absurdo argument has to be noted;much philosophical reasoning is vitiated by it. The only logical conclusionto be drawn, when a contradiction issues from a train of reasoning, is thatat least one of the premises involved in the inference is false. It is rashlyassumed without further question that the peccant premise can at oncebe located. In mathematics this assumption is often justified, and phi-losophers have been thereby misled. But in the absence of a well-definedcategoreal scheme of entities, issuing in a satisfactory metaphysical system,every premise in a philosophical argument is under suspicion.

Philosophy will not regain its proper status until the gradual elaborationof categoreal schemes, definitely stated at each stage of progress, is recog-nized as its proper objective. There may be rival schemes, inconsistentamong themselves; each with its own merits and its own failures. It willthen be the purpose of research to conciliate the differences. Metaphysicalcategories are not dogmatic statements of the obvious; they are tentativeformulations of the ultimate generalities.

If we consider any scheme of philosophic categories as one complexassertion, and apply to it the logician's alternative, true or false, the answermust be that the scheme is false. The same answer must be given to a likeques- [13] tion respecting the existing formulated principles of any science.

The scheme is true with unformulated qualifications, exceptions, limita-tions, and new interpretations in terms of more general notions. We donot yet know how to recast the scheme into a logical truth. But the schemeis a matrix from which true propositions applicable to particular circum-stances can be derived. We can at present only trust our trained instincts

3 Cf. Principia Mathematica, by Bertrand Russell and A. N. Whitehead, Vol.I, Introduction and Introduction to the Second Edition. These introductorydiscussions are practically due to Russell, and in the second edition wholly so.

as to the discrimination of the circumstances in respect to which thescheme is valid.

The use of such a matrix is to argue from it boldly and with rigid logic.The scheme should therefore be stated with the utmost precision anddefiniteness, to allow of such argumentation. The conclusion of the argu-ment should then be confronted with circumstances to which it shouldapply.

The primary advantage thus gained is that experience is not interrogatedwith the benumbing repression of common sense. The observation acquiresan enhanced penetration by reason of the expectation evoked by the con-clusion of the argument. The outcome from this procedure takes one ofthree forms: (i) the conclusion may agree with the observed facts; (ii) theconclusion may exhibit general agreement, with disagreement in detail;(iii) the conclusion may be in complete disagreement witht the facts.

In the first case, the facts are known with more adequacy and the ap-plicability of the system to the world has been elucidated. In the secondcase, criticisms of the observation of the facts and of the details of thescheme are both required. The history of thought shows that false inter-pretations of observed facts enter into the records of their observation.Thus both theory, and received notions as to fact, are in doubt. In thethird case, a fundamental reorganization of theory is required either byway of limiting it to some special province, or by way of entire abandon-ment of its main categories of thought.

[14] After the initial basis of a rational life, with a civilized language, hasbeen laid, all productive thought has proceeded either by the poetic insightof artists, or by the imaginative elaboration of schemes of thought capableof utilization as logical premises. In some measure or other, progress isalways a transcendence of what is obvious.

Rationalism never shakes off its status of an experimental adventure.The combined influences of mathematics and religion, which have sogreatly contributed to the rise of philosophy, have also had the unfortunateeffect of yoking it with static dogmatism. Rationalism is an adventure inthe clarification of thought, progressive and never final. But it is an ad-venture in which even partial success has importance.

SECTION IV

The field of a special science is confined to one genus of facts, in thesense that no statements are made respecting facts which lie outside thatgenus. The very circumstance that a science has naturally arisen concerninga set of facts secures that facts of that type have definite relations amongthemselves which are very obvious to all mankind. The common obvious-ness of things arises when their explicit apprehension carries immediateimportance for purposes of survival, or of enjoyment—that is to say, forpurposes of 'being' and of 'well-being/ Elements in human experience,

singled out in this way, are those elements concerning which language iscopious and. within its limits, precise. The special sciences, therefore, dealwith topics which lie open to easy inspection and are readily expressed bywords.

The study of philosophy is a voyage towards the larger generalities.For this reason in the infancy of science, when the main stress lay in thediscovery of the most general ideas usefully applicable to the subject-matter in question, philosophy was not sharply distinguished from science.To this day, a new science with any substantial novelty in its notions isconsidered to be in some way [15] peculiarly philosophical. In their laterstages, apart from occasional disturbances, most sciences accept withoutquestion the general notions in terms of which they develop. The mainstress is laid on the adjustment and the direct verification of more specialstatements. In such periods scientists repudiate philosophy; Newton, justlysatisfied with his physical principles, disclaimed metaphysics.

The fate of Newtonian physics warns us that there is a development inscientific first principles, and that their original forms can only be savedby interpretations of meaning and limitations of their field of application-interpretations and limitations unsuspected during the first period ofsuccessful employment. One chapter in the history of culture is concernedwith the growth of generalities. In such a chapter it is seen that the oldergeneralities, like the older hills, are worn down and diminished in height,surpassed by younger rivals.

Thus one aim of philosophy is to challenge the half-truths constitutingthe scientific first principles. The systematization of knowledge cannot beconducted in watertight compartments. All general truths condition eachother; and the limits of their application cannot be adequately definedapart from their correlation by yet wider generalities. The criticism ofprinciples must chiefly take the form of determining the proper meaningsto be assigned to the fundamental notions of the various sciences, whenthese notions are considered in respect to their status relatively to eachother. The determination of this status requires a generality transcendingany special subject-matter.

If we may trust the Pythagorean tradition, the rise of European philoso-phy was largely promoted by the development of mathematics into ascience of abstract generality. But in its subsequent development themethod of philosophy has also been vitiated by the example of mathe-matics. The primary method of mathematics is deduction; the primarymethod of philosophy is descrip- \16] tive generalization. Under the in-fluence of mathematics, deduction has been foisted onto philosophy as itsstandard method, instead of taking its true place as an essential auxiliarymode of verification whereby to test the scope of generalities. This mis-apprehension of philosophic method has veiled the very considerable suc-cess of philosophy in providing generic notions which add lucidity to ourapprehension of the facts of experience. The depositions of Plato, Aristotle,

Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz,t Locke, Berkeley, Hume,Kant, Hegel, merely mean that ideas which these men introduced into thephilosophic tradition must be construed with limitations, adaptations, andinversions, either unknown to them, or even explicitly repudiated by them.A new idea introduces a new alternative; and we are not less indebted toa thinker when we adopt the alternative which he discarded. Philosophynever reverts to its old position after the shock of a great philosopher.

SECTION V

Every science must devise its own instruments. The tool required forphilosophy is language. Thus philosophy redesigns language in the sameway that, in a physical science, pre-existing appliances are redesigned. Itis exactly at this point that the appeal to facts is a difficult operation. Thisappeal is not solely to the expression of the facts in current verbal state-ments. The adequacy of such sentences is the main question at issue. Itis true that the general agreement of mankind as to experienced facts isbest expressed in language. But the language of literature breaks downprecisely at the task of expressing in explicit form the larger generalities—the very generalities which metaphysics seeks to express.

The point is that every proposition refers to a universe exhibiting somegeneral systematic metaphysical character. Apart from this background,the separate entities which go to form the proposition, and the propositionas a whole, are without determinate character. Nothing [17] has been de-fined, because every definite entity requires a systematic universe to supplyits requisite status. Thus every proposition proposing a fact* must, in itscomplete analysis, propose the general character of the universe requiredfor that fact. There are no self-sustained facts, floating in nonentity. Thisdoctrine, of the impossibility of tearing a proposition from its systematiccontext in the actual world, is a direct consequence of the fourth and thetwentieth of the fundamental categoreal explanations which we shall beengaged in expanding and illustrating. A proposition can embody partialtruth because it only demands a certain type of systematic environment,which is presupposed in its meaning. It does not refer to the universe inall its detail.

One practical aim of metaphysics is the accurate analysis of propositions;not merely of metaphysical propositions, but of quite ordinary propositionssuch as There is beef for dinner today/ and 'Socrates is mortal/ The onegenus of facts which constitutes the field of some special science requiressome common metaphysical presupposition respecting the universe. It ismerely credulous to accept verbal phrases as adequate statements ofpropositions. The distinction between verbal phrases and complete propo-sitions is one of the reasons why the logicians" rigid alternative, 'true orfalse," is so largely irrelevant for the pursuit of knowledge.

The excessive trust in linguistic phrases has been the well-known reasonvitiating so much of the philosophy and physics among the Greeks andamong the mediaeval thinkers who continued the Greek traditions. Forexample John Stuart Mill writes:They [the Greeks] t had great difficulty in distinguishing betweenthings which their language confounded, or in putting mentally to-gether things which it distinguished,* and could hardly combine theobjects in nature into any classes but those which were made forthem by the popular phrases of their own country; or at least couldnot help fancying those classes to be natural, and all others arbitraryand artificial. Ac- [18] cordingly, scientific investigation among theGreek schools of speculation and their followers in the Middle Ages,was little more than a mere sifting and analysing of the notions at-tached to common language. They thought that by determining themeaning of words they could become acquainted with facts.4Mill then proceeds to quote from Whewell5 a paragraph illustrating thesame weakness of Greek thought.

But neither Mill, nor Whewell, tracks this difficulty about languagedown to its sources. They both presuppose that language does enunciatewell-defined propositions. This is quite untrue. Language is thoroughly in-determinate, by reason of the fact that every occurrence presupposes somesystematic type of environment.

For example, the word 'Socrates/ referring to the philosopher, in onesentence may stand for an entity presupposing a more closely defined back-ground than the word 'Socrates/ with the same reference, in another sen-tence. The word 'mortal' affords an analogous possibility. A precise lan-guage must await a completed metaphysical knowledge.

The technical language of philosophy represents attempts of variousschools of thought to obtain explicit expression of general ideas pre-supposed by the facts of experience. It follows that any novelty in meta-physical doctrines exhibits some measure of disagreement with statementsof the facts to be found in current philosophical literature. The extent ofdisagreement measures the extent of metaphysical divergence. It is, there-fore, no valid criticism on one metaphysical school to point out that itsdoctrines do not follow from the verbal expression of the facts acceptedby another school. The whole contention is that the doctrines in questionsupply a closer approach to fully expressed propositions.

The truth itself is nothing else than how the composite natures of theorganic actualities of the world obtain ade- [19] quate representation in thedivine nature. Such representations compose the 'consequent nature7 ofGod, which evolves in its relationship to the evolving world without dero-

* tLogic, Book V, Ch. III.

5 Cf. Whewell's History of the Inductive Sciences.

gation to the eternal completion of its primordial conceptual nature. Inthis way the 'ontological principle' is maintained—since there can be nodeterminate truth, correlating impartially the partial experiences of manyactual entities, apart from one actual entity to which it can be referred.The reaction of the temporal world on the nature of God is consideredsubsequently in Part V: it is there termed 'the consequent nature of God;

Whatever is found in 'practice' must lie within the scope of the meta-physical description. When the description fails to include the 'practice/the metaphysics is inadequate and requires revision. There can be noappeal to practice to supplement metaphysics, so long as we remain con-tented with our metaphysical doctrines. Metaphysics is nothing but thedescription of the generalities which apply to all the details of practice.

No metaphysical system can hope entirely to satisfy these pragmatictests. At the best such a system will remain only an approximation to thegeneral truths which are sought. In particular, there are no precisely statedaxiomatic certainties from which to start. There is not even the languagein which to frame them. The only possible procedure is to start from verbalexpressions which, when taken by themselves with the current meaning oftheir words, are ill-defined and ambiguous. These are not premises to beimmediately reasoned from apart from elucidation by further discussion;they are endeavours to state general principles which will be exemplifiedin the subsequent description of the facts of experience. This subsequentelaboration should elucidate the meanings to be assigned to the wordsand phrases employed. Such meanings are incapable of accurate appre-hension apart from a correspondingly accurate apprehension of the meta-physical background which the [20] universe provides for them. But no lan-guage can be anything but elliptical, requiring a leap of the imagination tounderstand its meaning in its relevance to immediate experience. The posi-tion of metaphysics in the development of culture cannot be understoodwithout remembering that no verbal statement is the adequate expressionof a proposition.

An old established metaphysical system gains a false air of adequateprecision from the fact that its words and phrases have passed into currentliterature. Thus propositions expressed in its language are more easilycorrelated to our flitting intuitions into metaphysical truth. When we trustthese verbal statements and argue as though they adequately analysedmeaning, we are led into difficulties which take the shape of negations ofwhat in practice is presupposed. But when they are proposed as first prin-ciples they assume an unmerited air of sober obviousness. Their defect isthat the true propositions which they do express lose their fundamentalcharacter when subjected to adequate expression. For example considerthe type of propositions such as The grass is green/ and 'The whale isbig/ This subject-predicate form of statement seems so simple, leadingstraight to a metaphysical first principle; and yet in these examples it con-ceals such complex, diverse meanings.

SECTION VI

It has been an objection to speculative philosophy that it is over-ambitious. Rationalism, it is admitted, is the method by which advanceis made within the limits of particular sciences. It is, however, held thatthis limited success must not encourage attempts to frame ambitiousschemes expressive of the general nature of things.

One alleged justification of this criticism is ill-success: European thoughtis represented as littered with metaphysical systems, abandoned and un-reconciled.

Such an assertion tacitly fastens upon philosophy the old dogmatic test.The same criterion would fasten ill- [21] success upon science. We no moreretain the physics of the seventeenth century than we do the Cartesianphilosophy of that century. Yet within limits, both systems express im-portant truths. Also we are beginning to understand the wider categorieswhich define their limits of correct application. Of course, in that century,dogmatic views held sway; so that the validity both of the physical notions,and of the Cartesian notions, was misconceived. Mankind never quiteknows what it is after. When we survey the history of thought, and like-wise the history of practice, we find that one idea after another is tried out,its limitations defined, and its core of truth elicited. In application to theinstinct for the intellectual adventures demanded by particular epochs,there is much truth in Augustine's rhetorical phrase, Securus judicat orbisterrarum. At the very least, men do what they can in the way of system-atization, and in the event achieve something. The proper test is not thatof finality, but of progress.

But the main objection, dating from the sixteenth century and receivingfinal expression from Francis Bacon, is the uselessness of philosophic spec-ulation. The position taken by this objection is that we ought to describedetailed matter of fact, and elicit the laws with a generality strictly limitedto the systcmatization of these described details. General interpretation,it is held, has no bearing upon this procedure; and thus any system of gen-eral interpretation, be it true or false, remains intrinsically barren. Un-fortunately for this objection, there are no brute, self-contained matters offact, capable of being understood apart from interpretation as an elementin a system. Whenever we attempt to express the matter of immediate ex-perience, we find that its understanding leads us beyond itself, to its con-temporaries, to its past, to its future, and to the universals in terms ofwhich its definiteness is exhibited. But such universals, by their very charac-ter of universality, embody the potentiality of other facts with varianttypes of definiteness. Thus [22] the understanding of the immediate brutefact requires its metaphysical interpretation as an item in a world with somesystematic relation to it. When thought comes upon the scene, it findsthe interpretations as matters of practice. Philosophy does not initiateinterpretations. Its search for a rationalistic scheme is the search for more

adequate criticism, and for more adequate justification, of the interpre-tations which we perforce employ. Our habitual experience is a complexof failure and success in the enterprise of interpretation. If we desire arecord of uninterpreted experience, we must ask a stone to record its auto-biography. Every scientific memoir in its record of the 'facts' is shotthrough and through with interpretation. The methodology of rationalinterpretation is the product of the fitful vagueness of consciousness. Ele-ments which shine with immediate distinctness, in some circumstances,retire into penumbral shadow in other circumstances, and into black dark-ness on other occasions. And yet all occasions proclaim themselves as ac-tualities within the flux of a solid world, demanding a unity of interpre-tation.

Philosophy is the self-correction by consciousness of its own initial ex-cess of subjectivity. Each actual occasion contributes to the circumstancesof its origin additional formative elements deepening its own peculiarindividuality. Consciousness is only the last and greatest of such elementsby which the selective character of the individual obscures the externaltotality from which it originates and which it embodies. An actual in-dividual, of such higher grade, has truck with the totality of things byreason of its sheer actuality; but it has attained its individual depth of beingby a selective emphasis limited to its own purposes. The task of philosophyis to recover the totality obscured by the selection. It replaces in rationalexperience what has been submerged in the higher sensitive experienceand has been sunk yet deeper by the initial operations of consciousnessitself. The selectiveness of individual experience is moral so far as it con-[23] forms to the balance of importance disclosed in the rational vision; andconversely the conversion of the intellectual insight into an emotional forcecorrects the sensitive experience in the direction of morality. The correc-tion is in proportion to the rationality of the insight.

Morality of outlook is inseparably conjoined with generality of outlook.The antithesis between the general good and the individual interest can beabolished only when the individual is such that its interest is the generalgood, thus exemplifying the loss of the minor intensities in order to findthem again with finer composition in a wider sweep of interest.

Philosophy frees itself from the taint of ineffectiveness by its close rela-tions with religion and with science, natural and sociological. It attains itschief importance by fusing the two, namely, religion and science, into onerational scheme of thought. Religion should connect the rational gen-erality of philosophy with the emotions and purposes springing out ofexistence in a particular society, in a particular epoch, and conditioned byparticular antecedents. Religion is the translation of general ideas intoparticular thoughts, particular emotions, and particular purposes; it is di-rected to the end of stretching individual interest beyond its self-defeatingparticularity. Philosophy finds religion, and modifies it; and converselyreligion is among the data of experience which philosophy must weave into

16 The Speculative Scheme

its own scheme. Religion is an ultimate craving to infuse into the insistentparticularity of emotion that non-temporal generality which primarily be-longs to conceptual thought alone. In the higher organisms the differencesof tempo between the mere emotions and the conceptual experiences pro-duce a life-tedium, unless this supreme fusion has been effected. The twosides of the organism require a reconciliation in which emotional experi-ences illustrate a conceptual justification, and conceptual experiences findan emotional illustration.

[24] This demand for an intellectual justification of brute experience hasalso been the motive power in the advance of European science. In thissense scientific interest is only a variant form of religious interest. Any sur-vey of the scientific devotion to 'truth/ as an ideal, will confirm this state-ment. There is, however, a grave divergence between science and religionin respect to the phases of individual experience with which they are con-cerned. Religion is centered upon the harmony of rational thought withthe sensitive reaction to the percepta from which experience originates.Science is concerned with the harmony of rational thought with the per-cepta themselves. When science deals with emotions, the emotions inquestion are percepta and not immediate passions—other people's emotionand not our own: at least our own in recollection, and not in immediacy.Religion deals with the formation of the experiencing subject; whereasscience deals with the objects, which are the data forming the primaryphase in this experience. The subject originates from, and amid, givenconditions; science conciliates thought with this primary matter of fact;and religion conciliates the thought involved in the process with the sensi-tive reaction involved in that same process. The process is nothing elsethan the experiencing subject itself. In this explanation it is presumed thatan experiencing subject is one occasion of sensitive reaction to an actualworld. Science finds religious experiences among its percepta; and religionfinds scientific concepts among the conceptual experiences to be fused withparticular sensitive reactions.

The conclusion of this discussion is, first, the assertion of the old doctrinethat breadth of thought reacting with intensity of sensitive experiencestands out as an ultimate claim of existence; secondly, the assertion thatempirically the development of self-justifying thoughts has been achievedby the complex process of generalizing! from particular topics, of imagi-natively schematizing the generalizations, and finally by renewed compari-son [25] of the imagined scheme with the direct experience to which itshould apply.

There is no justification for checking generalization at any particularstage. Each phase of generalization exhibits its own peculiar simplicitieswhich stand out just at that stage, and at no other stage. There are sim-plicities connected with the motion of a bar of steel which are obscuredif we refuse to abstract from the individual molecules; and there are certainsimplicities concerning the behaviour of men which are obscured if we

Speculative Philosophy 17

refuse to abstract from the individual peculiarities of particular specimens.In the same way. there are certain general truths, about the actual thingsin the common world of activity, which will be obscured when attentionis confined to some particular detailed mode of considering them. Thesegeneral truths, involved in the meaning of every particular notion respect-ing the actions of things, are the subject-matter* for speculative philosophy.

Philosophy destroys its usefulness when it indulges in brilliant feats ofexplaining away. It is then trespassing with the wrong equipment uponthe field of particular sciences. Its ultimate appeal is to the general con-sciousness of what in practice we experience. Whatever thread of presup-position characterizes social expression throughout the various epochs ofrational societyt must find its place in philosophic theory. Speculative bold-ness must be balanced by complete humility before logic, and before fact.It is a disease of philosophy when it is neither bold nor humble, butmerely a reflection of the temperamental presuppositions of exceptionalpersonalities.

Analogously, we do not trust any recasting of scientific theory depend-ing upon a single performance of an aberrant experiment, unrepeated. Theultimate test is always widespread, recurrent experience; and the moregeneral the rationalistic scheme, the more important is this final appeal.

The useful function of philosophy is to promote the [26] most generalsystematization of civilized thought. There is a constant reaction betweenspecialism and common sense. It is the part of the special sciences tomodify common sense. Philosophy is the welding of imagination and com-mon sense into a restraint upon specialists, and also into an enlargementof their imaginations. By providing the generic notions philosophy shouldmake it easier to conceive the infinite variety of specific instances whichrest unrealized in the womb of nature.

CHAPTER IITHE CATEGOREAL SCHEME i

SECTION I

[27] This chapter contains an anticipatory sketch of the primary notionswhich constitute the philosophy of organism. The whole of the subsequentdiscussion in these lectures has the purpose of rendering this summaryintelligible, and of showing that it embodies generic notions inevitablypresupposed in our reflective experience—presupposed, but rarely expressedin explicit distinction. Four notions may be singled out from this sum-mary, by reason of the fact that they involve some divergence fromantecedent philosophical thought. These notions are, that of an 'actualentity/ that of a 'prehension,' that of a 'nexus/ and that of the 'ontologicalprinciple/ Philosophical thought has made for itself difficulties by dealingexclusively in very abstract notions, such as those of mere awareness, mereprivate sensation, mere emotion, mere purpose, mere appearance, merecausation. These are the ghosts of the old 'faculties/ banished frompsychology, but still haunting metaphysics. There can be no 'mere' to-getherness of such abstractions. The result is that philosophical discussionis enmeshed in the fallacy of 'misplaced concreteness.'x In the three no-tions—actual entity, prehension, nexus—an endeavour has been made tobase philosophical thought upon the most concrete elements in our ex-perience.

'Actual entities'-also termed 'actual occasions'—are the final real things -of which the world is made up. There is no going behind actual entitiesto find anything \28] more real. They differ among themselves: God is anactual entity, and so is the most trivial puff of existence in far-off emptyspace. But, though there are gradations of importance, and diversities offunction, yet in the principles which actuality exemplifies all are on thesame level. The final facts are, all alike, actual entities; and these actualentities are drops of experience, coi iplex and interdependent.

In its recurrence to the notion oi a plurality of actual entities the phi-losophy of organism is through and through Cartesian.t The 'ontologicalprinciple' broadens and extends a general principle laid down by JohnLocke in his Essay (Bk. II, Ch. XXIII, Sect. 7),t when he asserts that"power" is "c? great part of our complex ideas of substances "\ The notion

1 Cf. my Science and the Modern World, Ch. III.18

of 'substance' is transformed into that of 'actual entity'; and the notionof 'power' is transformed into the principle that the reasons for things arealways to be found in the composite nature of definite actual entities—in the nature of God for reasons of the highest absoluteness, and in thenature of definite temporal actual entities for reasons which refer to aparticular environment. The ontological principle can be summarized as:no actual entity, then no reason.

Each actual entity is analysable in an indefinite number of ways. Insome modes of analysis the component elements are more abstract thanin other modes of analysis. The analysis of an actual entity into 'pre-hensions' is that mode of analysis which exhibits the most concrete ele-ments in the nature of actual entities. This mode of analysis will be termedthe 'division' of the actual entity in question. Each actual entity is 'divis-ible' in an indefinite number of ways, and each way of 'division' yields itsdefinite quota of prehensions. A prehension reproduces in itself the generalcharacteristics of an actual entitv: it is referent to an external world, andin this sense will be said to have a 'vector character'; it involves emotion,and purpose, and valuation, and causation. In fact, any characteristic ofan actual entity is reproduced [29] in a prehension. It might have been acomplete actuality; but, by reason of a certain incomplete partiality, a pre-hension is only a subordinate element in an actual entity. A reference tothe complete actuality is required to give the reason why such a prehensionis what it is in respect to its subjective form. This subjective form isdetermined by the subjective aim at further integration, so as to obtainthe 'satisfaction' of the completed subject. In other words, final causationand atomism are interconnected philosophical principles.

With the purpose of obtaining a one-substance cosmology, 'prehensions'are a generalization from Descartes' mental 'cogitations,' and fromLocke's 'ideas,' to express the most concrete mode of analysis applicableto every grade of individual actuality. Descartes and Locke maintained atwo-substance ontology—Descartes explicitly, Locke by implication. Des-cartes, the mathematical physicist, emphasized his account of corporealsubstance; and Locke, the physician and the sociologist, confined himselfto an account of mental substance. The philosophy of organism, in itsscheme for one type of actual entities, adopts the view that Locke's ac-count of mental substance embodies, in a very special form, a more pene-trating philosophic description than does Descartes' account of corporealsubstance. Nevertheless, Descartes' account must find its place in thephilosophic scheme. On the whole, this is the moral to be drawn fromthe Monadologyt of Leibniz. His monads are best conceived as generaliza-tions of contemporary notions of mentality. The contemporary notionsof physical bodies only enter into his philosophv subordinately and deriv-atively. The philosophy of organism endeavours to hold the balance moreevenly. But it does start with a generalization of Locke's account of mentaloperations.

Actual entities involve each other by reason of their prehensions of eachother. There are thus real individual facts of the togetherness of actualentities, which are real, individual, and particular, in the same sense in[30] which actual entities and the prehensions are real, individual, and par-ticular. Any such particular fact of togetherness among actual entities iscalled a *nexus? (plural form is written 'nexus'). The ultimate facts of im-mediate actual experience are actual entities, prehensions, and nexus. Allelse is, for our experience, derivative abstraction.

The explanatory purpose of philosophy is often misunderstood. Itsbusiness is to explain the emergence of the more abstract things from themore concrete things. It is a complete mistake to ask how concrete par-ticular fact can be built up out of universals. The answer is, In no way/The true philosophic question 2 is, How can concrete fact exhibit entitiesabstract from itself and yet participated in by its own nature?

In other words, philosophy is explanatory of abstraction, and not ofconcreteness. It is by reason of their instinctive grasp of this ultimate truththat, in spite of much association with arbitrary fancifulness and atavisticmysticism, types of Platonic philosophy retain their abiding appeal; theyseek the forms in the facts. Each fact is more than its forms, and eachform 'participates' throughout the world of facts. The definiteness of factis due to its forms; but the individual fact is a creature, and creativity isthe ultimate behind all forms, inexplicable by forms, and conditioned byits creatures.

SECTION II

The Categories

, I. The Category of the Ultimate.

II. Categories of Existence.

III. Categories of Explanation.

IV. Categoreal Obligations.

It is the purpose of the discussion in these lectures to make clear themeaning of these categories, their appli- [31] cability, and their adequacy.The course of the discussion will disclose how very far they are fromsatisfying this ideal.

Every entity should be a specific instance of one category of existence,every explanation should be a specific instance of categories of explanation,and every obligation should be a specific instance of categoreal obliga-

2 In this connection I may refer to the second chapter of my book The Princi-ple of Relativity, Cambridge University Press, t 1922.

tions. The Category^ of the Ultimate expresses the general principle pre-supposed in the three more special categories.

The Category of the Ultimate

'Creativity/ 'many/ 'one' are the ultimate notions involved in the mean-ing of the synonymous terms 'thing/ 'being/ 'entity/ These three notionscomplete the Category of the Ultimate and are presupposed in all themore special categories.

The term "'one* does not stand for 'the integral number one/ which isa complex special notion. It stands for the general idea underlying alikethe indefinite article 'a or an/ and the definite article 'the/ and the demon-stratives 'this or that/ and the relatives 'which or what or how.7 It standsfor the singularity of an entity. The term 'many' presupposes the term'one/ and the term 'one' presupposes the term 'many/ The term 'many'conveys the notion of 'disjunctive diversity'; this notion is an essential*element in the concept of 'being/ There are many 'beings' in disjunctivediversity.

'Creativity* is the universal of universals characterizing ultimate matterof fact. It is that ultimate principle by which the many, which are the*universe disjunctively, become the one actual occasion, which is the uni-verse conjunctively. It lies in the nature of things that the many enterinto complex unity.

'Creativity' is the principle of novelty. An actual occasion is a novelentity diverse from any entity in the 'many' which it unifies. Thus 'creativ-ity' introduces novelty into the content of the many, which are the [32]universe disjunctively. The 'creative advance' is the application of this ul-timate principle of creativity to each novel situation which it originates.

'Together' is a generic term covering the various special ways in whichvarious sorts of entities are 'together' in any one actual occasion. Thus'together' presupposes the notions 'creativity/ 'many/ 'one/ 'identity' and'diversity/ The ultimate metaphysical principle is the advance from dis-junction to conjunction, creating a novel entity other than the entitiesgiven in disjunction. The novel entity is at once the togetherness of the'many' which it finds, and also it is one among the disjunctive 'many'which it leaves; it is a novel entity, disjunctively among the many entitieswhich it synthesizes. The many become one, and are increased by one.In their natures, entities are disjunctively 'many' in process of passage intoconjunctive unity. This Category of the Ultimate replaces Aristotle'scategory of 'primary substance/

Thus the 'production of novel togetherness' is the ultimate notion em-bodied in the term 'concrescence/ These ultimate notions of 'productionof novelty' and of 'concrete togetherness' are inexplicable either in terms ofhigher universals or in terms of the components participating in the con-

crescence. The analysis of the components abstracts from the concrescence.The sole appeal is to intuition.

The Categories of Existence

There are eight Categories of Existence:

(i) Actual Entities (also termed Actual Occasions), or Final Realities,or Res Verae.

(ii) Prehensions, or Concrete Facts of Relatedness.

(iii) Nexus (plural of Nexus), or Public Matters of Fact.

(iv) Subjective Forms, or Private Matters of Fact.

(v) Eternal Objects, or Pure Potentials for the Specific Determinationof Fact, or Forms of Definiteness.

(vi) Propositions, or Matters of Fact in Potential [33] Determination, orImpure Potentials for the Specific Determination of Matters of Fact, orTheories.

(vii) Multiplicities, or Pure Disjunctions of Diverse Entities.

(viii) Contrasts, or Modes of Synthesis of Entities in one Prehension,or Patterned Entities.t

Among these eight categories of existence, actual entities and eternalobjects stand out with a certain extreme finality. The other types of exis-tence have a certain intermediate character. The eighth category includesan indefinite progression of categories, as we proceed from 'contrasts' to'contrasts of contrasts/ and on indefinitely to higher grades of contrasts.

The Categories of Explanation

There are twenty-seven Categories of Explanation:

(i) That the actual world is a process, and that the process is the be-coming of actual entities. Thus actual entities are creatures; they are alsotermed 'actual occasions/

(ii) That in the becoming of an actual entity, the potential unity ofmany entities in disjunctive diversity*—actual and non-actual—acquiresthe real unity of the one actual entity; so that the actual entity is the realconcrescence of many potentials.

(iii) That in the becoming of an actual entity, novel prehensions, nexus,subjective forms, propositions, multiplicities, and contrasts, also become;but there are no novel eternal objects.

(iv) That the potentiality for being an element in a real concrescence*of many entities into one actuality! is the one general metaphysical char-acter attaching to all entities, actual and non-actual; and that every itemin its universe is involved in each concrescence. In other words, it belongsto the nature of a 'being' that it is a potential for every 'becoming/ Thisis the 'principle of relativity/

(v) That no two actual entities originate from an iden- \34] tical uni-verse; though the difference between the two universes only consists in

some actual entities, included in one and not in the other, and in the sub-ordinate entities which each actual entity introduces into the world. Theeternal objects are the same for all actual entities. The nexus of actualentities in the universe correlate to a concrescencef is termed 'the actualworld' correlate to that concrescence.

(vi) That each entity in the universe of a given concrescence can, so faras its own nature is concerned, be implicated in that concrescence in oneor other of many modes; but in fact it is implicated only in one mode:that the particular mode of implication is only rendered fully determinateby that concrescence, though it is conditioned by the correlate universe.This indetermination, rendered determinate in the real concrescence, isthe meaning of 'potentiality.' It is a conditioned indetermination, and istherefore called a 'real potentiality/

(vii) That an eternal object can be described only in terms of its poten-tiality for 'ingression' into the becoming of actual entities; and that itsanalysis only discloses other eternal objects. It is a pure potential. Theterm 'ingression' refers to the particular mode in which the potentiality ofan eternal object is realized in a particular actual entity, contributing tothe definiteness of that actual entity.

(viii) That two descriptions are required for an actual entity: (a) onewhich is analytical of its potentiality for 'objectiflcation' in the becomingof other actual entities, and (b) another which is analytical of the processwhich constitutes its own becoming.

The term 'objectification' refers to the particular mode in which thepotentiality of one actual entity is realized in another actual entity.

(ix) That how an actual entity becomes constitutes what that actualentity is;t so that the two descriptions of an actual entity are not inde-pendent. Its 'being' is [35] constituted by its 'becoming; This is the 'prin-ciple of process/

(x) That the first analysis of an actual entity, into its most concreteelements, discloses it to be a concrescence of prehensions, which haveoriginated in its process of becoming. All further analysis is an analysisof prehensions. Analysis in terms of prehensions is termed 'division/

(xi) That every prehension consists of three factors: (a) the 'subject'which is prehending, namely, the actual entity in which that prehension-is a concrete element; (b) the 'datum' which is prehended; (c) the 'sub-jective form' which is how that subject prehends that datum.

Prehensions of actual entities—i.e., prehensions whose data involveactual entities—are termed 'physical prehensions'; and prehensions ofeternal objects are termed 'conceptual prehensions/ Consciousness is notnecessarily involved in the subjective forms of either type of prehension.

(xii) That there are two species of prehensions: (a) 'positive prehen-sions' which are termed 'feelings,' and (b) 'negative prehensions' whichare said to 'eliminate from feeling.' Negative prehensions also have sub-jective forms. A negative prehension holds its datum as inoperative in the

progressive concrescence of prehensions constituting the unity of thesubject,

(xiii) That there are many species of subjective forms, such as emotions,valuations, purposes, adversions, aversions, consciousness, etc.

(xiv) That a nexus is a set of actual entities in the unity of the related-ness constituted by their prehensions of each other, or—what is the samething conversely expressed—constituted by their objectifications in eachother.

(xv) That a proposition is the unity of. certain actual entities in theirpotentiality for forming a nexus, with its potential relatedness partiallydefined by certain eternal objects which have the unity of one complexeternal [36] object. The actual entities involved are termed the 'logical sub-jects/ the complex eternal object is the 'predicate/

(xvi) That a multiplicity consists of many entities, and its unity is con-stituted by the fact that all its constituent entities severally satisfy at leastone condition which no other entity satisfies.

Every statement about a particular multiplicity can be expressed as astatement referent either (a) to all its members severally, or (b) to anindefinite some of its members severally, or (c) as a denial of one of thesestatements. Any statement, incapable of being expressed in this form, isnot a statement about a multiplicity, though it may be a statement aboutan entity closely allied to some multiplicity, i.e., systematically allied toeach member of some multiplicity.

(xvii) That whatever is a datum for a feeling has a unity as felt Thusthe many components of a complex datum have a unity: this unity is a'contrast' of entities. In a sense this means that there are an endless num-ber of categories of existence, since the synthesis of entities into a contrastin general produces a new existential type. For example, a proposition is,in a sense, a 'contrast/ For the practical purposes of 'human understand-ing/ it is sufficient to consider a few basic types of existence, and to lumpthe more derivative types together under the heading of 'contrasts/ Themost important of such 'contrasts' is the 'affirmation-negation' contrastin which a proposition and a nexus obtain synthesis in one datum, themembers of the nexus being the 'logical subjects' of the proposition.

(xviii) That every condition to which the process of becoming conformsin any particular instance! has its reason either in the character of someactual entity in the actual world of that concrescence, or in the characterof the subject which is in process of concrescence. This category of ex-planation is termed the 'ontological principle.' It could also be termed the'principle of efficient, [37] and final, causation/ This ontological principlemeans that actual entities are the only reasons; so that to search for areason is to search for one or more actual entities. It follows that anycondition to be satisfied by one actual entity in its process expresses a facteither about the 'real internal constitutions' of some other actual entities,or about the 'subjective aim' conditioning that process.

The phrase 'real internal constitution' is to be found in Locke's EssayConcerning Human Understanding (III, III, 15): "And thus the realinternal (but generally in substances unknown) constitution of things,whereon their discoverable qualities depend, may be called their 'es-sence/ " Also the terms 'prehension' and 'feeling' are to be compared withthe various significations of Locke's term 'idea.' But they are adopted asmore general and more neutral terms than 'idea' as used by Locke, whoseems to restrict them to conscious mentality. Also the ordinary logicalaccount of 'propositions' expresses only a restricted aspect of their role inthe universe, namely, when they are the data of feelings whose subjectiveforms are those of judgments. It is an essential doctrine in the philosophyof organism that the primary function of a proposition is to be relevant asa lure for feeling. For example, some propositions are the data of feelingswith subjective forms such as to constitute those feelings to be the enjoy-ment of a joke. Other propositions are felt with feelings whose subjectiveforms are horror, disgust, or indignation. The 'subjective aim,' which con-trols the becoming of a subject, is that subject feeling a proposition withthe subjective form of purpose to realize it in that process of self-creation.

(xix) That the fundamental types of entities are actual entities, andeternal objects; and that the other types of entities only express how allentities of the two fundamental types are in community with each other,in the actual world.

[38] (xx) That to 'function' means to contribute determination to theactual entities in the nexus of some actual world. Thus the determinaie-ness and self-identity of one entity cannot be abstracted from the com-munity of the diverse functionings of all entities. 'Determination' is an-alysable into 'definiteness' and 'position,' where 'definiteness't is the illus-tration of select eternal objects, and 'position' is relative status in a nexusof actual entities.

(xxi) An entity is actual, when it has significance for itself. By this it ismeant that an actual entity functions in respect to its own determination.Thus an actual entity combines self-identity with self-diversity.

(xxii) That an actual entity by functioning in respect to itself playsdiverse roles in self-formation without losing its self-identity. It is self-creative: and in its process of creation transforms its diversity of roles intoone coherent role. Thus 'becoming' is the transformation of incoherenceinto coherence, and in each particular instance ceases with this attainment.

(xxiii) That this self-functioning is the real internal constitution of anactual entity. It is the 'immediacy' of the actual entity. An actual entityis called the 'subject' of its own immediacy.

(xxiv) The functioning of one actual entity in the self-creation of an-other actual entity is the 'objectification' of the former for the latter actualentity. The functioning of an eternal object in the self-creation of an ac-tual entity is the 'ingression' of the eternal object in the actual entity.

(xxv) The final phase in the process of concrescence, constituting an

actual entity, is one complex, fully determinate feeling. This final phaseis termed the 'satisfaction/ It is fully determinate (a) as to its genesis,(b) as to its objective character for the transcendent creativity, and (c) asto its prehension—positive or negative—of every item in its universe.

(xxvi) Each element in the genetic process of an actual [39] entity hasone self-consistent function, however complex, in the final satisfaction.

(xxvii) In a process of concrescence, there is a succession of phases inwhich new prehensions arise by integration of prehensions in antecedentphases. In these integrations 'feelings' contribute their 'subjective forms7and their 'data' to the formation of novel integral prehensions; but 'nega-tive prehensions' contribute only their 'subjective forms/ The process con-tinues till all prehensions are components in the one determinate integralsatisfaction.

SECTION III

There are nine Categoreal Obligations:

(i) The Category of Subjective Unity, The many feelings which belongto an incomplete phase in the process of an actual entity, though unin-tegrated by reason of the incompleteness of the phase, are compatible forintegration by reason of the unity of their subject.

(ii) The Category of Objective Identity. There can be no duplica-tion of any element in the objective datum of the 'satisfaction' of an actualentity, so far as concerns the function of that element in the 'satisfaction/

Here, as always, the term 'satisfaction' means the one complex fullydeterminate feeling which is the completed phase in the process. Thiscategory expresses that each element has one self-consistent function, how-ever complex. Logic is the general analysis of self-consistency.

(iii) The Category of Objective Diversity. There can be no 'coalescence'of diverse elements in the objective datum of an actual entity, so far asconcerns the functions of those elements in that satisfaction.

'Coalescence' here means the notion of diverse elements exercising anabsolute identity of function, devoid of the contrasts inherent in theirdiversities.

(iv) The Category of Conceptual Valuation. From each physical feel-ing there is the derivation of a purely [40] conceptual feeling whose datumis the eternal object determinant of the defmiteness of the actual entity, orof the nexus, physically felt.

*(v) The Category of Conceptual Reversion. There is secondary orig-ination of conceptual feelings with data which are partially identical with,and partially diverse from, the eternal objects forming the data in the firstphase of the mental pole. The diversity is a relevant diversity determinedby the subjective aim.

Note that category (iv) concerns conceptual reproduction of physicalfeeling, and category (v) concerns conceptual diversity from physicalfeeling.

(vi) The Category of Transmutation. When (in accordance with cate-gory [iv], or with categories [iv] and [v])t one and the same conceptualfeeling is derived impartially by a prehending subject from its analogoussimplet physical feelings of various actual entities in its actual world, then,in a subsequent phase of integration of these simple physical feelings to-gether with the derivate conceptual feeling, the prehending subject may-transmute the datum of this conceptual feeling into a characteristic ofsome nexus containing those prehended actual entities among its mem-bers, or of some part of that nexus. In this way the nexus (or its part),thus characterized, is the objective datum of a feeling entertained by thisprehending subject.

It is evident that the complete datum of the transmuted feeling is acontrast, namely? 'the nexus, as one, in contrast with the eternal object/This type of contrast is one of the meanings of the notion 'qualificationof physical substance by quality/

This category is the way in which the philosophy of organism, which isan atomic theory of actuality, meets a perplexity which is inherent in allmonadic cosmologies. Leibniz in his Monadology meets the same diffi-culty by a theory of 'confused' perception. But he fails to make clear how'confusion' originates.

(vii) The Category of Subjective Harmony. The val- [41] uations of con-ceptual feelings are mutually determined by the adaptation of those feel-ings to be contrasted elements congruent with the subjective aim.

Category (i) and category (vii) jointly express a pre-established harmonyin the process of concrescence of any one subject. Category (i) has to dowith data felt, and category (vii) with the subjective forms of the con-ceptual feelings. This pre-established harmony is an outcome of the factthat no prehension can be considered in abstraction from its subject, al-though it originates in the process creative of its subject.

(viii) The Category of Subjective Intensity. The subjective aim, wherebythere is origination of conceptual feeling, is at* intensity of feeling (a) inthe immediate subject, and (/?) in the relevant future.

This double aim—at the immediate present and the relevant future-is less divided than appears on the surface. For the determination of therelevant future, and the anticipatory feeling respecting provision for itsgrade of intensity, are elements affecting the immediate complex of feel-ing. The greater part of morality hinges on the determination of relevancein the future. The relevant future consists of those elements in the an-ticipated future which are felt with effective intensity by the present sub-ject by reason of the real potentiality for them to be derived from itself.

(ix) The Category of Freedom and Determination. The concrescence ofeach individual actual entity is internally determined and is externallyfree.

This category can be condensed into the formula, that in each con-crescence whatever is determinable is determined, but that there is always

a remainder for the decision of the subject-superject of that concrescence.This subject-superject is the universe in that synthesis, and beyond it thereis nonentity. This final decision is the reaction of the unity of the wholeto its own internal determination. This reaction is the final modificationof emotion, appreciation, and purpose. But the decision [42] of the wholearises out of the determination of the parts, so as to be strictly relevantto it.

SECTION IV

The whole of thet discussion in the subsequent parts either leads upto these categories (of the four types) or is explanatory of them, or isconsidering our experience of the world in the light of these categories.But a few preliminary notes may be useful.

It follows from the fourth category of explanation that the notion of'complete abstraction' is self-contradictory. For you cannot abstract theuniverse from any entity, actual or non-actual, so as to consider that entityin complete isolation. Whenever we think of some entity, we are asking,What is it fit for here? In a sense, every entity pervades the whole world;for this question has a definite answer for each entity in respect to anyactual entity or any nexus of actual entities.

It follows from the first category of explanation that 'becoming' is acreative advance into novelty. It is for this reason that the meaning of thephrase 'the actual world' is relative to the becoming of a definite actualentity which is both novel and actual, relatively to that meaning, and tono other meaning of that phrase. Thus, conversely, each actual entitycorresponds to a meaning of 'the actual world' peculiar to itself. This pointis dealt with more generally in categories of explanation (iii) and (v). Anactual world is a nexus; and the actual world of one actual entity sinksto the level of a subordinate nexus in actual worlds beyond that actualentity.

Trie first, the fourth, the eighteenth, and twenty-seventh categories statedifferent aspects of one and the same general metaphysical truth. The firstcategory states the doctrine in a general way: that every ultimate actualityembodies in its own essence what Alexander 3 \43] terms 'a principle of un-rest,' namely, its becoming. The fourth category applies this doctrine to thevery notion of an 'entity.' It asserts that the notion of an 'entity' means'an element contributory to the process of becoming.' We have in thiscategory the utmost generalization of the notion of 'relativity.' The eigh-teenth category asserts that the obligations imposed on the becoming ofany particular actual entity arise from the constitutions of other actualentities.

The four categories of explanation, (x) to (xiii), constitute the repudia-

3 Cf. "Artistic Creation and Cosmic Creation," Proc. Brit. Acad., 1927\ Vol.XIII.

The Categoreal Scheme 29

tion of the notion of vacuous actuality, which haunts realistic philosophy.The term Vacuous actuality' here means the notion of a res vera devoid ofsubjective immediacy. This repudiation is fundamental for the organicphilosophy (cf. Part II, Ch. VII, 'The Subjectivist Principle'). The notionof Vacuous actuality' is very closely allied to the notion of the 'inherenceof quality in substance/ Both notions—in their misapplication as funda-mental metaphysical categories—find their chief support in a misunder-standing of the true analysis of 'presentational immediacy' (cf. Part II,Ch. II, Sects. I and V).

It is fundamental to the metaphysical doctrine of the philosophy oforganism, that the notion of an actual entity as the unchanging subjectof change is completely abandoned. An actual entity is at once the subjectexperiencing and the superject of its experiences. It is subject-superject,and neither half of this description can for a moment be lost sight of.The term 'subject' will be mostly employed when the actual entity isconsidered in respect to its own real internal constitution. But 'subject'is always to be construed as an abbreviation of 'subject-superject.'*

The ancient doctrine that 'no one crosses the same river twice' is ex-tended. No thinker thinks twice; and, to put the matter more generally, nosubject experiences twice. This is what Locke ought to have meant by hisdoctrine of time as a 'perpetual perishing.'

[44] This repudiation directly contradicts Kant's 'First Analogy of Expe-rience' in either of its ways of phrasing (1st or 2ndt edition). In the phi-losophy of organism it is not 'substance' which is permanent, but 'form.'Forms suffer changing relations; actual entities 'perpetually perish' sub-jectively, but are immortal objectively. Actuality in perishing acquiresobjectivity, while it loses subjective immediacy. It loses the final causationwhich is its internal principle of unrest, and it acquires efficient causationwhereby it is a ground of obligation characterizing the creativity.

Actual occasions in their 'formal' constitutions are devoid of all in-determination. Potentiality has passed into realization. They are completeand determinate matter of fact, devoid of all indecision. They form theground of obligation. But eternal objects, and propositions, and some morecomplex sorts of contrasts, involve in their own natures indecision. Theyare, like all entities, potentials for the process of becoming. Their ingres-sion expresses the definiteness of the actuality in question. But their ownnatures do not in themselves disclose in what actual entities this poten-tiality of ingression is realized. Thus they involve indetermination in asense more complete than do the former set.

A multiplicity merely enters into process through its individual mem-bers. The only statements to be made about a multiplicity express howits individual members enter into the process of the actual world. Anyentity which enters into process in this way belongs to the multiplicity, andno other entities do belong to it. It can be treated as a unity for this pur-pose, and this purpose only. For example, each of the six kinds of entities

just mentioned is a multiplicityt (i.e., not the individual entities of thekinds, but the collective kinds of the entities). A multiplicity has solelya disjunctive relationship to the actual world. The 'universe' comprisingthe absolutely initial data for an actual entity is a multiplicity. The treat-ment of a multiplicity as though it [45] had the unity belonging to an en-tity of any one of the other six kinds produces logical errors. Whenever theword 'entity' is used, it is to be assumed, unless otherwise stated, that itrefers to an entity of one of the six kinds, and not to a multiplicity.

There is no emergent evolution concerned with a multiplicity, so thatevery statement about a multiplicity is a disjunctive statement about itsindividual members. Entities of any of the first six kinds, and generic con-trasts, will be called 'proper entities/

In its development the subsequent discussion of the philosophy of or-ganism is governed by the belief that the subject-predicate form of propo-sition is concerned with high abstractions, except in its application to sub-jective forms. This sort of abstraction, apart from this exception, is rarelyrelevant to metaphysical description. The dominance of Aristotelian logicfrom the late classical period onwards has imposed on metaphysicalthought the categories naturally derivative from its phraseology. This dom-inance of his logic does not seem to have been characteristic of Aristotle'sown metaphysical speculations. The divergencies, such as they are, in theselectures from other philosophical doctrines mostly depend upon the factthat many philosophers, who in their explicit statements criticize theAristotelian notion of 'substance/ yet implicitly throughout their discus-sions presuppose that the 'subject-predicate' form of proposition embodiesthe finally adequate mode of statement about the actual world. The evilproduced by the Aristotelian 'primary substance' is exactly this habit ofmetaphysical emphasis upon the 'subject-predicate7 form of proposition.

CHAPTER IIISOME DERIVATIVE NOTIONS

SECTION I

[46] The primordial created fact is the unconditioned conceptual valua-tion of the entire multiplicity of eternal objects. This is the 'primordialnature' of God. By reason of this complete valuation, the objectification ofGod in each derivate actual entity results in a graduation of the relevanceof eternal objects to the concrescent phases of that derivate occasion. Therewill be additional ground of relevance for select eternal objects by reasonof their ingression into derivate actual entities belonging to the actualworld of the concrescent occasion in question. But whether or no this bethe case, there is always the definite relevance derived from God. Apartfrom God. eternal objects unrealized in the actual world would be rela-tively non-existent for the concrescence in question. For effective relevancerequires agency of comparison, and agency belongs exclusively to actualoccasions.** This divine ordering is itself matter of fact, thereby condition-ing creativity. Thus possibility which transcends realized temporal matterof fact has a real relevance to the creative advance. God is the primordialcreature; but the description of his nature is not exhausted by this concep-tual side of it. His 'consequent nature' results from his physical prehen-sions of the derivative actual entities (cf. Part V).

'Creativity' is another rendering of the Aristotelian 'matter/ and of themodern 'neutral stuff/ But it is divested of the notion of passive recep-tivity, either of 'form/ or of external relations; it is the pure notion of theactivity conditioned by the objective immortality of [47] the actual world—a world which is never the same twice, though always with the stable ele-ment of divine ordering. Creativity is without a character of its own inexactly the same sense in which the Aristotelian 'matter' is without a char-acter of its own. It is that ultimate notion of the highest generality at *the base of actuality. It cannot be characterized, because all characters aremore special than itself. But creativity is always found under conditions,and described as conditioned. The non-temporal act of all-inclusive un-fettered valuation is at once a creature of creativity and a condition forcreativity. It shares this double character with all creatures. By reason ofits character as a creature, always in concrescence and never in the past, itreceives a reaction from the world; this reaction is its consequent nature.It is here termed 'God'; because the contemplation of our natures, as

31

enjoying real feelings derived from the timeless source of all order, acquiresthat 'subjective form' of refreshment and companionship at which reli-gions aim.

This function of creatures, that they constitute the shifting character ofcreativity, is here termed the 'objective immortality' of actual entities.Thus God has objective immortality in respect to his primordial natureand his consequent nature. The objective immortality of his consequentnature is considered later (cf. Part V); we are now concerned with hisprimordial nature.

God's immanence in the world in respect to his primordial nature is anurge towards the future based upon an appetite in the present. Appetitionis at once the conceptual valuation of an immediate physical feeling com-bined with the urge towards realization of the datum conceptually pre-hended. For example, t 'thirst* is an immediate physical feeling integratedwith the conceptual prehension of its quenching.

Appetitionx is immediate matter of fact including in itself a principle ofunrest, involving realization of what [48] is not and may be. The imme-diate occasion thereby conditions creativity so as to procure, in the future,physical realization of its mental pole, according to the various valuationsinherent in its various conceptual prehensions. All physical experience isaccompanied by an appetite for, or against, its continuance: an example isthe appetition of self-preservation. But the origination of the novel con-ceptual prehension has, more especially, to be accounted for. Thirst is anappetite towards a difference—towards something relevant, somethinglargely identical, but something with a definite novelty. This is an exampleat a low level which shows the germ of a free imagination.

In what sense can unrealized abstract form be relevant? What is its basisof relevance? 'Relevance' must express some real fact of togethernessamong forms. The ontological principle can be expressed as: All real to-getherness is togetherness in the formal constitution of an actuality. So ifthere be a relevance of what in the temporal world is unrealized, the rele-vance must express a fact of togetherness in the formal constitution of anon-temporal actuality. But by the principle of relativity there can only beone non-derivative actuality, unbounded by its prehensions of an actualworld. Such a primordial superject of creativity achieves, in its unity ofsatisfaction, the complete conceptual valuation of all eternal objects. Thisis the ultimate, basic adjustment of the togetherness of eternal objects onwhich creative order depends. It is the conceptual adjustment of all ap-petites in the form of aversions and adversions. It constitutes the meaningof relevance. Its status as an actual efficient fact is recognized by termingit the 'primordial nature of God/

The word 'appetition' illustrates a danger which lurks in technical terms.This same danger is also illustrated in the psychology derived from Freud.

1 Cf. Leibniz's Monadology.

The mental poles of actualities contribute various grades of complex feel-ings to the actualities including them as factors. The [49] basic operationsof mentality are 'conceptual prehensions.' These are the only operations of'pure' mentality. All other mental operations are 'impure/ in the sensethat they involve integrations of conceptual prehensions with the physicalprehensions of the physical pole. Since 'impurity* in prehension refers tothe prehension arising out of the integration of 'pure' physical prehensionswith 'pure' mental prehensions, it follows that an 'impure't mental pre-hension is also an 'impure' physical prehension and conversely. Thus theterm 'impure' applied to a prehension has a perfectly definite meaning;and does not require the terms 'mental' or 'physical/ except for the direc-tion of attention in the discussion concerned.

The technical term 'conceptual prehension' is entirely neutral, devoidof all suggestiveness. But such terms present great difficulties to the under-standing, by reason of the fact that they suggest no particular exemplifica-tions. Accordingly, we seek equivalent terms which have about them thesuggestiveness of familiar fact. We have chosen the term 'appetition/which suggests exemplifications in our own experience, also in lower formsof life such as insects and vegetables. But even in human experience 'ap-petition' suggests a degrading notion of this basic activity in its more in-tense operations. We are closely concerned with what Bergson calls 'intui-tion'—with some differences however. Bergson's 'intuition't is an 'impure'operation; it is an integral feeling derived from the synthesis of the con-ceptual prehension with the physical prehension from which it has beenderived according to the 'Category of Conceptual Reproduction' (Cate-goreal Obligation! IV). It seems that Bergson's term 'intuition' has thesame meaning as 'physical purpose' in Part III of these lectures. AlsoBergson's 'intuition' seems to abstract from the subjective form of emotionand purpose. This subjective form is an essential element in the notion of'conceptual prehension,' as indeed in that of any prehension. It is an essen-tial element in 'physical purpose' (cf. Part III), If we con- [SO] sider these'pure' mental operations in their most intense operations, we should choosethe term 'vision.' A conceptual prehension is a direct vision of some possi-bility of good or oft evil—of some possibility as to how actualities may bedefinite. There is no reference to particular actualities, or to any par-ticular actual world. The phrase 'of good or of evil' has been added to in-clude a reference to the subjective form; the mere word 'vision' abstractsfrom this factor in a conceptual prehension. If we say that God's primor-dial nature is a completeness of 'appetition,'f we give due weight to thesubjective form—at a cost. If we say that God's primordial nature is 'in-tuition/ we suggest mentality which is 'impure' by reason of synthesis withphysical prehension. If we say that God's primordial nature is 'vision,' wesuggest a maimed view of the subjective form, divesting it of yearningafter concrete fact—no particular facts, but after some actuality. There isdeficiency in God's primordial nature which the term 'vision' obscures.

One advantage of the term Vision' is that it connects this doctrine of Godmore closely with philosophical tradition. 'Envisagement' is perhaps a saferterm than Vision/ To sum up: God's primordial nature' is abstracted fromhis commerce with 'particulars/ and is therefore devoid of those 'impure'intellectual cogitations which involve propositions (cf. Part III). It is Godin abstraction, alone with himself. As such it is a mere factor in God, de-ficient in actuality.

SECTION II

The notions of 'social order' and of 'personal order' cannot be omittedfrom this preliminary sketch. A 'society/ in the sense in which that termis here used, is a nexus with social order; and an 'enduring object/ or 'en-during creature/ is a society whose social order has taken the special formof 'personal order.'

A nexus enjoys 'social order' where (i) there is a common element ofform illustrated in the definiteness [Si] of each of its included actual en-tities, and (ii) this common element of form arises in each member of thenexus by reason of the conditions imposed upon it by its prehensions ofsome other members of the nexus, and (iii) these prehensions impose thatcondition of reproduction by reason of their inclusion of positive feelingsof that* common form. Such a nexus is called a 'society/ and the commonform is the 'defining characteristic' of the society. The notionf of 'definingcharacteristic' is allied to the Aristotelian notion oft 'substantial form/

The common element of form is simply a complex eternal object ex-emplified in each member of the nexus. But the social order of the nexusis not the mere fact of this common form exhibited by all its members. Thereproduction of the common form throughout the nexus is due to thegenetic relations of the members of the nexus among each other, and tothe additional fact that genetic relations include feelings of the commonform. Thus the defining characteristic is inherited throughout the nexus,each member deriving it from those other members of the nexus whichare antecedent to its own concrescence.

A nexus enjoys 'personal order' when (a) it is a 'society/ and (/?) whenthe genetic relatedness of its members orders these members 'serially/

By this 'serial ordering' arising from the genetic relatedness, it is meantthat any member of the nexus—excluding the first and the last, if there besuch—constitutes a 'cut' in the nexus, so that (a) this member inheritsfrom all members on one side of the cut, and from no members on theother side of the cut, and (b) if A and B are two members of the nexusand B inherits from A, then the side of B's+ cut, inheriting from B, formspart of the side of A's cut, inheriting from A, and the side of A's cut fromwhich A inherits forms part of the side of B's cut from which B inherits.Thus the nexus forms a single line of inheritance of its defining character-istic. Such a nexus is called an 'enduring object/ It might have been

Some Derivative Notions 35

termed a 'person/ in the legal sense [52] of that term. But unfortunately'person' suggests the notion of consciousness, so that its use would lead tomisunderstanding. The nexus 'sustains a character/ and this is one of themeanings of the Latin word persona. But an 'enduring object/ qua 'per-son/ does more than sustain a character. For this sustenance arises out ofthe special genetic relations among the members of the nexus. An ordinaryphysical object, which has temporal endurance, is a society. In the ideallysimple case, it has personal order and is an 'enduring object.7 A society may(or may not) be analysable into many strands of 'enduring objects/ Thiswill be the case for most ordinary physical objects. These enduring objectsand 'societies/ analysable into strands of enduring objects, are the per-manent entities which enjoy adventures of change throughout time andspace. For example, they form the subject-matter of the science of dy-namics. Actual entities perish, but do not change; they are what they are.A nexus which (i) enjoys social order, and (ii) is analysable into strandsof enduring objects may be termed a 'corpuscular society/ A society maybe more or less corpuscular, according to the relative importance of thedefining characteristics of the various enduring objects compared to thatof the defining characteristic of the whole corpuscular nexus.

SECTION III

There is a prevalent misconception that 'becoming' involves the notionof a unique seriality for its advance into novelty. This is the classic notionof 'time/ which philosophy took over from common sense. Mankind madean unfortunate generalization from its experience of enduring objects. Re-cently physical science has abandoned this notion. Accordingly we shouldnow purge cosmology of a point of view which it ought never to haveadopted as an ultimate metaphysical principle. In these lectures the term'creative advance' is not to be construed in the sense of a uniquely serialadvance.

[S3] Finally, the extensive continuity of the physical universe has usuallybeen construed to mean that there is a continuity of becoming. But if weadmit that 'something becomes/ it is easy, by employing Zeno's method, toprove that there can be no continuity of becoming.2 There is a becomingof continuity, but no continuity of becoming. The actual occasions are thecreatures which become, and they constitute a continuously extensiveworld. In other words, extensiveness becomes, but 'becoming' is not itselfextensive.

Thus the ultimate metaphysical truth is atomism. The creatures areatomic. In the present cosmic epoch there is a creation of continuity. Per-haps such creation is an ultimate metaphysical truth holding of all cosmic

2Cf. Part II, Ch. II, Sect. II; and also my Science and the Modern World,Ch. VII, for a discussion of this argument.

36 The Speculative Scheme

epochs; but this does not* seem to be a necessary conclusion. The morelikely opinion is that extensive continuity is a special condition arisingfrom the society of creatures which constitute our immediate epoch. Butatomism does not exclude complexityt and universal relativity. Each atomis a system of all things.

The proper balance between atomism and continuity is of importance tophysical science. For example, the doctrine, here explained, conciliatesNewton's corpuscular theory of light with the wave theory. For both acorpuscle, and an advancing element of at wave front, are merely a per-manent form propagated from atomic creature to atomic creature. A cor-puscle is in fact an 'enduring object.' The notion of an 'enduring object'is, however, capable of more or less completeness of realization. Thus, indifferent stages of its career, a wave of light may be more or less corpuscu-lar. A train of such waves at all stages of its career involves social order;but in the earlier stages this social order takes the more special form ofloosely related strands of personal order. This dominant personal ordergradually vanishes as the time advances. Its defining characteristics becomeless and [54] less important, as their various features peter out. The wavesthen become a nexus with important social order, but with no strands ofpersonal order. Thus the train of waves starts as a corpuscular society, andends as a society which is not corpuscular.

SECTION IV

Finally, in the cdsmological scheme here outlined one implicit assump-tion of the philosophical tradition is repudiated. The assumption is thatthe basic elements of experience are to be described in terms of one, orall, of the three ingredients, consciousness, thought, sense-perception. Thelast term is used in the sense of 'conscious perception in the mode of pre-sentational immediacy/ Also in practice sense-perception is narroweddown to visual perception. According to the philosophy of organism thesethree components are unessential elements in experience, either physicalor mental. Any instance of experience is dipolar, whether that instancebe God or an actual occasion of the world. The origination of God is fromthe mental pole, the origination of an actual occasion is from the physicalpole; but in either case these elements, consciousness, thought, sense-per-ception, belong to the derivative 'impure7 phases of the concrescence, if inany effective sense they enter at all.

This repudiation is the reason why, in relation to the topic under discus-sion, the status of presentational immediacy is a recurrent theme through-out the subsequent Partst of these lectures.

PART IIDISCUSSIONS AND APPLICATIONS

CHAPTER IFACT AND FORM

SECTION I

[62] All human discourse which bases its claim to consideration on thetruth of its statements must appeal to the facts. In none of its branchescan philosophy claim immunity to this rule. But in the case of philosophythe difficulty arises that the record of the facts is in part dispersed vaguelythrough the various linguistic expressions of civilized language and ofliterature, and is in part expressed more precisely under the influence ofschemes of thought prevalent in the traditions of science and philosophy.

In this second part of these lectures, the scheme of [63] thought which isthe basis of the philosophy of organism is confronted with various interpre-tations of the facts widely accepted in thet European tradition, literary,philosophic, and scientific. So far as concerns philosophy only a selectedgroup can be explicitly mentioned. There is no point in endeavouring toforce the interpretations of divergent philosophers into a vague agreement.What is important is that the scheme of interpretation here adopted canclaim for each of its main positions the express authority of one, or theother, of some supreme master of thought—Plato, Aristotle, Descartes,Locke, Hume, Kant. But ultimately nothing rests on authority; the finalcourt of appeal is intrinsic reasonableness.

The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradi-tion is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato. I do not mean thesystematic scheme of thought which scholars have doubtfully extractedfrom his writings. I allude to the wealth of general ideas scattered throughthem. His personal endowments, his wide opportunities for experience ata great period of civilization, his inheritance of an intellectual traditionnot yet stiffened by excessive systematization, have made his writings t aninexhaustible mine of suggestion. Thus in one sense by stating my beliefthat the train of thought in these lectures is Platonic, I am doing no morethan expressing the hope that it falls within the European tradition. But Ido mean more: I mean that if we had to render Plato's general point ofview with the least changes made necessary by the intervening two thou-sand years of human experience in social organization, in aesthetic attain-ments, in science, and in religion, we should have to set about the con-struction of a philosophy of organism. In such a philosophy the actualitiesconstituting the process of the world are conceived as exemplifying the

39

ingression (or 'participation') of other things which constitute the poten-tialities of definiteness for any actual existence. The things which are tem-poral arise by their participation in the things which are eternal. The[64] two sets are mediated by a thing which combines the actuality of whatis temporal with the timelessness of what is potential. This final entity isthe divine element in the world, by which the barren inefficient disjunctionof abstract potentialities obtains primordially the efficient conjunction ofideal realization. This ideal realization of potentialities in a primordialactual entity constitutes the metaphysical stability whereby the actualprocess exemplifies general principles of metaphysics, and attains the endsproper to specific types of emergent order. By reason of the actuality of thisprimordial valuation of pure potentials, each eternal object has a definite,effective relevance to each concrescent process. Apart from such orderings,**there would be a complete disjunction of eternal objects unrealized in thetemporal world. Novelty would be meaningless, and inconceivable. We arehere extending and rigidly applying Hume's principle, that ideas of reflec-tion are derived from actual facts.

By this recognition of the divine element the general Aristotelian princi-ple is maintained that, apart from things that are actual, there is nothing—nothing either in fact or in efficacy. This is the true general principlewhich also underlies Descartes' dictum: "For this reason, when we per-ceive any attribute, we therefore conclude that some existing thing orsubstance to which it may be attributed, is necessarily present." *■ Andagain: "for every clear and distinct conception (perceptio) is withoutdoubt something, and hence cannot derive its origin from what isnought, . . ."2 This general principle will be termed the 'ontological prin-ciple.7 It is the principle that everything is positively somewhere in ac-tuality, and in potency everywhere. In one of its applications this principleissues in the doctrine of 'conceptualising Thus [65] the search for a reasonis always the search for an actual fact which is the vehicle of the reason. Theontological principle, as here defined, constitutes the first step in the de-scription of the universe as a solidarity3 of many actual entities. Eachactual entity is conceived as an act of experience arising out of data. It isa process of 'feeling' the many data, so as to absorb them into the unity ofone individual 'satisfaction/ Here 'feeling' is the term used for the basicgeneric operation of passing from the objectivity of the data to the sub-jectivity of the actual entity in question. Feelings are variously specialized

1 Principles of Philosophy, Part I, 52; translation by Haldane and Ross. Allquotations from Descartes are from this translation.*

2 Meditation IV, towards the end.

3 The word 'solidarity' has been borrowed from Professor Wildon Carr's Presi-dential Address to the Aristotelian Society, Session 1917-1918. The address—'The Interaction of Body and Mind"—develops the fundamental principle sug-gested by this word.

operations, effecting a transition into subjectivity. They replace the 'neu-tral stuff' of certain realistic philosophers. An actual entity is a process,and is not describable in terms of the morphology of a 'stuff/ This use ofthe term 'feeling' has a close analogy to Alexander's4 use of the term'enjoyment'; and has also some kinship with Bergson's use of the term'intuition; A near analogy is Locke's use of the term 'idea/ including 'ideasof particular things' (cf. his Essay, III, III, 2, 6, and 7). But the word'feeling/ as used in these lectures, is even more reminiscent of Descartes.For example: "Let it be so; still it is at least quite certain that it seems tome that I see light, that I hear noise and that I feel heat. That cannot befalse; properly speaking it is what is in me called feeling (sentire); andused in this precise sense that is no other thing than thinking." 5

In Cartesian language, the essence of an actual entity consists solely inthe fact that it is a prehending thing (i.e., a substance whose whole essenceor nature is to prehend).6 A 'feeling' belongs to the positive species [66] of'prehensions.' There are two species of prehensions, the 'positive species' andthe 'negative species.' An actual entity has a perfectly definite bond witheach item in the universe. This determinate bond is its prehension of thatitem. A negative prehension is the definite exclusion of that item frompositive contribution to the subject's own real internal constitution. Thisdoctrine involves the position that a negative prehension expresses abond. A positive prehension is the definite inclusion of that item into posi-tive contribution to the subject's own real internal constitution. Thispositive inclusion is called its 'feeling' of that item. Other entities are re-quired to express how any one item is felt. All actual entities in the actualworld, relatively to a given actual entity as 'subject,' are necessarily 'felt'by that subject, though in general vaguely. An actual entity as felt is saidto be 'objectified' for that subject. Only a selection of eternal objects are'felt' by a given subject, and these eternal objects are then said to have'ingression' in that subject. But those eternal objects which are not felt arenot therefore negligible. For each negative prehension has its own sub-jective form, however trivial and faint. It adds to the emotional complex,though not to the objective data. The emotional complex is the subjectiveform of the final 'satisfaction.' The importance of negative prehensionsarises from the fact, that (i) actual entities form a system, in the sense ofentering into each other's constitutions, (ii) that by the ontologicalprinciple every entity is felt by some actual entity, (iii) that, as a conse-quence of (i) and (ii), every entity in the actual world of a concrescentactuality has some gradation of real relevance to that concrescence, (iv)that, in consequence of (iii), the negative prehension of an entity is a

4 Cf. his Space, Time and Deity, passim.

5 Meditation II, Haldane and Ross translation.

6 For the analogue to this sentence cf. Meditation VI; substitute 'Ens pre-hendens" fort 'Ens cogitans.7

positive fact with its emotional subjective form,t (v) there is a mutualsensitivity of the subjective forms of prehensions, so that they are not in-different to each other, (vi) the concrescence issues in one concrete feel-ing, the satisfaction.

SECTION II

[67] That we fail to find in experience any elements intrinsically incapa-ble of exhibition as examples of general theoryt is the hope of rationalism.This hope is not a metaphysical premise. It is the faith which forms themotive for the pursuit of all sciences alike, including metaphysics.

In so far as metaphysics enables us to apprehend the rationality ofthings, the claim is justified. It is always open to us, having regard to theimperfections of all metaphysical systems, to lose hope at the exact pointwhere we find ourselves. The preservation of such faith must depend on anultimate moral intuition into the nature of intellectual action—that itshould embody the adventure of hope. Such an intuition marks the pointwhere metaphysics—and indeed every science—gains assurance from reli-gion and passes over into religion. But in itself the faith does not embody apremise from which the theory starts: it is an ideal which is seeking satis-faction. In so far as we believe that doctrine, we are rationalists.

There must, however, be limits to the claim that all the elements inthe universe are explicable by 'theory/ For 'theory' itself requires that therebe given' elements so as to form the material for theorizing. Plato himselfrecognizes this limitation: I quote from Professor A. E. Taylor's summaryof the Timaeus:

In the real world there is always, over and above "law," a factor ofthe "simply given" or "brute fact," not accounted for and to be ac-cepted simply as given. It is the business of science never to acquiescein the merely given, to seek to "explain" it as the consequence, in virtueof rational law, of some simpler initial "given." But, however far sci-ence may carry this procedure, it is always forced to retain some ele-ment of brute fact, the merely given, in its account of things. It is thepresence in nature of this element of the given, this surd or irrationalas it has [68] sometimes been called, which Timaeus appears to be per-sonifying in his language about Necessity.7

So far as the interpretation of Plato is concerned, I rely upon the au-thority of Professor Taylor. But, apart from this historical question, a clearunderstanding of the 'given' elements in the world is essential for any formof Platonic realism.

For rationalistic thought, the notion of 'givenness' carries with it areference beyond the mere data in question. It refers to a 'decision'whereby what is 'given' is separated off from what for that occasion is 'not

7 Plato, The Man and His Work, Lincoln MacVeagh, New York, 1927.*

given/ This element of 'givenness' in things implies some activity pro-curing limitation. The word 'decision' does not here imply conscious judg-ment, though in some 'decisions' consciousness will be a factor. The wordis used in its root sense of a 'cutting off/ The ontological principle declaresthat every decision is referable to one or more actual entities, because inseparation from actual entities there is nothing, merely nonentity—'Therest is silence/

The ontological principle asserts the relativity of decision; whereby everydecision expresses the relation of the actual thing, for which a decision ismade, to an actual thing by which that decision is made. But 'decision'cannot be construed as a casual adjunct of an actual entity. It constitutesthe very meaning of actuality. An actual entity arises from decisions for it,and by its very existence provides decisions for other actual entities whichsupersede it. Thus the ontological principle is the first stage in constitutinga theory embracing the notions of 'actual entity/ 'givenness,' and 'process/Just as 'potentiality for process' is the meaning of the more general term'entity/ or 'thing; so 'decision' is the additional meaning imported by theword 'actual' into the phrase 'actual entity/ 'Actuality' is the decisionamid 'potentiality/ It represents stubborn fact which cannot be evaded.The real internal constitution of an actual [69] entity progressively consti-tutes a decision conditioning the creativity which transcends that actuality.The Castle Rock at Edinburgh exists from moment to moment, and fromcentury to century, by reason of the decision** effected by its own historicroute of antecedent occasions. And if, in some vast upheaval of nature, itwere shattered into fragments, that convulsion would still be conditionedby the fact that it was the destruction of that rock. The point to be empha-sized is the insistent particularity of things experienced and of the act ofexperiencing. Bradley's doctrine 8—Wolf-eating-Lamb as a universal quali-fying the absolute—is a travesty of the evidence. That wolf eat* that lambat that spot at that time: the wolf knew it; the lamb knew it; and thecarrion birds knew it. Explicitly in the verbal sentence, or implicitly in theunderstanding of the subject entertaining it, every expression of a proposi-tion includes demonstrative elements. In fact each word, and each sym-bolic phrase, is such an element, exciting the conscious prehension of someentity belonging to one of the categories of existence.

SECTION III

Converselv. where there is no decision involving exclusion, there is nogivenness. For example, the total multiplicity of Platonic forms is not'given/ But in respect of each actual entity, there is givenness of suchforms. The determinate definiteness of each actuality is an expression of aselection from these forms. It grades them in a diversity of relevance. This

8 Cf. Logic, Bk. I, Ch. II, Sect. 42.

ordering of relevance starts from those forms which are, in the fullestsense, exemplified, and passes through grades of relevance down to thoseforms which in some faint sense are proximately relevant by reason ofcontrast with actual fact. This whole gamut of relevance is 'given/ andmust be referred to the decision of actuality.

The term 'Platonic form' has here been used as the [70] briefest way ofindicating the entities in question. But these lectures are not an exegesis ofPlato's writings; the entities in question are not necessarily restricted tothose which he would recognize as 'forms/ Also the term 'idea' has a sub-jective suggestion in modern philosophy, which is very misleading for mypresent purposes; and in any case it has been used in many senses and hasbecome ambiguous. The term 'essence/ as used by the Critical Realists,also suggests their use of it, which diverges from what I intend. Accord-ingly, by way of employing a term devoid of misleading suggestions, I usethe phrase 'eternal object' for what in the preceding paragraph of thissection I have termed a 'Platonic form/ Any entity whose conceptual rec-ognition does not involve a necessary reference to any definite actual en-tities of the temporal world is called an 'eternal object/

In this definition the 'conceptual recognition' must of course be anoperation constituting a real feeling belonging to some actual entity. Thepoint is that the actual subject which is merely conceiving the eternal ob-ject is not thereby in direct relationship to some other actual entity, apartfrom any other peculiarity in the composition of that conceiving subject.This doctrine applies also to thef primordial nature of God, which is hiscomplete envisagement of eternal objects; he+ is not thereby directly relatedto the given course of history. The given course of history presupposes hisprimordial nature, but his primordial nature does not presuppose it.

An eternal object is always a potentiality for actual entities; but in itself,as conceptually felt, it is neutral as to the fact of its physical ingression inany particular actual entity of the temporal world. 'Potentiality' is the cor-relative of 'givenness/ The meaning of 'givenness' is that what is 'given'* might not have been 'given'; and that what is not 'given' might have been'given.'

Further, in the complete particular 'givenness' for an actual entity thereis an element of exclusiveness. The [71] various primary data and the con-crescent feelings do not form a mere multiplicity. Their synthesis in thefinal unity of one actual entity is another fact of 'givenness.' The actual en-tity terminates its becoming in one complex feeling involving a completelydeterminate bond with every item in the universe, the bond being either a*positive or a negative prehension. This termination is the 'satisfaction' ofthe actual entity. Thus the addition of another component alters thissynthetic 'givenness.' Any additional component is therefore contrary tothis integral 'givenness' of the original. This principle may be illustrated byour visual perception of a picture. The pattern of colours is 'given' for us.

But an extra patch of red does not constitute a mere addition; it alters thewhole balance. Thus in an actual entity the balanced unity of the total'givenness' excludes anything that is not given.

This is the doctrine of the emergent unity of the superject. An actualentity is to be conceived both as a subject presiding over its own immediacyof becoming, and a superject which is the atomic creature exercising itsfunction of objective immortality. It has become a 'being'; and it belongs tothe nature of every 'being' that it is a potential for every 'becoming.'

This doctrine, that the final 'satisfaction' of an actual entity is intolerantof any addition, expresses the fact that every actual entity—since it iswhat it is—is finally its own reason for what it omits. In the real internalconstitution of an actual entity there is always some element which is con-trary to an omitted element. Here 'contrary' means the impossibility ofjoint entry in the same sense. In other words, indetermination has evap-orated from 'satisfaction/ so that there is a complete determination of'feeling/ or of 'negation of feeling/ respecting the universe. This evapora-tion of indetermination is merely another way of considering the processwhereby the actual entity arises from its data. Thus, in another sense, eachactual entity includes the uni- \72] verse, by reason of its determinate atti-tude towards every element in the universe.

Thus the process of becoming is dipolar, (i) by reason of its qualificationby the determinateness of the actual world, and (ii) by its conceptual pre-hensions of the indeterminateness of eternal objects. The process is con-stituted by the influx of eternal objects into a novel determinateness offeeling which absorbs the actual world into a novel actuality.

The 'formal' constitution of an actual entity is a process of transitionfrom indetermination towards terminal determination. But the indetermi-nation is referent to determinate data. The 'objective7 constitution of an*actual entity is its terminal determination, considered as a complex of com-ponent determinates by reason of which the actual entity is a datum forthe creative advance. The actual entity on its physical side is composed ofits determinate feelings of its actual world, and on its mental side isoriginated by its conceptual appetitions.

Returning to the correlation of 'givenness' and 'potentiality/ we see that'givenness' refers to 'potentiality/ and 'potentiality' to 'givenness'; also wesee that the completion of 'givenness' in actual fact converts the 'not-given'for that fact into 'impossibility' for that fact. The individuality of an actualentity involves an exclusive limitation. This element of 'exclusive limita-tion' is the definiteness essential for the synthetic unity of an actual entity.This synthetic unity forbids the notion of mere addition to the includedelements.

It is evident that 'givenness' and 'potentiality' are both meaningless apartfrom a multiplicity of potential entities. These potentialities are the'eternal objects.' Apart from 'potentiality' and 'givenness/ there can be no

nexus of actual things in process of supersession by novel actual things.The alternative is a static monistic universe, without unrealized poten-tialities; since 'potentiality* is then a meaningless term.

[73] The scope of the ontological principle is not exhausted by the corol-lary that 'decision7 must be referable to an actual entity. Everything mustbe somewhere; and here "somewhere' means 'some actual entity/ Accord-ingly the general potentiality of the universe must be somewhere; since itretains its proximate relevance to actual entities for which it is unrealized.This 'proximate relevance' reappears in subsequent concrescence as finalcausation regulative of the emergence of novelty. This 'somewhere' is thenon-temporal actual entity. Thus 'proximate relevance' means 'relevanceas in the primordial mind of God.'t

It is a contradiction in terms to assume that some explanatory fact canfloat into the actual world out of nonentity. Nonentity is nothingness.Every explanatory fact refers to the decision and to the efficacy* of anactual thing. The notion of 'subsistence' is merely the notion of how eternalobjects can be components of the primordial nature of God. This is aquestion for subsequent discussion (cf. Part V). But eternal objects, as inGod's primordial nature, constitute the Platonic world of ideas.

There is not, however, one entity which is merely the class of all eternalobjects. For if we conceive any class of eternal objects, there are additionaleternal objects which presuppose that class but do not belong to it. For thisreason, at the beginning of this section, the phrase 'the multiplicity ofPlatonic forms' was used, instead of the more natural phrase 'thet class ofPlatonic forms.' A multiplicity is a type of complex thing which has theunity derivative from some qualification which participates in each of itscomponents severally; but a multiplicity has no unity derivative merelyfrom its various components.

SECTION IV

The doctrine just stated—that every explanatory fact refers to the deci-sion and to the efficacy of an actual [74} thing—requires discussion in ref-erence to the ninth Categoreal Obligation. This category states that 'Theconcrescence of each individual actual entity is internally determined andis externally free.'

The peculiarity of the course of history illustrates the joint relevance ofthe 'ontological principle' and of this categoreal obligation. The evolutionof history can be rationalized by the consideration of the determinationof successors by antecedents. But, on the other hand, the evolution of his-tory is incapable of rationalization because it exhibits a selected flux ofparticipating forms. No reason, internal to history, can be assigned whythat flux of forms, rather than another flux, should have been illustrated.It is true that any flux must exhibit the character of internal determina-tion. So much follows from the ontological principle. But every instance of

internal determination assumes that flux up to that point. There is noreason why there could be no alternative flux exhibiting that principle ofinternal determination. The actual flux presents itself with the characterof being merely 'given.7 It does not disclose any peculiar character of 'per-fection.7 On the contrary, the imperfection of the world is the theme ofevery religion which offers a way of escape, and of every sceptic who de-plores the prevailing superstition. The Leibnizian theory of the 'best ofpossible worlds7 is an audacious fudge produced in order to save the faceof a Creator constructed by contemporary, and antecedent, theologians.Further, in the case of those actualities whose immediate experience ismost completely open to us, namely, human beings, the final decision ofthe immediate subject-superject, constituting the ultimate modification ofsubjective aim, is the foundation of our experience of responsibility, of ap-probation or of disapprobation, of self-approval or of self-reproach, of free-dom, of emphasis. This element in experience is too large to be put asidemerely as misconstruction. It governs the whole tone of human life. It canbe illustrated+ by striking [75] instances from fact or from fiction. Butthese instances are only conspicuous illustrations of human experienceduring each hour and each minute. The ultimate freedom of things, lyingbeyond all determinations, was whispered by Galileo—E pur si muove—freedom for the inquisitors to think wrongly, for Galileo to think rightly,and for the world to move in despite of Galileo and inquisitors.

The doctrine of the philosophy of organism is that, however far thesphere of efficient causation be pushed in the determination of componentsof a concrescence—its data, its emotions, its appreciations, its purposes, itsphases of subjective aim—beyond the determination of these componentsthere always remains the final reaction of the self-creative unity of theuniverse. This final reaction completes the self-creative act by putting thedecisive stamp of creative emphasis upon the determinations of efficientcause. Each occasion exhibits its measure of creative emphasis in propor-tion to its measure of subjective intensity. The absolute standard of suchintensity is that of the primordial nature of God, which is neither greatnor small because it arises out of no actual world. It has within it no com-ponents which are standards of comparison. But in the temporal world foroccasions of relatively slight experient intensity, their decisions of creativeemphasis are individually negligible compared to the determined com-ponents which they receive and transmit. But the final accumulation of allsuch decisions—the decision of God's nature and the decisions of all occa-sions—constitutes that special element in the flux of forms in history, whichis given7 and incapable of rationalization beyond the fact that within itevery component which is determinable is internally determined.

The doctrine is, that each concrescence is to be referred to a definite freeinitiation and a definite free conclusion. The initial fact is macrocosmic, inthe sense of having equal relevance to all occasions; the final fact is micro-

[76] cosmic, in the sense of being peculiar to that occasion. Neither fact iscapable of rationalization, in the sense of tracing the antecedents whichdetermine it. The initial fact is the primordial appetition, and the final factis the decision of emphasis, finally creative of the 'satisfaction/

SECTION V

The antithetical terms 'universals7 and 'particulars' are the usual wordsemployed to denote respectively entities which nearly, though not quite,9correspond to the entities here termed 'eternal objects/ and 'actual en-tities.7 These terms, 'universals7 and 'particulars/ both in the suggestive-ness of the two words and in their current philosophical use, are somewhatmisleading. The ontological principle, and the wider doctrine of universalrelativity, on which the present metaphysical discussion is founded, blurthe sharp distinction between what is universal and what is particular. Thenotion of a universal is of that which can enter into the description of manyparticulars; whereas the notion of a particular is that it is described by uni-versal, and does not itself enter into the description of any other particu-lar. According to the doctrine of relativity which is the basis of the meta-physical system of the present lectures, both these notions involve a mis-conception. An actual entity cannot be described, even inadequately, byuniversals; because other actual entities do enter into the description ofany one actual entity. Thus every so-called 'universal7 is particular in thesense of being just what it is, diverse from everything else; and every so-called 'particular7 is universal in the sense of entering into the constitu-tions of other actual entities. The contrary opinion led to the collapse ofDescartes7 many substances into Spinoza's one substance; to Leibniz'swindowless monads with their pre-established harmony; to the scepticalreduction of Hume's philosophy—a reduction first effected by Hume him-self, \77] and reissued with the most beautiful exposition by Santayana inhis Scepticism and Animal Faith.

The point is that the current view of universals and particulars inevitablyleads to the epistemological position stated by Descartes:

From this I should conclude that I knew the wax by means of visionand not simply by the intuition of the mind; unless by chance I re-member that, when looking from a window and saying I see men whopass in the street, I really do not see them, but infer that what I seeis men, just as I say that I see wax. And yet what do I see from thewindow but hats and coats which may cover automatic machines?Yet I judge these to be men. And similarly solely by the faculty ofjudgment [judicandi] which rests in my mind, I comprehend thatwhich I believed I saw with my eyes.10

9 For example, prehensions and subjective forms are also 'particulars.'

10 Meditation II.

In this passage it is assumed 1X that Descartes—the Ego in question—is aparticular, characterized only by universals. Thus his impressions—to useHume's word—are characterizations by universals. Thus there is no percep-tion of a particular actual entity. He arrives at the belief in the actualentity by 'the faculty of judgment.7 But on this theory he has absolutelyno analogy upon which to found any such inference with the faintestshred of probability. Hume, accepting Descartes' account of perception (inthis passage), which also belongs to Locke in some sections of his Essay;easily draws the sceptical conclusion. Santayana irrefutably exposes thefull extent to which this scepticism must be carried. The philosophy oforganism recurs to Descartes7 alternative theory of 'realties objectiva,' andendeavours to interpret it in terms of a consistent ontology. Descartes en-deavoured to combine the two theories; but his unquestioned acceptanceof the subject-predicate dogma forced him [78] into a representative theoryof perception, involving a 'judicium7 validated by our assurance of thepower and the goodness of God. The philosophy of organism in its accountof prehension takes its stand upon the Cartesian terms 'realitas objectiva,7'inspection and Hntuitio.7 The two latter terms are transformed into thenotion of a 'positive prehension,7 and into operations described in thevarious categories of physical and conceptual origination. A recurrence tothe notion of 'God7 is still necessary to mediate between physical and con-ceptual prehensions, but not in the crude form of giving a limited letterof credit to a 'judicium.'

Hume, in effect, agrees that 'mind7 is a process of concrescence arisingfrom primary data. In his account, these data are 'impressions of sensa-tion7; and in such impressions no elements other than universals are dis-coverable. For the philosophy of organism, the primary data are alwaysactual entities absorbed into feeling in virtue of certain universals sharedalike by the objectified actuality and the experient subject (cf. Part III).Descartes takes an intermediate position. He explains perception in Hu-mian terms, but adds an apprehension of particular actual entities in virtueof an Hnspectio7 and a 'judicium7 effected by the mind (Meditations II andIJJ).t Here he is paving the way for Kant, and for the degradation of theworld into 'mere appearance.'

AH modern philosophy hinges round the difficulty of describing theworld in terms of subject and predicate, substance and quality, particularand universal. The result always does violence to that immediate experi-ence which we express in our actions, our hopes, our sympathies, our pur-poses, and which we enjoy in spite of our lack of phrases for its verbal

11 Perhaps inconsistently with what Descartes says elsewhere: in other passagesthe mental activity involved seems to be analysis which discovers 'realitas ob-jectiva7 as a component element of the idea in question. There is thus Hnspectio'rather than 'judicium.7

analysis. We find ourselves in a buzzing12 world, amid a democracy offellow creatures; whereas, under some disguise or other orthodox philoso-phy can only introduce us to solitary substances, each enjoying an illusoryexperience: "O Bottom, thou [79] art changed! what do I see on thee?'7*The endeavour to interpret experience in accordance with the overpoweringdeliverance of common senset must bring us back to some restatement ofPlatonic realism, modified so as to avoid the pitfalls which the philosophi-cal investigations of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries have dis-closed.

The true point of divergence is the false notion suggested by the contrastbetween the natural meanings of the words 'particular' and 'universal/ The'particular7 is thus conceived as being just its individual self with no neces-sary relevance to any other particular. It answers to Descartes7 definitionof substance: "And when we conceive of substance, we merely conceive anexistent thing which requires nothing but itself in order to exist.7713 Thisdefinition is a true derivative from Aristotle's definition: A primary sub-stance is "neither asserted of a subject nor present in a subject.7714 Wemust add the title phrase of Descartes7 The Second Meditation: "Of theNature of the Human Mind; and that it is more easily known than theBody,'7 together with his two statements: "... thought constitutes thenature of thinking substance,'7 and "everything that we find in mind isbut so many diverse forms of thinking.7715 This sequence of quotationsexemplifies the set of presuppositions which led to Locke's empiricism andto Kant's critical philosophy—the two dominant influences from whichmodern thought is derived. This is the side of seventeenth-century philoso-phy which is here discarded.

The principle of universal relativity directly traverses Aristotle's dictum,'A substancet is not present in a subject.' On the contrary, according tothis principle an actual entity is present in other actual entities. In fact ifwe allow for degrees of relevance, and for negligible relevance, we mustsay that every actual entity is present in every other actual entity. Thephilosophy of organism [80] is mainly devoted to the task of making clearthe notion of 'being present in another entity.' This phrase is here borrowedfrom Aristotle: it is not a fortunate phrase, and in subsequent discussionit will be replaced by the term 'objectification.' The Aristotelian phrasesuggests the crude notion that one actual entity is added to another sim-pliciter. This is not what is meant. One role of the eternal objects is thatthey are those elements which express how any one actual entity is con-stituted by its synthesis of other actual entities, and how that actual entitydevelops from the primary dative phase into its own individual actual

12 This epithet is, of course, borrowed from William James.

13 Principles of Philosophy, Part I, 51.*

14 Aristotle by W. D. Ross, Ch. II.

15 Principles of Philosophy, Part I, 53.

existence, involving its individual enjoyments and appetitions. An actualentity is concrete because it is such a particular concrescence of theuniverse.

SECTION VI

A short examination of Locke's Essay Concerning^ Human Under-standing will throw light on the presuppositions from which the philosophyof organism originates. These citations from Locke are valuable as clearstatements of the obvious deliverances of common sense, expressed withtheir natural limitations. They cannot be bettered in their character of pre-sentations of facts which have to be accepted by any satisfactory system ofphilosophy.

The first point to notice is that in some of his statements Locke comesvery near to the explicit formulation of an organic philosophy of the typebeing developed here. It was only his failure to notice that his problemrequired a more drastic revision of traditional categories than that whichhe actually effected, that led to a vagueness of statement, and the intru-sion of inconsistent elements. It was this conservative, other side of Lockewhich led to his sceptical overthrow by Hume. In his turn. Hume (despitehis explicit repudiation in his Treatise, Part I, Sect. VI) was a thoroughconservative, and in his explanation of mentality and its content nevermoved away from the subject-predicate habits of thought [81] which hadbeen impressed on the European mind by the overemphasis on Aristotle'slogic during the long mediaeval period. In reference to this twist of mind,probably Aristotle was not an Aristotelian. But Hume's sceptical reductionof knowledge entirely depends (for its arguments) on the tacit presupposi-tion of the mind as subject and of its contents as predicates—a presuppo-sition which explicitly he repudiates.

The merit of Locke's Essay Concerning^ Human Understanding is itsadequacy, and not its consistency. He gives the most dispassionate descrip-tions of those various elements in experience which common sense neverlets slip. Unfortunately he is hampered by inappropriate metaphysicalcategories which he never criticized. He should have widened the titleof his book into 'An Essay Concerningt Experience/ His true topic is theanalysis of the types of experience enjoyed by an actual entity. But thiscomplete experience is nothing other than what the actual entity is in it-self, for itself. I will adopt the pre-Kantian phraseology, and say that theexperience enjoyed by an actual entity is that entity formaliter. By this Imean that the entity, when considered 'formally,' is being described in re-spect to those forms of its constitution whereby it is that individual entitywith its own measure of absolute self-realization. Its 'ideas of things' arewhat other things are for it. In the phraseology of these lectures, they areits 'feelings.' The actual entity is composite and analysable; and its 'ideas'express how, and in what sense, other things are components in its own

constitution. Thus the form of its constitution is to be found by an analy-sis of the Lockian ideas. Locke talks of 'understanding7 and 'perception/He should have started with a more general neutral term to express thesynthetic concrescence whereby the many things of the universe becomethe one actual entity. Accordingly I have adopted the term 'prehension/to express the activity whereby an actual entity effects its own concretionof other things.

[82] The 'prehension7 of one actual entity by another actual entity is thecomplete transaction, analysable into the objectification of the formerentity as one of the data for the latter, and into the fully clothed feelingwhereby the datum is absorbed into the subjective satisfaction—'clothed7with the various elements of its 'subjective form.7 But this definition can bestated more generally so as to include the case of the prehension of aneternal object by an actual entity; namely, The 'positive prehension7 of anentity by an actual entity is the complete transaction analysable into theingression, or objectification, of that entity as a datum for feeling, andinto the feeling whereby this datum is absorbed into the subjective satis-faction. I also discard Locke's term 'idea.7 Instead of that term, the otherthings, in their limited r61es as elements for the actual entity in question,are called 'objects7 for that thing. There are four main types of objects,namely, 'eternal objects,7 'propositions,7 'objectified7 actual entities andnexus. These 'eternal objects7 are Locke's ideas as explained in his Essay(II, I, l),t where he writes:Idea is the object of thinking.—Every man being conscious to himselfthat he thinks, and that which his mind is applied about, whilst think-ing, being the ideas that are there, it is past doubt that men have intheir mind several ideas, such as aret those expressed by the words,"whiteness, hardness, sweetness, thinking, motion, man, elephant, army,drunkenness,77 and others.But latert (III, III, 2), when discussing general terms (and subcon-sciously, earlier in his discussion of 'substance7 in II, XXIII), he adds par-enthetically another type of ideas which are practically what I term 'ob-jectified actual entities' and 'nexus.7 He calls them 'ideas of particularthings7; and he explains why, in general, such ideas cannot have theirseparate names. The reason is simple and undeniable: there are too manyactual entities. He writes: "But it is beyond the power of human capacityto frame and retain distinct ideas of all the particular things we meet with:every bird and beast men saw, [83] every tree and plant that affected thesenses, could not find a place in the most capacious understanding.77 Thecontext shows that it is not the impossibility of an 'idea7 of any particularthing which is the seat of the difficulty; it is solely their number. This no-tion of a direct 'idea' (or 'feeling') of an actual entity is a presupposition ofall common sense; Santayana ascribes it to 'animal faith.7 But it accordsvery ill with the sensationalist theory of knowledge which can be derived

from other parts of Locke's writings. Both Locke and Descartes wrestlewith exactly the same difficulty.

The principle that I am adopting is that consciousness presupposes ex-perience, and not experience consciousness. It is a special element in thesubjective forms of some feelings. Thus an actual entity may, or may not,be conscious of some part of its experience. Its experience is its completeformal constitution, including its consciousness, if any. Thus, in Locke'sphraseology, its 'ideas of particular things' are those other things exercisingtheir function as felt components of its constitution. Locke would only termthem 'ideas' when these objectifications belong to that region of experiencelit up by consciousness. In Section 4t of the same chapter, he definitelymakes all knowledge to be "founded in particular things.77 He writes:". . . yet a distinct name for every particular thing would not be of anygreat use for the improvement of knowledge: which, though founded inparticular things,1* enlarges itself by general views; to which things reducedinto sortst under general names, are properly subservient/7 Thus for Locke,in this passage, there are not first the qualities and then the conjecturalparticular things; but conversely. Also he illustrates his meaning of a 'par-ticular thing' by a leaf/ a 'crow,7 a 'sheep,7 a 'grain of sand.7 So he is notthinking of a particular patch of colour, or other sense-datum.17 For ex-ample, [84] in Section 7 of the same chapter, in reference to children hewrites: "The ideas of the nurse and the mother are well framed in theirminds; and, like pictures of them there, represent only those individuals.77This doctrine of Locke's must be compared with Descartes' doctrine of'realitas objectiva.7 Locke inherited the dualistic separation of mind frombody. If he had started with the one fundamental notion of an actual en-tity, '.he complex of ideas disclosed in consciousness would have at onceturned into the complex constitution of the actual entity disclosed in itsown consciousness, so far as it is conscious—fitfully, partially, or not at all.Locke definitely states how ideas become general. In Section 6 of thechapter he writes: ". . . and ideas become general by separating fromthem the circumstances of time, and place, and any other ideas that maydetermine them to this or that particular existence." Thus for Locke theabstract idea is preceded by the 'idea of a particular existent'; "[children]frame an idea which they find those many particulars do partake in.7' Thisstatement of Locke's should be compared with the Category of Con-ceptual Valuation, which is the fourth categoreal obligation.

Locke discusses the constitution of actual things under the term 'realessences.' He writes (Section 15,t same chapter): "And thus the real in-

16 My italics.

17 As he is in I, II, 15, where he writes, "The senses at first let in particularideas, and furnish the yet empty cabinet; . . ." Note the distinction between'particular ideas' and 'ideas of particular things/

ternal (but generally in substances unknown) constitution of things,whereon their discoverable qualities depend, may be called their 'essence/ "The point is that Locke entirely endorses the doctrine that an actual entityarises out of a complex constitution involving other entities, though,t byhis unfortunate use of such terms as 'cabinet/ he puts less emphasis on thenotion of 'process7 than does Hume.

Locke has in fact stated in his work one main problem for the philosophyof organism. He discovers that the mind is a unity arising out of the activeprehension of ideas into one concrete thing. Unfortunately, he presup-poses both the Cartesian dualism whereby minds are one kind of par-ticulars, and natural entities are another kind [85] of particulars, and alsothe subject-predicate dogma. He is thus, in company with Descartes, drivento a theory of representative perception. For example, in one of the quota-tions already cited,t he writes: "and, like pictures of them there, representonly those individuals.77 This doctrine obviously creates an insoluble prob-lem for epistemology, only to be solved either by some sturdy make-believeof 'animal faith,7 with Santayana, or by some doctrine of illusorinesst—some doctrine of mere appearance, inconsistent if taken as real—withBradley. Anyhow 'representative perception7 can never, within its ownmetaphysical doctrines, produce the title deeds to guarantee the validity ofthe representation of fact by idea.

Locke and the philosophers of his epoch—the seventeenth and eigh-teenth centuries—are misled by one fundamental misconception. It is theassumption, unconscious and uncriticized, that logical simplicity can beidentified with priority in the process constituting an experient occasion.Locke founded the first two books of his Essay on this presupposition, withthet exception of his early sections on 'substance,7 which are quoted imme-diately below. In the third and fourth books of the Essay he abandons thispresupposition, again unconsciously as it seems.

This identification of priority in logic with priority in practice hasvitiated thought and procedure from the first discovery of mathematics andlogic by the Greeks. For example, some of the worst defects in educationalprocedure have been due to it. Locke's nearest approach to the philosophyof organism, and—from the point of view of that doctrine—his main over-sight, are best exemplified by the first section of his chapter, 'Of our Com-plex Ideas of Substances7 (II, XXIII, 1). He writes:

The mind, being, as I have declared, furnished with a great numberof the simple ideas conveyed in by the senses, as they are found inexterior things, or by reflection on its own operations, takes notice,also, that a certain number of these simple ideas go constantly to-gether; [86] which being presumed to belong to one thing, and wordsbeing suited to common apprehensions, and made use of for quick dis-patch, are called, so united in one subject, by one name; which, by in-advertency, we are apt afterward to talk of and consider as one simpleidea, which indeed is a complication of many ideas together: because,

as I have said, not imagining how these simple ideas can subsist bythemselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some substratumwherein they do subsist, and from which they do result; which there-fore we call "substance/'

In this section, Locke's first statement, which is the basis of the re-mainder of the section, is exactly the primary assumption of the philosophyof organism: "The mind, being . . . furnished with a great number of thesimple ideas conveyed in by the senses, as they are found in exteriorthings, . . ." Here the last phrase, 'as they are found in exterior things/asserted what later I shall call the vector character of the primary feelings.The universals involved obtain that status by reason of the fact that 'theyare found in exterior things' This is Locke's assertion and it is the assertionof the philosophy of organism. It can also be conceived as a developmentof Descartes' doctrine of 'realitas objectiva.7 The universals are the onlyelements in the data describable by concepts, because concepts are merelythe analytic functioning of universals. But the 'exterior things/ althoughthey are not expressible by concepts in respect to their individual particu-larity, are no less data for feeling; so that the concrescent actuality arisesfrom feeling their status of individual particularity; and thus that particu-larity is included as an element from which feelings originate, and whichthey concern.

The sentence later proceeds with, "a certain number of these simpleideas go constantly together." This can only mean that in the immediateperception 'a certain number of these simple ideas' are found together in anexterior thing, and that the recollection of antecedent moments of experi-ence discloses that the same fact, of [87] togetherness in an exterior thing,holds for the same set of simple ideas. Again, the philosophy of organismagrees that this description is true for moments of immediate experience.But Locke, owing to the fact that he veils his second premise under thephrase 'go constantly together,' omits to consider the question whether the'exterior things' of the successive moments are to be identified.

The answer of the philosophy of organism is that, in the sense in whichLocke is here speaking, the exterior things of successive moments are notto be identified with each other. Each exterior thing is either one actualentity, or (more frequently) is a nexus of actual entities with imme-diacies mutually contemporary. For the sake of simplicity we will speakonly of the simpler case where the 'exterior thing' means one actual entityat the moment in question. But what Locke is explicitly concerned with isthe notion of the self-identity of the one enduring physical body which lastsfor years, or for seconds, or for ages. He is considering the current philo-sophical notion of an individualized particular substance (in the Aristot-elian sense) which undergoes adventures of change, retaining its substantialform amid transition oft accidents. Throughout his Essay, he in effect re-tains this notion while rightly insisting on its vagueness and obscurity. Thephilosophy of organism agrees with Locke and Hume, that the non-in-

dividualized substantial form is nothing else than the collectiqn of uni-versal—or? more accurately, the one complex universal—common to thesuccession of 'exterior things' at successive moments respectively. In otherwords, an 'exterior thing' is either one 'actual entity/ or is a 'society' with a'defining characteristic' For the organic philosophy, these 'exterior things'(in the former sense) are the final concrete actualities. The individualizedsubstance (of Locke) must be construed to be the historic route constitutedby some society of fundamental 'exterior things,' stretching from the first'thing' to the last 'thing/

[88] But Locke, throughout his Essay, rightly insists that the chief ingre-dient in the notion of 'substance' is the notion of 'power/ The philosophyof organism holds that,t in order to understand 'power/ we must have acorrect notion of how each individual actual entity contributes to thedatum from which its successors arise and to which they must conform.The reason why the doctrine of power is peculiarly relevant to the en-during things, which the philosophy of Locke's day conceived as individual-ized substances, is that any likeness between the successive occasions ofat historic route procures a corresponding identity between their contribu-tions to the datum of any subsequent actual entity; and it therefore securesa corresponding intensification in the imposition of conformity. The princi-ple is the same as that which holds for the more sporadic occasions inempty space; but the uniformity along the historic route increases the de-gree of conformity which that route exacts from the future. In particulareach historic route of like occasions tends to prolong itself, by reason of theweight of uniform inheritance derivable from its members. The philosophyof organism abolishes the detached mind. Mental activity is one of themodes of feeling belonging to all actual entities in some degree, but onlyamounting to conscious intellectuality in some actual entities. This highergrade of mental activity is the intellectual self analysis of the entity in anearlier stage of incompletion, effected by intellectual feelings produced ina later stage of concrescence.18

The perceptive constitution of the actual entity presents the problem,How can the other actual entities, each with its own formal existence, alsoenter objectively into the perceptive constitution of the actual entity inquestion? This is the problem of the solidarity of the universe. The classicaldoctrines of universals and particulars, of subject and predicate, of individ-ual substances not present in other individual substances, of [89] the exter-nality of relations, alike render this problem incapable of solution. Theanswer given by the organic philosophy is the doctrine of prehensions, in-volved in concrescent integrations, and terminating in a definite, complexunity of feeling. To be actual must mean that all actual things are alike ob-jects, enjoying objective immortality in fashioning creative actions; andthat all actual things are subjects, each prehending the universe from which

18 Cf. Part III, Ch. V.

it arises. The creative action is the universe always becoming one in a par-ticular unity of self-experience, and thereby adding to the multiplicitywhich is the universe as many. This insistent concrescence into unity isthe outcome of the ultimate self-identity of each entity. No entity—be it'universal' or 'particular'—can play disjoined roles. Self-identity requiresthat every entity have one conjoined, self-consistent function, whatever bethe complexity of that function.

SECTION VII

There is another side of Locke, which is his doctrine of power/ Thisdoctrine is a better illustration of his admirable adequacy than of his con-sistency; there is no escape from Hume's demonstration that no such doc-trine is compatible with a purely sensationalist philosophy. The establish-ment of such a philosophy, though derivative from Locke, was not hisexplicit purpose. Every philosophical school in the course of its historyrequires two presiding philosophers. One of them under the influence ofthe main doctrines of the school should survey experience with some ade-quacy, but inconsistently. The other philosopher should reduce the doc-trines of the school to a rigid consistency; he will thereby effect a reductioad absurdum. No school of thought has performed its full service tophilosophy until these men have appeared. In this way the school of sensa-tionalist empiricism derives its importance from Locke and Hume.

Locke introduces his doctrine of 'power' as follows (II, XXI, L3t)*

This idea how got.—The mind being [90] every day informed, bythe senses, of the alteration of those simple ideas it observes in thingswithout, and taking notice how one comes to an end and ceases tobe, and another begins to exist which was not before; reflecting also onwhat passes within itself, and observing a constant change of its ideas,sometimes by the impression of outward objects on the senses, andsometimes by the determination of its own choice; and concluding,from what it has so constantly observed to have been, that the likechanges will for the future be made in the same things! by like agents,and by the like ways; considers in one thing the possibility of havingany of its simple ideas changed, and in another the possibility ofmaking that change; and so comes by that idea which we call "power."Thus we say, fire has a power to melt gold; . . . and gold has a powerto be melted: ... In which and thet like cases, the power we con-sider is in reference to the change of perceivable ideas: for we cannotobserve any alteration to be made in, or operation upon, any thing,but by the observable change of its sensible ideas; nor conceive anyalteration to be made, but by conceiving a change of some of itsideas. . . .* Power thus considered is twofold; viz. as able to make, orable to receive, any change: the one may be called "active," and theother "passive," power. . . .* I confess power includes in it some kind

of relation,—a relation to action or change; as, indeed, which of ourideas, of what kind soever, when attentively considered, does not?For our ideas of extension, duration, and number, do they not allcontain in them a secret relation of the parts? Figure and motion havesomething relative in them much more visibly. And sensible qualities,as colours and smells, etc., what are they but the powers of differentbodies in relation to our perception? . . . Our idea therefore of power,I think, may well have a place amongst other simple ideas, and beconsidered as one of them, being one of those that make a principalingredient in our complex ideas of substances, as we shall hereafterhave occasion to observe.

[91] In this important passage, Locke enunciates the main doctrines ofthe philosophy of organism, namely: the principle of relativity; the rela-tional character of eternal objects, whereby they constitute the forms ofthe objectifications of actual entities for each other; the composite char-acter of an actual entity (i.e., a substance); the notion of 'power' as makinga principal ingredient in that of actual entity (substance). In this latternotion, Locke adumbrates both the ontological principle, and also theprinciple that the 'power' of one actual entity on the other is simply howthe former is objectified in the constitution of the other. Thus the prob-lem of perception and the problem of power are one and the same, at leastso far as perception is reduced to mere prehension of actual entities. Per-ception, in the sense of consciousness of such prehension, requires the ad-ditional factor of the conceptual prehension of eternal objects, and a pro-cess of integration of the two factors (cf. Part III).

Locke's doctrine of 'power' is reproduced in the philosophy of organismby the doctrine of the two types of objectification, namely, (a) 'causalobjectification,'and (p) 'presentational objectification.'

In 'causal objectification' what is felt subjectively by the objectified ac-tual entity is transmitted objectively to the concrescent actualities whichsupersede it. In Locke's phraseology the objectified actual entity is thenexerting 'power.' In this type of objectification the eternal objects, rela-tional between object and subject, express the formal constitution of theobjectified actual entity.

In 'presentational objectification' the relational eternal objects fall intotwo sets, one set contributed by the 'extensive' perspective of the perceivedfrom the position of the perceiver, and the other set by the antecedent con-crescent phases of the perceiver. What is ordinarily termed 'perception' isconsciousness of presentational objectification. But according to the phi-losophy of organism there can be consciousness of both types of objectifi-cation. There can be such consciousness of both [92] types because, ac-cording to this philosophy, the knowable is the complete nature of theknower, at least such phases of it as are antecedent to that operation ofknowing.

Locke misses one essential doctrine, namely, that the doctrine of interna1

Fact and Form 59

relations makes it impossible to attribute 'change7 to any actual entity.Every actual entity is what it is, and is with its definite status in theuniverse, determined by its internal relations to other actual entities.'Change' is the description of the adventures of eternal objects in theevolving universe of actual things.

The doctrine of internal relations introduces another considerationwhich cannot be overlooked without error. Locke considers the 'real es-sence' and the 'nominal essence' of things. But on the theory of the gen-eral relativity of actual things between each other, and of the internality ofthese relations, there are two distinct notions hidden under the term 'realessence/ both of importance. Locke writes (III, III, 15):Essence may be taken for the being of any thing, whereby it is what itis. And thus the real internal (but generally in substances unknown)constitution of things, whereon their discoverable qualities depend,may be called their "essence/7... It is true, there is ordinarily supposeda real constitution of the sorts of things: and it is past doubt theremust be some real constitution, on which any collection of simpleideas co-existing must depend. But it being evident that things areranked under names into sorts or species only as they agree to certainabstract ideas to which we have annexed those t names, the essence ofeach genus or sort comes to be nothing but that abstract idea, whichthe general or "sortal" (if I may have leave so to call it from "sort," as Ido "general" from genus) name stands for. And thist we shall find tobe that which the word "essence" imparts in its mostt familiar use.These two sorts of essences, I suppose, may not unfitly be termed, theone the "real," the other the "nominal," essence.

[93] The fundamental notion of the philosophy of organism is expressedin Locke's phrase, "it is past doubt there must be some real constitution,on which any collection of simple ideas co-existing must depend." Lockemakes it plain (cf. II, II, 1) that by a 'simple idea' he means the ingressionin the actual entity (illustrated by 'a piece of wax/ 'a piece of ice/ 'a rose')of some abstract quality which is not complex (illustrated by 'softness/'warmth/ 'whiteness'). For Locke such simple ideas, coexisting^ in an actualentity, require a real constitution for that entity. Now in the philosophy oforganism, passing beyond Locke's explicit statement, the notion of a realconstitution is taken to mean that the eternal objects function by intro-ducing the multiplicity of actual entities as constitutive of the actual en-tity in question. Thus the constitution is 'real' because it assigns its statusin the real world to the actual entity. In other words the actual entity, invirtue of being what it is, is also where it is. It is somewhere because it issome actual thing with its correlated actual world. This is the direct denialof the Cartesian doctrine, ". . . an existent thing which requires nothingbut itself in order to exist." It is also inconsistent with Aristotle's phrase,"neither asserted of a subject nor present in a subject."I am certainly not maintaining that Locke grasped explicitly the impli-

cations of his words as thus developed for the philosophy of organism.But it is a short step from a careless phrase to a flash of insight; nor is it un-believable that Locke saw further into metaphysical problems than someof his followers. But abandoning the question of what Locke had in hisown mind, the 'organic doctrine' demands a 'real essence7 in the sense of acomplete analysis of the relations, and inter-relations of the actual entitieswhich are formative of the actual entity in question, and an 'abstract es-sence' in which the specified actual entities are replaced by the notions ofunspecified entities in such a combination: this is the notion of an un-specified actual entity. Thus the real [94] essence involves real objectifica-tions of specified actual entities; the abstract essence is a complex eternalobject. There is nothing self-contradictory in the thought of many actualentities with the same abstract essence; but there can only be one actualentity with the same real essence. For the real essence indicates 'where'the entity is, that is to say, its status in the real world; the abstract essenceomits the particularity of the status.

The philosophy of organism in its appeal to the facts can thus supportitself by an appeal to the insight of John Locke, who in British philosophyis the analogue to Plato, in the epoch of his life, in personal endowments,in width of experience, and in dispassionate statement of conflictingintuitions.

This doctrine of organism is the attempt to describe the world as aprocess of generation of individual actual entities, each with its own ab-solute self-attainment. This concrete finality of the individual is nothingelse than a decision referent beyond itself. The 'perpetual perishing' (cf.Locke, II, XIV, It) of individual absoluteness is thus foredoomed. But the'perishing' of absoluteness is the attainment of 'objective immortality.'This last conception expresses the further element in the doctrine of or-ganism—that the process of generation is to be described in terms of actualentities.

CHAPTER IITHE EXTENSIVE CONTINUUM

SECTION I

[95] We must first consider the perceptive mode in which there is clear,distinct consciousness of the 'extensive' relations of the world. These rela-tions include the 'extensiveness' of space and the 'extensiveness' of time.Undoubtedly, this clarity, at least in regard to space, is obtained only inordinary perception through the senses. This mode of perception is heretermed 'presentational immediacy/ In this 'mode' the contemporary worldis consciously prehended as a continuum of extensive relations.

It cannot be too clearly understood that some chief notions of Europeanthought were framed under the influence of a misapprehension, only par-tially corrected by the scientific progress of the last century. This mistakeconsists in the confusion of mere potentiality with actuality. Continuityconcerns what is potential; whereas actuality is incurably atomic.

This misapprehension is promoted by the neglect of the principle that,so far as physicalt relations are concerned, contemporary events happen incausal independence of each other.1 This principle will have to be ex-plained later, in connection with an examination of process and of time. Itreceives an exemplification in the character of our perception of the worldof contemporary actual entities. That contemporary world is objectified[96] for us as 'realitas objectiva,7 illustrating bare extension with its variousparts discriminated by differences of sense-data, t These qualities, such ascolours, sounds, bodily feelings, tastes, smells, together with the perspec-tives introduced by extensive relationships, are the relational eternal ob-jects whereby the contemporary actual entities are elements in our consti-tution. This is the type of objectification which (in Sect. VII of theprevious chapter) has been termed 'presentational objectification.'

In this way, by reason of the principle of contemporary independence,the contemporary world is objectified for us under the aspect of passivepotentiality. The very sense-data by which its parts are differentiated aresupplied by antecedent states of our own bodies, and so is their distributionin contemporary space. Our direct perception of the contemporary worldis thus reduced to extension, defining (i) our own geometrical perspectives,and (ii) possibilities of mutual perspectives for other contemporary entities

1 This principle lies on the surface of the fundamental Einsteinian formula forthe physical continuum.

61

inter se, and (iii) possibilities of division. These possibilities of division con-stitute the external world a continuum. For a continuum is divisible; sofar as the contemporary world is divided by actual entities, it is not a con-tinuum, but is atomic. Thus the contemporary world is perceived with itspotentiality for extensive division, and not in its actual atomic division.

The contemporary world as perceived by the senses is the datum forcontemporary actuality, and is therefore continuous—divisible but notdivided. The contemporary world is in fact divided and atomic, being amultiplicity of definite actual entities. These contemporary actual entitiesare divided from each other, and are not themselves divisible into othercontemporary actual entities. This antithesis will have to be discussed later(cf. Part IV). But it is necessary to adumbrate it here.

This limitation of the way in which the contemporary actual entities arerelevant to the 'formal' existence of the subject in question is the firstexample of the general [97] principle, that objectification relegates into ir-relevance, or into a subordinate relevance, the full constitution of the ob-jectified entity. Some real component in the objectified entity assumes ther61e of being how that particular entity is a datum in the experience of thesubject. In this case, the objectified contemporaries are only directly rele-vant to the subject in their character of arising from a datum which is anextensive continuum. They do, in fact, atomize this continuum; but theaboriginal potentiality, which they include and realize, is what they con-tribute as the relevant factor in their objectifications. They thus exhibit thecommunity of contemporary actualities as a common world with mathe-matical relations—where the term 'mathematical' is used in the sense inwhich it would have been understood by Plato, Euclid, and Descartes,before the modern discovery of the true definition of pure mathematics.

The bare mathematical potentialities of the extensive continuum re-quire an additional content in order to assume the role of real objects forthe subject. This content is supplied by the eternal objectst termed sense-data. These objects are 'given' for the experience of the subject. Theirgivenness does not arise from the 'decision' of the contemporary entitieswhich are thus objectified. It arises from the functioning of the antecedentphysical body of the subject; and this functioning can in its turn be ana-lysed as representing the influence of the more remote past, a past com-mon alike to the subject and to its contemporary actual entities. Thusthese sense-data are eternal objects playing a complex relational role;they connect the actual entities of the past with the actual entities of thecontemporary world, and thereby effect objectifications of the contem-porary things and of the past things. For instance, we see the contemporarychair, but we see it with our eyes; and we touch the contemporary chair,but we touch it with our hands. Thus colours objectify the chair in oneway, and objectify the eyes in another way, as elements in the experienceof the subject. [95] Also touch objectifies the chair in one way, and ob-

jectifies the hands in another way, as elements in the experience of thesubject. But the eyes and the hands are in the past (the almost immediatepast) and the chair is in the present The chair, thus objectified, is theobjectification of a contemporary nexus of actual entities in its unity as onenexus. This nexus is illustrated as to its constitution by the spatial region,with its perspective relations. This region is, in fact, atomized by the mem-bers of the nexus. By the operation of the Category of Transmutation (cf.Parts III and IV), in the objectification an abstraction is made from themultiplicity of members and from all components of their formal consti-tutions, except the occupation of this region. This prehension, in theparticular example considered, will be termed the prehension of a 'chair-image/ Also the intervention of the past is not confined to antecedent eyesand hands. There is a more remote past throughout nature external to thebody. The direct relevance of this remote past, relevant by reason of itsdirect objectification in the immediate subject, is practically negligible, sofar as concerns prehensions of a strictly physical type.

But external nature has an indirect relevance by the transmissionthrough it of analogous prehensions. In this way there are in it varioushistorical routes of intermediate objectifications. Such relevant historicalroutes lead up to various parts of the animal body, and transmit into itprehensions which form the physical influence of the external environmenton the animal body. But this external environment which is in the past ofthe concrescent subject is also, with negligible exceptions, in the past ofthe nexus which is the objectified chair-image. If there be a 'real chair/there will be another historical route of objectifications from nexus tonexus in this environment. The members of each nexus will be mutuallycontemporaries. Also the historical route will lead up to the nexus whichis the chair-image. The complete nexus, composed of this historical routeand the [99] chair-image, will form a 'corpuscular' society. This society isthe 'real chair/

The prehensions of the concrescent subject and the formal constitutionsof the members of the contemporary nexus which is the chair-image arethus conditioned by the properties of the same environment in the past.The animal body is so constructed that, with rough accuracy and innormal conditions, important emphasis is thus laid upon those regions inthe contemporary world which are particularly relevant for the futureexistence of the enduring object of which the immediate percipient is oneoccasion.

A reference to the Category of Transmutation will show that perceptionof contemporary 'images7 in the mode of 'presentational immediacy' is an'impure' prehension. The subsidiary 'pure7 physical prehensions are thecomponents which provide some definite information as to the physicalworld; the subsidiary 'pure7 mental prehensions are the components byreason of which the theory of 'secondary qualities7 was introduced into the

theory of perception. The account here given traces back these secondaryqualities to their root in physical prehensions expressed by the 'wiihness ofthe body/

If the familiar correlations between physical paths and the life-historiesof a chair and of the animal body are not satisfied, we are apt to say thatour perceptions are delusive. The word 'delusive'" is all very well as a tech-nical term; but it must not be misconstrued to mean that what we havedirectly perceived, we have not directly perceived. Our direct perception,via our senses, of an immediate extensive shape, in a certain geometricalperspective to ourselves, and in certain general geometrical relations to thecontemporary world, remains an ultimate fact. Our inferences are at fault.In Cartesian phraseology, it is a final 'inspectio' (also termed Hntuitio')which, when purged of all 'judicium—i.e., of 'inference — is final for belief.This whole question of 'delusive' perception must be considered later (cf.Part III, Chs. Ill to V) in more [100] detail. We can, however, see at oncethat there are grades of 'delusiveness.' There is the non-delusive case, whenwe see a chair-image and there is a chair. There is the partially delusive casewhen we have been looking in a mirror; in this case, the chair-image wesee is not the culmination of the corpuscular society of entities which wecall the real chair. Finally, we may have been taking drugs, so that thechair-image we see has no familiar counterpart in any historical route of acorpuscular society. Also there are other delusive grades where the lapse oftime is the main element. These cases are illustrated by our perceptions ofthe heavenly bodies. In delusive cases we are apt, in a confusing way, tosay that the societies of entities which we did not see but correctly inferredare the things that we 'really' saw.

The conclusion of this discussion is that the ingression of the eternalobjects termed 'sense-data't into the experience of a subject cannot beconstrued as the simple objectification of the actual entity to which, in-ordinary speech, we ascribe that sense-datum as a quality. The ingressioninvolves a complex relationship, whereby the sense-datum emerges as the'given' eternal object by which some past entities are objectified (for ex-ample, colour seen with the eyes and bad temper inherited from theviscera) and whereby the sense-datum also enters into the objectificationof a society of actual entities in the contemporary world. Thus a sense-datum has ingression into experience by reason of its forming the what ofa very complex multiple integration of prehensions within that occasion.For example, the ingression of a visual sense-datum involves the causalobjectification of various antecedent bodily organs and the presentationalobjectification of the shape seen, this shape being a nexus of contemporaryactual entities. In this account of the ingression of sense-data, the animalbody is nothing more than the most intimately relevant part of the ante-cedent settled world. To sum up this account: When we perceive a con-temporary extended shape which we term a 'chair/ the sense- [101} data in-volved are not necessarily elements in the 'real internal constitution' of this

chair-image: they are elements—in some way of feeling—in the 'real in-ternal constitutions' of those antecedent organs of the human body withwhich we perceive the 'chair/ The direct recognition of such antecedentactual entities, with which we perceive contemporaries, is hindered and,apart from exceptional circumstances, rendered impossible by the spatialand temporal vagueness which infect such data. Later (cf. Part III, Chs.Ill to V) the whole question of this perception of a nexus vaguely, that isto say, without distinction of the actual entities composing it, is discussedin terms of the theory of prehensions, and in relation to the Category ofTransmutation.

SECTION II

This account of 'presentational immediacy' presupposes two metaphysi-cal assumptions:

(i) That the actual world, in so far as it is a community of entitieswhich are settled, actual, and already become, conditions and limits thepotentiality for creativeness beyond itself. This 'given' world provides de-terminate data in the form of those objectifications of themselves whichthe characters of its actual entities can provide. This is a limitation laidupon the general potentiality provided by eternal objects, consideredmerely in respect to the generality of their natures. Thus, relatively to anyactual entity, there is a 'giver/ world of settled actual entities and a 'real'potentiality, which is the datum for creativeness beyond that standpoint.This datum, which is the primary phase in the process constituting anactual entity, is nothing else than the actual world itself in its characterof a possibility for the process of being felt. This exemplifies the meta-physical principle that every 'being' is a potential for a 'becoming/ Theactual world is the 'objective content' of each new creation.

Thus we have always to consider two meanings of [102] potentiality: (a)the 'general' potentiality, which is the bundle of possibilities, mutually con-sistent or alternative, provided by the multiplicity of eternal objects, and(b) the 'real' potentiality, which is conditioned by the data provided bythe actual world. General potentiality is absolute, and real potentiality isrelative to some actual entity, taken as a standpoint whereby the actualworld is denned. It must be remembered that the phrase 'actual world' islike 'yesterday' and 'tomorrow/ in that it alters its meaning according tostandpoint. The actual world must always mean the community of allactual entities, including the primordial actual entity called 'God' andthe temporal actual entities.

Curiously enough, even at this early stage of metaphysical discussion,the influence of the 'relativity theory' of modern physics is important.According to the classical 'uniquely serial' view of time, two contemporaryactual entities define the same actual world. According to the modern view

no two actual entities define the same actual world. Actual entities arecalled 'contemporary' when neither belongs to the given* actual world de-fined by the other.

The differences between the actual worlds of a pair of contemporaryentities, which are in a certain sense 'neighbours/ are negligible for mosthuman purposes. Thus the difference between the 'classical' and the 'rela-tivity' view of time only rarely has any important relevance. I shall alwaysadopt the relativity view; for one reason, because it seems better to accordwith the general philosophical doctrine of relativity which is presupposedin the philosophy of organism; and for another reason, because with rareexceptions the classical doctrine can be looked on as a special case of therelativity doctrine—a case which does not seem to accord with experimentalevidence. In other words, the classical view seems to limit a generalphilosophical doctrine; it is the larger assumption; and its consequences,taken in conjunction with other scientific principles, seem to be false.

[J03] (ii) The second metaphysical assumption is that the real poten-tialities relative to all standpoints are coordinated as diverse determinationsof one extensive continuum. This extensive continuum is one relationalcomplex in which all potential objectifications find their niche. It underliesthe whole world, past, present, and future. Considered in its full generality,apart from the additional conditions proper only to the cosmic epoch ofelectrons, protons, molecules, and star-systems, the properties of this con-tinuum are very few and do not include the relationships of metricalgeometry. An extensive continuum is a complex of entities united by thevarious allied relationships of whole to part, and of overlapping so as topossess common parts, and of contact, and of other relationships derivedfrom these primary relationships. The notion of a 'continuum' involvesboth the property of indefinite divisibility and the property of unboundedextension. There are always entities beyond entities, because nonentity isno boundary. This extensive continuum expresses the solidarity of all pos-sible standpoints throughout the whole process of the world. It is not a factprior to the world; it is the first determination of order—that is, of realpotentiality—arising out of the general character of the world. In its fullgenerality beyond the present epoch, it does not involve shapes, dimen-sions, or measurability; these are additional determinations of real po-tentiality arising from our cosmic epoch.

This extensive continuum is 'real/ because it expresses a fact derivedfrom the actual world and concerning the contemporary actual world. Allactual entities are related according to the determinations of this con-tinuum; and all possible actual entities in the future must exemplify thesedeterminations in their relations with the already actual world. The realityof the future is bound up with the reality of this continuum. It is thereality of what is potential, in its character of a real component of what isactual. Such a real component must be interpreted in \104] terms of the

relatedness of prehensions. This task will be undertaken in Chapter V ofPart IV of these lectures.

Actual entities atomize the extensive continuum. This continuum is initself merely the potentiality for division; an actual entity effects thisdivision. The objectification of the contemporary world merely expressesthat world in terms of its potentiality for subdivision and in terms of themutual perspectives which any such subdivision will bring into real ef-fectiveness. These are the primary governing data for any actual entity;for they express how all actual entities are in the solidarity of one world.With the becoming of any actual entity what was previously potential inthe space-time continuum is now the primary real phase in something ac-tual. For each process of concrescence a regional standpoint in the world,defining a limited potentiality for objectifications, has been adopted. Inthe mere extensive continuum there is no principle to determine whatregional quanta shall be atomized, so as to form the real perspective stand-point for the primary data constituting the basic phase in the concrescenceof an actual entity. The factors in the actual world whereby this de-termination is effected will be discussed at a later stage of this investiga-tion. They constitute the initial phase of the 'subjective aim/ This initialphase is a direct derivate from God's primordial nature. In this function,as in every other, God is the organ of novelty, aiming at intensification.

In the mere continuum there are contrary potentialities; in the actualworld there are definite atomic actualities determining one coherent sys-tem of real divisions throughout the region of actuality. Every actual entityin its relationship to other actual entities is in this sense somewhere inthe continuum, and arises out of the data provided by this standpoint.But in another sense it is everywhere throughout the continuum; for itsconstitution includes the objectifications of the actual world and therebyincludes the continuum; also the [105] potential objectifications of itselfcontribute to the real potentialities whose solidarity the continuum ex-presses. Thus the continuum is present in each actual entity, and eachactual entity pervades the continuum.

This conclusion can be stated otherwise. Extension, apart from itsspatialization and temporalization, is that general scheme of relationshipsproviding the capacity that many objects can be welded into the real unityof one experience. Thus, an act of experience has an objective scheme ofextensive order by reason of the double fact that its own perspective stand-point has extensive content, and that the other actual entities are objecti-fied with the retention of their extensive relationships. These extensiverelationships are more fundamental than their more special spatial andtemporal relationships. Extension is the most general scheme of real po-tentiality, providing the background for all other organic relations. Thepotential scheme does not determine its own atomization by actual en-tities. It is divisible; but its real division by actual entities depends upon

more particular characteristics of the actual entities constituting the ante-cedent environment. In respect to time, this atomization takes the specialform 2 of the 'epochal theory of time/ In respect to space, it means thatevery actual entity in the temporal world is to be credited with a spatialvolume for its perspective standpoint. These conclusions are required bythe consideration 3 of Zeno's arguments, in connection with the presump-tion that an actual entity is an act of experience. The authority of Wil-liam James can be quoted in support of this conclusion. He writes: "Eitheryour experience is of no content, of no change, or it is of a perceptibleamount of content or change. Your acquaintance with reality grows liter-ally by buds or drops of perception. Intellectually and on reflection youcan divide these into components, but as immediately given, [106] theycome totally or not at all." 4 James also refers to Zeno. In substance I agreewith his argument from Zeno; though I do not think that he allows suf-ficiently for those elements in Zeno's paradoxes which are the product ofinadequate mathematical knowledge. But I agree that a valid argumentremains after the removal of the invalid parts.

The argument, so far as it is valid, elicits a contradiction from the twopremises: (i) that in a becoming something (res vera) becomes, and (ii)that every act of becoming is divisible into earlier and later sections whichare themselves acts of becoming. Consider, for example, an act of becom-ing during one second. The act is divisible into two acts, one during theearlier half of the second, the other during the later half of the second.Thus that which becomes during the whole second presupposes thatwhich becomes during the first half-second. Analogously, that which be-comes during the first half-second presupposes that which becomes dur-ing the first quarter-second, and so on indefinitely. Thus if we considerthe process of becoming up to the beginning of the second in question,and ask what then becomes, no answer can be given. For, whatever creaturewe indicate presupposes an earlier creature which became after the be-ginning of the second and antecedently to the indicatedt creature. There-fore there is nothing which becomes, so as to effect a transition into thesecond in question.

The difficulty is not evaded by assuming that something becomes ateach non-extensive instant of time. For at the beginning of the second oftime there is no next instant at which something can become.

Zeno in his 'Arrow in Its Flight' seems to have had an obscure grasp ofthis argument. But the introduction of motion brings in irrelevant details.The true difficulty is to understand how the arrow survives the lapse of

2 Cf. my Science and the Modern World, Ch. VII.

3 Cf. loc. cit.; and Part IV of the present work.

4 Some Problems of Philosophy, Ch X; my attention was drawn to this pas-sage by its quotation in Religion in thef Philosophy of William James, by Pro-fessor J. S. Bixler.

time. [107] Unfortunately Descartes' treatment of 'endurance' is verysuperficial, and subsequent philosophers have followed his example.

In his 'Achilles and the Tortoise' Zeno produces an invalid argumentdepending on ignorance of the theory of infinite convergent numericalseries. Eliminating the irrelevant details of the race and of motion—de-tails which have endeared the paradox to the literature of all ages—con-sider the first half-second as one act of becoming, the next quarter-secondas another such act, the next eighth-second as yet another, and so on in-definitely. Zeno then illegitimately assumes this infinite series of acts ofbecoming can never be exhausted. But there is no need to assume that aninfinite series of acts of becoming, with a first act, and each act with animmediate successor,! is inexhaustible in the process of becoming. Simplearithmetic assures us that the series just indicated will be exhausted in theperiod of one second. The way is then open for the intervention of a newact of becoming which lies beyond the whole series. Thus this paradox ofZeno is based upon a mathematical fallacy.

The modification of the *'Arrow' paradox, stated above, brings out theprinciple that every act of becoming must have an immediate successor, ifwe admit that something becomes. For otherwise we cannot point outwhat creature becomes as we enter upon the second in question. But wecannot, in the absence of some additional premise, infer that every act ofbecoming must have had an immediate predecessor.

The conclusion is that in every act of becoming there is the becoming ofsomething with temporal extension; but that the act itself is not extensive,in the sense that it is divisible into earlier and later acts of becoming whichcorrespond to the extensive divisibility of what has become.

In this section, the doctrine is enunciated that the creature is extensive,but that its act of becoming is not extensive. This topic is resumed in PartIV. How- [108] ever, some anticipation of Parts III and IV is now required.

The res vera, in its character of concrete satisfaction, is divisible intoprehensions which concern its first temporal half and into prehensionswhich concern its second temporal half. This divisibility is what constitutesits extensiveness. But this concern with a temporal and spatial sub-regionmeans that the datum of the prehension in question is the actual world,objectified with the perspective due to that sub-region. A prehension, how-ever, acquires subjective form, and this subjective form is only renderedfully determinate by integration with conceptual prehensions belonging tothe mental pole of the res vera. The concrescence is dominated by a sub-jective aim which essentially concerns the creature as a final superject. Thissubjective aim is this subject itself determining its own self-creation as onecreature. Thus the subjective aim does not share in this divisibility. If weconfine attention to prehensions concerned with the earlier half, their sub-jective forms have arisen from nothing. For the subjective aim which be-longs to the whole is now excluded. Thus the evolution of subjective formcould not be referred to any actuality. The ontological principle has been

violated. Something has floated into the world from nowhere.

The summary statement of this discussion is, that the mental pole de-termines the subjective forms and that this pole is inseparable from thetotal res vera.

SECTION III

The discussion of the previous sections has merely given a moderno>hape to the oldest of European philosophic doctrines. But as a doctrineof common sense, it is older still—as old as consciousness itself. The mostgeneral notions underlying the words 'space' and 'time' are those whichthis discussion has aimed at expressing in their true connection with theactual world. The alternative doctrine, which is the Newtonian cosmology,emphasized the [109] 'receptacle' theory of space-time, and minimized thefactor of potentiality. Thus bits of space and time were conceived as beingas actual as anything else, and as being 'occupied' by other actualitieswhich were the bits of matter. This is the Newtonian absolute' theory ofspace-time, which philosophers have never accepted, though at times somehave acquiesced. Newton's famous Scholium 5 to his first eight definitionsin his Principia expresses this point of view with entire clearness:

Hitherto I have laid down the definitions of such words as are lessknown, and explained the sense in which I would have them to beunderstood in the following discourse. I do not define time, space,place, and motion, as being well known to all. Only I must observe,that the vulgar conceive those quantities under no other notions butfrom the relation they bear to sensible objects. And thence arise cer-tain prejudices, for the removing of which, it will be convenient to dis-tinguish them into absolute and relative, true and apparent, mathe-matical and common.

I. Absolute, true, and mathematical time, of itself, and from itsown nature, flows equably without regard to anything external, andby another name is called duration: relative, apparent, and commontime, is some sensible and external (whether accurate or unequable)measure of duration by thet means of motion, which is commonlyused instead of true time; such as an hour, a day, a month, a year.

II. Absolute space, in its own nature, and without regard to any-thing external, remains always similar and immovable. Relative spaceis some movable dimension or measure of the absolute spaces; whichour senses determine by its position to bodies, and which is vulgarlytaken for immovable space; . . . Absolute and relative space are thesame in figure and magnitude; but they do not remain always nu-merically the same. . . .

IV. ... As the order of the parts of time is [110] immutable, soalso is the order of the parts of space. Suppose those parts to be

5 Andrew Motte's translation; new edition revised, London, 1803.

moved out of their places, and they will be moved (if the expressionmay be allowed) out of themselves. For times and spaces are, as itwere, the places as well of themselves as of all other things. All thingsare placed in time as to order of succession; and in space as to order oftsituation. It is from their essence or nature that they are places; andthat the primary places of things should be movable, is absurd. Theseare, therefore, the absolute places; and translations out of those placesare the only absolute motions. . . . Now no other places are im-movable but those that, from infinity to infinity, do all retain thesame given positions one to another; and upon this account mustever remain unmoved; and do thereby constitute, what I call, im-movable space. The causes by which true and relative motions aredistinguished, one from the other, are the forces impressed uponbodies to generate motion. True motion is neither generated noraltered, but by some force impressed upon the body moved: butrelative motion may be generated or altered without any force im-pressed upon the body. For it is sufficient only to impress some forceon other bodies with which the former is compared, that by theirgiving way, that relation may be changed, in which the relative restor motion of this other body did consist. . . . The effects which dis-tinguish absolute from relative motion are, the forces of recedingfrom the axis of circular motion. For there are no such forces in a cir-cular motion purely relative, but, in a true and absolute circular mo-tion, they are greater or less, according to the quantity of motion. . . .Wherefore relative quantities are not the quantities themselves,whose names they bear, but those sensible measures of them (eitheraccurate or inaccurate) which are commonly used instead of the mea-sured quantities themselves. . . .

I have quoted at such length from Newton's Scholium because thisdocument constitutes the clearest, most definite, and most influentialstatement among the cos- [111] mological speculations of mankind, specu-lations of a type which first assume scientific importance with the Py-thagorean school preceding and inspiring Plato. Newton is presupposingfour types of entities which he does not discriminate in respect to theiractuality: for him minds are actual things, bodies are actual things, ab-solute durations of time are actual things, and absolute places are actualthings. He does not use the word 'actual'; but he is speaking of matterof fact, and he puts them all on the same level in that respect. The resultis to land him in a clearly expressed but complex and arbitrary scheme ofrelationships between spaces inter se; between durations inter se; and be-tween minds, bodies, times and places, for the conjunction of them all intothe solidarity of the one universe. For the purposes of science it was anextraordinarily clarifying statement, that is to say, for all the purposes ofscience within the next two hundred years, and for most of its purposessince that period. But, as a fundamental statement, it lies completely open

to sceptical attack; and also, as Newton himself admits, diverges fromcommon sense—"the vulgar conceive those quantities under no othernotions but from the relation they bear to sensible objects/' Kant onlysaved it by reducing it to the description of a construct by means of which'pure intuition' introduces an order for chaotic data; and for the schools oftranscendentalists derived from Kant this construct has remained in theinferior position of a derivative from the proper ultimate substantialreality. For them it is an element in 'appearance'; and appearance is to bedistinguished from reality. The philosophy of organism is an attempt,with the minimum of critical adjustment, to return to the conceptions of'the vulgar/f In the first place, the discussion must fasten on the notion ofa 'sensible object/ to quote Newton's phrase. We may expand Newton'sphrase, and state that the common sense of mankind conceives that all itsnotions ultimately refer to actual entities, or as Newton terms them,'sensible objects.' Newton, basing himself upon [112] current physicalnotions, conceived 'sensible objects' to be the material bodies to whichthe science of dynamics applies. He was then left with the antithesis be-tween 'sensible objects' and empty space. Newton, indeed, as a privateopinion, conjectured that there is a material medium pervading space.But he also held that there might not be such a medium. For him thenotion 'empty space'—that is, mere spatiality—had sense, conceived asan independent actual existence 'from infinity to infinity/ In this hediffered from Descartes. Modern physics sides with Descartes. It has in-troduced the notion of the 'physical field.' Also the latest speculations tendto remove the sharp distinction between the 'occupied' portions of thefield and the 'unoccupied' portion. Further, in these lectures (cf. Ch. Ill ofPart II), a distinction is introduced, not explicitly in the mind either of'the vulgar' or of Newton. This distinction is that between (i) an actualentity, (ii) an enduring object, (hi) a corpuscular society, (iv) a non-corpuscular society, (v) a non-social nexus. A non-social nexus is whatanswers to the notion of 'chaos.' The extensive continuum is that generalrelational element in experience whereby the actual entities experienced,and that unit experience itself, are united in the solidarity of one commonworld. The actual entities atomize it, and thereby make real what wasantecedently merely potential. The atomization of the extensive con-tinuum is also its temporalization; that is to say, it is the process of thebecoming of actuality into what in itself is merely potential. The sys-tematic scheme, in its completeness embracing the actual past and thepotential future, is prehended in the positive experience of each actualentity. In this sense, it is Kant's 'form of intuition'; but it is derived fromthe actual world qua datum, and thus is not 'pure' in Kant's sense of thatterm. It is not productive of the ordered world, but derivative from it.The prehension of this scheme is one more example that actual fact in-cludes in its own constitution [113] real potentiality which is referentbeyond itself. The former example is 'appetition.'

SECTION IV

Newton in his description of space and time has confused what is 'real'potentiality with what is actual fact. He has thereby been led to divergefrom the judgment of 'the vulgar' who "conceive those quantities under noother notions but from the relation they bear to sensible objects."! Thephilosophy of organism starts by agreeing with 'the vulgar' except that theterm 'sensible object' is replaced by 'actual entity'; so as to free our notionsfrom participation in an epistemologicalf theory as to sense-perception.When we further consider how to adjust Newton's other descriptions tothe organic theory, the surprising fact emerges that we must identify theatomized quantum of extension correlative to an actual entity, with New-ton's absolute place and absolute duration. Newton's proof that motiondoes not apply to absolute place, which in its nature is immovable, alsoholds. Thus an actual entity never moves: it is where it is and what it is.In order to emphasize this characteristic by a phrase connecting the notionof 'actual entity' more closely with our ordinary habits of thought, I willalso use the term 'actual occasion' in the place of the term 'actual entity.'Thus the actual world is built up of actual occasions; and by the oncologi-cal principle whatever things there are in any sense of 'existence,' are de-rived by abstraction from actual occasions. I shall use the term 'event' inthe more general sense of a nexus of actual occasions, inter-related in somedeterminate fashion in one extensive quantum. An actual occasion is thelimiting type of an event with only one member.

It is quite obvious that meanings have to be found for the notions of'motion' and of 'moving bodies.' For the present, this enquiry must bepostponed to a later chapter [114] (cf. Part IV and also Ch. Ill of thisPart). It is sufficient to say that a molecule in the sense of a moving body,with a history of local change, is not an actual occasion; it must thereforebe some kind of nexus of actual occasions. In this sense it is an event, butnot an actual occasion. The fundamental meaning of the notion of'change' is 'the difference between actual occasions comprised in somedeterminate event.'

A further elucidation of the status of the extensive continuum in theorganic philosophy is obtained by comparison with Descartes' doctrine ofmaterial bodies. It is at once evident that the organic theory is muchcloser to Descartes' views than to Newton's, On this topic Spinoza is prac-tically a logical systematization of Descartes, purging him of inconsis-tencies. But this attainment of logical coherence is obtained by empha-sizing just those elements in Descartes which the philosophy of organismrejects. In this respect, Spinoza perforins the same office for Descartes thatHume does for Locke. The philosophy of organism may be conceived as arecurrence to Descartes and to Locke, in respect to just those elements intheir philosophies which are usually rejected by reason of their inconsis-tency with the elements which their successors developed. Thus the phi-

losophy of organism is pluralistic in contrast with Spinoza's monism; andis a doctrine of experience prehending actualities, in contrast with Hume'ssensationalist phenomenalism.

First let us recur to Descartes at the stage of thought antecedent to hisdisastrous classification of substances into two species, bodily substance andmental substance. At the beginning of Meditation i, he writes:For example, there is the fact that I am here, seated by the fire,attired in a dressing gown, having this paper in my hands and othersimilar matters. And how could I deny that these hands and this bodyare mine, were it not perhaps that I compare myself to certain per-sons, devoid of sense. . . . But they are mad, and I should not [JJ5]be any thef less insane were I to follow examples so extravagant.At the same time I must remember that I am a man, and that con-sequently I am in the habit of sleeping, and in my dreams represent-ing to myself the same things or sometimes even less probable things,than do those who are insane in their waking moments. ... At thesame time we must at least confess that the things which are repre-sented to us in sleep are like painted representations which can onlyhave been formed as the counterparts of something real and true [adsimiliiudinem rerum verarum], and that in this way those generalthings at least, i.e. eyes, a head, hands, and a whole body, are notimaginary things, but things really existent. . . . And for the samereason, although these general things, to wit, [a body],6 eyes, a head,hands, and such like, may be imaginary, we are bound at the sametime to confess that there are at least some other objects yet moresimple and more universal, which are real and true [vera esse]; and ofthese just in the same way as with certain real colours, all these imagesof things which dwell in our thoughts, whether true and real or falseand fantastic, are formed.

To such a class of things pertains corporeal nature in general, andits extension, the figure of extended things, their quantity or magni-tude and number, as also the place in which they are, the time whichmeasures their duration, and so on. . . .

In Meditation II, after a slight recapitulation, he continues, speaking ofGod:Then without doubt I exist also if he deceives me, and let himdeceive me as much as he will, he can never cause me to be nothingso long as I think that I am something. So that after having reflectedwell and carefully examined all things, we must come to the definiteconclusion that this proposition: I am, I exist, is necessarily true eachtime that I pronounce it, or that I mentally conceive it.[116} At the end of the quotation from Meditation J, Descartes uses the

6 Haldane and Ross enclose in square brackets phrases appearing in the Frenchversion, and not in the Latin. I have compared with the Latin.

phrase res vera in the same sense as that in which I have used the term'actual/ It means 'existence' in the fullest sense of that term, beyondwhich there is no other. Descartes, indeed, would ascribe to God 'exis-tence' in a generically different sense. In the philosophy of organism, ashere developed, God's existence is not generically different from that ofother actual entities, except that he is 'primordial' in a sense to be grad-ually explained.

Descartes does not explicitly frame the definition of actuality in termsof the ontological principle, as given in Section IVt of this chapter, thatactual occasions form the ground from which all other types of existenceare derivative and abstracted; but he practically formulates an equivalent insubject-predicate phraseology, when he writes: "For this reason, when weperceive any attribute, we therefore conclude that some existing thing orsubstance to which it may be attributed, is necessarily present." 7 ForDescartes the word 'substance' is the equivalent of my phrase 'actual occa-sion.' I refrain from the term 'substance,' for one reason because it sug-gests the subject-predicate notion; and for another reason because Des-cartes and Locke permit their substances to undergo adventures of chang-ing qualifications, and thereby create difficulties.

In the quotation from the second Meditation: "I am, I exist, is nec-essarily true each time that I pronounce it, or that I mentally conceive it,"fDescartes adopts the position that an act of experience is the primary typeof actual occasion. But in his subsequent developments he assumes thathis mental substances endure change. Here he goes beyond his argument.For each time he pronounces 'I am, I exist/ the actual occasion, which isthe ego, is different; and the 'he' which is common to the two egos is aneternal object or, alternatively, the nexus of successive occasions. Also inthe quotation from the first [117] Meditation he begins by appealing to anact of experience—"I am here, seated by the fire. ..." He then associatesthis act of experience with his body—"these hands and body are mine.*'He then finally appeals for some final notion of actual entities in theremarkable sentence: "And for the same reason, although these generalthings, to wit, [a body], eyes, a head, hands, and such like, may be imaginary,we are bound at the same time to confess that there are at least someother objects yet more simple and more universal, which are real and true;and of these ... all these images of things which dwell in our thoughts,whether true and real or false and fantastic, are formed."

Notice the peculiarly intimate association with immediate experiencewhich Descartes claims for his body, an association beyond the meresense-perception of the contemporary world—"these hands and feet aremine." In the philosophy of organism this immediate association is therecognition of them as distinguishable data whose formal constitutions areimmediately felt in the origination of experience. In this function the

7 Principles of Philosophy, Part I, 52.

animal body does not differ in principle from the rest of the past actualworld; but it does differ in an intimacy of association by reason of whichits spatial and temporal connections obtain some definition in the ex-perience of the subject. What is vague for the rest of the world has ob-tained some additional measure of distinctness for the bodily organs. But,in principle, it would be equally true to say, The actual world is mine.'Descartes also asserts that "objects yet more simple and more uni-versal, which are real and true" are what the "images of things whichdwellf in our thoughts"! are formed of. This does not seem to accordwith his theory of perception, of a later date, stated in his Principles, PartIV, 196, 197, 198. In the later theory the emphasis is on the judicium, inthe sense of Inference/ and not in the sense of inspectio of realitas ob-jectiva. But it does accord with the organic theory, that the objectificationsof other actual occasions form the given data from which an actual occa-[118] sion originates. He has also brought the body into its immediateassociation with the act of experience. Descartes, with Newton, assumesthat the extensive continuum is actual in the full sense of being an actualentity. But he refrains from the additional material bodies which Newtonprovides. Also in his efforts to guard his representative 'ideas' from thefatal gap between mental symbol and actuality symbolized, he practically,in some sentences, expresses the doctrine of objectification here put for-ward. Thus:Hence the idea of the sun will be the sun itself existing in themind, not indeed formally, as it exists in the sky, but objectively,i.e. in the way in which objects are wont to exist in the mind; and thismode of being is truly much less perfect than that in which thingsexist outside the mind, but it is not on that account mere nothing,as I have already said.8

Both Descartes and Locke, in order to close the gap between idea repre-senting and actual entity represented/ require this doctrine of 'the sunitself existing in the mind/ But though, as in this passage, they at timescasually state it in order to push aside the epistemological difficulty, theyneither of them live up to these admissions. They relapse into the tacitpresupposition of the mind with its private ideas which are in fact qualitieswithout intelligible connection with the entities represented.

But if we take the doctrine of objectification seriously, the extensivecontinuum at once becomes the primary factor in objectification. It pro-vides the general scheme of extensive perspective which is exhibited in allthe mutual objectifications by which actual entities prehend each other.Thus in itself, the extensive continuum is a scheme of real potentialitywhich must find exemplificationt in the mutual prehension of all actualentities. It also finds exemplification in each actual entity considered

8 Reply to Objections J: I have already quoted this passage in my Science andthe* Modem Woddf note to Ch. IV.

'formally/ In this sense, actual entities are extensive, [JJ9] since they ariseout of a potentiality for division, which in actual fact is not divided (cf.Part IV). It is for this reason, as stated above, that the phrase 'actualoccasion' is used in the place of 'actual entity/

Descartes' doctrine of the physical world as exhibiting an extensiveplenum of actual entities is practically the same as the 'organic' doctrine.But Descartes' bodies have to move, and this presupposition introducesnew obscurities. It is exactly at this point that Newton provides a clearconception in comparison with that of Descartes. In the 'organic' doctrine,motion is not attributable to an actual occasion.

In the 'organic' theory, (i) there is only one type of temporal actualentity; (ii) each such actual entity is extensive; (iii) from the standpointof any one actual entity, the 'given/ actual world is a nexus of actual en-tities, transforming the potentiality of the extensive scheme into a plenumof actual occasions; (iv) in this plenum, motion cannot be significantlyattributed to any actual occasion; (v) the plenum is continuous in respectto the potentiality from which it arises, but each actual entity is atomic;(vi) the term 'actual occasion' is used synonymouslyt with 'actual entity';but chiefly when its character of extensiveness has some direct relevance tothe discussion, either extensiveness in the form of temporal extensiveness,that is to say 'duration/ or extensiveness in the form of spatial extension,or in the more complete signification of spatio-temporal extensiveness.

SECTION V

The baseless metaphysical doctrine of 'undifferentiated endurance' is asubordinate derivative from the misapprehension of the proper characterof the extensive scheme.

In our perception of the contemporary world via presentational im-mediacy, nexus of actual entities are objectified for the percipient underthe perspective of their characters of extensive continuity. In the percep-tion of a contemporary stone, for example, the separate indi- \120) vidualityof each actual entity in the nexus constituting the stone is merged into theunity of the extensive plenum, which for Descartes and for common sense,is the stone. The complete objectification is effected by the generic exten-sive perspective of the stone, specialized into the specific perspective ofsome sense-datum, such as some definite colour, for example. Thus theimmediate percept assumes the character of the quiet undifferentiated en-durance of the material stone, perceived by means of its quality of colour.This basic notion dominates language, and haunts both science and philos-ophy. Further, by an unfortunate application of the excellent maxim, thatour conjectural explanation should always proceed by the utilization of avera causa, whenever science or philosophy has ventured to extrapolatebeyond the limits of the immediate deliverance of direct perception, asatisfactory explanation has always complied with the condition that sub-stances with undifferentiated endurance of essential attributes be pro-

duced, and that activity be explained as the occasional modification oftheir accidental qualities and relations. Thus the imaginations of men aredominated by the quiet extensive stone with its relationships of positions,and its quality of colour—relationships and qualities which occasionallychange. The stone, thus interpreted, guarantees the vera causa, and con-jectural explanations in science and philosophy follow its model.

Thus in framing cosmological theory, the notion of continuous stuff withpermanent attributes, enduring without differentiation, and retaining itsself-identity through any stretch of time however small or large, has beenfundamental. The stuff undergoes change in respect to accidental qualitiesand relations; but it is numerically self-identical in its character of oneactual entity throughout its accidental adventures. The admission of thisfundamental metaphysical concept has wrecked the various systems ofpluralistic realism.

This metaphysical concept has formed the basis of scientific materialism.For example, when the activities [121] associated with so-called emptyspace required scientific formulation, the scientists of the nineteenth cen-tury produced the materialistic ether as the ultimate substratum whoseaccidental adventures constituted these activities.

But the interpretation of the stone, on which the whole concept isbased, has proved to be entirely mistaken. In the first place, from theseventeenth century onwards the notion of the simple inherence of thecolour in the stone has had to be given up. This introduces the furtherdifficulty that it is the colour which is extended and only inferentially thestone, since now we have had to separate the colour from the stone.Secondly, the molecular theory has robbed the stone of its continuity, ofits unity, and of its passiveness. The stone is now conceived as a society ofseparate molecules in violent agitation. But the metaphysical concepts,which had their origin in a mistake about the stone, were now applied tothe individual molecules. Each atom was still a stuff which retained its self-identity and its essential attributes in any portion of time—however short,and however long—provided that it did not perish. The notion of the un-differentiated endurance of substances with essential attributes and withaccidental adventures! was still applied. This is the root doctrine of ma-terialism: the substance, thus conceived, is the ultimate actual entity.

But this materialistic concept has proved to be as mistaken for the atomas it was for the stone. 'The atom is only explicable as a society with ac-tivities involving rhythms with their definite periods. Again the conceptshifted its application: protons and electrons were conceived as ma-terialistic electric charges whose activities could be construed as locomotiveadventures. We are now approaching the limits of any reasonable certaintyin our scientific knowledge; but again there is evidence that the conceptmay be mistaken. The mysterious quanta of energy have made their ap-pearance, derived, as it would seem, from the recesses of protons, or ofelectrons. Still worse for the concept, these quanta seem to dissolve [122]

into the vibrations of light. Also the material of the stars seems to bewasting itself in the production of the vibrations.

Further, the quanta of energy are associated by a simple law with theperiodic rhythms which we detect in the molecules. Thus the quanta are,themselves, in their own nature, somehow vibratory; but they emanatefrom the protons and electrons. Thus there is every reason to believe thatrhythmic periods cannot be dissociated from the protonic and electronicentities.

The same concept has been applied in other connections where it evenmore obviously fails. It is said that 'men are rational/ This is palpablyfalse: they are only intermittently rational—merely liable to rationality.Again the phrase 'Socrates is mortal' is only another way of saying that'perhaps he will die/ The intellect of Socrates is intermittent: he occa-sionally sleeps and he can be drugged or stunned.

The simple notion of an enduring substance sustaining persistent quali-ties, either essentially or accidentally, expresses a useful abstract for manypurposes of life. But whenever we try to use it as a fundamental statementof the nature of things, it proves itself mistaken. It arose from a mistakeand has never succeeded in any of its applications. But it has had onesuccess: it has entrenched itself in language, in Aristotelian logic, and inmetaphysics. For its employment in language and in logic, there is—asstated above—a sound pragmatic defence. But in metaphysics the conceptis sheer error. This error does not consist in the employment of the word'substance'; but in the employment of the notion of an actual entity whichis characterized by essential qualities, and remains numerically one amidstthe changes of accidental relations and of accidental qualities. The con-trary doctrine is that an actual entity never changes, and that it is the out-come of whatever can be ascribed to it in the way of qualitv or relationship.There then remain two alternatives for philosophy: (i) a monistic universe[123] with the illusion of change; and (ii) a pluralistic universe in which'change' means the diversities among the actual entities which belong tosome one society of a definite type.

SECTION VI

We can now, in a preliminary way, summarize some of the agreementsand disagreements between the philosophy of organism and the seven-teenth-century founders of the modern philosophic and scientific traditions.

It is the basis of any realistic philosophy, that in perception there is adisclosure of objectified data, which are known as having a communitywith the immediate experience for which they are data. This 'community'*is a community of common activity involving mutual implication. Thispremise is asserted as a primary fact, implicitly assumed in every detail ofour organization of life. It is implicitly asserted by Locke in his statement(II, XXIII, 7, heading), "Power, a great part of our complex ideas of

substances."t The philosophy of organism extends the Cartesian subjectiv-ism by affirming the 'ontological principle' and by construing it as the defi-nition of 'actuality/ This amounts to the assumption that each actual entityis a locus for the universe. Accordingly Descartes' other statement, thatevery attribute requires a substance,! is merely a special, limited exampleof this more general principle.

Newton, in his treatment of space, transforms potentiality into actual fact,that is to say, into a creature, instead of a datum for creatures. Accordingto the philosophy of organism, the extensive space-time continuum is thefundamental aspect of the limitation laid upon abstract potentiality by theactual world. A more complete rendering of this limited, 'real' potentialityis the 'physical field/ A new creation has to arise from the actual world asmuch as from pure potentiality: it arises from the total universe and notsolely from its mere abstract elements. It also adds to that universe. Thus[124] every actual entity springs from that universe which there is for it.Causation is nothing else than one outcome of the principle that everyactual entity has to house its actual world.

According to Newton, a portion of space cannot move. We have to askhow this truth, obvious from Newton's point of view, takes shape in theorganic theory. Instead of a region of space, we should consider a bit of thephysical field. This bit, expressing one way in which the actual world in-volves the potentiality for a new creation, acquires the unity of an actualentity. The physical field is, in this way, atomized with definite divisions: itbecomes a 'nexus'f of actualities. Such a quantum (i.e., each actual divi-sion) of the extensive continuum is the primary phase of a creature. Thisquantum is constituted by its totality of relationships and cannot move.Also the creature cannot have any external adventures, but only the in-ternal adventure of becoming. Its birth is its end.

This is a theory of monads; but it differs from Leibniz's in that hismonads change. In the organic theory, they merely become. Each monadiccreature is a mode of the process of 'feeling' the world, of housing theworld in one unit of complex feeling, in every way determinate. Such aunit is an 'actual occasion'; it is the ultimate creature derivative from thecreative process.

The term 'event' is used in a more genera] sense. An event is a nexus ofactual occasions inter-related in some determinate fashion in some exten-sive quantum: it is either a nexus in its formal completeness, or it is anobjectified nexus. One actual occasion is a limiting type of event. Themost general sense of the meaning of change is 'the differences betweenactual occasions in one event.' For example, a molecule is a historic routeof actual occasions; and such a route is an 'event.' Now the motion of themolecule is nothing else than the differences between the successive occa-sions of its life-history in respect to the extensive quanta from which theyarise; \12S] and the changes in the molecule are the consequential dif-ferences in the actual occasions.

The Extensive Continuum 81

The organic doctrine is closer to Descartes than to Newton. Also it isclose to Spinoza; but Spinoza bases his philosophy upon the monistic sub-stance, of which the actual occasions are inferior modes. The philosophyof organism inverts this point of view.

As to the direct knowledge of the actual world as a datum for theimmediacy of feeling, we first refer to Descartes in Meditation J, 'Thesehands and this body are mine'7; also to Hume in his many assertions of thetype, we see with our eyes. Such statements witness to direct knowledge ofthe antecedent functioning of the body in sense-perception. Both agree-though Hume more explicitly—that sense-perception of the contemporaryworld is accompanied by perception of the 'withness' of the body. It isthis withness that makes the body the starting point for our knowledge ofthe circumambient world. We find here our direct knowledge of 'causalefficacy/ Hume and Descartes in their theory of direct perceptive knowl-edge dropped out this withness of the body; and thus confined perceptionto presentational immediacy. Santayana, in his doctrine of 'animal faith/practically agrees with Hume and Descartes as to this withness of theactual world, including the body. Santayana also excludes our knowledgeof it from givenness. Descartes calls it a certain kind of 'understanding';Santayana calls it 'animal faith' provoked by 'shock'; and Hume calls it"practice.7

But we must—to avoid 'solipsism of the present moment'—include indirect perception something more than presentational immediacy. For theorganic theory, the most primitive perception is 'feeling the body as func-tioning/ This is a feeling of the world in the past; it is the inheritance ofthe world as a complex of feeling; namely, it is the feeling of derived feel-ings. The later, sophisticated perception is 'feeling the contemporaryworld/ Even this presentational immediacy begins with [126] sense-presen-tation of the contemporary body. The body, however, is only a peculiarlyintimate bit of the world. Just as Descartes said, 'this body is mine'; so heshould have said, 'this actual world is mine/ My process of 'being myselfis my origination from my possession of the world.

It is obvious that there arise the questions of comparative relevance andof comparative vagueness, which constitute the perspective of the world.For example, the body is that portion of the world where, in causal per-ception, there is some distinct separation of regions. There is not, in causalperception, this distinctness for the past world external to the body. Weeke out our knowledge by 'symbolic transference7 from causal perceptionto sense-presentation, and vice versa.

Those realists, who base themselves upon the notion of substance, donot get away from the notion of actual entities which move and change.From the point of view of the philosophy of organism, there is greatmerit in Newton's immovable receptacles. But for Newton they are eternal.Locke's notion of time hits the mark better: time is 'perpetually perish-ing.' In the organic philosophy an actual entity has 'perished* when it is

complete. The pragmatic use of the actual entity, constituting its staticlife, lies in the future. The creature perishes and is immortal. The actualentities beyond it can say, 'It is mine/ But the possession imposesconformation.

This conception of an actual entity in the fluent world is little morethan an expansion of a sentence in the Timaeus: 9 "But that which isconceived by opinion with the help of sensation and without reason, isalways in af process of becoming and perishing and never really is." Berg-son, in his protest against "spatialization," is only echoing Plato's phrase'and never really is/

9 28A;f Jowett's translation. Professor A. E. Taylor in his Commentary OnPlato's Timaeus renders the word 8o£a by 'belief or 'judgment' in the place ofJowett's word 'opinion/ Taylor's translation brings out the Platonic influence inDescartes' Meditations, namely Plato's 8o£a is the Cartesian judicium.

CHAPTER IIITHE ORDER OF NATURE

SECTION I

[127] In this, and in the next chapter, among modern philosophers weare chiefly concerned with Hume and with Kant, and among ancient phi-losophers with the Timaeus of Plato. These chapters are concerned withthe allied problems of 'order in the universe/ of 'induction/ and of 'gen-eral truths/ The present chapter is wholly concerned with the topic of'order/ For the organic doctrine the problem of order assumes primaryimportance. No actual entity can rise beyond what the actual world as adatum from its standpoint—its actual world—allows it to be. Each suchentity arises from a primary phase of the concrescence of objectificationswhich are in some respects settled: the basis of its experience is 'given/Now the correlative of 'order' is 'disorder/ There can be no peculiar mean-ing in the notion of 'order' unless this contrast holds. Apart from it, 'order*must be a synonym for 'givenness/ But 'order' means more than 'given-ness/ though it presupposes 'givenness';t 'disorder' is also 'given/ Eachactual entity requires a totality of 'givenness/ and each totality of 'given-ness' attains its measure of 'order/

Four grounds of 'order' at once emerge:

(i) That 'order' in the actual world is differentiated from mere'givenness' by introduction of adaptation for the attainment of an end.

(ii) That this end is concerned with the gradations of intensity in thesatisfactions of actual entities (members of the nexus) in whose formalconstitutions the nexus [128] (i.e., antecedent members of the nexus) inquestion is objectified.

(iii) That the heightening of intensity arises from order such that themultiplicity of components in the nexus can enter explicit feeling as con-trasts, and are not dismissed into negative prehensions as incompatibilities.

(iv) That 'intensity' in the formal constitution of a subject-superjectinvolves 'appetition' in its objective functioning as superject.

'Order' is a mere generic term: there can only be some definite specific'order/ not merely 'order' in the vague. Thus every definite total phase of'givenness' involves a reference to that specific 'order' which is its dominantideal, and involves the specific 'disorder' due to its inclusion of 'given'components which exclude the attainment of the full ideal. The attain-ment is partial, and thus there is 'disorder'; but there is some attainment,

83

and thus there is some 'order/ There is not just one ideal 'order' whichall actual entities should attain and fail to attain. In each case there is anideal peculiar to each particular actual entity, and arising from the domi-nant components in its phase of 'givenness.' This notion of 'dominance*will have to be discussed later in connection with the notion of the sys-tematic character of a 'cosmic epoch' and of the subordinate systematiccharacters of 'societies' included in a cosmic epoch. The notion of oneideal arises from the disastrous overmoralization of thought under the in-fluence of fanaticism, or pedantry. The notion of a dominant ideal peculiarto each actual entity is Platonic.

It is notable that no biological science has been able to express itselfapart from phraseology which is meaningless unless it refers to ideals properto the organism in question. This aspect of the universe impressed itselfon that great biologist and philosopher, Aristotle. His philosophy led to awild overstressing of the notion of 'final causes'! during the Christian mid-dle ages; and thence, by a reaction, to the correlative overstressing of [129]the notion of 'efficient causes' during the modern scientific period. Onetask of a sound metaphysics is to exhibit final and efficient causes in theirproper relation to each other. The necessity and the difficulty of this taskare stressed by Hume in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.

Thus the notion of 'order' is bound up with the notion of an actualentity as involving an attainment which is a specific satisfaction. This satis-faction is the attainment of something individual to the entity in question.It cannot be construed as a component contributing to its own concres-cence; it is the ultimate fact, individual to the entity. The notion of 'satis-faction' is the notion of the 'entity as concrete' abstracted from the 'processof concrescence'; it is the outcome separated from the process, therebylosing the actuality of the atomic entity, which is both process and out-come. 'Satisfaction' provides the individual element in the composition ofthe actual entity—that element which has led to the definition of substanceas 'requiring nothing but itself in order to exist.' But the 'satisfaction' isthe 'superject' rather than the 'substance' or the 'subject.' It closes up theentity; and yet is the superject adding its character to the creativity wherebythere is a becoming of entities superseding the one in question. The'formal' reality of the actuality in question belongs to its process of con-crescence and not to its 'satisfaction/ This is the sense in which thephilosophy of organism interprets Plato's phrase 'and never really is'; forthe superject can only be interpreted in terms of its 'objective immortality/

'Satisfaction' is a generic term: there are specific differences betweenthe 'satisfactions' of different entities, including gradations of intensity.These specific differences can only be expressed by the analysis of the com-ponents in the concrescence out of which the actual entity arises. The in-tensity of satisfaction is promoted by the 'order' in the phases from whichconcrescence arises and through which it passes; it is enfeebled by the [130]'disorder/ The components in the concrescence are thus 'values' con-

tributary to the 'satisfaction/ The concrescence is thus the building upof a determinate 'satisfaction/ which constitutes the completion of theactual togetherness of the discrete components. The process of concres-cence terminates with the attainment of a fully determinate 'satisfaction';and the creativity thereby passes over into the 'given' primary phase for theconcrescence of other actual entities. This transcendence is thereby estab-lished when there is attainment of determinate 'satisfaction' completingthe antecedent entity. Completion is the perishing of immediacy: 'It neverreally is/f

No actual entity can be conscious of its own satisfaction; for such knowl-edge would be a component in the process, and would thereby alter thesatisfaction. In respect to the entity in question the satisfaction can onlybe considered as a creative determination, by which the objectifications ofthe entity beyond itself are settled. In other words, the 'satisfaction' of anentity can only be discussed in terms of the usefulness of that entity. It isa qualification of creativity. The tone of feeling embodied in this satisfac-tion passes into the world beyond, by reason of these objectifications. Theworld is self-creative; and the actual entity as self-creating creature passesinto its immortal function of part-creator of the transcendent world. In itsself-creation the actual entity is guided by its ideal of itself as individualsatisfaction and as transcendent creator. The enjoyment of this ideal is the'subjective aim/ by reason of which the actual entity is a determinateprocess.

This subjective aim is not primarily intellectual; it is the lure for feeling.This lure for feeling is the germ of mind. Here I am using the term 'mind'to mean the complex of mental operations involved in the constitution ofan actual entity. Mental operations do not necessarily involve conscious-ness. The concrescence, absorb- [131] ing the derived data into immediateprivacy, consists in mating the data with ways of feeling provocative of theprivate synthesis. These subjective ways of feeling are not merely receptiveof the data as alien facts; they clothe the dry bones with the flesh of a realbeing, emotional, purposive, appreciative. The miracle of creation is de-scribed in the vision of the prophet Ezekiel: "So I prophesied as he com-manded me, and the breath came into them, and they lived, and stood upupon their feet, an exceeding great army." T

The breath of feeling which creates a new individual fact has an origina-tion not wholly traceable to the mere data. It conforms to the data, in thatit feels the data. But the how of feeling, though it is germane to the data,is not fully determined by the data. The relevant feeling is not settled, asto its inclusions or exclusions of 'subjective form/ by the data about whichthe feeling is concerned. The concrescent process is the elimination ofthese indeterminations of subjective forms. The quality of feeling has to bedefinite in respect to the eternal objects with which feeling clothes itself

1 Ezekiel, xxxvii:10.t

in its self-definition. It is a mode of ingression of eternal objects into theactual occasion. But this self-definition is analysable into two phases. First,the conceptual ingression of the eternal objects in the double r&le of beinggermane to the data and of being potentials for physical feeling. This isthe ingression of an eternal object in the r61e of a conceptual lure for feel-ing. The second phase is the admission of the lure into the reality of feeling,or its rejection from this reality. The relevance of an eternal object in itsrole of lure is a fact inherent in the data. In this sense the eternal objectis a constituent of the 'objective lure/ But the admission into, or rejectionfrom, reality of conceptual feeling is the originative decision of the actualoccasion. In this sense an actual occasion is causa sui. The subjective formsof the prehen- [132] sions in one phase of concrescence control the specificintegrations of prehensions in later phases of that concrescence.

An example of the lure for feeling is given by Hume himself. In the firstsection of his Treatise* he lays down the proposition, "That all our simpleideas in their first appearance, are derived from simple impressions? whichare correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent!' It must beremembered that in the organic philosophy the 'data of objectifications' arethe nearest analogue to Hume's 'simple impressions/ Thus, modifyingHume's principle, the only lure to conceptual feeling is an exact con-formation to the qualities realized in the objectified actualities. But Hume(toe. eft.) notes an exception which carries with it the exact principlewhich has just been laid down, namely, the principle of relevant potentials,unrealized in the datum and yet constituent of an 'objective lure' byproximity to the datum. The point is that 'order' in the actual world in-troduces a derivative 'order' among eternal objects. Hume writes:There is. however, one contradictory phenomenon, which may prove,that it is not absolutely impossible for ideas to go before their corre-spondent impressions. I believe it will readily be allowed, that the sev-eral distinct ideas of colours, which enter by the eyes, orf those ofsounds, which are conveyed by the hearing, are really different fromeach other, though, at the same time, resembling. Now, if this be trueof different colours, it must be no less so of the different shades of thesame colour, that each of them produces a distinct idea, independent ofthe rest. . . . Suppose, therefore, a person to have enjoyed his sight forthirty years, and to have become perfectly well acquainted with coloursof all kinds, excepting one particular shade of blue, for instance, whichit never hast been his fortune to meet with. Let all the different shadesof that colour, except that single one, be placed before him, descendinggradually from the deepest to the [133] lightest; it is plain, that hewill perceive a blank, where that shade is wanting, and will be sensiblethat there is a greater distance in that place, betwixtt the contiguouscolours, than in any other. Now I ask, whether it is possible for him,from his own imagination, to supply this deficiency, andt raise up tohimself the idea of that particular shade, though it had never been

conveyed to him by his senses? I believe there are few but will be of

opinion that he can; and this may serve as a proof, that the simple

ideas are not always derived from the correspondent impressions;

though the instancet is so particular and singular, that it is scarce

worth our observing, and does not merit that, for it alone, we should

alter our general maxim.

This passage requires no comment, except for its final clause. Hume putsthe 'instance' aside as being 'particular and singular'; it is exactly this esti-mate which is challenged by the philosophy of organism. The analysis ofconcrescence, here adopted, conceives that there is an origination of con-ceptual feeling, admitting or rejecting whatever is apt for feeling by reasonof its germaneness to the basic data. The gradation of eternal objects inrespect to this germaneness is the 'objective lure' for feeling; the concres-cent process admits a selection from this 'objective lure7 into subjectiveefficiency. This is the subjective 'ideal of itself which guides the process.Also the basic data are constituted by the actual world which 'belongs to'that instance of concrescent process. Feelings are 'vectors'; for they feelwhat is there and transform it into what is here.

The term 'potential difference' is an old one in physical science; and re-cently it has been introduced in physiology with a meaning diverse from,though generically allied to, its older meaning in physics. The ultimate factin the constitution of an actual entity which suggests this term is the ob-jective lure for feeling. In the comparison of two actual entities, the con-trast be- \134] tween their objective lures is their 'potential difference'; andall other uses of this phrase are abstractions derivative from this ultimatemeaning.

The 'objectifications' of the actual entities in the actual world, relative toa definite actual entity, constitute the efficient causes out of which thatactual entity arises; the 'subjective aim' at 'satisfaction' constitutes the finalcause, or lure, whereby there is determinate concrescence; and that at-tained 'satisfaction' remains as an element in the content of creative pur-pose. There is, in this way, transcendence of the creativity; and thistranscendence effects determinate objectifications for the renewal of theprocess in the concrescence of actualities beyond that satisfied superject.

Thus an actual entity has a threefold! character: (i) it has the char-acter 'given' for it by the past; (ii) it has the subjective character aimedat in its process of concrescence; (iii) it has the superjective character,which is the pragmatic value of its specific satisfaction qualifying thetranscendent creativity.

In the case of the primordial actual entity, which is God, there is nopast. Thus the ideal realization of conceptual feeling takes the precedence.God differs from other actual entities in rhe fact that Hume's principle, ofthe derivate character of conceptual feelings, does not hold for him. Thereis still, however, the same threefold character: (i) The 'primordial na-ture' of God is the concrescence of at unity of conceptual feelings, in-

eluding among their data all eternal objects. The concrescence is directedby the subjective aim. that the subjective forms of the feelings shall besuch as to constitute the eternal objects into relevant lures of feeling* sev-erally appropriate for all realizable basic conditions, (ii) The 'consequentnature' of God is the physical prehension by God of the actualities of theevolving universe. His! primordial nature directs such perspectives of ob-jectification that each novel actuality in the temporal world contributessuch elements as it can to a realization in God [J35] free from inhibitionsof intensity by reason of discordance, (iii) The 'superjective nature'f ofGod is the character of the pragmatic value of his specific satisfactionqualifying the transcendent creativity in the various temporal instances.

This is the conception of God, according to which he is considered as theoutcome of creativity, as the foundation of order, and as the goad* to-wards novelty. 'Order' and 'novelty' are but the instruments of his sub-jective aim which is the intensification of 'formal immediacy.' It is to benoted that every actual entity, including God, is something individual forits own sake; and thereby transcends the rest of actuality. And also it is tobe noted that every actual entity, including God, is a creature transcendedby the creativity which it qualifies. A temporal occasion in respect to thesecond element of its character, and God in respect to the first element ofhis character satisfy Spinoza's definition of substance, that it is causa sui.To be causa sui means that the process of concrescence is its own reasonfor the decision in respect to the qualitative clothing of feelings. It isfinally responsible for the decision by which any lure for feeling is ad-mitted to efficiency. The freedom inherent in the universe is constitutedby this element of self-causation.

In the subsequent discussion, 'actual entity' will be taken to mean a con-ditioned actual entity of the temporal world, unless God is expressly in-cluded in the discussion. The term 'actual occasion' will always excludeGod from its scope.

The philosophy of organism is the inversion of Kant's philosophy. TheCritique of Pure Reason describes the process by which subjective datapass into the appearance of an objective world. Trie philosophy of organ-ism seeks to describe how objective data pass into subjective satisfaction,and how order in the objective data provides intensity in the subjectivesatisfaction. For Kant, the world emerges from the subject; for the philoso-phy of [J36] organism, the subject emerges from the world—a 'superject'rather than a 'subject.' The word 'object' thus means an entity which is apotentiality for being a component in feeling; and the word 'subject' meansthe entity constituted by the process of feeling, and including this process.The feeler is the unity emergent from its own feelings; and feelings are thedetails of the process intermediary between this unity and its many data.The data are the potentials for feeling; that is to say, they are objects. Theprocess is the elimination of indeterminateness of feeling from the unityof one subjective experience. The degree of order in the datum is measured

by the degree of richness in the objective lure. The 'intensity7 achieved be-longs to the subjective form of the satisfaction,

SECTION II

It has been explained in the previous section that the notion of 'order' isprimarily applicable to the objectified data for individual actual entities.It has been necessary to give a sketch of some categories applying to anactual entity in order to show how this can be the case. But there is aderivative sense of the term 'order/ which is more usually in our mindswhen we use that word. We speak of the 'order of nature/ meaningthereby the order reigning in that limited portion of the universe,2 or evenof the surface of the earth, which has come under our observation. We alsospeak of a man of orderly life, or of disorderly life. In any of these senses,the term 'order' evidently applies to the relations among themselves en-joyed by many actual entities which thereby form a society. The term'society' will always be restricted to mean a nexus of actual entities whichare 'ordered' among themselves in the sense to be explained in this sec-tion.3 [137] The point of a 'society,' as the term is here used, is that it isself-sustaining; in other words, that it is its own reason. Thus a society ismore than a set of entities to which the same class-name applies: that isto say, it involves more than a merely mathematical conception of 'order.'To constitute a society, the class-name has got to apply to each member,by reason of genetic derivation from other members of that same society.The members of the society are alike because, by reason of their commoncharacter, they impose on other members of the society the conditionswhich lead to that likeness.

This likeness4 consists in the fact that (i) a certain element of 'form'is a contributory component to the individual satisfaction of each memberof the society; and that (ii) the contribution by the element to the objecti-fication of any one member of the society for prehension by other mem-bers promotes its analogous reproduction in the satisfactions of those othermembers. Thus a set of entities is a society (i) in virtue of a 'definingcharacteristic' shared by its members, and (ii) in virtue of the presence ofthe defining characteristic being due to the environment provided by thesociety itself.

For example, the life of** man is a historic route of actual occasionswhich in a marked degree—to be discussed more fully later—inherit fromeach other. That set of occasions, dating from his first acquirement of the

2 Cf. The Fitness of the Environment, New York, Macmiilan, 1913, TheOrder of Nature, Harvard Univ. Press, 1917, and Blood, Ha ward Univ. Press,1928, Ch. 1, allt by Professor L. }. Henderson. These works are fundamentalfor anv discussion of this subject.

3 Also cf.t Part I, Ch. Ill, Sect. II.4Cf. Parti, Ch. Ill, Sect. II.

Greek language and including all those occasions up to his loss of anyadequate knowledge of that language, constitutes a society in reference toknowledge of the Greek language. Such knowledge is a common character-istic inherited from occasion to occasion along the historic route. Thisexample has purposely been chosen for its reference to a somewhat trivialelement of order, viz. knowledge of the Greek language; a more importantcharacter of order would have been that complex character in virtue ofwhich a man is considered to be the same enduring person from birth todeath. Also in this in- [138] stance the members of the society are arrangedin a serial order by their genetic relations. Such a society is said 5 to possess'personal order/

Thus a society is, for each of its members, an environment with someelement of order in it, persisting by reason of the genetic relations betweenits own members. Such an element of order is the order prevalent in thesociety.

But there is no society in isolation. Every society must be consideredwith its background of a wider environment of actual entities, which alsocontribute their objectifications to which the members of the society mustconform. Thus the given contributions of the environment must at leastbe permissive of the self-sustenance of the society. Also, in proportion toits importance, this background must contribute those general characterswhich the more special character of the society presupposes for its mem-bers. But this means that the environment, together with the society inquestion, must form a larger society in respect to some more generalcharacters than those defining the society from which we started. Thus wearrive at the principle that every society requires a social background, ofwhich it is itself a part. In reference to any given society the world of actualentities is to be conceived as forming a background in layers of social order,the defining characteristics becoming wider and more general as we widenthe background. Of course, the remote actualities of the background havetheir own specific characteristics of various types of social order. But suchspecific characteristics have become irrelevant for the society in questionby reason of the inhibitions and attenuations introduced by discordance,that is to say, by disorder.

The metaphysical characteristics of an actual entity—in the proper gen-eral sense of 'metaphysics'—should be those which apply to all actual en-tities. It may be doubted whether such metaphysical concepts have ever[J 39] been formulated in their strict purity—even taking into accountthe most general principles of logic and of mathematics. We have to con-fine ourselves to societies sufficiently wide, and yet such that their definingcharacteristics cannot safely be ascribed to all actual entities which havebeen or may be.

The causal laws which dominate a social environment are the product

5 Cf. Part I, Ch. Ill, Sect. II.

of the defining characteristic of that society. But the society is only efficientthrough its individual members. Thus in a society, the members can onlyexist by reason of the laws which dominate the society, and the laws onlycome into being by reason of the analogous characters of the membersof the society.

But there is not any perfect attainment of an ideal order whereby theindefinite endurance of a society is secured. A society arises from disorder,where 'disorder7 is defined by reference to the ideal for that society; thefavourable background of a larger environment either itself decays, orceases to favour the persistence of the society after some stage of growth:the society then ceases to reproduce its members, and finally after a stageof decay passes out of existence. Thus a system of 'laws' determining re-production in some portion of the universe gradually rises into dominance;it has its stage of endurance, and passes out of existence with the decayof the society from which it emanates.

The arbitrary, as it were 'given/ elements in the laws of nature warn usthat we are in a special cosmic epoch. Here the phrase 'cosmic epoch' isused to mean that widest society of actual entities whose immediate rele-vance to ourselves is traceable. This epoch is characterized by electronicand protonic actual entities, and by yet more ultimate actual entities whichcan be dimly discerned in the quanta of energy. Maxwell's equations ofthe electromagnetic field hold sway by reason of the throngs of electronsand of protons. Also each electron is a society of electronic occasions, andeach proton is a soci- [MO] ety of protonic occasions. These occasions arethe reasons for the electromagnetic laws; but their capacity for reproduc-tion, whereby each electron and each proton has a long life, and wherebynew electrons and new protons come into being, is itself due to these samelaws. But there is disorder in the sense that the laws are not perfectlyobeyed, and that the reproduction is mingled with instances of failure.There is accordingly a gradual transition to new types of order, superveningupon a gradual rise into dominance on the part of the present naturallaws.

But the arbitrary factors in the order of nature are not confined to theelectromagnetic laws. There are the four dimensions of the spatio-temporalcontinuum, the geometrical axioms, even the mere dimensional characterof the continuum—apart from the particular number of dimensions—andthe fact of measurability. In later chapters (cf. Part IV) it will be evidentthat all these properties are additional to the more basic fact of extensive-ness; also, that even extensiveness allows of grades of specialization, arbi-trarily one way or another, antecedently to the introduction of any of theseadditional notions. By this discovery the logical and mathematical investi-gations of the last two centuries are very relevant to philosophy. For thecosmological theories of Descartes, Newton, Locke, Hume, and Kant wereframed in ignorance of that fact. Indeed, in the Timaeus Plato seems to bemore aware of it than any of his successors, in the sense that he frames

statements whose meaning is elucidated by its explicit recognition. These'given7 factors in geometry point to the wider society of which the elec-tronic cosmic epoch constitutes a fragment.

A society does not in any sense create the complex of eternal objectswhich constitutes its defining characteristic. It only elicits that complexinto importance for its members, and secures the reproduction of its mem-bership. In speaking of a society—unless the context ex- [141] pressly re-quires another interpretation—'membership' will always refer to the actualoccasions, and not to subordinate enduring objects composed of actualoccasions such as the life of an electron or of a man. These latter societiesare the strands of 'personal' order which enter into many societies; gen-erally speaking, whenever we are concerned with occupied space, we aredealing with this restricted type of corpuscular societies; and wheneverwe are thinking of the physical field in empty space, we are dealing withsocieties of the wider type. It seems as if the careers of waves of light illus-trate the transition from the more restricted type to the wider type.

Thus our cosmic epoch is to be conceived primarily as a society of elec-tromagnetic occasions, including electronic and protonic occasions, andonly occasionally—for the sake of brevity in statement—as a society of elec-trons and protons. There is the same distinction between thinking of anarmy either as a class of men, or as a class of regiments.

SECTION III

Thus the physical relations, the geometrical relations of measurement,the dimensional relations, and the various grades of extensive relations,involved in the physical and geometrical theory of nature, are derivativefrom a series of societies of increasing width of prevalence, the more spe-cial societies being included in the wider societies. This situation consti-tutes the physical and geometrical order of nature. Beyond these societiesthere is disorder, where 'disorder' is a relative term expressing the lack ofimportance possessed by the defining characteristics of the societies inquestion beyond their own bounds. When those societies decay, it will notmean that their defining characteristics cease to exist; but that they lapseinto unimportance for the actual entities in question. The term 'disorder'refers to a society only partially influential in impressing its characteristicsin the [142] form of prevalent laws. This doctrine, that order is a socialproduct, appears in modern science as the statistical theory of the laws ofnature, and in the emphasis on genetic relation.

But there may evidently be a state in which there are no prevalent so-cieties securing any congruent unity of effect. This is a state of chaoticdisorder; it is disorder approaching an absolute sense of that term. In suchan ideal state, what is 'given' for any actual entity is the outcome ofthwarting, contrary decisions from the settled world. Chaotic disordermeans lack of dominant definition of compatible contrasts in the satisfac-

tions attained, and consequent enfeeblement of intensity. It means thelapse towards slighter actuality. It is a natural figure of speech, but onlya figure of speech, to conceive a slighter actuality as being an approachtowards nonentity. But you cannot approach nothing; for there is nothingto approach. It is an approach towards the futility of being a faint compro-mise between contrary reasons. The dominance of societies, harmoniouslyrequiring each other, is the essential condition for depth of satisfaction.

The Timaeus of Plato, and the Scholium of Newton—the latter alreadyin large part quoted—are the two statements of cosmological theory whichhave had the chief influence on Western thought. To the modern reader,the Timaeus, considered as a statement of scientific details, is in compar-ison with the Scholium simply foolish. But what it lacks in superficial de-tail, it makes up for by its philosophic depth. If it be read as an allegory,it conveys profound truth; whereas the Scholium is an immensely ablestatement of details which, although abstract and inadequate as a philoso-phy, can within certain limits be thoroughly trusted for the deduction oftruths at the same level of abstraction as itself. The penalty of its philo-sophical deficiency is that the Scholium conveys no hint of the limits ofits own application. The practical effect is that the readers, and almostcertainly Newton himself, so construe its meaning as to fall into [143} whatI have elsewhere 6 termed the 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness/ It is theoffice of metaphysics to determine the limits of the applicability of suchabstract notions.

The Scholium betrays its abstractness by affording no hint of that aspectof self-production, of generation, of cf>6ai<;, of natura naturans, which isso prominent in nature. For the Scholium, nature is merely, and com-pletely, there, externally designed and obedient. The full sweep of themodern doctrine of evolution would have confused the Newton of theScholium, but would have enlightened the Plato of the Timaeus. So faras Newton is concerned, we have his own word for this statement. In aletter to Bentley, he writes: "When I wrote my treatise about our system,I had an eye upon such principles as might work with considering men forthe belief of a Deity; . . ." 7 The concept in Newton's mind is that of afully articulated system requiring a definite supernatural origin with thatarticulation. This is the form of the cosmological argument, now generallyabandoned as invalid; because our notion of causation concerns the rela-tions of states of things within the actual world, and can only be illegit-imately extended to a transcendent derivation. The notion of God, whichwill be discussed later (cf. Part V), is that of an actual entity immanentin the actual world, but transcending any finite cosmic epoch—a being atonce actual, eternal, immanent, and transcendent. The transcendence of

6 Cf. Science and the\ Modern World, Ch. III.

7 This quotation is taken from Jebb's Life of Bentley, Ch. II. The Life is pub-lished in the English Men of Letters series.

God is not peculiar to him. Every actual entity, in virtue ot its novelty,transcends its universe, God included.

In the Scholium, space and time, with all their current mathematicalproperties, are ready-made for the material masses; the material masses areready-made for the 'forces' which constitute their action and reaction; andspace, and time, and material masses, and forces, are [144] alike ready-made for the initial motions which the Deity impresses throughout theuniverse. It is not possible to extract from the Scholium—construed withmisplaced concreteness—either a theism, or an atheism, or an epistemology,which can survive a comparison with the facts. This is the inescapableconclusion to be inferred from Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Re-ligion. Biology is also reduced to a mystery; and finally physics itself hasnow reached a stage of experimental knowledge inexplicable in terms ofthe categories of the Scholium.

In the Timaeus, there are many phrases and statements which find theirfinal lucid expression in the Scholium. While noting this concurrence ofthe two great cosmological documents guiding Western thought, it can-not be too clearly understood that, within its limits of abstraction, whatthe Scholium says is true, and that it is expressed with the lucidity ofgenius. Thus any cosmological document which cannot be read as an inter-pretation of the Scholium is worthless. But there is another side to theTimaeus which finds no analogy in the Scholium. In general terms, thisside of the Timaeus may be termed its metaphysical character, that is tosay, its endeavour to connect the behaviour of things with the formal na-ture of things. The behaviour apart from the things is abstract, and so arethe things apart from their behaviour. Newton—wisely, for his purposes-made this abstraction which the Timaeus endeavours to avoid.

In the first place, the Timaeus connects behaviour with the ultimatemolecular characters of the actual entities. Plato conceives the notion ofdefinite societies of actual molecular entities, each society with its de-fining characteristics. He does not conceive this assemblage of societies ascausa sui. But he does conceive it as the work of subordinate deities, whoare the animating principles of those departments of nature. In Greekthought, either poetic or philosophic, the separation between the cpOoiqand such deities had not that absolute character which it has for us whohave inherited the Semitic Jehovah.

[J45] Newton could have accepted a molecular theory as easily as Plato,but there is this difference between them: Newton would have been sur-prised at the modern quantum theory and at the dissolution of quanta intovibrations; Plato would have expected it. While we note the many thingssaid by Plato in the Timaeus which are now foolishness, we must also givehim credit for that aspect of his teaching in which he was two thousandyears ahead of his time. Plato accounted for the sharp-cut differences be-tween kinds of natural things, by assuming an approximation of the mole-

cules of the fundamental kinds respectively to the mathematical forms ofthe regular solids. He also assumed that certain qualitative contrasts in oc-currences, such as that between musical notes, depended on the participa-tion of these occurrences in some of the simpler ratios between integralnumbers. He thus obtained a reason why there should be an approxima-tion to sharp-cut differences between kinds of molecules, and why thereshould be sharp-cut relations of harmony standing out amid dissonance.Thus 'contrast'—as the opposite of incompatibility—depends on a certainsimplicity of circumstance; but the higher contrasts depend on the assem-blage of a multiplicity of lower contrasts, this assemblage again exhibitinghigher types of simplicity.

It is well to remember that the modern quantum theory, + with its sur-prises in dealing with the atom, is only the latest instance of a well-markedcharacter of nature, which in each particular instance is only explained bysome ad hoc dogmatic assumption. The theory of biological evolutionwould not in itself lead us to expect the sharply distinguished genera andspecies which we find in nature. There might be an occasional bunching ofindividuals round certain typical forms; but there is no explanation of thealmost complete absence of intermediate forms. Again Newton's Scholiumgives no hint of the ninety-two possibilities for atoms, or of the limitednumber of ways in which atoms can be combined so as to form molecules.Physicists are now explaining these [J46] chemical facts by means of con-ceptions which Plato would have welcomed.

There is another point in which the organic philosophy only repeatsPlato. In the Timaeus the origin of the present cosmic epoch is traced backto an aboriginal disorder, chaotic according to our ideals. This is the evolu-tionary doctrine of the philosophy of organism. Plato's notion has puz-zled critics who are obsessed with the Semitic 8 theory of a wholly tran-scendent God creating out of nothing an accidental universe. Newton heldthe Semitic theory. The Scholium made no provision for the evolution ofmatter—very naturally, since the topic lay outside its scope. The result hasbeen that the non-evolution of matter has been a tacit presuppositionthroughout modern thought. Until the last few years the sole alternativeswere: either the material universe, with its present type of order, is eternal;or else it came into being, and will pass out of being, according to the fiatof Jehovah. Thus, on all sides, Plato's allegory of the evolution of a newtype of order based on new types of dominant societies became a daydream,puzzling to commentators.

Milton, curiously enough, in his Paradise Lost wavers between theTimaeus and the Semitic doctrine. This is only another instance of theintermixture of classical and Hebrew notions on which his charm of

8 The book of Genesis is too primitive to bear upon this point.

thought depends. In the description of Satan's journey across Chaos, Satandiscovers

The secrets of the hoary deep, a dark

Illimitable ocean, without bound,

Without dimension, where length, breadth and highth,

And time and place are lost; where eldest Night f

And Chaos, ancestors of Nature, hold

Eternal anarchy amidst the noise

Of endless wars, and by confusion stand.9

Milton is here performing for Plato the same poetic service that Lucre-tius performed for Democritus—with [147] less justification, since Platowas quite capable of being his own poet. Also the fact of Satan's journeyhelped to evolve order; for he left a permanent track, useful for the devilsand the damned.

The appeal to Plato in this section has been an appeal to the factsagainst the modes of expression prevalent in the last few centuries. Theserecent modes of expression are partly the outcome of a mixture of theologyand philosophy, and are partly due to the Newtonian physics, no longeraccepted as a fundamental statement. But language and thought have beenframed according to that mould; and it is necessary to remind ourselvesthat this is not the way in which the world has been described by some ofthe greatest intellects. Both for Plato and for Aristotle the process of theactual world has been conceived as a real incoming of forms into real po-tentiality, issuing into that real togetherness which is an actual thing.Also, for the Timaeus, the creation of the world is the incoming of a typeof order establishing a cosmic epoch. It is not the beginning of matter offact, but the incoming of a certain type of social order.

SECTION IV

The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to a discussion—largelyconjectural—of the hierarchy of societies composing our present epoch. Inthis way, the preceding discussion of 'order' may be elucidated. It is to becarefully noted that we are now deserting metaphysical generality. We shallbe considering the more special possibilities of explanation consistent withour general cosmological doctrine, but not necessitated by it.

The physical world is bound together by a general type of relatednesswhich constitutes it into an extensive continuum. When we analyse theproperties of this continuum we discover that they fall into two classes, ofwhich one—the more special—presupposes the other—the more general.10The more general type of properties [148] expresses the mere fact of 'ex-tensive connection/ of 'whole and part/ of various types of 'geometrical

9 Paradise Lost, Bk. II.

10 Cf. Part IV for a detailed discussion.

elements' derivable by 'extensive abstraction; but excluding the introduc-tion of more special properties by which straight lines are definable xl andmeasurability thereby introduced.

In these general properties of extensive connection, we discern the de-fining characteristic of a vast nexus extending far beyond our immediatecosmic epoch. It contains in itself other epochs, with more particularcharacteristics incompatible with each other. Then from the standpoint ofour present epoch, the fundamental society in so far as it transcends ourown epoch seems a vast confusion mitigated by the few, faint elements oforder contained in its own defining characteristic of 'extensive connection.7We cannot discriminate its other epochs of vigorous order, and we merelyconceive it as harbouring the faint flush of the dawn of order in our ownepoch. This ultimate, vast society constitutes the whole environment withinwhich our epoch is set, so far as systematic characteristics are discernibleby us in our present stage of development. In the future the growth oftheory may endow our successors with keener powers of discernment.

Our logical analysis, in company with immediate intuition (inspectio),enables us to discern a more special society within the society of pure ex-tension. This is the 'geometrical7 society. In this society12 those specializedrelationships hold, in virtue of which straight lines are defined. Systematicgeometry is illustrated in such a geometrical society; and metrical rela-tionships can be defined in terms of the analogies of function within thescheme of any one systematic geometry. These 'analogies of function7 arewhat is meant by the notion of 'congruence.7 This notion is nonsense apartfrom a systematic geometry. The inclusion of extensive quantity [149]among fundamental categoreal notions is a complete mistake. This notionis definable in terms of each systematic geometry finding its application in ageometrical society. It is to be noticed that a systematic geometry is deter-mined by the definition of straight lines applicable to the society in ques-tion. Contrary to the general opinio^ this definition is possible in inde-pendence of the notion of 'measurement.7 It cannot however be provedthat in the same geometrical society there may not be competing familiesof loci with equal claims to the status of being a complete family of straightlines.

Given a family of straight lines, expressing a system of relatedness in a'geometric7 society, the notion of 'congruence7 and thence of 'measurement7is now determinable in a systematic way throughout the society. But againin this case there certainly are competing systems of measurement. Hencein connection with each family of straight lines—allowing there be morethan one such family—there are alternative systems13 of metrical geom-

^ Cf. Part IV, Chs.t III, IV, V.

12 Cf. Part IV, especially Chs. Ill, IV, V.

13 The existence of alternative systems was demonstrated by Cayley in his"Sixth Memoir on Quantics" in Transactions of the Royal Society, 1859.t

etry, no one system being more fundamental than the other. Our presentcosmic epoch is formed by an 'electromagnetic7 society, which is a morespecial society contained within the geometric society. In this society yetmore special defining characteristics obtain. These characteristics presup-pose those of the two wider societies within which the 'electromagnetic'society is contained. But in the ''electromagnetic' society the ambiguity asto the relative importance of competing families of straight lines (if therebe such competing families), and the ambiguity as to the relative im-portance of competing definitions of congruence, are determined in favourof one family and one14 congruence-definition. This determination iseffected by an additional set of physical relationships throughout the so-ciety. But this set has lost [ISO] its merely systematic character because itconstitutes our neighbourhood. These relationships involve components ex-pressive of certain individual diversities, and identities between the occa-sions which are the members of the nexus. But these diversities and iden-tities are correlated according to a systematic law expressible in terms of thesystematic measurements derived from the geometric nexus. We herearrive at the notion of physical quantities which vary from individual toindividual; this is the notion of the systematization of individual differ-ences, the notion of Taw/

It is the ideal of mathematical physicists to formulate this systematiclaw in its complete generality for our epoch. It is sufficient for our purposesto indicate the presumed character of this law by naming the members ofthe society 'electromagnetic occasions/ Thus our present epoch is domi-nated by a society of electromagnetic occasions. In so far as this dominanceapproaches completeness, the systematic law which physics seeks is ab-solutely dominant. In so far as the dominance is incomplete, the obedienceis a statistical fact with its corresponding lapses.

The electromagnetic society exhibits the physical electromagnetic fieldwhich is the topic of physical science. The members of this nexus are theelectromagnetic occasions.

But in its turn, this electromagnetic society would provide no adequateorder for the production of individual occasions realizing peculiar 'inten-sities7 of experience unless it were pervaded by more special societies,vehicles of such order. The physical world exhibits a bewildering com-plexity of such societies, favouring each other, competing with each other.

The most general examples of such societies are the regular trains ofwaves, individual electrons, protons, individual molecules, societies ofmolecules such as inorganic bodies, living cells, and societies of cells suchas vegetable and animal bodies.

14 The transformations into an indefinite variety of coordinates, to which the'tensor theory' refers, all presuppose one congruence-definition.t The invarianceof the Einsteinian *ds' expresses this fact.

SECTION V

[151] It is obvious that the simple classification (cf. Part I, Ch. Ill, Sect.II) of societies into 'enduring objects/ 'corpuscular societies/ and 'non-corpuscular societies' requires amplification. The notion of a society whichincludes subordinate societies and nexus with a definite pattern of struc-tural inter-relationsf must be introduced. Such societies will be termed'structured/

A structured society as a whole provides a favourable environment forthe subordinate societies which it harbours within itself. Also the wholesociety must be set in a wider environment permissive of its continuance.Some of the component groups of occasions in a structured society can betermed 'subordinate societies/ But other such groups must be given thewider designation of 'subordinate nexus/ The distinction arises because insome instances a group of occasions, such as? for example, a particular en-during entity, could have retained the dominant features of its definingcharacteristic in the general environment, apart from the structured society.It would have lost some features; in other words, the analogous sort ofenduring entity in the general environment is, in its mode of definiteness,not quite identical with the enduring entity within the structured environ-ment. But, abstracting such additional details from the generalized de-fining characteristic, the enduring object with that generalized character-istic may be conceived as independent of the structured society withinwhich it finds itself.t For example, we speak of a molecule within a livingcell, because its general molecular features are independent of the environ-ment of the cell. Thus a molecule is a subordinate society in the structuredsociety which we call the 'living cell/

But there may be other nexus included in a structured society which,excepting the general systematic characteristics of the external environ-ment, present no features capable of genetically sustaining themselves apartfrom [152] the special environment provided by that structured society.It is misleading, therefore, to term such a nexus a 'society' when it is be-ing considered in abstraction from the whole structured society. In such anabstraction it can be assigned no 'social' features. Recurring to the exampleof a living cell, it will be argued that the occasions composing the 'empty7space within the cell exhibit special features which analogous occasions out-side the cell are devoid of. Thus the nexus, which is the empty space withina living cell, is called a 'subordinate nexus/ but not a 'subordinate society/

Molecules are structured societies, and so in all probability are separateelectrons and protons. Crystals are structured societies. But gases are notstructured societies in any important sense of that term; although theirindividual molecules are structured societies.

It must be remembered that each individual occasion within a specialform of society includes features which do not occur in analogous occasions

in the external environment. The first stage of systematic investigationmust always be the identification of analogies between occasions within thesociety and occasions without it. The second stage is constituted by themore subtle procedure of noting the differences between behaviour withinand without the society, differencest of behaviour exhibited by occasionswhich also have close analogies to each other. The history of science ismarked by the vehement, dogmatic denial of such differences, until theyare found out.

An obvious instance of such distinction of behaviour is afforded by thenotion of the deformation of the shape of an electron according to varia-tions in its physical situation.

A 'structured society7 may be more or less 'complex' in respect to themultiplicity of its associated sub-societies and sub-nexus and to the intricacyof their structural pattern.

A structured society which is highly complex can be [153] correspond-ingly favourable to intensity of satisfaction for certain sets of its com-ponent members. This intensity arises by reason of the ordered complexityof the contrasts which the society stages for these components.!

The structural relations gather intensity from this intensity in the in-dividual experiences. Thus the growth of a complex structured societyexemplifies the general purpose pervading nature. The mere complexity ofgivenness which procures incompatibilities has been superseded by thecomplexity of order which procures contrasts.

SECTION VI

The doctrine that every society requires a wider social environmentleads to the distinction that a society may be more or less 'stabilized' inreference to certain sorts of changes in that environment. A society is'stabilized' in reference to a species of change when it can persist throughan environment whose relevant parts exhibit that sort of change. If thesociety would cease to persist through an environment with that sort ofheterogeneity, then the society is in that respect 'unstable/ A complex so-ciety which is stable provided that the environment exhibits certain fea-tures t is said to be 'specialized7 in respect to those features. The notion of'specialization7 seems to include both that of 'complexity7 and that ofstrictly conditioned 'stability/

An unspecialized society can survive through important changes in itsenvironment. This means that it can take on different functions in respectto its relationship to a changing environment. In general the defining char-acteristic of such a society will not include any particular determinationof structural pattern. By reason of this flexibility of structural pattern, thesociety can adopt that special pattern adapted to the circumstances of themoment. Thus an unspecialized society is apt to be deficient in structuralpattern, when viewed as a whole.

[154] Thus in general an unspecialized society does not secure conditionsfavourable for intensity of satisfaction among its members, whereast astructured society with a high grade of complexity will in general be de-ficient in survival value. In other words, such societies will in general be'specialized' in the sense of requiring a very special sort of environment.

Thus the problem t for Nature is the production of societies which are'structured' with a high 'complexity/ and which are at the same time 'un-specialized.7 In this way, intensity is mated with survival.

SECTION VII

There are two ways in which structured societies have solved this prob-lem. Both ways depend on that enhancement of the mental pole, whichis a factor in intensity of experience. One way is by eliciting a massiveaverage objectification of a nexus, while eliminating the detailed diversitiesof the various members of the nexus in question. This method, in fact,employs the device of blocking out unwelcome detail. It depends on thefundamental truth that objectification is abstraction. It utilizes this abstrac-tion inherent in objectification so as to dismiss the thwarting elements of anexus into negative prehensions. At the same time the complex intensityin the structured society is supported by the massive objectifications of themany environmental nexus, each in its unity as one nexus, and not in itsmultiplicity as many actual occasions.

This mode of solution requires the intervention of mentality operating inaccordance with the Category of Transmutation (i.e., Categoreal Obliga-tion VI). It ignores diversity of detail by overwhelming the nexus by meansof some congenial uniformity which pervades it. The environment maythen change indefinitely so far as concerns the ignored details—so long asthey can be ignored.

The close association of all physical bodies, organic and [155] inorganicalike, with 'presented loci' definable 15 by straight lines, suggests that thisdevelopment of mentality is characteristic of the actual occasions whichmake up the structured societies which we know as 'material bodies; Thisclose association is evidenced by the importance of 'acceleration' in thescience of dynamics.! For 'acceleration7 is nothing else than a mode ofestimating the shift from one family of 'presented loci' to another suchfamily (cf. Part IV).

Such mentality represents the first grade of ascent beyond the mere re-productive stage which employs nothing more than the Category of Con-ceptual Reproduction (i.e., Categoreal Obligation IV). There is someinitiative of conceptual integration, but no originality in conceptual pre-hension. This initiative belongs to the Category of Transmutation, and theexcluded originality belongs to the Category of Reversion.

15 Cf. Ch. IV of this Partt and also Part IV.

These material bodies belong to the lowest grade of structured societieswhich are obvious to our gross apprehensions. They comprise societies ofvarious types of complexity—crystals, rocks, planets, and suns. Such bodiesare easily the most long-lived of the structured societies known to us,capable of being traced through their individual life-histories.

The second way of solving the problem is by an initiative in conceptualprehensions, i.e., in appetition. The purpose of this initiative is to receivethe novel elements of the environment into explicit feelings with such sub-jective forms as conciliate them with the complex experiences proper tomembers of the structured society. Thus in each concrescent occasion itssubjective aim originates novelty to match the novelty of the environment.

In the case of the higher organisms, this conceptual initiative amounts tothinking about the diverse experiences; in the case of lower organisms,! thisconceptual initiative merely amounts to thoughtless adjustment of aestheticemphasis in obedience to an ideal of harmony. [156] In either case thecreative determination which transcends the occasion in question has beendeflected by an impulse original to that occasion. This deflection in generaloriginates a self-preservative reaction throughout the whole society. It maybe unfortunate or inadequate; and in the case of persistent failure we arein the province of pathology.

This second mode of solution also presupposes the former mode. Thusthe Categories of Conceptual Reversion and of Transmutation are bothcalled into play.

Structured societies in which the second mode of solution has im-portance are termed 'living/ It is obvious that a structured society may havemore or less 'life/ and that there is no absolute gap between living' and'non-living7 societies. For certain purposes, whatever 'life' there is in asociety may be important; and for other purposes, unimportant.

A structured society in which the second mode is unimportant, and thefirst mode is important will be termed 'inorganic'

In accordance with this doctrine of life,7 the primary meaning of 'life'is the origination of conceptual novelty—novelty of appetition. Such origi-nation can only occur in accordance with the Category of Reversion. Thusa society is only to be termed 'living' in a derivative sense. A 'living society'is one which includes some 'living occasions.' Thus a society may be moreor less 'living,' according to the prevalence in it of living occasions. Alsoan occasion may be more or less living according to the relative importanceof the novel factors in its final satisfaction.

Thus the two ways in which dominant members of structured societiessecure stability amid environmental novelties are (i) elimination of diver-sities of detail, and (ii) origination of novelties of conceptual reaction. Asthe result, there is withdrawal or addition of those details of emphasiswhereby the subjective aim directs the [157] integration of prehensions inthe concrescent phases of dominant members.

SECTION VIII

There is yet another factor in 'living7 societies which requires more de-tached analysis. A structured society consists in the patterned intertwiningof various nexus with markedly diverse defining characteristics. Some ofthese nexus are of lower types than others, and some will be of markedlyhigher types. There will be the 'subservient' nexus and the 'regnant7 nexuswithin the same structured society. This structured society will provide theimmediate environment which sustains each of its sub-societies, subservientand regnant alike. In a living society only some of its nexus will be suchthat the mental poles of all their members have any original reactions.These will be its 'entirely living7 nexus, and in practice a society is onlycalled 'living7 when such nexus are regnant. Thus a living society involvesnexus which are 'inorganic/ and nexus which are inorganic do not needthe protection of the whole 'living7 society for their survival in a changingexternal I environment. Such nexus are societies. But 'entirely living7 nexusdo require such protection, if they are to survive. According to this con-jectural theory, an 'entirely living7 nexus is not a 'society.7 This is the theoryof the animal body, including a unicellular body as a particular instance.A complex inorganic system of interaction is built up for the protection ofthe 'entirely living7 nexus, and the originative actions of the living elementsare protective of the whole system. On the other hand, the reactions! ofthe whole system provide the intimate environment required by the 'en-tirely living7 nexus. We do not know of any living society devoid of its sub-servient apparatus of inorganic societies.

'Physical Physiology deals with the subservient inorganic apparatus; and'Psychological Physiology7 seeks to deal with 'entirely living7 nexus, partlyin abstraction [158] from the inorganic apparatus, and partly in respect totheir response to the inorganic apparatus, and partly in regard to theirresponse to each other. Physical Physiology has, in the last century, estab-lished itself as a unified science; Psychological Physiology is still in theprocess of incubation.

It must be remembered that an integral living society, as we know it, notonly includes the subservient inorganic apparatus, but also includes manyliving nexus,t at least one for each 'cell/

SECTION IX

It will throw light upon the cosmology of the philosophy of organism toconjecture some fundamental principles of Psychological Physiology assuggested by that cosmology and by the preceding conjectures concerningthe 'societies7 of our epoch. These principles are not necessitated by thiscosmology; but they seem to be the simplest principles which are bothconsonant with that cosmology, and also fit the facts.

In the first instance, consider a single living cell. Such a cell includessubservient inorganic societies, such as molecules and electrons. Thus, thecell is an 'animal body'; and we must presuppose the physical physiology7proper to this instance. But what of the individual living occasions?

The first question to be asked is as to whether the living occasions, inabstraction from the inorganic occasions of the animal body, form a cor-puscular sub-society, so that each living occasion is a member of an en-during entity with its personal order. In particular we may ask whetherthis corpuscular society reduces to the extreme instance of such a society,namely, to one enduring entity with its one personal order.f

The evidence before us is of course extremely slight; but so far as itgoes, it suggests a negative answer to both these questions. A cell gives noevidence whatever of a single unified mentality, guided in each of its occa-[J59] sions by inheritance from its own past. The problem to be solved isthat of a certain originality in the response of a cell to external stimulus.The theory of an enduring entity with its inherited mentality gives us areason why this mentality should be swayed by its own past. We ask forsomething original at the moment, and we are provided with a reason forlimiting originality. Life is a bid for freedom: an enduring entity bindsany one of its occasions to the line of its ancestry. The doctrine of theenduring soul with its permanent characteristics is exactly the irrelevantanswer to the problem which life presents. That problem is, How can therebe originality? And the answer explains how the soul need be no moreoriginal than a stone.

The theory of a corpuscular society, made up of many enduring entities,fits the evidence no better. The same objections apply. The root fact is that'endurance7 is a device whereby an occasion is peculiarly bound by a singleline of physical ancestry, while 'life7 means novelty, introduced in accord-ance with the Category of Conceptual Reversion. There are the sameobjections to many traditions as there are to one tradition. What has to beexplained is originality of response to stimulus. This amounts to the doc-trine that an organism is 'alive7 when in some measure its reactions areinexplicable by any tradition of pure physical inheritance.

Explanation by 'tradition7 is merely another phraseology for explana-tion by 'efficient cause.7 We require explanation by 'final cause.7 Thus asingle occasion is alive when the subjective aim which determines its pro-cess of concrescence has introduced a novelty of definiteness not to befound in the inherited data of its primary phase. The novelty is introducedconceptually and disturbs the inherited 'responsive7 adjustment of subjec-tive forms. It alters the 'values/ in the artist's sense of that term.

It follows from these considerations that in abstraction from its animalbody an 'entirely living* nexus is not [J60] properly a society at all, since'life' cannot be a defining characteristic. It is the name for originality, andnot for tradition. The mere response to stimulus is characteristic of allsocieties whether inorganic or alive. Action and reaction are bound to-

gether. The characteristic of life is reaction adapted to the capture of in-tensity, under a large variety of circumstances. But the reaction is dictatedby the present and not by the past. It is the clutch at vivid immediacy.

SECTION X

Another characteristic of a living society is that it requires food. In amuseum the crystals are kept under glass cases; in zoological gardens theanimals are fed. Having regard to the universality of reactions with envi-ronment, the distinction is not quite absolute. It cannot, however, beignored. The crystals are not agencies requiring the destruction of elab-orate societies derived from the environment; a living society is such anagency. The societies which it destroys are its food. This food is destroyedby dissolving it into somewhat simpler social elements. It has been robbedof something. Thus, all societies require interplay with their environment;and in the case of living societies this interplay takes the form of robbery.The living society may, or may not, be a higher type of organism than thefood which it disintegrates. But whether or no it be for the general good,life is robbery. It is at this point that with life morals become acute. Therobber requires justification.

The primordial appetitions which jointly constitute God's purpose areseeking intensity, and not preservation. Because they are primordial, thereis nothing to preserve. He, in his primordial nature, is unmoved by love forthis particular, or that particular; for in this foundational process of crea-tivity, there are no preconstituted particulars. In the foundations of hisbeing, God is indifferent alike to preservation and to novelty. [161] Hecares not whether an immediate occasion be old or new, so far as concernsderivation from its ancestry. His aim 16 for it is depth of satisfaction as anintermediate step towards the fulfilment of his own being. His tendernessis directed towards each actual occasion, as it arises.

Thus God's purpose in the creative advance is the evocation of inten-sities. The evocation of societies is purely subsidiary to this absolute end.The characteristic of a living society is that a complex structure of in-organic societies is woven together for the production of a non-social nexuscharacterized by the intense physical experiences of its members. But suchan experience is derivate from the complex order of the material animalbody, and not from the simple 'personal order' of past occasions withanalogous experience. There is intense experience without the shackle ofreiteration from the past. This is the condition for spontaneity of concep-tual reaction. The conclusion to be drawn from this argument is that lifeis a characteristic of 'empty space' and not of space 'occupied' by any cor-puscular society. In a nexus of living occasions, there is a certain socialdeficiency. Life lurks in the interstices of each living cell, and in the in-

16 Cf. Part V.

terstices of the brain. In the history of a living society, its more vividmanifestations wander to whatever quarter is receiving from the animalbody an enormous variety of physical experience. This experience, iftreated inorganically, must be reduced to compatibility by the normal ad-justments of mere responsive reception. This means the dismissal of in-compatible elements into negative prehensions.

The complexity of the animal body is so ordered that in the critical por-tions of its interstices the varied datum of physical experience is complex,and on the edge of a compatibility beyond that to be achieved by mere in-organic treatment. A novel conceptual prehension disturbs [162] the sub-jective forms of the initial responsive phase. Some negative prehensions arethus avoided, and higher contrasts are introduced into experience.

So far as the functioning of the animal body is concerned, the totalresult is that the transmission of physical influence, through the emptyspace within it, has not been entirely in conformity with the physical lawsholding for inorganic societies. The molecules within an animal body ex-hibit certain peculiarities of behaviour not to be detected outside an animalbody. In fact, living societies illustrate the doctrine that the laws of naturedevelop together with societies which constitute an epoch. There are sta-tistical expressions of the prevalent types of interaction. In a living cell, thestatistical balance has been disturbed.

The connection of 'food' with 'life' is now evident. The highly complexinorganic societies required for the structure of a cell, or other living body,lose their stability amid the diversity of the environment. But, in thephysical field of empty space produced by the originality of living occasions,chemical dissociations and associations take place which would not other-wise occur. The structure is breaking down and being repaired. The foodis that supply of highly complex societies from the outside which, under theinfluence of life, will enter into the necessary associations to repair thewaste. Thus life acts as though it were a catalytic agent.

The short summary of this account of a living cell is as follows: (i) anextremely complex and delicately poised chemical structure; (ii) for theoccasions in the interstitialf 'empty' space a complex objective datumderived from this complex structure; (iii) under normal 'responsive' treat-ment, devoid of originality, the complex detail reduced to physical sim-plicity by negative prehensions; (iv) this detail preserved for positive feel-ing by the emotional and purposive readjustments produced by originalityof conceptual feeling (appetition); (v) the physical distortion of the field,leading to instability of [163] the structure; (vi) the structure acceptingrepair by food from the environment.

SECTION XI

The complexity of nature is inexhaustible. So far we have argued that thenature of life is not to be sought by its identification with some society of

occasions, which are living in virtue of the defining characteristic of thatsociety. An 'entirely living' nexus is7 in respect to its life, not social. Eachmember of the nexus derives the necessities of its being from its prehen-sions of its complex social environment; by itself the nexus lacks the geneticpower which belongs to 'societies/ But a living nexus, though non-social invirtue of its life/ may support a thread of personal order along some his-torical route of its members. Such an enduring entity is a living person/It is not of the essence of life to be a living person. Indeed a living personrequires that its immediate environment be a living, non-social nexus.

The defining characteristic of a living person is some definite type ofhybrid prehensions transmitted from occasion to occasion of its existence.The term 'hybrid' is defined more particularly in Part III. It is sufficientto state here that a 'hybrid' prehension is the prehension by one subject ofa conceptual prehension, or of an 'impure' prehension, belonging to thementality of another subject. By this transmission the mental originalityof the living occasions receives a character and a depth. In this way origi-nality is both 'canalized'—to use Bergson's word—and intensified. Its rangeis widened within limits. Apart from canalization, depth of originalitywould spell disaster for the animal body. With it, personal mentality canbe evolved, so as to combine its individual originality with the safety of thematerial organism on which it depends. Thus life turns back into society: itbinds originality within bounds, and gains the massiveness due to reiteratedcharacter.

In the case of single cells, of vegetation, and of the [164] lower forms ofanimal life, we have no ground for conjecturing living personality. But inthe case of the higher animals there is central direction, which suggeststhat in their case each animal body harbours a living person, or living per-sons. Our own self-consciousness is direct awareness of ourselves as suchpersons.17 There are limits to such unified control, which indicate dis-sociation of personality, multiple personalities in successive alternations,and even multiple personalities in joint possession. This last case belongsto the pathology of religion, and in primitive times has been interpreted asdemoniac possession. Thus, though life in its essence is the gain of inten-sity through freedom, yet it can also submit to canalization and so gain themassiveness of order. But it is not necessary merely to presuppose thedrastic case of personal order. We may conjecture, though without muchevidence, that even in the lowest form of life the entirely living nexus iscanalized into some faint form of mutual conformity. Such conformityamounts to social order depending on hybrid prehensions of originalities inthe mental poles of the antecedent members of the nexus. The survivalpower, arising from adaptation and regeneration, is thus explained. Thuslife is a passage from physical order to pure mental originality, and from

17 This account of a living personality requires completion by reference to itsobjectification in the consequent nature of God. Cf. Part V, Ch. II.

108 Discussions and Applications

pure mental originality to canalized mental originality. It must also benoted that the pure mental originality works by the canalization of rele-vance arising from the primordial nature of God. Thus an originality in thetemporal world is conditioned, though not determined, by an initial sub-jective aim supplied by the ground of all order and of all originality.

Finally, we have to consider the type of structured + society which givesrise to the traditional body-mind problem. For example, human men-tality is partly the outcome of the human body, partly the single directive[165] agency of the body, partly a system of cogitations which have a cer-tain irrelevance to the physical relationships of the body. The Cartesianphilosophy is based upon the seeming fact—the plain fact—of one bodyand one mind, which are two substances in causaU association. For thephilosophy of organism the problem is transformed.

Each actuality is essentially bipolar, physical and mental, and the physi-cal inheritance is essentially accompanied by a conceptual reaction partlyconformed to it, and partly introductory of a+ relevant novel contrast, butalways introducing emphasis, valuation, and purpose. The integration ofthe physical and mental side into a unity of experience is a self-formationwhich is a process of concrescence, and which by the principle of objectiveimmortality characterizes the creativity which transcends it. So thoughmentality is non-spatial, mentality is always a reaction from, and integra-tion with, physical experience which is spatial. It is obvious that we mustnot demand another mentality presiding over these other actualities (akind of Uncle Sam, over and above all the U.S. citizens). All the life inthe body is the life of the individual cells. There are thus millions uponmillions of centres of life in each animal body. So what needs to be ex-plained is not dissociation of personality but unifying control, by reasonof which we not only have unified behaviour, which can be observed byothers, but also consciousness of a unified experience.

A good many actions do not seem to be due to the unifying control, e.g.,with proper stimulants a heart can be made to go on beating after it hasbeen taken out of the body. There are centres of reaction and control whichcannot be identified with the centre of experience. This is still more so withinsects. For example, worms and jellyfish seem to be merely harmonizedcells, very little centralized; when cut in two, their parts go on performingtheir functions independently. Through a series of animals we can trace aprogressive rise into a [166] centrality of control. Insects have some cen-tral control; even in man, many of the body's actions are done with someindependence, but with an organ of central control of very high-grade char-acter in the brain.

The state of things, according to the philosophy of organism, is very dif-ferent from the Scholastic view of St. Thomas Aquinas, of the mind as in-forming the body. The living body is a coordination of high-grade actualoccasions; but in a living body of a low type the occasions are much nearerto a democracy. In a living body of a high type there are grades of occa-

The Order of Nature 109

sions so coordinated by their paths of inheritance through the body, thata peculiar richness of inheritance is enjoyed by various occasions in someparts of the body. Finally, the brain is coordinated so that a peculiar rich-ness of inheritance is enjoyed now by this and now by that part; and thusthere is produced the presiding personality at that moment in the body.Owing to the delicate organization of the body, there is a returned influ-ence, an inheritance of character derived from the presiding occasion andmodifying the subsequent occasions through the rest of the body.

We must remember the extreme generality of the notion of an enduringobject—a genetic character inherited through a historic route of actualoccasions. Some kinds of enduring objects form material bodies, others donot. But just as the difference between living and non-living occasions isnot sharp, but more or less, so the distinction between an enduring objectwhich is an atomic material body and one which is nott is again more orless. Thus the question as to whether to call an enduring object a transitionof matter or of character is very much a verbal question as to where youdraw the line between the various properties (cf. the way in which thedistinction between matter and radiant energy has now vanished).

Thus in an animal body the presiding occasion, if there be one, is thefinal node, or intersection, of a complex [167} structure of many enduringobjects. Such a structure pervades the human body. The harmonized rela-tions of the parts of the body constitute this wealth of inheritance into aharmony of contrasts, issuing into intensity of experience. The inhibitionsof opposites have been adjusted into the contrasts of opposites. The humanmind is thus conscious of its bodilyt inheritance. There is also an enduringobject formed by the inheritance from presiding occasion to presiding oc-casion. This endurance of the mind is only one more example of the gen-eral principle on which the body is constructed. This route of presidingoccasions probably wanders from part to part of the brain, dissociated fromthe physical material atoms. But central personal dominance is only partial,and in pathological cases is apt to vanish.

CHAPTER IVORGANISMS AND ENVIRONMENT

SECTION I

[168] So far the discussion has chiefly concentrated upon the discrimina-tion of the modes of functioning which in germ, or in mere capacity, arerepresented in the constitution of each actual entity. The presumptionthat there is only one genus of actual entities constitutes an ideal of cos-mological theory to which the philosophy of organism endeavours to don-form. The description of the generic character of an actual entity shouldinclude God, as well as the lowliest actual occasion, though there is a spe-cific difference between the nature of God and that of any occasion.

Also the differences between actual occasions, arising from the charac-ters of their data, and from the narrowness and widths of their feelings,and from the comparative importance of various stages, enable a classifica-tion to be made whereby these occasions are gathered into various types.From the metaphysical standpoint these types are not to be sharply dis-criminated; as a matter of empirical observation, the occasions do seem tofall into fairly distinct classes.

The character of an actual entity is finally governed by its datum; what-ever be the freedom of feeling arising in the concrescence, there can be notransgression of the limitations of capacity inherent in the datum. Thedatum both limits and supplies. It follows from this doctrine that thecharacter of an organism depends on that of its environment. But thecharacter of an environment is the sum of the characters of the varioussocieties of actual entities which jointly constitute that envi- [J69] ron-ment; although it is pure assumption that every environment is com-pletely overrun by societies of entities. Spread through the environmentthere may be many entities which cannot be assigned to any society ofentities. The societies in an environment will constitute its orderly ele-ment, and the non-social actual entities will constitute its element ofchaos. There is no reason, so far as our knowledge is concerned, to con-ceive the actual world as purely orderly, or as purely chaotic.

Apart from the reiteration gained from its societies, an environmentdoes not provide the massiveness of emphasis capable of dismissing itscontrary elements into negative prehensions. Any ideal of depth of satis-faction, arising from the combination of narrowness and width, can onlybe achieved through adequate order. In proportion to the chaos there istriviality. There are different types of order; and it is not true that in pro-

portion to the orderliness there is depth. There are various types of order,and some of them provide more trivial satisfaction than do others. Thus,if there is to be progress beyond limited ideals, the course of history byway of escape must venture along the borders of chaos in its substitutionof higher for lower types of order.

The immanence of God gives reason for the belief that pure chaos isintrinsically impossible. At the other end of the scale, the immensity ofthe world negatives the belief that any state of order can be so establishedthat beyond it there can be no progress. This belief in a final order, popu-lar in religious and philosophic thought, seems to be due to the prevalentfallacy that all types of seriality necessarily involve terminal instances.It follows that Tennyson's phrase,

. . . onef far-off divine event

To which the whole creation moves,

presents a fallacious conception of the universe.

An actual entity must be classified in respect to its [170] 'satisfaction/and this arises out of its datum by the operations constituting its 'process/Satisfactions can be classified by reference to 'triviality/ Vagueness/ 'nar-rowness/ 'width.' Triviality and vagueness are characteristics in the satis-faction which have their origins respectively in opposed characteristics inthe datum. Triviality arises from lack of coordination in the factors of thedatum, so that no feeling arising from one factor is reinforced by anyfeeling arising from another factor. In other words, the specific constitu-tion of the actual entity in question is not such as to elicit depth of feel-ing from contrasts thus presented. Incompatibility has predominated overcontrast. Then the process can involve no coordinating intensificationeither from a reinforced narrowness, or from enhancement of relevancedue to the higher contrasts derived from harmonized width. Triviality isdue to the wrong sort of width; that is to say, it is due to width withoutany reinforced narrowness in its higher categories. Harmony is this com-bination of width and narrowness. Some narrow concentration on alimited set of effects is essential for depth; but the difference arises in thelevels of the categories of contrast involved. A high category involves un-plumbed potentiality for the realization of depth in its lower components.Thus 'triviality' arises from excess of incompatible differentiation.

On the other hand, 'vagueness' is due to excess of identification. In thedatum the objectifications of various actual entities are replicas with faintcoordinations of perspective contrast. Under these conditions the con-trasts between the various objectifications are faint, and there is deficiencyin supplementary feeling discriminating the objects from each other.There can thus be intensive narrowness in the prehension of the wholenexus, by reason of the common character,! combined with vagueness,which is the irrelevance of the differences between the definite actual en-tities of the nexus. The objectified entities reinforce each other by their

likeness. But there [171] is lack of differentiation among the componentobjectifications owing to the deficiency in relevant contrasts.

In this way a group of actual entities contributes to the satisfaction asone extensive whole. It is divisible, but the actual divisions, and theirsporadic differences of character, have sunk into comparative irrelevancebeside the one character belonging to the whole and any of its parts.

By reason of vagueness, many count as one, and are subject to indefi-nite possibilities of division into such multifold unities. When there issuch vague prehension, the differences between the actual entities so pre-hended are faint chaotic factors in the environment, and have therebybeen relegated to irrelevance. Thus vagueness is an essential condition forthe narrowness which is one condition for depth of relevance. It enables abackground to contribute its relevant quota, and it enables a social groupin the foreground to gain concentrated relevance for its community ofcharacter. The right chaos, and the right vagueness, are jointly requiredfor any effective harmony. They produce the massive simplicity which hasbeen expressed by the term 'narrowness/ Thus chaos is not to be identifiedwith evil; for harmony requires the due coordination of chaos, vagueness,narrowness, and width.

According to this account, the background in which the environment isset must be discriminated into two layers. There is first the relevant back-ground, providing a massive systematic uniformity. This background isthe presupposed world to which all ordinary propositions refer. Secondly,there is the more remote chaotic background which has merely an irrelevanttriviality, so far as concerns direct objectification in the actual entity inquestion. This background represents those entities in the actual worldwith such perspective remoteness that there is even a chaos of diversecosmic epochs. In the background there is triviality, vagueness, and mas-sive uniformity; in the foreground discrimination and [172] contrasts, butalways negative prehensions of irrelevant diversities.

SECTION II

Intensity is the reward of narrowness. The domination of the environ-ment by a few social groups is the factor producing both the vagueness ofdiscrimination between actual entities and the intensification of relevanceof common characteristics. These are the two requisites for narrowness.The lower organisms have low-grade types of narrowness; the higher or-ganisms have intensified contrasts in the higher categories. In describingthe capacities, realized or unrealized, of an actual occasion, we have, withLocke, tacitly taken human experience as an example upon which tofound the generalized description required for metaphysics. But when weturn to the lower organisms we have first to determine which among suchcapacities fade from realization into irrelevance, that is to say, by com-parison with human experience which is our standard.

In any metaphysical scheme founded upon the Kantian or Hegeliantraditions, experience is the product of operations which lie among thehigher of the human modes of functioning. For such schemes, ordered ex-perience is the result of schematization of modes of thought, concerningcausation, substance, quality, quantity.

The process by which experiential unity is attainedf is thereby con-ceived in the guise of modes of thought. The exception is to be found inKant's preliminary sections on 'Transcendental Aesthetic/ by which heprovides space and time. But Kant, following Hume, assumes the radicaldisconnection of impressions qua data; and therefore conceives his tran-scendental aesthetic* to be the mere description of a subjective processappropriating the data by orderliness of feeling.

The philosophy of organism aspires to construct a critique of purefeeling, in the philosophical position in [173] which Kant put his Critiqueof Pure Reason. This should also supersede the remaining Critiques re-quired in the Kantian philosophy. Thus in the organic philosophy Kant's'Transcendental Aesthetic' becomes a distorted fragment of what shouldhave been his main topic. The datum includes its own interconnections,and the first stage of the process of feeling is the reception into the^responsive conformity of feeling whereby the datum, which is mere po-tentiality, becomes the individualized basis for a complex unity ofrealization.

This conception, as found in the philosophy of organism, is practicallyidentical with Locke's ways of thought in the latter half of his Essay. Hespeaks of the ideas in the perceived objects, and tacitly presupposes theiridentification with corresponding ideas in the perceiving mind. The ideas inthe objects have been appropriated by the subjective functioning of theperceiving mind. This mode of phraseology can be construed as a casualcarelessness of speech on the part of Locke, or a philosophic inconsistency.But apart from this inconsistency Locke's philosophy falls to pieces; as infact was its fate in the hands of Hume.

There is, however, a fundamental misconception to be found in Locke,and in prevalent doctrines of perception. It concerns the answer to thequestiont as to the description of the primitive types of experience. Lockeassumes that the utmost primitiveness is to be found in sense-perception.The seventeenth-century physics, with the complexities of primary andsecondary qualities, should have warned philosophers that sense-percep-tion was involved in complex modes of functioning. Primitive feeling is tobe found at a lower level. The mistake was natural for mediaeval and Greekphilosophers: for they had not modern physics before them as a plainwarning. In sense-perception we have passed the Rubicon, dividing directperception from the higher forms of mentality, which play with error andthus found intellectual empires.

[174] The more primitive types of experience are concerned with sense-reception, and not with sense-perception. This statement will require some

prolonged explanation. But the course of thought can be indicated byadopting Bergson's admirable phraseology, sense-reception is 'unspatial-ized/ and sense-perception is 'spatialized/ In sense-reception the sensa arethe definiteness of emotion: they are emotional forms transmitted fromoccasion to occasion. Finally in some occasion of adequate complexity, theCategory of Transmutation endows them with the new function of charac-terizing nexus.

SECTION HI

In the first place, those eternal objects which will be classified under thename 'sensa' constitute the lowest category of eternal objects. Such eternalobjects do not express a manner of relatedness between other eternal ob-jects. They are not contrasts, or patterns. Sensa are necessary as com-ponents in any actual entity, relevant in the realization of the highergrades. But a sensum does not, for its own realization, require any eternalobject of a lower grade, though it does involve the potentiality of patternand does gain access of intensity from some realization of status in somerealized pattern. Thus a sensum requires, as a rescue from its shallownessof zero width, some selective relevance of wider complex eternal objectswhich include it as a component; but it does not involve the relevance ofany eternal objects which it presupposes. Thus, in one sense, a sensum issimple; for its realization does not involve the concurrent realization ofcertain definite eternal objects, which are its definite simple components.But, in another sense, each sensum is complex; for it cannot be dissociatedfrom its potentiality for ingression into any actual entity, and fromf itspotentiality of contrasts and of patterned relationships with other eternalobjects. Thus each sensum shares the characteristic common to all eternalobjects, that it introduces the notion of the logi- [175] cal variable, in bothforms, the unselective 'any' and the selective 'some/

It is possible that this definition of 'sensa' excludes some cases of con-trast which are ordinarily termed 'sensa' and that it includes some emo-tional qualities which are ordinarily excluded. Its convenience consists inthe fact that it is founded on a metaphysical principle, and not on anempirical investigation of the physiology of the human body.

Narrowness in the lowest category achieves such intensity as belongs tosuch experience, but fails by reason of deficiency of width. Contrast elicitsdepth, and only shallow experience is possible when there is a lack of pat-terned contrast. Hume notices the comparative failure of the higher fa-culty of imagination in respect to mere sensa. He exaggerates this com-parative failure into a dogma of absolute inhibition to imagine a novelsensum; whereas the evidence which he himself adduces, of the imagina-tion of a new shade of colour to fill a gap in a graduated scale of shades,shows t that a contrast between given shades can be imaginatively extendedso as to generate the imagination of the missing shade. But Hume's ex-

ample also shows that imagination finds its easiest freedom among thehigher categories of eternal objects,

A pattern is in a sense simple: a pattern is the 'manner' of a complexcontrast abstracted from the specific eternal objects which constitute the'matter' of the contrast. But the pattern refers unselectively to any eternalobjects with the potentiality of being elements in the 'matter' of somecontrast in that 'manner/

A pattern and a sensum are thus both simple in the sense that neitherinvolves other specified eternal objects in its own realization. The mannerof a pattern is the individual essence of the pattern. But no individualessence is realizable apart from some of its potentialities of relationship,that is, apart from its relational essence. But a pattern lacks simplicity inanother sense, in which \176] a sensum retains simplicity. The realizationof a pattern necessarily involves the concurrent realization of a group ofeternal objects capable of contrast in that pattern. The realization of thepattern is through the realization of this contrast. The realization mighthave occurred by means of another contrast in the same pattern; butsome complex contrast in that pattern is required. But the realization of asensum in its ideal shallowness of intensity, with zero width, does notrequire any other eternal object, other than its intrinsic apparatus of indi-vidual and relational essence; it can remain just itself, with its unrealizedpotentialities for patterned contrasts. An actual entity with this absolutenarrowness has an ideal faintness of satisfaction, differing from the idealzero of chaos, but equally impossible. For realization means ingression inan actual entity, and this involves the synthesis of all ingredients with dataderived from a complex universe. Realization is ideally distinguishablefrom the ingression of contrasts, but not in fact.

The simplest grade of actual occasions must be conceived as experienc-ing a few sensa, with the minimum of patterned contrast. The sensa arethen experienced emotionally, and constitute the specific feelings whoseintensities sum up into the unity of satisfaction. In such occasions the proc-ess is deficient in its highest phases; the process is the slave to the datum.There is the individualizing phase of conformal feeling, but the originativephases of supplementary and conceptual feelingsf are negligible.

SECTION IV

According to this account, the experience of the simplest grade of ac-tual entity is to be conceived as the unoriginative response to the datumwith its simple content of sensa. The datum is simple, because it presentsthe objectified experiences of the past under the guise of simplicity. Occa-sions A, B, and C enter into the experience of occasion M as themselvesexperiencing [177] sensa Si and s2 unified by some faint contrast betweensx and s2. Occasion JVf responsively feels sensa $1 and s2 as its own sensa-tions. There is thus a transmission of sensation emotion from A, B, and Cto M. If M had the wit of self-analysis, M would know that it felt its own

sensa, by reason of a transfer from A, B, and C to itself. Thus the (un-conscious) direct perception of A, B, and C is merely the causal efficacyof A, B, and C as elements in the constitution of M. Such direct percep-tion will suffer from vagueness; for if A, B, and C tell the same tale withminor variation of intensity, the discrimination of A, and B, and C fromeach other will be irrelevant. There may thus remain a sense of the causalefficacy of actual presences, whose exact relationships in the external worldare shrouded. Thus the experience of M is to be conceived as a quantitativeemotion arising from the contribution of sensa from A, B, C and propor-tionately conformed to by M.

Generalizing from the language of physics, the experience of M is anintensity arising out of specific sensa, directed from A, B, C. There is infact a directed influx from A, B, C of quantitative feeling, arising fromspecific forms of feeling. The experience has a vector character, a commonmeasure of intensity, and specific forms of feelings conveying that inten-sity. If we substitute the term 'energy' for the concept of a quantitativeemotional intensity, and the term 'form of energy7 for the concept of'specific form of feeling/ and remember that in physics Vector' means defi-nite transmission from elsewhere, we see that this metaphysical descriptionof the simplest elements in the constitution of actual entities agrees ab-solutely with the general principles according to which the notions ofmodern physics are framed. The 'datum/ in metaphysics is the basis of thevector-theory in physics; the quantitative satisfaction in metaphysics isthe basis of the scalar localization of energy in physics; the 'sensa' inmetaphysics are the basis of the diversity of specific forms under whichenergy clothes itself. Sci- [178] entific descriptions are, of course, entwinedwith the specific details of geometry and physical laws, which arise fromthe special order of the cosmic epoch in which we find ourselves. But thegeneral principles of physics are exactly what we should expect as a spe-cific exemplification of the metaphysics required by the philosophy oforganism. It has been a defect in the modern philosophies that they throwno light whatever on any scientific principles. Science should investigateparticular species, and metaphysics should investigate the generic notionsunder which those specific principles should fall. Yet, modern realismshave had nothing to say about scientific principles; and modern idealismshave merely contributed the unhelpful suggestion that the phenomenalworld is one of the inferior avocations of the Absolute.

The direct perception whereby the datum in the immediate subject isinherited from the past can thus, under an abstraction, be conceived as thetransference of throbs of emotional energy, clothed in the specific formsprovided by sensa. Since the vagueness in the experientf subject will veilthe separate objeetifications wherein there are individual contributionsto the total satisfaction, the emotional energy in the final satisfaction wearsthe aspect of a total intensity capable of all gradations of ideal variation.But in its origin it represents the totality arising from the contributions of

separate objects to that form of energy. Thus, having regard to its origin,a real atomic structure of each form of energy is discernible, so much fromeach objectified actual occasion; and only a finite number of actual occa-sions will be relevant.

This direct perception, characterized by mere subjective responsivenessand by lack of origination in the higher phases, exhibits the constitutionof an actual entity under the guise of receptivity. In the language of causa-tion, it describes the efficient causation operative in the actual world. Inthe language of epistemology, as framed by Locke, it describes how theideas of particular [179] existents are absorbed into the subjectivity of thepercipient and are the datum for its experience of the external world. Inthe language of science, it describes how the quantitative intensity of lo-calized energy bears in itself the vector marks of its origin, and the spe-cialities of its specific forms; it also gives a reason for the atomic quantato be discerned in the building up of a quantity of energy. In this way,the philosophy of organism—as it should—appeals to the facts.

SECTION V

The current accounts of perception are the stronghold of modern meta-physical difficulties. They have their origin in the same misunderstandingwhich led to the incubus of the substance-quality categories. The Greekslooked at a stone, and perceived that it was grey. The Greeks were ig-norant of modern physics; but modern philosophers discuss perception interms of categories derived from the Greeks.

The Greeks started from perception in its most elaborate and sophisti-cated form, namely, visual perception. In visual perception, crude per-ception is most completely made over by the originative phases in ex-perience, phases which are especially prominent in human experience. Ifwe wish to disentangle the two earlier prehensive phases—the receptivephases, namely, the datum and the subjective response—from the moreadvanced originative phases, we must consider what is common to allmodes of perception, amid the bewildering variety of originativeamplification.

On this topic I am content to appeal to Hume. He writes: "But mysenses convey to me only the impressions of coloured points, disposed in acertain manner. If the eye is sensible of any thingt further, I desire it maybe pointed out to me/'1 And again: "It is universally allowed by thewriters on optics, that the eye at all times sees an equal number of physicalpoints, and that a man [180] on the top of a mountain has no larger animage presented to his senses, than when he is cooped up in the narrow-est court or chamber." 2

In each of these quotations Hume explicitly asserts that the eye sees.

1 Treatise, Bk. U Part II, Sect. III. Italics not his.

2 Treatise, Bk. I, Part III, Sect. IX.*

The conventional comment on such a passage is that Hume, for the sakeof intelligibility, is using common forms of expression; that he is onlyreally speaking of impressions on the mind; and that in the dim future,some learned scholar will gain reputation by emending 'eye' into 'ego/The reason for citing the passages is to enforce the thesis that the formof speech is literary and intelligible because it expresses the ultimate truthof animal perception. The ultimate momentary 'ego' has as its datum the'eye as experiencing such-and-suchf sights/ In the second quotation, thereference to the number of physical points is a reference to the excitedarea on the retina. Thus the 'eye as experiencing such-and-such sights' ispassed on as a datum7 from the cells of the retina, throughf the train ofactual entities forming the relevant nerves, up to the brain. Any directrelation of eye to brain is entirely overshadowed by this intensity of in-direct transmission. Of course this statement is merely a pale abstractionfrom the physiological theory of vision. But the physiological accountdoes not pretend to be anything more than indirect inductive knowledge.The point here to be noticed is the immediate literary obviousness of 'theeye as experiencing such-and-such sights/ This is the very reason whyHume uses the expression in spite of his own philosophy. The conclusion,which the philosophy of organism draws, is that in human experience thefundamental fact of perception is the inclusion, in the datum, of the ob-jectification of an antecedent part of the human body with such-and-suchexperiences. Hume agrees with this conclusion f sufficiently well so as toargue from it, when it suits his purpose. He writes:

I would fain ask those philosophers, who found so much of theirreasonings on the distinction [J81] of substance and accident, andimagine we have clear ideas of each, whether the idea of substance bederived from the impressions of sensation or reflection? If it be con-veyed to usf by our senses, I ask, which of them, and after what man-ner? If it be perceived by the eyes, it must be a colour; if by the ears, asound; if by the palate, a taste; and so of the other senses.3We can prolong Hume's list: the feeling of the stone is in the hand; thefeeling of the food is the ache in the stomach; the compassionate yearningis in the bowels, according to biblical writers; the feeling of well-being is inthe viscera passim; ill temper is the emotional tone derivative from thedisordered liver.

In this list, Hume's and its prolongation, for some cases—as in sight,for example—the supplementary phase in the ultimate subject overbal-ances in importance the datum inherited from the eye. In other cases, asin touch, the datum of 'the feeling in the hand' maintains its importance,however much the intensity, or even the character, of the feeling may bedue to supplementation in the ultimate subject: this instance should becontrasted with that of sight. In the instance of the ache the stomach, as

3 Treatise, Bk. I, Part I, Sect. VI.

datum, is of chief importance, and the food though obscurely felt issecondary—at least, until the intellectual analysis of the situation due tothe doctor, professional or amateur. In the instances of compassion, well-being, and ill temper, the supplementary feelings in the ultimate subjectpredominate, though there are obscure references to the bodily organs asinherited data.

This survey supports the view that the predominant basis of perceptionis perception of the various bodily organs, as passing on their experiencesby channels of transmission and of enhancement. It is the accepted doc-trine in physical science that a living body is to be interpreted accordingto what is known of other sections of the physical universe. This is a soundaxiom; but it [182] is double-edged. For it carries with it the converse de-duction that other sections of the universe are to be interpreted in ac-cordance with what we know of the human body.

It is also a sound rule that all interpretation should be based upon avera causa. Now the original reliance upon 'the grey stone7 has beenshown by modern physics to be due to a misapprehension of a complexsituation; but we have direct knowledge of the relationship of our centralintelligence to our bodily feelings. According to this interpretation, thehuman body is to be conceived as a complex 'amplifier'—to use the lan-guage of the technology of electromagnetism. The various actual entities,which compose the body, are so coordinated that the experiences of anypart of the body are transmitted to one or more central occasions to beinherited with enhancements accruing upon the way, or finally added byreason of the final integration. The enduring personality is the historicroute of living occasions which are severally dominant in the body at suc-cessive instants. The human body is thus achieving on a scale of concen-trated efficiency a type of social organization, which with every gradationof efficiency constitutes the orderliness whereby a cosmic epoch shelters initself intensity of satisfaction.

The crude aboriginal character of direct perception is inheritance. Whatis inherited is feeling-tone with evidence of its origin: in other words, vectorfeeling-tone. In the higher grades of perception vague feeling-tone dif-ferentiates itself into various types of sensa—those of touch, sight, smell,etc.—each transmuted into a definite prehension of tonal contemporarynexusf by the final percipient.

SECTION VI

In principle, the animal body is only the more highly organized andimmediate part of the general environment for its dominant actual occa-sion, which is the ultimate [183] percipient. But the transition from with-out to within the body marks the passage from lower to higher grades ofactual occasions. The higher the grade, the more vigorous and the moreoriginal is the enhancement from the supplementary phase. Pure recep-

tivity and transmission givef place to the trigger-action of life wherebythere is release of energy in novel forms. Thus the transmitted datum ac-quires sensa enhanced in relevance or even changed in character by thepassage from the low-grade external world into the intimacy of the humanbody. The datum transmitted from the stone becomes the touch-feelingin the hand, but it preserves the vector characterf of its origin from thestone. The touch-feeling in the hand with this vector origin from the stoneis transmitted to the percipient in the brain. Thus the final perception isthe perception of the stone through the touch in the hand. In this per-ception the stone is vague and faintly relevant in comparison with thehand. But, however dim, it is there.

In the transmission of inheritance from A to B, to C, to D, A is ob-jectified by the eternal object S as a datum for B; where S is a sensum or acomplex pattern of sensa. Then B is objectified for C. But the datum forB is thereby capable of some relevance for C, namely, A as objectified forB becomes reobjectified for C; and so on to D7 and throughout the line ofobjectifications. Then for the ultimate subject M the datum includes A asthus transmitted, B as thus transmitted, and so on. The final objectifica-tions for M are effected by a set S3 f of eternal objects which is a modifica-tion of the original group S. The modification consists partly in relegationof elements into comparative irrelevance, partly in enhancement of rele-vance for other elements, partly in supplementation by eliciting intoimportant relevance some eternal objects not in the original S. Generallythere will be vagueness in the distinction between A, and B, and C, andD, etc., in their function as components in the datum for M. Some of theline, A and C for instance, may stand out \184] with distinctness by rea-son of some peculiar feat of original supplementation which retains itsundimmed importance in subsequent transmission. Other members of thechain may sink into oblivion. For example, in touch there is a reference tothe stone in contact with the hand, and a reference to the hand; but innormal, healthy, bodily operations the chain of occasions along the armsinks into the background, almost into complete oblivion. Thus M, whichhas some analytic consciousness of its datum, is conscious of the feeling inits hand as the hand touches the stone. According to this account, per-ception in its primary form is consciousness of the causal efficacy of theexternal world by reason of which the percipient is a concrescence from adefinitely constituted datum. The vector character of the datum is thiscausal efficacy.

Thus perception, in this primary sense, is perception of the settledworld in the past as constituted by its feeling-tones, and as efficacious byreason of those feeling-tones. Perception, in this sense of the term, will becalled 'perception in the mode of causal efficacy/ Memory is an exampleof perception in this mode. For memory is perception relating to the datafrom some historic route of ultimate percipient subjects Mi, M2, M3,etc., leading up to M which is the memorizing percipient.

SECTION VII

It is evident that 'perception in the mode of causal efficacy' is not thatsort of perception which has received chief attention in the philosophicaltradition. Philosophers have disdained the information about the universeobtained through their visceral feelings, and have concentrated on visualfeelings.

What we ordinarily term our visual perceptions are the result of thelater stages in the concrescence of the percipient occasion. When weregister in consciousness our visual perception of a grey stone, somethingmore than bare sight is meant. The 'stone' has a reference [185] to itspast, when it could have been used as a+ missile if small enough, or as a seatif large enough. A 'stone' has certainly a history, and probably a future. It isone of the elements in the actual world which has got to be referred toas an actual reason and not as an abstract potentiality. But we all knowthat the mere sight involved, in the perception of the grey stone, is thesight of a grey shape contemporaneous with the percipient, and withcertain spatial relations to the percipient, more or less vaguely defined.Thus the mere sight is confined to the illustration of the geometricalperspective relatedness, of a certain contemporary spatial region, to thepercipient, the illustration being effected by the mediation of 'grey/ Thesensum 'grey' rescues that region from its vague confusion with otherregions.

Perception which merely, by means of a sensum, rescues from vaguenessa contemporary spatial region, in respect to its spatial shape and its spatialperspective from the percipient, will be called 'perception in the mode ofpresentational immediacy.'

Perception in this mode has already been considered in Part II, ChapterII. A more elaborate discussion of it can now be undertaken.4 The defini-tion, which has just been given, extends beyond the particular case ofsight. The unravelling of the complex interplay between the two modes ofperception—causal efficacy and presentational immediacy—tis one mainproblem of the theory of perception.5 The ordinary philosophical discus-sion of perception is almost wholly concerned with this interplay, andignores the two pure modes which are essential for its proper explanation.The interplay between the two modes will be termed 'symbolic reference.'

[186] Such symbolic reference is so habitual in human experience thatgreat care is required to distinguish the two modes. In order to find ob-

4 Also cf.f subsequent discussions in Parts III and IV.

5 Cf. my Barbour-Page lectures, Symbolism, Its Meaning and Effect, deliveredat the University of Virginia, April, 1927 (New York: Macrnillan, 1927; Cam-bridge University Press, 1928).+ Another discussion of this question is thereundertaken, with other illustrations, Cf. also Professor Norman Kemp Smith'sProlegomena to an Idealist Theory of Knowledge, Macrnillan, 1924.

vious examples of the pure mode of causal efficacy we must have recourseto the viscera and to memory; and to find examples of the pure mode ofpresentational immediacy we must have recourse to so-called 'delusive'perceptions. For example, the image of a grey stone as seen in a mirrorillustrates the space behind the mirror; the visual delusions arising fromsome delirium, or some imaginative excitement, illustrate surroundingspatial regions; analogously for the double-vision due to maladjustment ofthe eyes; the sight at night, of the stars and nebulae and Milky Way,illustrates vague regions of the contemporary sky; the feelings in ampu-tated limbs illustrate spaces beyond the actual body; a bodily pain, re-ferred to some part not the cause of the disorder, illustrates the painfulregion though not the pain-giving region. All these are perfectly good ex-amples of the pure mode of presentational immediacy.

The epithet 'delusive/ which fits many, if not all, of these examples ofpresentational immediacy, is evidence that the mediating eternal object isnot to be ascribed to the donation of the perceived region. It must haveacquired its ingression in this mode from one of the originative phases ofthe percipient occasion. To this extent, the philosophy of organism is inagreement with the seventeenth-century doctrine of primary and second-ary qualities, the mediating eternal object being, in this mode of ingres-sion, a secondary quality. But in the philosophy of organism the doctrinedoes not have the consequences which follow in the earlier philosophies.

The account of perception in the pure mode of presentational imme-diacy, which has just been given, agrees absolutely with Descartes' doctrineof perception in general, so far as can be judged from his arguments whichpresuppose perception, and putting aside a few detached [J87] passageswherein he comes near to the doctrine of 'objectification' and near toLocke's second doctrine of 'ideas determined to particular existents.' Any-how, his conclusion immediately follows that, in perception, thus de-scribed, all that is perceived is that the object has extension and isimplicated in a complex of extensive relatedness with the animal bodyof the percipient. Part of the difficulties of Cartesian philosophy, andof any philosophy which accepts this account as a complete accountof perception, is to explain how we know more than this meagre factabout the world although our only avenue of direct knowledge limitsus to this barren residium. Also, if this be all that we perceive aboutthe physical world, we have no basis for ascribing the origination ofthe mediating sensa to any functioning of the human body. We are thusdriven to the Cartesian duality of substances, bodies and minds. Percep-tion is to be ascribed to mental functioning in respect to the barren ex-tensive universe. We have already done violence to our immediate con-viction by thus thrusting the human body out of the story; for, as Humehimself declares, we know that we see by our eyes, and taste by our palates.But when we have gone so far, it is inevitable to take a further step, andto discard our other conviction that we are perceiving a world of actual

things within which we find ourselves. For a barren, extensive world is notreally what we mean. We thus reduce perceptions to consciousness ofimpressions on the mind, consisting of sensa with 'manners' of related-ness. We then come to Hume, and to Kant. Kant's philosophy is an en-deavour to retrieve some meaning for the two convictions which we havesuccessively discarded. We have noted that Locke wavers in his account ofperception, so that in the earlier portion of his Essay he agrees with Hume,and in the later portion with the philosophy of organism. We have alsonoted that Hume is inconsistent to the extent of arguing from a convic-tion which is discarded in his philosophy.

SECTION VIII

[188] Presentational immediacy illustrates the contemporary world in re-spect to its potentiality for extensive subdivision into atomic actualitiesand in respect to the scheme of perspective relationships which therebyeventuates. But it gives no information as to the actual atomization ofthis contemporary 'real potentiality/ By its limitations it exemplifies thedoctrine, already stated above, that the contemporary world happens in-dependently of the actual occasion with which it is contemporary. This isin fact the definition of contemporaneousness (cf. Part II, Ch. II, Sect. I);namely, that actual occasions, A and B, are mutually contemporary, whenA does not contribute to the datum for B, and B does not contribute tothe datum for A, except that both A and B are atomic regions in the po-tential scheme of spatio-temporal extensiveness which is a datum for bothA and B.

Hume's polemic respecting causation is, in fact, one prolonged, con-vincing argument that pure presentational immediacy does not discloseany causal influence, either whereby one actual entity is constitutive ofthe percipient actual entity, or whereby one perceived actual entity is con-stitutive of another perceived actual entity. The conclusion is that, in sofar as concerns their disclosure by presentational immediacy, actual en-tities in the contemporary universe are causally independent of each other.

The two pure modes of perception in this way disclose a variety of locidefined by reference to the percipient occasion M. For example, there arethe actual occasions of the settled world which provide the datum for M;these lie in M's causal past. Again, there are the potential occasions forwhich M decides its own potentialities of contribution to their data; theselie in M's causal future. There are also those actual occasions which lieneither in M's causal past, nor in M's causal future. Such actual occasionsare called M's 'contemporaries/ These \189] three loci are defined solelyby reference to the pure mode of causal efficacy.

We now turn to the pure mode of presentational immediacy. One greatdifference from the previous way+ of obtaining loci at once comes intoview. In considering the causal mode, the past and the future were de-

fined positively, and the contemporaries of M were defined negatively aslying neither in M's past nor in JVfs future. In dealing with presentationalimmediacy the opposite way must be taken. For presentational immediacygives positive information only about the immediate present as defined byitself. Presentational immediacy illustrates, by means of sensa, potentialsubdivisions within a cross-section of the world, which is in this way ob-jectified for M. This cross-section is JVPs immediate present. What is inthis way illustrated is the potentiality for subdivision into actual atomicoccasions; we can also recognize potentialities for subdivision of regionswhose subdivisions remain unillustrated by any contrast of sensa. Thereare well-known limitations to such direct perceptions of unillustrated po-tentiality, a perception outrunning the real illustration of division by con-trasted sensa. Such limitations constitute the minima sensibilia.

Hume's polemic respecting causation constitutes a proof that M's 'im-mediate present' lies within the locus of M's contemporaries. The presen-tation to M of this locus, forming its immediate present, contributes toM's datum two facts about the universe: one fact is that there is a 'unisonof becoming/ constituting a positive relation of all the occasions in thiscommunity to any one of them. The members of this community share ina common immediacy; they are in 'unison' as to their becoming: that isto say, any pair of occasions in the locus are contemporaries. The otherfact is the subjective illustration of the potential extensive subdivisionwith complete vagueness respecting the actual atomization. For example,the stone, which in the immediate [190] present is a group of many actualoccasions, is illustrated as one grey spatial region. But, to go back to theformer fact, the many actual entities of the present stone and the per-cipient are connected together in the 'unison of immediate becoming.'This community of concrescent occasions, forming M's immediate present,thus establishes a principle of common relatedness, a principle realized asan element in M's datum. This is the principle of mutual relatedness inthe 'unison of becoming/ But this mutual relatedness is independent ofthe illustration by those sensat through which presentational immediacyfor M is effected. Also the illustration by these sensa has unequal relevancefor M, throughout the locus. In its spatially remote parts it becomes vaguerand vaguer, fainter and fainter; and yet the principle of 'unison of be-coming' still holds, in despite of the fading importance of the sensa. Wethus find that the locus—namely, M's immediate present—is determinedby the condition of 'mutual unison' independently of variations of rele-vant importance in M's illustrative sensa, and extends to their utmostbounds of faintness, and is equally determinate beyond such bounds. Wethus gain the conception of a locus in which any two atomic actualitiesare in 'concrescent unison,' and which is particularized by the fact that Mbelongs to it, and so do all actual occasions belonging to extensive regionswhich lie in M's immediate present as illustrated by importantly relevantsensa. This complete region is the prolongation of M's immediate present

beyond M's direct perception, the prolongation being effected by theprinciple of 'concrescent unison/

A complete region, satisfying the principle of 'concrescent unison/ willbe called a 'duration/ A duration is a cross-section of the universe; it isthe immediate present condition of the world at some epoch, according tothe old 'classical' theory of time—a theory never doubted until within thelast few years. It will have been seen that the philosophy of organismaccepts and defines this [191] notion. Some measure of acceptance isimposed upon metaphysics. If the notion be wholly rejected no appeal touniversal obviousness of conviction can have any weight; since there canbe no stronger instance of this force of obviousness.

The 'classical' theory of time tacitly assumed that a duration includedthe directly perceived immediate present of each one of its members. Theconverse proposition certainly follows from the account given above, thatthe immediate present of each actual occasion lies in a duration. An actualoccasion will be said 6 to be 'cogredientf with' or 'stationary in' the dura-tion including its directly perceived immediate present. The actual occa-sion is included in its own immediate present; so that each actual occa-sion through its percipience in the pure mode of presentational imme-diacy—if such percipience has important relevance—defines one durationin which it is included. The percipient occasion is 'stationary' in thisduration.

But the classical theory also assumed the converse of this statement. Itassumed that any actual occasion only lies in one duration; so that if Nlies in the duration including M's immediate present, then M lies in theduration including N's immediate present. The philosophy of organism, inagreement with recent physics, rejects this conversion; though it holds thatsuch rejection is based on scientific examination of our cosmic epoch, andnot on any more general metaphysical principle. According to the philoso-phy of organism, in the present cosmic epoch only one duration includesall M's immediate present; this one duration will be called M's 'presentedduration.' But M itself lies in many durations; each duration including Malso includes some portions of M's presented duration. In the case ofhuman perception practically all the important portions are thus included;also in human experience the relationship to such dura- \192] tions is whatwe express by the notion of 'movement/

To sum up this discussion. In respect to any one actual occasion Mthere are three distinct nexus of occasions to be considered:

(i) The nexus of M's contemporaries, defined by the characteristic thatM and any one of its contemporaries happen in causal independence ofeach other.

(ii) Durations including M;f any such duration is defined by the char-acteristic that any two of its members are contemporaries. (It follows that

6 Cf. my Principles of Natural Knowledge, Ch. XI, and my Concept of Nature,Ch. V.

any member of such a duration is contemporary with M, and thence thatsuch durations are all included in the locus (i). The characteristic prop-erty of a duration is termed 'unison of becoming/)

(iii) M's presented locus, which is the contemporary nexus perceived inthe mode of presentational immediacy, with its regions defined by sensa.It is assumed, on the basis of direct intuition, that JVf s presented locus isclosely related to some one duration including M. It is also assumed, asthe outcome of modern physical theory, that there is more than one dura-tion including M. The single duration which is so related to M's presentedlocus is termed 'JVf s presented duration/ But this connection is criticizedin the following sections of this chapter. In Part IV, the connection ofthese 'presented' loci to regions defined by straight lines is considered inmore detail; the notion of 'strain-loci'* is there introduced.

SECTION IX

Physical science has recently arrived at the stage in which the practicalidentification, made in the preceding section, between the 'presentedlocus' of an actual entity, and a locus in 'unison of becoming with theactual entity must be qualified.

The two notions, 'presented locus' and 'unison of becoming/ are dis-tinct. The identification merely rests on the obvious experience of dailylife. In any recasting of [193] thought it is obligatory to include the iden-tification as a practical approximation to the truth, sufficient for daily life.Subject to this limitation, there is no reason for rejecting any distinctionbetween them which the evidence suggests.

In the first place, the presented locus is defined by some systematicrelation to the human body—so far as we rely, as we must, upon humanexperience. A certain state of geometrical strain in the body, and a certainqualitative physiological excitement in the cells of the body, govern thewhole process of presentational immediacy. In sense-perception the wholefunction of antecedent occurrences outside the body is merely to excitethese strains and physiological excitements within the body. But anyother means of production would do just as well, so long as the relevantstates of the body are in fact produced. The perceptions are functions ofthe bodily states. The geometrical details of the projected sense-perceptiondepend on the geometrical strains in the body, the qualitative sensa de-pend on the physiological excitements of the requisite cells in the body.

Thus the presented locus must be a locus with a systematic geometricalrelation to the body. According to all the evidence, it is completely inde-pendent of the contemporary actualities which in fact make up the nexusof actualities in the locus. For example, we see a picture on the wall withdirect vision. But if we turn our back to the wall, and gaze into a goodmirror, we see the same sight as an image behind the mirror. Thus, giventhe proper physiological state of the body, the locus presented in sense-

perception is independent of the details of the actual happenings whichit includes. This is not to sayt that sense-perception is irrelevant to thereal world. It demonstrates to us the real extensive continuum in terms of **which these contemporary happenings have their own experiences quali-fied. Its additional information in terms of the qualitative sensa has rele-vance in proportion to the relevance of the immediate bodily state to theimme- [194] diate happenings throughout the locus. Both are derivedfrom a past which is practically common to them all. Thus there is alwayssome relevance; the correct interpretation of this relevance is the art ofutilizing the perceptive mode of presentational immediacy as a means forunderstanding the world as a medium.

But the question which is of interest for this discussion is how thissystematic relevance, of body to presented locus, is definable. This is not amere logical question. The problem is to point out that element in thenature of things constituting such a geometrical relevance of the bodv tothe presented locus. If there be such an element, we can understand that acertain state of the body may lift it into an important factor of ourexperience.

The only possible elements capable of this extended systematic relevancebeyond the body are straight lines and planes. Planes are definable interms of straight lines, so that we can concentrate attention upon straightlines.

It is a dogma of science that straight lines are not definable in terms ofmere notions of extension. Thus, in the expositions of recent physicaltheory, straight lines are defined in terms of the actual physical happenings.The disadvantage of this doctrine is that there is no method of charac-terizing the possibilities of physical events antecedently to their actualoccurrence. It is easy to verify that in fact there is a tacit relevance to anunderlying system, by reference to which the physical loci—including thosecalled 'straight lines'—are defined. The question is how to define this un-derlying system in terms of 'pure' straight lines, determinable without ref-erence to the casual** details of the happenings.

It will be shown later (cf. Part IV, Chs. Ill and IV) that this dogma ofthe indefinability of straight lines is mistaken. Thus the systematic relationof the body to the presented locus occasions no theoretical difficulty.

All measurement is effected by observations of sensa [195] with geo-metrical relations within this presented locus. Also all scientific observa-tion of the unchanged character of things ultimately depends! upon themaintenance of directly observed geometrical analogies within such loci.

However far the testing of instruments is carried, finally all scientificinterpretation is based upon the assumption of directly observed unchange-ably of some instrument for seconds, for hours, for months, for years.When we test this assumption we can only use another instrument; andthere! cannot be an infinite regress of instruments.

Thus ultimately all science depends upon direct observation of homol-

128 Discussions and Applications

ogy of status within a system. Also the observed system is the complex ofgeometrical relations within some presented locus.

In the second place, a locus of entities in 'unison of becoming' ob-viously depends on the particular actual entities. The question, as to howthe extensive continuum is in fact atomized by the atomic actualities, isrelevant to the determination of the locus. The factor of temporal en-durance selected for any one actuality will depend upon its initial 'sub-jective aim/ The categoreal conditions which govern the 'subjective aim'are discussed later in Part III. They consist generally in satisfying somecondition of a maximum, to be obtained by the transmission of inheritedtypes of order. This is the foundation of the 'stationary' conditions interms of which the ultimate formulations of physical science can bemathematically expressed.

Thus the loci of 'unison of becoming' are only determinable in terms ofthe actual happenings of the world. But the conditions which they satisfyare expressed in terms of measurements derived from the qualification ofactualities by the systematic character of the extensive continuum.

The term 'duration' will be used for a locus of 'unison of becoming/and the terms 'presented locus' and 'strain- [196] locus' for the systematiclocus involved in presentational immediacy.7

The strain-loci provide the systematic geometry with its homology ofrelations throughout all its regions; the durations share in the deficiency ofhomology characteristic of the physical field which arises from the pe-culiarities of the actual events.

SECTION X

We can now sum up this discussion of organisms, order, societies,! nexus.

The aim of the philosophy of organism is to express a coherent cos-mology based upon the notions of 'system,' 'process/ 'creative advance intonovelty,' 'res vera! (in Descartes' sense), 'stubborn fact/ 'individual unity ofexperience,' 'feeling/ 'time as perpetual perishing/ 'endurance as re-crea-tion/ 'purpose,' 'universals as forms of defmiteness/ 'particulars—i.e., resverae—as ultimate agents of stubborn fact.'

Every one of these notions is explicitly formulated either by Descartesor by Locke. Also no one can be dropped without doing violence to com-mon sense. But neither Descartes nor Locke weaves these notions into onecoherent system of cosmology. In so far as either philosopher is systematic,he relies on alternative notions which in the end lead to Hume's extremeof sensationalism.

In the philosophy of organism it is held that the notion of 'organism'has two meanings, interconnected but intellectually separable, namely,the microscopic meaning and the macroscopic meaning.** The microscopic

7 In The Concept of Nature these two loci were not discriminated, namely,durations and strain-loci.

Organisms and Environment 129

meaning is concerned with the formal constitution of an actual occasion,considered as a process of realizing an individual unity of experience. Themacroscopic meaning is concerned with the givenness of the actual world,considered as the stubborn fact which at once limits and provides [197]opportunity for the actual occasion. The canalization of the creative urge,exemplified in its massive reproduction of social nexus, is for commonsense the final illustration of the power of stubborn fact. Also in our ex-perience, we essentially arise out of our bodies which are the stubbornfacts of the immediate relevant past. We are also carried on by our im-mediate past of personal experience; we finish a sentence because we havebegun it. The sentence may embody a new thought, never phrased before,or an old one rephrased with verbal novelty. There need be no well-wornassociation between the sounds of the earlier and the later words. But itremains remorselessly true, that we finish a sentence because we have be-gun it. We are governed by stubborn fact.

It is in respect to this 'stubborn fact' that the theories of modern philos-ophy are weakest. Philosophers have worried themselves about remoteconsequences, and the inductive formulations of science. They should con-fine attention to the rush of immediate transition. Their explanationswould then be seen in their native absurdity.

CHAPTER VLOCKE AND HUME

SECTION I

[198] A more detailed discussion of Descartes, Locke, and Hume—inthis and in the succeeding chapter—may make plain how deeply the philos-ophy of organism is founded on seventeenth-century thought and how atcertain critical points it diverges from that thought

We shall understand better the discussion, if we start with some analysisof the presuppositions upon which Hume's philosophy rests. These pre-suppositions were not original to Hume, nor have they ceased with him.They were largely accepted by Kant and are widely prevalent in modernphilosophy. The philosophy of organism can be best understood by con-ceiving it as accepting large portions of the expositions of Hume and Kant,with the exception of these presuppositions, and of inferences directlyderived from them. Hume is a writer of unrivalled clearness; and, as far aspossible? it will be well to allow him to express his ideas in his own words.He writes:

We may observe, that it is universally allowed by philosophers,and is besides pretty obvious of itself, that nothing is ever really pres-ent with the mind but its perceptions or impressions and ideas, andthat external objects become known to us only by those perceptionsthey occasion. To hate, to love, to think, to feel, to see; all this isnothing but to perceive.1Again:

All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves intotwo distinct kinds, which I shall call impressions and ideas. Thedifference betwixt these consists in [199] the degrees of force and live-liness, with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way intoour thought or consciousness. Those perceptions which enter withmost force and violence, we may name impressions; and, under thisname, I comprehend all our sensations, passions, and emotions, asthey make their first appearance in the soul. By ideas, I mean thefaint images of these in thinking and reasoning; such as, for instance,are all the perceptions excited by the present discourse, excepting onlythose which arise from the sight and touch, and excepting the imme-diate pleasure or uneasiness it may occasion,2

1 Treatise, Bk. I, Part II, Sect. VI.

2 Treatise, Bk. I, Part I, Sect. I.

The exceptions made in the above quotation are, of course, due to thefact that the 'perceptions' arising in these excepted ways are 'impressions'and not 'ideas/ Hume immediately draws attention to the fact that hedeserts Locke's wide use of the term 'idea/ and restores it to its more usualand narrow meaning. He divides both ideas and impressions into 'simple'and 'complex/ He then adds:

... we shall here content ourselves with establishing one generalproposition, That all our simple ideas in their first appearance, arederived from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them,and which they exactly represent?

When Hume passes on to complex impressions and ideas, his admirableclearness partially deserts him. He fails to distinguish sufficiently between(i) the '(manner' (or 'order') in which many simples constitute some onecomplex perception, i.e., impression or idea; and (ii) the efficacious fact byreason of which this complex perception arises; and (iii) the mere multi-plicity of simples which constitute the complex perception in this definitemanner. In this respect Hume's followers only differ from Hume by dis-carding some of that clarity which never wholly deserts him. Each one ofthese three notions is an essential element in his argument. He writes:[200] ... we may conclude with certainty, that the idea of extension isnothing but a copy of these colouredf points, and of the manner oftheir appearance.4Also he writes:

Were ideas entirely loose and unconnected, chancef alone wouldjoin them; and it is impossible the same simple ideas should! fallregularly into complex ones (as they commonly do), without somebond of union among them, some associating quality, by which oneidea naturally introduces another. This uniting principle among ideasis not to be considered as an inseparable connection; for that has beenalready 5 excluded from the imagination: nor yet are we to conclude,that without it the mind cannot join two ideas; for nothing is morefree than that faculty: but we are only to regard it as a gentle force,which commonly prevails, and is the cause why, among other things,languages so nearly correspond to each other; Nature, in a manner,pointing out to every one those simple ideas, which are most properto be united into a complex one.6As a final quotation, to illustrate Hume's employment of the third no-tion, we have:The idea of a substance as well as that of a mode, is nothing but a col-lection of simple ideas, that are united by the imagination, and have aparticular name assigned them, . . . But the difference betwixt these

3 Treatise, Bk. I, Part I, Sect. I.

4 Treatise, Bk. I, Part II, Sect. III.

5 Cf. Hume's previous section.

6 Treatise, Bk. I, Part I, Sect. IV.

ideas consists in this, that the particular qualities, which form at sub-stance, are commonly referred to an unknown something [italicsHume's], in which they are supposed to inhere; or granting this fictionshould not take place, are at least supposed to be closely and in-separably connected by the relations of contiguity and causation.The effect of this is, that whatever new simple quality we discover tohave the same connection with the rest, we immediately comprehendit among them, even though it did not enter into the first conceptionof the substance. . . . The principle of union being regarded as thechief part of the complex [201] idea, gives entrance to whatever qual-ity afterwards occurs, and is equally comprehended by it, as are theothers, which first presented themselves. . . .7

In this last quotation, the phrase 'principle of union' is ambiguous asbetween 'manner' and 'efficacious' reason. In either sense, it is inconsistentwith the phrase 'nothing but a collection,' which at the beginning of \fhequotation settles so simply the notion of 'substance.'

Returning to the first of this sequence of three quotations, we note thatany particular 'manner' of composition must itself be a simple idea, or im-pression. For otherwise we require yet another 'manner' of compositionfor the original manner, and so on indefinitely. Thus there is either avicious infinity or a final simple idea. But Hume admits that there arenovel compound ideas which are not copies of compound impressions.Thus he should also admit that there is a novel simple idea conveying thenovel 'manner,' which is not a copy of an impression. He has also himselfdrawn attention to another exception in respect to missing shades ofcolour in a graduated colour scheme. This exception cannot be restrictedto colour, and must be extended to sound, and smell, and to all gradua-tions of sensations. Thus Hume's proposition, that simple ideas are allcopies of simple impressions, is subject to such considerable qualificationsthat it cannot be taken for an ultimate philosophical principle, at leastnot when enunciated in Hume's unguarded fashion. Hume himself, inthe passage (Part I, Sect. IV) quoted above for its relevance to his doc-trine of the association of ideas, says, ". . . for nothing is more free thanthat faculty [i.e., the imagination]." But he limits its freedom to theproduction of novel complex ideas, disregarding the exceptional case ofmissing shades. This question of imaginative freedom is obviously treatedvery superficially by Hume. Imagination is never very free: it does notseem to be limited to complex ideas, as asserted by [202] him; but suchfreedom as it has in fact seems to establish the principle of the possibilityof diverse actual entities with diverse grades of imaginative freedom,some more, some less, than the instances in question.

In this discussion of Hume's doctrine of imaginative freedom, twoother points have been left aside. One such point is the difference be-

7 Treatise, Bk. I, Part I, Sect. VI. Italics not in edition quoted, except wherenoted.*

tween various grades of generic abstraction, for example, scarlet, red?colour, sense-datum, manner of connectedness of diverse sense-data. Theother point is the contrast between 'simplicity' and 'complexity/ We maydoubt whether 'simplicity' is ever more than a relative term, having regardto some definite procedure of analysis. I hold this to be the case; and byreason of this opinion find yet another reason for discarding Hume'sdoctrine which would debar imagination from the free conceptual pro-duction of any type of eternal objects, such as Hume calls 'simple/ Butthere is no such fact as absolute freedom; every actual entity possessesonly such freedomt as is inherent in the primary phase 'given' by its stand-point of relativity to its actual universe. Freedom, givenness, potentiality,are notions which presuppose each other and limit each other.

SECTION II

Hume, at the end of this passage on the connectedness of ideas, placesthe sentence "... Nature, in a manner, pointing out to every one thosesimple ideas, which are most proper to be united into a complex one." *Hume's philosophy is occupied with the double search, first, for mannersof unity, whereby many simples become one complex impression; andsecondly, for a standard of propriety by which to criticize the productionof ideas.

Hume can find only one standard of propriety, and that is, repetition.Repetition is capable of more or less: the more often impressions arerepeated, the more proper it is that ideas should copy them. Fortunately,and without any reason so far as Hume can discover, complex [203] im-pressions, often repeated, are also often copied by their correspondingcomplex ideas.

Also the frequency of ideas following upon the frequency of their cor-relate impressions is also attended by an expectation of the repetition ofthe impression. Hume also believes, without any reason he can assign, thatthis expectation is pragmatically justified. It is this pragmatic justification,without metaphysical reason, which constitutes the propriety attaching to'repetition/ This is the analysis of the course of thought involved in Hume'sdoctrine of the association of ideas in its relation to causation, and inHume's final appeal to practice.

It is a great mistake to attribute to Hume any disbelief in the importanceof the notion of 'cause and effect/ Throughout the Treatise he steadilyaffirms its fundamental importance; and finally, when he cannot fit it intohis metaphysics, he appeals beyond his metaphysics to an ultimate justifi-cation outside any rational systematization. This ultimate justification is'practice/

Hume writes:

As our senses show us in one instance two bodies, or motions, or

qualities, in certain relations of succession and contiguity, so our

memory presents us only with a multitude of instances wherein we

always find like bodies, motions, or qualities, in like relations. Fromthe mere repetition of any past impression, even to infinity, therenever will arise any new original idea, such as that of a necessaryconnection; and the number of impressions has in this case no moreeffect than if we confined ourselves to one only. But though this rea-soning seems just and obvious, yet, as it would be folly to despair toosoon, we shall continue the thread of our discourse; and having found,that after the discovery of the constant conjunction of any objects, wealways draw an inference from one object to another, we shall nowexamine the nature of that inference, and of the transition from theimpression to the idea. Perhaps it will appear in the end, that thenecessary connection depends on the inference, instead of the in-ference's depending on [204} the necessary connection. . . . The onlyconnection or relation of objects, which can lead us beyond the im-mediate impressions of our memory and senses, is that of cause andeffect; and that because it is the only one, on which we can found ajust inference from one object to another. The idea of cause andeffect is derived from experience [italics Hume's], which informs us,that such particular objects, in all past instances, have been con-stantly conjoined with each other: and as an object similar to one ofthese is supposed to be immediately present in its impression, wethence presume on the existence of one similar to its usual attendant.According to this account of things, which is, I think, in every pointunquestionable, probability is founded on the presumption of a re-semblance betwixt those objects of which we have had experience,and those of which we have had none; and, therefore, it is impossiblet this presumption can arise from probability*

Hume's difficulty with 'cause and effect' is that it lies "beyond the im-mediate impressions of our memory and senses."! In other words, this man-ner of connection is not given in any impression. Thus the whole basis ofthe idea, its propriety, is to be traced to the repetition of impressions. Atthis point of his argument, Hume seems to have overlooked the difficultythat 'repetition' stands with regard to 'impressions' in exactly the sameposition as does 'cause and effect.' Hume has confused a 'repetition ofimpressions' with an 'impression of repetitions of impressions/ In Hume'sown words on another topic (Part II, Sect. V):For whence should it be derived? Does it arise from an impression ofsensation or of reflection? Point it out distinctly to us, that we mayknow its nature and qualities. But if you cannot point out any suchimpression [Hume's italics], you may be certain you are mistaken,when you imagine you have any such idea*

Hume's answer to this criticism would, of course, be [205} that he ad-mits 'memory.' But the question is what is consistent with Hume's own

8 Treatise, Bk. I, Part III, Sect. VI. Italics not in Treatise.

doctrine. This is Hume's doctrine of memory (Part III, Sect. V): "Sincetherefore the memory is known, neither by the order of its complex ideas,nor f the nature of its simple ones; it follows, that the difference be-twixt it and the imagination lies in its superior force and vivacity." But (inPart I, Sect. I) he writes: "By ideas I mean the faint images of these [i.e.,impressions] in thinking and reasoning/' and later on he expands 'faint'into "degree of force and vivacity." 9 Thus, purely differing in 'force andvivacity/ we have the order: impressions, memories, ideas.

This doctrine is very implausible; and, to speak bluntly, is in contradic-tion to plain fact. But, even worse, it omits the vital character of memory,namely, that it is memory. In fact the whole notion of repetition is lost inthe 'force and vivacity doctrine. What Hume does explain is that with anumber of different perceptions immediately concurrent, he sorts themout into three different classes according to force and vivacity. But therepetition character, which he ascribes to simple ideas, and which is thewhole point of memory, finds no place in his explanation. Nor can it doso, without an entire recasting of his fundamental philosophic notions.

SECTION III

Hume's argument has become circular. In the beginning of his Treatise,he lays down the 'general proposition': "That all our simple ideas in theirfirst appearance, are derived from simple impressions, . . ." He proves thisby an empirical survey. But the proposition itself employs—covertly, so faras language is concerned—the notion of 'repetition/ which itself is not an'impression/ Again, later he finds 'necessary connection': he discards \206]this because he can find no corresponding impression. But the originalproposition was only founded on an empirical survey; so the argument fordismissal is purely circular. Further, if Hume had only attended to hisown excellent Part II, Section VI, "Of the Idea of Existence, and of externalExistence,"! he would have remembered that whatever we do think of,thereby in some sense 'exists.' Thus, having the idea of 'necessary con-nection/ the only question is as to its exemplification in the connectednessof our 'impressions.' He muddies the importance of an idea with the factof our entertainment of the idea. We cannot even be wrong in thinkingthat we think of 'necessary connection/ unless we are thinking of 'neces-sary connection.' Of course, we may be very wrong in believing that thenotion is important.

The reasons for this examination of Hume, including the prolongedquotations, are (i) that Hume states with great clearness important as-pects of our experience; (ii) that the defects in his statements are emi-

9 This doctrine of 'force and vivacity' is withdrawn in the last sentence* ofHume's Appendix to the Treatise. But the argument in the Treatise is substan-tially built upon it. In the light of the retraction the whole 'sensationalist' doc-trine requires reconsideration. The withdrawal cannot be treated as a minoradjustment.

nently natural defects which emerge with great clearness, owing to theexcellence of his presentation; and (iii) that Hume differs from the greatmajority of his followers chiefly by the way in which he faces up to theproblems raised by his own philosophy.

The first point to notice is that Hume's philosophy is pervaded by thenotion of 'repetition/ and that memory is a particular example of thischaracter of experience, that in some sense there is entwined in its funda-mental nature the fact that it is repeating something. Tear 'repetition' outof 'experience/ and there is nothing left. On the other hand, 'immediacy/or 'first-handedness/ is another element in experience. Feeling overwhelmsrepetition; and there remains the immediate, first-handed fact, which is theactual world in an immediate complex unity of feeling.

There is another contrasted pair of elements in experience, clusteringround the notion of time, namely, 'endurance' and 'change/ Descartes,who emphasizes the notion [207] of 'substance/ also emphasizes 'change/Hume, who minimizes the notion of 'substance/ similarly emphasizes'change/ He writes:Now as time is composed of parts that are not coexistent, an un-changeable object, since it produces none but coexistent impressions,produces none that can give us the idea of time: and, consequently,that idea must be derived from a succession of changeable objects,and time in its first appearance can never be severed from such asuccession.10Whereas Descartes writes:

... for this [i.e., 'the nature of time or of the duration of things'] isof such a kind that its parts do not depend one upon the other, andnever co-exist; and from the fact that we now are, it does not followthat we shall be a moment afterwards, if some cause—the same thatfirst produced us—does not continue so to produce us; that is to say,to conserve us.And again:

We shall likewise have a very different understanding of duration,order and number, if, in place of mingling with the idea that wehave of them what properly speaking pertains to the conception of sub-stance, we merely consider that the duration of each thing is a modeunder which we shall consider this thing in so far as it continues toexist; . . ,11

We have certainly to make room in our philosophy for the two con-trasted notions, one that every actual entity endures, and the other thatevery morning is a new fact with its measure of change.

These various aspects can be summed up in the statement that ex-perience involves a becoming, that becoming means that something be-

10 Treatise, Bk. I, Part II, Sect. III.

11 Principles, Part I, 21, and 55.

comes, and that what becomes involves repetition transformed into novelimmediacy.

This statement directly traverses one main presupposition which Des-cartes and Hume agree in stating explicitly. This presupposition is that ofthe individual independence of successive temporal occasions. For [208]example, Descartes, in the passage cited above, writes: "[The nature oftime is such]t that its parts do not depend one upon the other, . . ." AlsoHume's impressions are self-contained, and he can find no temporal re-lationship other than mere serial order. This statement about Hume re-quires qualifying so far as concerns the connection between 'impressions'and 'ideas/ There is a relation of 'derivation' of 'ideas' from 'impressions'which he is always citing and never discussing. So far as it is to be takenseriously—for he never refers it to a correlate 'impression'—it constitutesan exception to the individual independence of successive 'perceptions.'This presupposition of individual independence is what I have elsewhere 12called, the 'fallacy of simple location.' The notion of 'simple location' isinconsistent with any admission of 'repetition'; Hume's difficulties arisefrom the fact that he starts with simple locations and ends with repetition.In the organic philosophy the notion of repetition is fundamental. Thedoctrine of objectification is an endeavourf to express how what is settledin actuality is repeated under limitations, so as to be 'given' for immediacy.Later, in discussing 'time,' this doctrine will be termed the doctrine of'objective immortality.'

SECTION IV

The doctrine of the individual independence of real facts is derivedfrom the notion that the subject-predicate form of statement conveys atruth which is metaphysically ultimate. According to this view, an indi-vidual substance with its predicates constitutes the ultimate type of ac-tuality. If there be one individual, the philosophy is monistic; if there bemany individuals, the philosophy is pluralistic. With this metaphysicalpresupposition, the relations between individual substances constitutemetaphysical nuisances: there is no place for them. Accordingly—in de-fiance of the most obvious deliverance of our intuitive 'prejudices'—every[209] respectable philosophy of the subject-predicate type is monistic.

The exclusive dominance of the substance-quality metaphysics was enor-mouslv promoted by the logical bias of the mediaeval period. It was re-tarded by the study of Plato and of Aristotle. These authors included thestrains of thought which issued in this doctrine, but included them in-consistently mingled with other notions. The substance-quality meta-physics triumphed with exclusive dominance in Descartes' doctrines. Un-fortunately he did not realize that his notion of the 'res vera' did not en-tail the same disjunction of ultimate facts as that entailed by the Aris-

12 Cf. Science and the Modem World, Ch. III.

totelian notion of 'primary substance/ Locke led a revolt from this dom-inance, but inconsistently. For him and also for Hume, in the backgroundand tacitly presupposed in all explanations, there remained the mind withits perceptions. The perceptions, for Hume, are what the mind knowsabout itself; and tacitly the knowable facts are always treated as qualitiesof a subject—the subject being the mind. His final criticism of the notionof the 'mind' does not alter the plain fact that the whole of the previousdiscussion has included this presupposition. Hume's final criticism onlyexposes the metaphysical superficiality of his preceding exposition.

In the philosophy of organism a subject-predicate proposition is con-sidered as expressing a high abstraction.

The metaphysical superiority of Locke over Hume is exhibited in hiswide use of the term 'idea/ which Locke himself introduced and Humeabandoned. Its use marks the fact that his tacit subject-predicate bias isslight in its warping effect. He first (I, I, 8*) explains: "... I have usedit [i.e., idea] to express whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, orwhatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking; . . ."But later (III, III, 6t), without any explicit notice of the widening ofuse, he writes: ". . . and ideas become13 \210] general by separating fromthem the circumstances of time, and place, and any other ideas that maydetermine them to this or that particular existence" Here, for Locke, theoperations of the mind originate from ideas 'determined' to particularexistents. This is a fundamental principle with Locke; it is a casual con-cession to the habits of language with Hume; and it is a fundamentalprinciple with the philosophy of organism. In an earlier section (II, XXIII,1) Locke expresses more vaguely the same doctrine, though in this con-text he immediately waters it down into an unexplained notion of 'goingconstantly together': "The mind, being, . . . furnished with a great numberof the simple ideas conveyed in by the senses, as they are found in ex-terior things, . . . takes notice, also, that a certain number of these simpleideas go constantly together"

But Locke wavers in his use of this principle of some sort of perceptionof 'particular existents'; and Hume seeks consistency by abandoning it;while the philosophy of organism seeks to reconstruct Locke by abandon-ing those parts of his philosophy which are inconsistent with this prin-ciple. But the principle itself is to be found plainly stated by Locke.

Hume has only impressions of 'sensation' and of 'reflection/ He writes:"The first kind arises in the soul originally, from unknown causes."14Note the tacit presupposition of 'the soul' as subject, and 'impression ofsensation' as predicate. Also note the dismissal of any intrinsic relevance toa particular existent, which is an existent in the same sense as the 'soul' isan existent; whereas Locke illustrates his meaning by referring (cf. Ill,

13 Italics mine.*

14 Treatise, Bk. I, Part I, Sect. II.

HI, 7) to a 'child—corresponding to 'the soul7 in Hume's phrase—and toits 'nurse' of whom the child has its 'idea/

Hume is certainly inconsistent, because he cannot entirely disregardcommon sense. But his inconsistencies are violent, and his main argumentnegates Locke's use. [21 J] As an example of his glaring inconsistency ofphraseology, note:As to those impressions, which arise from the senses, their ultimatecause is, in my opinion, perfectly inexplicable by human reason, andit will always be impossible to decide with certainty, whether theyarrive immediately from the object, or are produced by the creativepower of the mind, or are derived from the Author of our being.15Here he inconsistently speaks of the object, whereas he has nothing onhand in his philosophy which justifies the demonstrative word 'the! Inthe second reference 'the object' has emerged into daylight. He writes:"There is no object which implies the existence of any other, if we con-sider these objects in themselves, and never look beyond the ideas whichwe form of them." This quotation exhibits an ingenious confusion wherebyHume makes the best of two metaphysical worlds, the world with Locke'sprinciple, and his own world which is without Locke's principle.

But Locke's principle amounts to this: That there are many actualexistents, and that in some sense one actual existent repeats itself inanother actual existent, so that in the analysis of the latter existent acomponent 'determined to' the former existent is discoverable. The phi-losophy of organism expresses this principle by its doctrines of 'prehen-sion' and of 'objectification.' Locke always supposes that consciousness isconsciousness of the ideas in the conscious mind. But he never separatesthe 'ideas' from the 'consciousness.' The philosophy of organism makesthis separation, and thereby relegates consciousness to a subordinate meta-physical position; and gives to Locke's Essay a metaphysical interpretationwhich was not in Locke's mind. This separation asserts Kant's principle:"Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sindblind." 16 But Kant's principle is here applied in exactly the converse wayto Kant's own use of it. Kant is obsessed with the mentality [212] of 'in-tuition,' and hencef with its necessary involution in consciousness. His*suppressed premise is 'Intuitions are never blind.'

SECTION V

In one important respect Hume's philosophical conceptions show amarked superiority over those of Locke. In the Essay Concerning HumanUnderstanding, the emphasis is laid upon the morphological structure of'human understanding.' The logical relationships of various sorts of 'ideas'are examined. Now, whether in physics, biology, or elsewhere, morphology,

is Treatise, Bk. I, Part III, Sect. V; cf. also Sect. VI.f

16 Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Logic,' Introduction, Sect. I.t

in the sense of the analysis of logical relationships, constitutes the firststage of knowledge. It is the basis of the new 'mathematical' methodwhich Descartes introduced. Morphology deals in analytical propositions,as they are termed by Kant. For example, Locke writes: "The commonnames of substances, as well as other general terms, stand for sorts:which 1? is nothing else but the being made signs of such complex ideas,wherein several particular substances do or might agree, by virtue of whichthey are capable of being comprehended in one common conception, andbe signified by one name." And again: "Our abstract ideas are to us themeasures of species." And again: "Nor let any one say, that the power ofpropagation in animals by the mixture of male and female, and in plantsby seeds, keeps the supposed real species distinct and entire/718 In tech-nical language, Locke had no use for genetic evolution.

On the other hand, Hume's train of thought unwittingly emphasizes'process/ His very scepticism is nothing but the discovery that there issomething in the world which cannot be expressed in analytic proposi-tions. Hume discovered that "We murder to dissect/' He did not saythis, because he belonged to the mid-eighteenth century; and so left theremark to Wordsworth. But, in [213] effect, Hume discovered that an ac-tual entity is at once a process, and is atomic; so that in no sense is it thesum of its parts. Hume proclaimed the bankruptcy of morphology.

Hume's account of the process discoverable in 'the soul' is as follows:first, impressions of sensation, of unknown origin; then, ideas of such im-pressions, 'derived from' the impressions; then, impressions of reflection'derived from' the antecedent ideas; and then, ideas of impressions of re-flection. Somewhere in this process, there is to be found repetition of im-pressions, and thence by 'habit'—by which we may suppose that a par-ticular mode of 'derivation' is meant—by habit, a repetition of the cor-relate ideas; and thence expectancy of the repetition of the correlate im-pressions. This expectancy would be an 'impression or reflection.' It isdifficult to understand why Hume exempts 'habit' from the same criticismas that applied to the notion of 'cause/ We have no 'impression' of 'habit/just as we have no 'impression' of 'cause.' Cause, repetition, habit are allin the same boat.

Somewhat inconsistently, Hume never allows impressions of sensationto be derived from the correlate ideas; though, as the difference betweenthem only consists in 'force and vivacity,' the reason for this refusal can-not be found inl his philosophy. The truth is that Hume retained anobstinate belief in an external world which his principles forbade him toconfess in his philosophical constructions. He reserved that belief for hisdaily life, and for his historical and sociological writings, and for hisDialogues Concerning Natural Religion,

The merit of Hume's account is that the process described is within

17 Italics mine.

18 III, VI, 1,22,23.

'the soul/ In the philosophy of organism 'the soul' as it appears in Hume,and 'the mind' as it appears in Locke and Hume, are replaced by thephrases 'the actual entity/ and 'the actual occasion/ these phrases beingsynonymous.

Two defects, found equally in Locke and in Hume, are, first, the con-fusion between a Lockian 'idea' and [214] consciousness of such an idea;and, secondly, the assigned relations between 'ideas' of sensation and'ideas' of reflection.! In Hume's language, this latter point is concernedwith the relations between 'impressions of sensation' and 'impressions ofreflection.' Hume and Locke, with the overintellectualist bias prevalentamong philosophers, assume that emotional feelings are necessarily deriva-tive from sensations. This is conspicuously not the case; the correlationbetween such feelings and sensations is on the whole a secondary effect.Emotions conspicuously brush aside sensations and fasten upon the 'par-ticular' objects to which—in Locke's phrase—certain 'ideas' are 'deter-mined.7 The confinement of our prehension of other actual entities to themediation of private sensations is pure myth. The converse doctrine isnearer the truth: the more primitive mode of objectification is via emo-tional tone, and only in exceptional organisms does objectification, viasensation, supervene with any effectiveness. In their doctrine on thispoint, Locke and Hume were probably only repeating the mediaeval tradi-tion, and they have passed on the tradition to their successors. None theless, the doctrine is founded upon no necessity of thought, and lacksempirical confirmation. If we consider the matter physiologically, the emo-tional tone depends mainly on the condition of the viscera which arepeculiarly ineffective in generating sensations. Thus the whole notion ofprehension should be inverted. We prehend other actual entities moreprimitively by direct mediation of emotional tone, and only secondarilyand waveringly by direct mediation of sense. The two modes fuse withimportant effects upon our perceptive knowledge. This topic must bereserved (cf. Parts III and IV) for further discussion; but it is fundamentalin the philosophy of organism. One difficulty in appealing to modernpsychology, for the purpose of a preliminary survey of the nature of ex-perience, is that so much of that science is based upon the presuppositionof the sensationalist mythology. Thus the sim- [215] pier, more naive sur-veys of Locke and Hume are philosophically the more useful.

Later, in Part III, a 'prehension' will be analysed into 'prehending sub-ject/ 'object prehended/ and 'subjective form.' The philosophy of or-ganism follows Locke in admitting particular 'exterior things' into thecategory of 'object prehended.' It also follows Hume in his admission atthe end of his Appendix to the Treatise: "Had I said, that two ideas of thesame object can only be different by their different jeelingy I should havebeen nearer the truth." What Hume here calls 'feeling' is expanded in thephilosophy of organism into the doctrine of 'subjective form.' But there isanother ineradicable difference between some prehensions, namely, their

142 Discussions and Applications

diversity of prehending subjects, when the two prehensions are in thatrespect diverse. The subsequent uses of the term 'feeling' are in the senseof the positive' type of prehensions, and not in the sense in which Humeuses it in the above quotation.

The approximation of the philosophy of organism to Santayana's doc-trine of 'animal faith' is effected by this doctrine of objectification by themediation of 'feeling/

Santayana would deny that 'animal faith' has in it any element of given-ness. This denial is presumably made in deference to the sensationalistdoctrine, that all knowledge of the external world arises by the mediationof private sensations. If we allow the term 'animal faith' to describe akind of perception which has been neglected by the philosophic tradition,then practically the whole of Santayana's discussion 19 is in accord withthe organic philosophy.

The divergence from, and the analogy to, Santayana's doctrine can beunderstood by quoting two sentences:I propose therefore to use the word existence ... to designate notdata of intuition but facts or events believed to occur in nature. Thesefacts or events will include, first, intuitions themselves, or instances ofcon- [216] sciousness, like pains and pleasures and all remembered ex-periences and mental discourse; and second, physical things andevents, having a transcendent relation to the data of intuition which,in belief, may be used as signs for them; . . .*

It may be remarked in passing that this quotation illustrates Santayana'sadmirable clarity of thought, a characteristic which he shares with the menof genius of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Now the exact pointwhere Santayana differs from the organic philosophy ist his implicit as-sumption that 'intuitions themselves* cannot be among the 'data of in-tuition/ that is to say, the data of other intuitions. This possibility is whatSantayana denies and the organic philosophy asserts. In this respectSantayana is voicing the position which, implicitly or explicitly, pervadesmodern philosophy. He is only distinguished by his clarity of thought. IfSantayana's position be granted, there is a phenomenal veil, a primitivecredulity associated with action and valuation, and a mysterious symbolismfrom the veil to the realities behind the veil. The only difference betweensuch philosophers lies in their reading of the symbolism, some read moreand some less. There can be no decision between them, since there are norational principles which penetrate from the veil to the dark background ofreality.

The organic philosophy denies this doctrine because, first, it is contraryto naive experience; secondly, 'memory' is a very special instance of anantecedent act of experience becoming a datum of intuition for anotheract of experience; thirdly, the rejected doctrine is derived from the mis-

19 Cf. his Scepticism and Animal Faith.

Locke and Hume 143

conception of Locke, already noted previously (cf. Part II, Ch. I, Sect.VI), that logical simplicity can be identified with priority in the con-crescent process. Locke, in his first two books,t attempts to build upexperience from the basic elements of simple 'ideas' of, sensation. Thesesimple ideas are practically Santayana's 'intuitions of essences.7 Santayanaexplicitly [217] repudiates the misconception, but in so doing he knocksaway one of the supports of his doctrine. A fourth reason for the rejectionof the doctrine is that the way is thereby opened for a rational scheme ofcosmology in which a final reality is identified with acts of experience.

CHAPTER VIFROM DESCARTES TO KANT

SECTION I

[218] A comparison of thet different ways in which Descartes and Lockerespectively conceived the scope of their investigations at once discloses thevery important shift which Locke introduced into the tradition of philo-sophic thought. Descartes asked the fundamental metaphysical question,What is it to be an actual entity? He found three kinds of actual entities,namely, cogitating minds, extended bodies, and God. His word for anactual entity was 'substance/ The fundamental proposition, whereby theanalysis of actuality could be achieved, took the form of predicating aquality of the substance in question. A quality was either an accident or anessential attribute. In the Cartesian philosophy there was room for threedistinct kinds of change: one was the change of accidents of an enduringsubstance; another was the origination of an individual substance; and thethird was the cessation of the existence of an enduring substance. Anyindividual belonging to either of the first two kinds of substances did notrequire any other individual of either of these kinds in order to exist. Butit did require the concurrence of God. Thus the essential attributes of amind were its dependence on God and its cogitations; and the essentialattributes of a body were its dependence on God and its extension. Des-cartes does not apply the term 'attribute' to the 'dependence on God?; butit is an essential element in his philosophy. It is quite obvious that theaccidental relationships between diverse individual substances form a greatdifficulty for Descartes. If they are to be included in his scheme of theactual [219] world, they must be qualities of a substance. Thus a relation-ship is the correlation of a pair of qualities,! one belonging exclusively toone individual, and the other exclusively to the other individual. The cor-relaton itself must be referred to God as one of his accidental qualities.This is exactly Descartes' procedure in his theory of representative ideas.In this theory, the perceived individual has one quality; the perceiving in-dividual has anothert quality which is the 'idea' representing this quality;God is aware of the correlation; and the perceiver's knowledge of Godguarantees for him the veracity of his idea. It is unnecessary to criticizethis very artificial account of what common sense believes to be our directknowledge of other actual entities. But it is the only account consistentwith the metaphysical materials provided by Descartes, combined with hisassumption of a multiplicity of actual entities. In this assumption of a

144

multiplicity of actual entities the philosophy of organism follows Des-cartes. It is, however! obvious that there are only two ways out of Descartes*difficulties; one way is to have recourse to some form of monism; the otherway is to reconstruct Descartes' metaphysical machinery.

But Descartes asserts one principle which is the basis of all philosophy:he holds that the whole pyramid of knowledge is based upon the im-mediate operation of knowing which is either an essential (for Descartes),or a contributory, element in the composition of an immediate actual en-tity. This is also a first principle for the philosophy of organism. ButDescartes allowed the subject-predicate form of proposition, and thephilosophical tradition derived from it, to dictate his subsequent meta-physical development. For his philosophy, 'actuality' meant 'to be a sub-stance with inhering qualities/ For the philosophy of organism, the per-cipient occasion is its own standard of actuality. If in its knowledge otheractual entities appear, it can only be because they conform to its standardof actuality. There can only be [220] evidence of a world of actual entities,if the immediate actual entity discloses them as essential to its own com-position. Descartes' notion of an unessential experience of the externalworld is entirely alien to the organic philosophy. This is the root point ofdivergence; and is the reason why the organic philosophy has to abandonany approach to the substance-quality notion of actuality. The organicphilosophy interprets experience as meaning the 'self-enjoyment of beingone among many, and of being one arising out of the composition ofmany/ Descartes interprets experience as meaning the 'self-enjoyment, byan individual substance, of its qualification by ideas/ t

SECTION II

Locke explicitly discards metaphysics. His enquiry has a limited scope:This therefore being my purpose, to inquire into the original, cer-tainty, and extent of human knowledge, together with the grounds anddegrees of belief, opinion, and assent, I shall not at present meddlewith the physical consideration of the mind, or trouble myself toexamine wherein its essence consists, ... It shall suffice to my presentpurpose, to consider the discerning faculties of a man as they are em-ployed about the objects which they have to do with; . . }

The enduring importance of Locke's work comes from the candour,clarity, and adequacy with which he stated the evidence, uninfluenced bythe bias of metaphysical theory. He explained, in the sense of statingplainly, and not in the more usual sense of 'explaining away/ By an ironicdevelopment in the history of thought, Locke's successors, who arrogatedto themselves the title of 'empiricists,' have been chiefly employed in ex-plaining away the obvious facts of experience in obedience to the a prioridoctrine of sensationalism, inherited from the mediaeval philosophy which

1 Essay, I, I, 2.

they despised. Locke's Essay is the invaluable storehouse for those whowish to [221] confront their metaphysical constructions by a recourse tothe facts.

Hume clipped his explanation by this a priori theory, which he statesexplicitly in the first quotation made from his Treatise in the previouschapter. It cannot be too often repeated:We may observe, that it is universally allowed by philosophers, and isbesides pretty obvious of itself, that nothing is ever really present withthe mind but its perceptionsf or impressions and ideas, and that ex-ternal objects become known to us only by those perceptions theyoccasion. To hate, to love, to think, to feel, to see; all this is nothingbut to perceive.

Hume, in agreement with what 'is universally allowed by philosophers/interprets this statement in a sensationalist sense. In accordance withthis sense, an impression is nothing else than a particular instance of themind's awareness of a universal, which may either be simple, or may be amanner of union of many simple universals. For Hume, hating, loving,thinking, feeling, are nothing but perceptions derivate from these funda-mental impressions. This is the a priori sensationalist dogma, which boundsall Hume's discoveries in the realm of experience. It is probable that thisdogma was in Locke's mind throughout the earlier portion of his Essay.But Locke was not seeking consistency with any a priori dogma. He alsofinds in experience 'ideas' with characteristics which 'determine them tothis or that particular existent.' Such inconsistency with their dogmashocks empiricists, who refuse to admit experience, naked and unashamed,devoid of their a priori figleaf. Locke is merely stating what, in practice,nobody doubts. But Locke would have agreed with Hume in refusing toadmit that 'ideas of reflection' may be directly 'determined to some par-ticular existent,' without the intervention of 'ideas of sensation.' In thisrespect, Locke was a sensationalist, and the philosophy of organism is notsensationalist. But Locke's avoidance of metaphysics only led him up to astage of thought for which meta- [222] physics is essential to clarity. Thequestions as to the status of a 'particular existent,' and of an 'idea deter-mined to a particular existent,' demand metaphysical discussion. Locke isnever tired of disparaging the notion of 'substance'; but he gives no hint ofalternative categories which he would employ to analysef the notions ofan 'actual entity' and of 'reality.' But his Essay, however, does contain aline of thought which can be developed into a metaphysic. In the firstplace, he distinctly holds that ideas of particular existents—for example,the child's idea of its mother—constitute the fundamental data which themental functioning welds into a unity by a determinate process of ab-sorption, including comparison, emphasis, and abstraction. He also holdsthat 'powers' are to be ascribed to particular existents whereby the con-stitutions of other particulars are conditioned. Correlatively, he holds thatthe constitutions of particular existents must be described so as to exhibit

their 'capacities' for being conditioned by such 'powers' in other particulars.He also holds that all qualities have in some sense a relational element inthem. Perhaps, though Locke does not say so, this notion of the relationalelement in qualities is illustrated in the following passage: "Besides, thereis scarce any particular thing existing, which, in some of its simple ideas,does not communicate with a greater, and in others with a less, number ofparticular beings: . . ." 2 Locke here expresses the notion of an identity be-tween two simple ideas in the form of a 'communication' between the par-ticular existents which possess that common quality. This passage alsoillustrates Locke's habit of employing the term 'idea't in a sense other thanparticular content of an act of awareness. Finally, Locke's notion of thepassage of time is that something is 'perpetually perishing/ If he hadgrasped the notion that the actual entity 'perishes' in the passage of time,so that no actual entity changes, he would have arrived [223] at the pointof view of the philosophy of organism. What he does say, is "perpetuallyperishing parts of succession." 3 Here, as elsewhere, Locke's neglect ofultimate questions revenges itself upon him. Nothing can make the var-ious parts of his Essay mutually consistent. He never revises the sub-stance-quality categories which remain presupposed throughout his Essay.In the first two books of the Essay, he professes to lay the foundations ofhis doctrine of ideas. These books are implicitly dominated by the notionof the ideas as mere qualifications of the substrate mind. In the third bookof the Essay he is apparently passing on to the application of his estab-lished doctrine of ideas to the subordinate question of the function oflanguage. But he tacitly introduces a new doctrine of ideas, which is dif-ficult to conciliate with the sensationalist doctrine of the preceding books.Hume concentrates upon the doctrine of Locke's earlier books; the phi-losophy of organism concentrates upon that of the later books in the Essay.If Locke's Essay is to be interpreted as a consistent scheme of thought, un-doubtedly Hume is right; but such an interpretation offers violence toLocke's contribution to philosophy.

SECTION III

In the philosophy of organism it is assumed that an actual entity iscomposite. 'Actuality* is the fundamental exemplification of composition;all other meanings of 'composition' are referent to this root-meaning. But'actuality' is a general term, which merely indicates this ultimate type ofcomposite unity: there are many composite unities to which this generalterm applies. There is no general fact of composition, not expressible interms of the composite constitutions of the individual occasions. Everyproposition is entertained in the constitution of some one actual entity, orseverally in the constitutions of many actual entities. This is only [224]

* Essay, III, IX, 14.3II, XIV, 1.

another rendering of the 'ontological principle/ It follows from the on-tological principle, thus interpreted, that the notion of a 'common world'must find its exemplification in the constitution of each actual entity, takenby itself for analysis. For an actual entity cannot be a member of a 'com-mon world/ except in the sense that the 'common world' is a constituentof its own constitution. It follows that every item of the universe, includ-ing all the other actual entities, is a constituentt in the constitution of anyone actual entity. This conclusion has already been employed under thetitle of the principle of relativity/ This principle of relativity is the axiomby which the ontological principle is rescued from issuing in an extrememonism. Hume adumbrates this principle in his notion of 'repetition/

Some principle is now required to rescue actual entities from beingundifferentiated repetitions, each of the other, with mere numerical di-versity. This requisite is supplied by the 'principle of intensive relevance/The notion of intensive relevance is fundamental for the meaning of suchconcepts as 'alternative possibilities/ 'more or less/ 'important or negli-gible.7 The principle asserts that any item of the universe, however pre-posterous as an abstract thought, or however remote as an actual entity,has its own gradation of relevance, as prehended, in the constitution of anyone actual entity: it might have had more relevance: and it might have hadless relevance, including the zero of relevance involved in the negativeprehension; but in fact it has just that relevance whereby it finds itsstatus in the constitution of that actual entity. It will be remembered thatHume finds it necessary to introduce the notion of variations in 'force andvivacity/ He is here making a particular application—and, as I believe, anunsuccessful application—of the general principle of intensive relevance.

There is interconnection between the degrees of relevance of differentitems in the same actual entity. This fact of interconnection is asserted inthe 'principle of \225] compatibility and contrariety/ There are itemswhich, in certain respective gradations of relevance, are contraries to eachother; so that those items, with their respective intensities of relevance,cannot coexist in the constitution of one actual entity. If some group ofitems, with their variety of relevance, can coexist in one actual entity, thenthe group, as thus variously relevant, is a compatible group. The variousspecific essences of one genus, whereby an actual entity may belong to oneor other of the species but cannot belong to more than one, illustrate theincompatibility between two groups of items. Also in so far as a specificessence is complex, the specific essence is necessarily composed of com-patible items, if there has been any exemplification of that species. But'feelings' are the entities which are primarily 'compatible7 or 'incom-patible/ All other usages of these terms are derivative.

The words 'real' and 'potential7 are, in this exposition, taken in senseswhich are antithetical. In their primary senses, they qualify the 'eternalobjects/ These eternal objects determine how the world of actual entitiesenters into the constitution of each one of its members via its feelings.

And they also express how the constitution of any one actual entity isanalysable into phases, related as presupposed and presupposing. Eternalobjects express how the predecessor-phase is absorbed into the successor-phaset without limitation of itself, but with additions necessary for thedetermination of an actual unity in the form of individual satisfaction. Theactual entities enter into each others' constitutions under limitations im-posed by incompatibilities4 of feelings. Such incompatibilities relegatevarious elements in the constitutions of felt objects to the intensive zero,which is termed 'irrelevance/ The preceding phases enter into their succes-sors with additions which eliminate the inde- [226] terminations. The howof the limitations, and the how of the additions, are alike the realization ofeternal objects in the constitution of the actual entity in question. Aneternal object in abstraction from any one particular actual entity is apotentiality for ingression into actual entities. In its ingression into anyone actual entity, either as relev9.it or as irrelevant, it retains its poten-tiality of indefinite diversity of modes of ingression, a potential indeter-mination rendered determinate in this instance. The definite ingressioninto a particular actual entity is not to be conceived as the sheer evocationof that eternal object from 'not-being' into 'being'; it is the evocation ofdetermination out of indetermination. Potentiality becomes reality; andyet retains its message of alternatives which the actual entity has avoided.In the constitution of an actual entity:—whatever component is red, mighthave been green; and whatever component is loved, might have beencoldly esteemed. The term 'universal' is unfortunate in its application toeternal objects; for it seems to deny, and in fact it was meant to deny, thatthe actual entities also fall within the scope of the principle of relativity.If the term 'eternal objects' is disliked, the term 'potentials' would besuitable. The eternal objects are the pure potentials of the universe; andthe actual entities differ from each other in their realization of potentials.Locke's term 'idea,' in his primary use of it in the first two books of theEssay, means the determinate ingression of an eternal object into the ac-tual entity in question. But he also introduces the limitationt to consciousmentality, which is here abandoned.

Thus in the philosophy of organism, Locke's first use of the term 'idea'is covered by the doctrine of the 'ingression7 of eternal objects into actualentities; and his second use of the same term is covered by the doctrine ofthe 'objectification' of actual entities. The two doctrines cannot be ex-plained apart from each other: they constitute explanations of the twofundamental principles—[227] the ontological principle and the principleof relativity.

The four stages constitutive of an actual entity have been stated abovein Part II, Chapter III, Section I. They can be named, datum, process,

4 Dr. H. M. Sheffer has pointed out the fundamental logical importance of thenotion of 'incompatibility'; cf. Trans. Amer. Math. Soc.,f Vol. XIV, pp. 481-488; and Introduction to Vol. 1 of Principia Mathematica (2nd edition).

satisfaction, decision. The two terminal stages have to do with 'becoming'in the sense of the transition from the settled actual world to the new-actual entity relatively to which that settlement is defined. But such'definition* must be found as an element in the actual entities concerned.The 'settlement' which an actual entity 'finds' is its datum. It is to be con-ceived as a limited perspective of the 'settled' world provided by theeternal objects concerned. This datum is 'decided' by the settled world.It is 'prehended' by the new superseding entity. The datum is the ob-jective content of the experience. The decision, providing the datum, is atransference of self-limited appetition; the settled world provides the 'realpotentiality' that its many actualities be felt compatibly; and the newconcrescence starts from this datum. The perspective is provided by theelimination of incompatibilities. The final stage, the 'decision/ is how theactual entity, having attained its individual 'satisfaction/ thereby adds adeterminate condition to the settlement for the future beyond itself. Thusthe 'datum' is the 'decision received/ and the 'decision' is the 'decisiontransmitted/ Between these two decisions, received and transmitted, therelie the two stages, 'process7 and 'satisfaction.' The datum is indeterminateas regards the final satisfaction. The 'process' is the addition of those ele-ments of feeling whereby these indeterminations are dissolved into de-terminate linkages attaining the actual unity of an individual actual entity.The actual entity, in becoming itself, also solves the question as to whatit is to be. Thus process is the stage in which the creative idea workstowards the definition and attainment of a determinate individuality.Process is the growth and attainment of a final end. The progressive defini-[228] tion of the final end is the efficacious condition for its attainment.The determinate unity of an actual entity is bound together by the finalcausation towards an ideal progressively defined by its progressive relationto the determinations and indeterminations of the datum. The ideal, itselffelt, defines what 'self shall arise from the datum; and the ideal is alsoan element in the self which thus arises.

According to this account, efficient causation expresses the transitionfrom actual entity to actual entity; and final causation expresses the in-ternal process whereby the actual entity becomes itself. There is the be-coming of the datum, which is to be found in the past of the world; andthere is the becoming of the immediate self from the datum. This latterbecoming is the immediate actual process. An actual entity is at once theproduct of the efficient past, and is also, in Spinoza's phrase, causa sui.Every philosophy recognizes, in some form or other, this factor of self-causation, in what it takes to be ultimate actual fact. Spinoza's words havealready been quoted. Descartes' argument, from the very fact of thinking,assumes that this freely determined operation is thereby constitutive of anoccasion in the endurance of an actual entity. He writes (Meditation II):"I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time that I pronounce it, or that I

mentally conceive it." Descartes in his own philosophy conceives thethinker as creating the occasional thought. The philosophy of organisminverts the order, and conceives the thought as a constituent operation inthe creation of the occasional thinker. The thinker is the final end wherebythere is the thought. In this inversion we have the final contrast between aphilosophy of substance and a philosophy of organism. The operations ofan organism are directed towards the organism as a 'superject/ and are notdirected from the organism as a 'subject/ The operations are directed fromantecedent organisms and to the immediate organism. They are Vectors/in that they convey the many [229] things into the constitution of thesingle superject. The creative process is rhythmic: it swings from thepublicity of many things to the individual privacy; and it swings back fromthe private individual to the publicity of the objectified individual. Theformer swing is dominated by the final cause, which is the ideal; and thelatter swing is dominated by the efficient cause, t which is actual.

SECTION IV

From the point of view of the philosophy of organism, the credit mustbe given to Hume that he emphasized the 'process' inherent in the fact ofbeing a mind. His analysis of that process is faulty in its details. It wasbound to be so; because, with Locke, he misconceived his problem to bethe analysis of mental operations. He should have conceived it as the anal-ysis of operations constituent of actual entities. He would then havefound mental operations in their proper place. Kant followed Hume inthis misconception; and was thus led to balance the world upon thought-oblivious to the scanty supply of thinking. But Hume, Kant, and thephilosophy of organism agree that the task of the critical reason is theanalysis of constructs; and 'construction' is 'process/ Hume's analysis ofthe construct which constitutes a mental occasion is: impressions of sen-sation, ideas of impressions of sensation, impressions of reflection, ideas ofimpressions of reflection. This analysis may be found obscurely in Locke.But Hume exhibits it as an orderly process; and then endeavours—andfails—to express in terms of it our ordinary beliefs, in which he shares.

For subsequent empiricists the pleasure of the dogma has overcome themetaphysical rule of evidence: that we must bow to those presumptions,which, in despite of criticism, we still employ for the regulation of ourlives. Such presumptions are imperative in experience. Rationalism isthe search for the coherence of such presumptions. Hume, in his series ofideas and of impressions, derivates from impressions of sensation, im-plicitly allows \230) that the building-up of experience is a process of addi-tion to original data. The philosophy of organism, in this respect, agrees withHume. It disagrees with Hume as to the proper characterization of theprimary data. In Hume's philosophy the primary impressions are char-acterized in terms of universals, e.g., in the first section of his Treatise he

refers to the colour 'red7 as an illustration. This is also the doctrine of thefirst two books of Locke's Essay. But in Locke's third book a differentdoctrine appears, and the primary data are explicitly said to be 'ideas ofparticular existents.' According to Locke's second doctrine, the ideas ofuniversals are derived from these primary data by a process of comparisonand analysis. The philosophy of organism agrees in principle with thissecond doctrine of Locke's. It is difficult, and trifling, to determine theexact extent of the agreement; because the expositions of Locke and Humebring in the very derivative operations involving consciousness. The or-ganic philosophy does not hold that the 'particular existents' are prehendedapart from universals; on the contrary, it holds that they are prehended bythe mediation of universals. In other words, each actuality is prehendedby means of some element of its own definiteness. This is the doctrine ofthe 'objectification' of actual entities. Thus the primary stage in the con-crescence of an actual entity is the way in which the antecedent universeenters into the constitution of the entity in question, so as to constitute thebasis of its nascent individuality. A converse way of looking at this truth isthat the relevance to other actual entities of its own status in the actualworld t is the initial datum in the process of its concrescence. When it isdesired to emphasize this interpretation of the datum, the phrase 'objec-tive content' will be used synonymously with the term 'datum.7 Of course,strictly speaking, the universals, to which Hume confines the datum, arealso 'objects'; but the phrase 'objective content' is meant to emphasize thedoctrine of 'objectificarion' of actual entities. If experi- \231] ence be notbased upon an objective content, there can be no escape from a solipsistsubjectivism. But Hume, and Locke in his main doctrine, fail to provideexperience with any objective content. Kant, fort whom 'process' ismainly a process of thought, accepts Hume's doctrine as to the 'datum'and turns the 'apparent' objective content into the end of the construct.So far, Kant's 'apparent' objective content seems to take the place of the'satisfaction' in the philosophy of organism. In this way there can be noreal escape from the solipsist difficulty. But Kant in his appeal to 'practicalreason' admits also the 'satisfaction' in a sense analogous to that in thephilosophy of organism; and by an analysis of its complex character hearrives at ultimate actualities which, according to his account, cannot bediscovered by any analysis of 'mere appearance.' This is a very complexdoctrine, which has been reproduced in all philosophies derivative fromKant. The doctrine gives each actual entity two worlds, one world of mereappearance, and the other world compact of ultimate substantial fact. Onthis point, as to the absence of 'objective content' in the datum for ex-perience, Santayana 5 seems to agree with Hume and Kant. But if his in-troduction of 'animal faith' is to be taken as a re-examination of the datumunder the influence of the sceptical conclusion from Hume's doctrine, then5 Cf. Scepticism and Animal Faith.

he, as his second doctrine, is practically reasserting Locke's second doc-trine. But if he is appealing to 'practice' away from the critical examina-tion of our sources of information, he must be classed with Hume andKant, although differing from them in every detail of procedure.

In view of the anti-rationalism of Hume's contented appeal to 'practice/it is very difficult to understand—except as another example of anti-ra-tionalism—the strong objection, entertained by Hume and by his 'em-piricist' followers, to the anti-rationalistic basis of some forms of religiousfaith. This strain of anti-rationalism [232] which Locke and Hume ex-plicitly introduced into philosophy marks the final triumph of the anti-rationalistic reaction against the rationalism of the Middle Ages. Ration-alism is the belief that clarity can only be reached by pushing explanationto its utmost limits. Locke, who hoped to attain final clarity in his analysisof human understanding in divorce from metaphysics, was, so far, an anti-rationalist. But Hume, in so far as he is to be construed as remaining con-tent with two uncoordinated sets of beliefs, one based on the critical ex-amination of our sources of knowledge, and the other on the uncritical+examination of beliefs involved in 'practice,' reaches the high watermarkof anti-rationalism in philosophy; for 'explanation' is the analysis ofcoordination.

SECTION V

The process whereby an actual entity, starting from its objective con-tent, attains its individual satisfaction, will be more particularly analysedin Part III. The primary character of this process is that it is individual tothe actual entity; it expresses how the datum, which involves the actualworld, becomes a component in the one actual entity. There must there-fore be no further reference to other actual entities; the elements availablefor the explanation are simply, the objective content, eternal objects, andthe selective concrescence of feelings whereby an actual entity becomesitself. It must be remembered that the objective content is analysable intoactual entities under limited perspectives provided by their own natures:these limited perspectives involve eternal objects in grades of relevance. Ifthe 'process' were primarily a process of understanding, we should have tonote that 'grades of relevance' are only other eternal objects in grades ofrelevance, and so on indefinitely. But we have not the sort of understand-ings which embrace such indefinite progressions. Accordingly there is herea vicious regress, if the process be essentially a process of understanding.But this is not the primary [233] description of it; the process is a processof 'feeling.' In feeling, what is felt is not necessarily analysed; in under-standing, what is understood is analysed, in so far as it is understood. Un-derstanding is a special form of feeling. Thus there is no vicious regress infeeling, by reason of the indefinite complexity of what is felt. Kant, in his

'Transcendental Aesthetic/1 emphasizes the doctrine that in intuition acomplex datum is intuited as one.

Again the selection involved in the phrase 'selective concrescence* is nota selection among the components of the objective content; for, by hy-pothesis, the objective content is a datum. The compatibilities and in-compatibilities which impose the perspective, transforming the actualworld into the datum, are inherent in the nature of things. Thus theselection is a selection of relevant eternal objects whereby what is adatum from without is transformed into its complete determination as afact within. The problem whicht the concrescence solves is, how the manycomponents of the objective content are to be unified in one felt contentwith its complex subjective form. This one felt content is the 'satisfaction/whereby the actual entity is its particular individual self; to use Descartes'phrase, 'requiring nothing but itself in order to exist/ In the conception ofthe actual entity in its phase of satisfaction, the entity has attained its in-dividual separation from other things; it has absorbed the datum, and ithas not yet lost itself in the swing back to the 'decision' whereby its ap-petition becomes an element in the data of other entities superseding it.Time has stood still—if only it could.

Thus process is the admission of eternal objects in their new role ofinvesting the datum with the individuality of the subject. The datum,*quat mere datum, includes the many individualities of the actual world.The satisfaction includes these many individualities as subordinate con-tributors to the one individuality. The process admits or rejectst eternalobjects which by their absorption into the subjective forms of the manyfeelings [234] effect this integration. The attainment of satisfaction rele-gates all eternal objects which are not 'felt' either as determinants ofdefiniteness in the data,t or as determinants of definiteness in the subjectiveform of the satisfaction, into the status of contraries to the eternal objectswhich are thus felt. Thus all indeterminations respecting the potentialitiesof the universe are definitely solved so far as concerns the satisfaction ofthe subject in question.

The process can be analysed genetically into a series of subordinatephases which presuppose their antecedents. Neither the intermediatephases, nor the datum which is the primary phase of all, determine thefinal phase of determinate individualization. Thus an actual entity, on its^subjective side, is nothing else than what the universe is for it, includingits own reactions. The reactions are the subjective forms of the feelings,elaborated into definiteness through stages of process. An actual entityachieves its own unity by its determinate feelings respecting every item ofthe datum. Every individual objectification in the datum has its perspec-tive defined by its own eternal objects with their own relevance compatiblewith the relevance of other objectifications. Each such objectification, andeach such complex of objectifications, in the datum is met with a corre-spondent feeling, with its determinate subjective form, until the many

From Descartes To Kant 155

become one experience, the satisfaction. The philosophies of substancepresuppose a subject which then encounters a datum, and then reacts tothe datum. The philosophy of organism presupposes a datum which is metwith feelings, and progressively attains the unity of a subject. But withthis doctrine, 'superject' would be a better term than 'subject/ Locke's'ideas of reflection' are the feelings, in so far as they have entered intoconsciousness.

It is by reference to feelings that the notion of 'immediacy' obtains itsmeaning. The mere objectification of actual entities by eternal objectslacks 'immediacy/ It is 'repetition'; and this is a contrary to 'immediacy.'[235] But 'process' is the rush of feelings whereby second-handedness at-tains subjective immediacy; in this way, subjective form overwhelms repe-tition, and transforms it into immediately felt satisfaction; objectivity isabsorbed into subjectivity. It is useful to compare this analysis of theconstruction of an act of experience with Kant's. In the first place Kant'sact of experience is essentially knowledge. Thus whatever is not knowledgeis necessarily inchoate, and merely on its way to knowledge. In comparingKant's procedure with that of the philosophy of organism, it must beremembered that an 'apparent' objective content is the end of Kant'sprocess, and thus takes the place of 'satisfaction' in the process as analysedin the philosophy of organism. In Kant's phraseology at the beginning ofthe Critique of Pure Reason, this 'apparent' objective content is referred toas 'objects.' He also accepts Hume's sensationalist account of the datum.Kant places this sentence at the commencement of the Critique: "Objectstherefore are given to us through our sensibility. Sensibility alone suppliesus with intuitions. These intuitions become thought through the under-standing, and hence arise conceptions." 6 This is expanded later in a formwhich makes Kant's adhesion to Hume's doctrine of the datum moreexplicit:

And here we see that the impressions of the senses give the first im-pulse to the whole faculty of knowledge with respect to them, andthus produce experience which consists of two very heterogeneouselements, namely, matter for knowledge, derived from the senses \eineMateriel zur Erkenntniss aus den Sinnen]f and a certain form accord-ing to which it is arranged, derived from the internal source of pureintuition and pure thought, first brought into action by the former,and then producing concepts.7Also:

Thoughts with- [236] out content are empty, intuitions without con-cepts are blind.8

6 "Vermittelst der Sinnlichkeit also werden uns Gegenstande gegeben, und sicallein liefert uns Anschauungenjf durch den Verstand aber werden sie gedacht,und von ihm entspringen BegrirTe." Translation in the text is Max Muller's.

7 Transcendental Analytic,'f Ch. II, Sect. I (Max Muller).

8 'Transcendental Logic,' Introduction, Sect. L*

In this last statement the philosophy of organism is in agreement withKant; but for a different reason. It is agreed that the functioning ofconcepts is an essential factor in knowledge, so that 'intuitions withoutconcepts are blind/ But for Kant, apart from concepts there is nothing toknow; since objects related in a knowable world are the product of con-ceptual functioning whereby categoreal form is introduced into the sense-datum, which otherwise is intuited in the form of a mere spatio-temporalflux of sensations. Knowledge requires that this mere flux be particularizedby conceptual functioning, whereby the flux is understood as a nexus of'objects/ Thus for Kant the process whereby there is experience is aprocess from subjectivity to apparent objectivity. The philosophy of or-ganism inverts this analysis, and explains the process as proceeding fromobjectivity to subjectivity, namely, from the objectivity, whereby the ex-ternal world is a datum, to the subjectivity, whereby there is one in-dividual experience. Thus, according to the philosophy of organism, inevery act of experience there are objects for knowledge; but, apart fromthe inclusion of intellectual functioning in that act of experience, there isno knowledge.

We have now come to Kant, the great philosopher who first, fully andexplicitly, introduced into philosophy the conception of an act of ex-perience as a constructive functioning, transforming subjectivity into ob-jectivity7, or objectivity into subjectivity; the order is immaterial in com-parison with the general idea. We find the first beginnings of the notion inLocke and in Hume. Indeed, in Locke, the process is conceived in itscorrect order, at least in the view of the philosophy of organism. But thewhole notion is only vaguely and inadequately conceived. The full sweepof the notion is due to Kant. The second half of the modern period ofphilosophical thought is to be dated from Hume and Kant. In it the [237]development of cosmology has been hampered by the stress laid upon one,or other, of three misconceptions:

(i) The substance-quality doctrine of actuality.

(ii) The sensationalist doctrine of perception.

(iii) The Kantian doctrine of the objective world as a construct fromsubjective experience.

The combined influence of these allied errors has been to reduce philos-ophy to a negligible influence in the formation of contemporary modesof thought. Hume himself introduces the ominous appeal to 'practice-not in criticism of his premises, but in supplement to his conclusions.Bradley, who repudiates Hume, finds the objective world in which we live,and move, and have our being, 'inconsistent if taken as real/ Neither sideconciliates philosophical conceptions of a real world with the world ofdaily experience.

CHAPTER VIITHE SUBJECTIVIST PRINCIPLE

SECTION I

[238] It is impossible to scrutinize too carefully the character to be as-signed to the datum in the act of experience. The whole philosophicalsystem depends on it. Hume's doctrine of 'impressions of sensation' (Trea-tise, Book I, Part I, Sect. II) is twofold. I will call one part of his doctrine'The Subjectivist Principle' and the other part 'The Sensationalist Prin-ciple/ It is usual to combine the two under the heading of the 'sensation-alist doctrine'; but two principles are really involved, and many philos-ophers—Locke, for instance—are not equally consistent in their adhesionto both of them. The philosophy of organism denies both of these doc-trines, in the form in which they are considered in this chapter, though itaccepts a reformed subjectivist principle (cf. Sect. Vf below and Part II,Ch. IX). Locke accepted the sensationalist principle, and was inconsistentin his statements respecting the subjectivist principle. With the exceptionof some lapses, he accepted the latter in the first two books of his Essay,and rejected it tacitly, but persistently, in the third and fourth books.Kant (in the Critique of Pure Reason) accepted the subjectivist principle,and rejected the sensationalist principle.

The sensationalist principle acquires dominating importance, if thesubjectivist principle be accepted. Kant's realization of this importanceconstituted the basis of his contribution to philosophy. The history ofmodern philosophy is the story of attempts to evade the inflexible con-sequences of the subjectivist principle, explicitly or implicitly accepted.The great merit of Hume and of [239] Kant is the explicitness with whichthey faced the difficulty.

The subjectivist principle is, that the datum in the act of experience canbe adequately analysed purely in terms of universals.

The sensationalist principle is, that the primary activity in the act ofexperience is the bare subjective entertainment of the datum, devoid ofany subjective form of reception. This is the doctrine of mere sensation.

The subjectivist principle follows from three premises: (i) The ac-ceptance of the 'substance-quality' concept as expressing the ultimate on-tological principle, (ii) The acceptance of Aristotle's definition of a pri-mary substance, as always a subject and never a predicate, (in) Theassumption that the experient subject is a primary substance. The firstpremise states that the final metaphysical fact is always to be expressed as

157

a quality inhering in a substance. The second premise divides qualities andprimary substances into two mutually exclusive classes. The two premisestogether are the foundation of the traditional distinction between uni-versal and particulars. The philosophy of organism denies the premises onwhich this distinction is founded. It admits two ultimate classes of entities,mutually exclusive. One class consists of 'actual entities/ which in thephilosophical tradition are mis-described as 'particulars'; and the otherclass consists of forms of definiteness, here named 'eternal objects/ whichin comparison with actual entities are mis-described as 'universals.' Thesemis-descriptions have already been considered (Part II, Ch. I, Sect. V).

Descartes held, with some flashes of inconsistency arising from the useof 'realitas objectiva/ the subjectivist principle as to the datum. But healso held that this mitigation of the subjeetivist* principle enabled the'process' within experience to include a sound argument for the existenceof God; and thence a sound argument for the general veridical character ofthose presumptions [240] as to the external world which somehow arisein the process.

According to the philosophy of organism, it is only by the introductionof covert inconsistencies into the subjectivist principle, as here stated, thatthere can be any escape from what Santayana calls, 'solipsism of the pres-ent moment/ Thus Descartes' mode of escape is either illusory, or itspremises are incompletely stated. This covert introduction is always arisingbecause common sense is inflexibly objectivist. We perceive other thingswhich are in the world of actualities in the same sense as we are. Also ouremotions are directed towards other things, including of course our bodilyorgans. These are our primary beliefs which philosophers proceed todissect.

Now philosophy has always proceeded on the sound principle that itsgeneralizationsf must be based upon the primary elements in actual ex-perience as starting-points. Greek philosophy had recourse to the commonforms of language to suggest its generalizations. It found the typical state-ment, 'That stone is grey'; and it evolved the generalization that the actualworld can be conceived as a collection of primary substances qualified byuniversal qualities. Of course, this was not the only generalization evolved:Greek philosophy was subtle and multiform, also it was not inflexiblyconsistent. But this general notion was always influencing thought, ex-plicitly or implicitly.

A theory of knowledge was also needed. Again philosophy started on asound principle, that all knowledge is grounded on perception. Perceptionwas then analysed, and found to be the awareness that a universal qualityis qualifying a particular substance. Thus perception is the catching of auniversal quality in the act of qualifying a particular substance. It wasthen asked, how the perceiver perceives; and the answer is,t by his organsof sensation. Thus the universal qualities which qualify the perceivedsubstances are, in respect to the [241] perceiver, his private sensations re-

ferred to particular substances other than himself. So far, the tradition ofphilosophy includes, among other elements, a factor of extreme ob-jectivism in metaphysics, whereby the subject-predicate form of propositionis taken as expressing a fundamental metaphysical truth. Descartes modi-fied traditional philosophy in two opposite ways. He increased the meta-physical emphasis on the substance-quality forms of thought. The actualthings 'required nothing but themselves in order to exist/ and were to bethought of in terms of their qualities, some of them essential attributes,and others accidental modes. He also laid down the principle, that thosesubstances which are the subjects enjoying conscious experiencest providethe primary data for philosophy, namely, themselves as in the enjoymentof such experience. This is the famous subjectivist bias which entered intomodern philosophy through Descartes. In this doctrine Descartes undoubt-edly made the greatest philosophical discovery since the age of Plato andAristotle. For his doctrine directly traversed the notion that the proposi-tion, 'This stone is grey/ expresses a primary form of known fact fromwhich metaphysics can start its generalizations. If we are to go back to thesubjective enjoyment of experience, the type of primary starting-point is'my perception of this stone as grey.' Primitive men were not metaphysi-cians, nor were they interested in the expression of concrete experience.Their language merely expressed useful abstractions, such as 'greyness ofthe stone/ But like Columbus who never visited America, Descartes missedthe full sweep of his own discovery, and he and his successors, Locke andHume, continued to construe the functionings of the subjective enjoymentof experience according to the substance-quality categories. Yet if theenjoyment of experience be the constitutive subjective fact, these cate-gories have lost all claim to any fundamental character in metaphysics.Hume—to proceed at once to the consistent exponent of the method-looked for a [242] universal quality to function as qualifying the mind, byway of explanation of its perceptive enjoyment. Now if we scan 'my per-ception of this stone as grey' in order to find a universal, the only availablecandidate is 'greyness/ Accordingly for Hume, 'greyness/ functioning as asensation qualifying the mind, is a fundamental type of fact for meta-physical generalization. The result is Hume's simple impressions of sensa-tion, which form the starting-point of his philosophy. But this is an entiremuddle,f for the perceiving mind is not grey, and so grey is now made toperform a new role. From the original fact 'my perception of this stone asgrey/ Hume extracts 'Awareness of sensation of greyness'; and puts itforward as the ultimate datum in this element of experience.

He has discarded the objective actuality of the stone-image in his searchfor a universal quality: this 'objective actuality' is Descartes' 'realitas ob-jective! \ Hume's search was undertaken in obedience to a metaphysicalprinciple which had lost all claim to validity, if the Cartesian discovery beaccepted. He is then content with 'sensation of greyness/ which is just asmuch a particular as the original stone-image. He is aware of 'this sensa-

tion of greyness.' What he has done is to assert arbitrarily the 'subjectivismand 'sensationalist' principles as applying to the datum for experience: thenotion 'this sensation of greyness' has no reference to any other actualentity. Hume thus applies to the experiencing subject Descartes' principle,that it requires no other actual entity in order to exist. The fact that fi-nally Hume criticizes the Cartesian notion of mindt does not alter theother fact that his antecedent arguments presuppose that notion.

It is to be noticed that Hume can only analyse the sensation in terms ofaf universal and of its realization in the prehending mind. For example,to take the first examples which in his Treatise he gives of such analysis, wefind 'red/ 'scarlet/ 'orange/ 'sweet/ 'bitter/ Thus Hume describes 'im-pressions of sensation' in the exact terms in which the philosophy of or-ganism describes con- [243] ceptual feelings. They are the particular feel-ings of universals, and are not feelings of other particular existents ex-emplifying universals. Hume admits this identification, and can find nodistinction except in 'force and vivacity/ He writes: "The first circum-stance that strikes my eye, is the great resemblance between our impres-sions and ideas in every particular except their degree of force andvivacity/'*

In contrast to Hume, the philosophy of organism keeps 'this stone asgrey' in the datum for the experience in question. It is, in fact, the 'objec-tive datum' of a certain physical feeling, belonging to a derivative type ina late phase of a concrescence. But this doctrine fully accepts Descartes'discovery that subjective experiencing is the primary metaphysical situa-tion which is presented to metaphysics for analysis. This doctrine is the'reformed subjectivist principle,'t mentioned earlier in this chapter. Ac-cordingly, the notion 'this stone as grey' is a derivative abstraction, neces-sary indeed as an element in the description of the fundamental experien-tial feeling, but delusive as a metaphysical starting-point. This derivativeabstraction is called an 'objectification/

The justification for this procedure is, first, common sense, and, sec-ondly, the avoidance of the difficulties which have dogged the subjectivistand sensationalist principles of modern philosophy. Descartes' discoveryon the side of subjectivism requires balancing by an 'objectivist' principleas to the datum for experience. Also, with the advent of Cartesian subjec-tivism, the substance-quality category has lost all claim to metaphysicalprimacy; and, with this disposition of substance-quality, we can reject thenotion of individual substances, each with its private world of qualitiesand sensations.

SECTION II

In the philosophy of organism knowledge is relegated to the intermedi-ate phase of j>rocess. Cognizance belongs to the genus of subjective formswhich are admitted, or [244] not admitted, to the function of absorbingthe objective content into the subjectivity of satisfaction. Its 'importance'

is therefore no necessary element in the concrete actual entity. In the caseof any one such entity, it may merely constitute an instance of whatLocke terms 'a capacity/ If we are considering the society of successiveactual occasions in the historic route forming the life of an enduring ob-ject, some of the earlier actual occasions may be without knowledge, andsome of the later may possess knowledge. In such a case, the unknowingman has become knowing. There is nothing surprising in this conclusion;it happens daily for most of us, when we sleep at night and wake in themorning. Every actual entity has the capacity for knowledge, and there isgraduation in the intensity of various items of knowledge; but, in gen-eral, knowledge seems to be negligible apart from a peculiar complexity inthe constitution of some actual occasion.

We—as enduring objects with personal order—objectify the occasions ofour own past with peculiar completeness in our immediate present. Wefind in those occasions, as known from our present standpoint, a surprisingvariation in the range and intensity of our realized knowledge. We sleep;we are half-awake; we are aware of our perceptions, but are devoid ofgeneralities in thought; we are vividly absorbed within a small region ofabstract though while oblivious to the world around; we are attending toour emotions—some torrent of passion—to them and to nothing else; weare morbidly discursive in the width of our attention; and finally we sinkback into temporary obliviousness, sleeping or stunned. Also we can re-member factors experienced in our immediate past, which at the time wefailed to notice. When we survey the chequered history of our own capac-ity for knowledge, does common sense allow us to believe that the opera-tions of judgment, operations which require definition in terms of con-scious apprehension, are those operations which are foundational in exist-ence either as \245] an essential attribute for an actual entity, or as thefinal culmination whereby unity of experience is attained?!

The general case x of conscious perception is the negative perception,namely, 'perceiving this stone as not grey/ The 'grey' then has ingressionin its full character of a conceptual novelty, illustrating an alternative. Inthe positive case, 'perceiving this stone as grey/ the grey has ingression inits character of a possible novelty, but in fact by its conformity empha-sizing the dative grey, blindly felt. Consciousness is the feeling of nega-tion: in the perception of 'the stone as grey/ such feeling is in barestgerm; in the perception of 'the stone as not grey/ such feeling is int fulldevelopment. Thus the negative perception is the triumph of conscious-ness. It finally rises to the peak of free imagination, in which the con-ceptual novelties search through a universe in which they are not dativelyexemplified.

Consciousness is the subjective form involved in feeling the contrastbetween the 'theory' which may be erroneous and the fact which is 'given/Thus consciousness involves the rise into importance of the contrast be-

1 Cf. Part III, for the full account.

tween the eternal objects designated by the words 'any' and 'just that/Conscious perception is? therefore, the most primitive form of judgment.The organic philosophy holds that consciousness only arises in a Jatederivative phase of complex integrations. If an actual occasion be suchthat phases of this sort are negligible in its concrescence, then in its ex-perience there is no knowledge;! owing to the fact that consciousness is asubjective form belonging to the later phases, the prehensions which itdirectly irradiates are those of an 'impure' type. Consciousness only il-luminates the more primitive types of prehension so far as these prehen-sions are still elements in the products of integration. Thus those elementsof our experience which stand out clearly and distinctly in our conscious-ness are not its basic facts; they are the derivative modifications whicharise in the process. For [246] example, consciousness only dimly illumi-nates the prehensions in the mode of causal efficacy, because these pre-hensions are primitive elements in our experience. But prehensions in themode of presentational immediacy are among those prehensions which weenjoy with the most vivid consciousness. These prehensions are latederivatives in the concrescence of an experient subject. The consequencesof the neglect of this law, that the late derivative elements are more clearlyilluminated by consciousness than the primitive elements, have been fatalto the proper analysis of an experient occasion. In fact, most of the diffi-culties of philosophy are produced by it. Experience has been explained ina thoroughly topsy-turvy fashion, the wrong end first. In particular, emo-tional and purposeful experience have been made to follow upon Hume'simpressions of sensation.

To sum up: (i) Consciousness is a subjective form arising in the higherphases of concrescence, (ii) Consciousness primarily illuminates the higherphase in which it arises, and only illuminates earlier phases derivatively, asthey remain components in the higher phase, (iii) It follows that theorder of dawning, clearly and distinctly, in consciousness is not the orderof metaphysical priority.

SECTION III

The primitive form of physical experience is emotional—blind emo-tion—received as felt elsewhere in another occasion and conformally ap-propriated as a subjective passion. In the language appropriate to thehigher stages of experience, the primitive element is sympathy, that is,feeling the feeling in another and feeling conformally with another. Weare so used to considering the high abstraction, 'the stone as green/ thatwe have difficulty in eliciting into consciousness the notion of 'green' asthe qualifying character of an emotion. Yet, the aesthetic feelings, wherebythere is pictorial art, are nothing else than products of the contrasts [247]latent in a variety of colours qualifying emotion, contrasts which are madepossible by their patterned relevance to each other. The separation of the

emotional experience from the presentational intuition is a high abstrac-tion of thought. Thus the primitive experience is emotional feeling, f feltin its relevance to a world beyond. The feeling is blind and the relevanceis vague. Also feeling, and reference to an exterior world, t pass into ap-petition, which is the feeling of determinate relevance to a world about tobe. In the phraseology of physics, this primitive experience is 'vectorfeeling/ that is to say, feeling from a beyond which is determinate andpointing to a beyond which is to be determined. But the feeling is sub-jectively rooted in the immediacy of the present occasion: it is what theoccasion feels for itself, as derived from the past and as merging into thefuture. In this vector transmission of primitive feeling the primitive pro-vision of width for contrast is secured by pulses of emotion, which in thecoordinate division of occasions (cf. Part IV) appear as wave-lengths andvibrations. In any particular cosmic epoch, the order of nature has securedthe necessary differentiation of function, so as to avoid incompatibilities,by shepherding the sensa characteristic of that epoch each into associationwith a definite pulse. Thus the transmission of each sensum is associatedwith its own wave-length. In physics, such transmission can be conceivedas corpuscular or undulatory, according to the special importance of par-ticular features in the instance considered. The higher phases of experi-ence increase the dimension of width, and elicit contrasts of higher types.The clash of uncoordinated emotions in the lower categories isf avoided:the aspect of inhibition and of transitory satisfaction is diminished. Ex-perience realizes itself as an element in what is everlasting (cf. Part V, Ch.II), and as embodying in itself the everlasting component of the universe.This gain does not necessarily involve consciousness. Also it involves en-hanced subjective emphasis. The occasion [248] has become less of a detailand more of a totality, so far as its subjective experience is concerned. Thefeeling of this width, with its enhancement of permanence, takes the formof blind zest, which can become self-defeating by excess of subjective em-phasis. The inhibitions of zest by lack of adequate width to combine thecontraries inherent in the environment lead to the destruction of the typeof order concerned. Every increase of sensitivity requires an evolutiontowards adaptation. It must be remembered, however, that emotion inhuman experience, or even in animal experience, is not bare emotion. Itis emotion interpreted, integrated, and transformed into higher categoriesof feeling. But even so, the emotional appetitive elements in our consciousexperience are those which most closely resemble the basic elements of allphysical experience.

SECTION IV

The distinction between the various stages of concrescence consists inthe diverse modes of ingression of the eternal objects involved. The im-manent decision, whereby there is a supervening of stages in an actual

entity, is always the determinant of a process of integration whereby com-pletion is arrived at—at least, such 'formal' completion as is proper to asingle actual entity. This determination originates with conceptual pre-hensions which enter into integration with the physical prehensions,!modifying both the data and the subjective forms.

The limitation whereby there is a perspective relegation of eternal ob-jects to the background is the characteristic of decision. Transcendentdecision includes God's decision. He is the actual entity in virtue of whichthe entire multiplicity of eternal objects obtains its graded relevance toeach stage of concrescence. Apart from God, there could be no relevantnovelty. Whatever arises in actual entities from God's decision, arises firstconceptually, and is transmuted into the physical world (cf. Part III). In'transcendent decision' there is transi- [249] tion from the past to the im-mediacy of the present; and in 'immanent decision' there is the process ofacquisition of subjective form and the integration of feelings. In thisprocess the creativity, universal throughout actuality, is characterized bythe datum from the past; and it meets this dead datum—universalizedinto a character of creativity—by the vivifying novelty of subjective formselected from the multiplicity of pure potentiality. In the process, the oldmeets the new, and this meeting constitutes the satisfaction of an im-mediate particular individual.

Eternal objects in any one of their modes of subjective ingrcssion arethen functioning in the guise of subjective novelty meeting the objectivedatum from the past. This word 'feeling' is a mere technical term; but ithas been chosen to suggest that functioning through which the con-crescent actuality appropriates the datum so as to make it its own. Thereare three successive phases of feelings, namely, a phase of 'conformal'ffeelings, one of 'conceptual' feelings, and one of 'comparative' feelings,including 'propositional' feelings in this last species. In the conformalfeelings the how of feeling reproduces what is felt. Some conformation isnecessary as a basis of vector transition, whereby the past is synthesizedwith the present. The one eternal object in its two-way function, as adeterminant of the datum and as a determinant of the subjective form, isthus relational. In this sense the solidarity of the universe is based on therelational functioning of eternal objects. The two latter? phases can beput together as the 'supplemental' phase.

An eternal object when it has ingression through its function of ob-jectifying the actual world, so as to present the datum for prehension, isfunctioning 'datively.' Hence, to sum up, there are four modes of func-tioning whereby an eternal object has ingression into the constitution ofan actual entity: (i) as dative ingression, (ii) in conformal physical feeling,(iii) in conceptual feeling, (iv) in comparative feeling.

\2S0] But the addition of diverse eternal objects is not of the essence of'supplementation': the essence consists in the adjustment of subjectiveimportance by functioning of subjective origin. The graduated emotional

intensity of the subject is constituting itself by reference to the physicaldata, datively there and conformally felt. All references to 'attention'usually refer to such supplementation in which the addition of diverseeternal objects is at a minimum; whereas references to 'emotion' usuallyrefer to such supplementation complicated by profuse addition of diverseeternal objects. Supplementary feeling is emotional and purposeful, be-cause it is what is felt by mere reason of the subjective appropriation ofthe objective data. But it is of the essence of supplementary feeling that itdoes not challenge its initial phase of conformal feeling by any reference toincompatibility. The stages of the subjective ingression of eternal objectsinvolve essential compatibility. The process exhibits an inevitable con-tinuity of functioning. Each stage carries in itself the promise of its suc-cessor, and each succeeding stage carries in itself the antecedent out ofwhich it arose. For example, t the complexity of the datum carries in itselfthe transition from the conformal feelings to supplementary feelings inwhich contrasts, latent in the datum, achieve real unity between the com-ponents. Thus components in the datum, which qua dative, are diverse,become united in specific realized contrast. As elements in the datum, thecomponents are individually given, with the potentiality for a contrast,which in the supplementary stage is either included or excluded. The con-formal stage merely transforms the objective content into subjective feel-ings. But the supplementary stage adds, or excludes, the realization of thecontrasts by which the original datum passes into its emotional unity.

This account enables us to conceive the stage of consciousness as a pro-longation of the stage of supplementation. The concrescence is an in-dividualization of the whole universe. Every eternal object, whether rele-vant [25J] or irrelevant to the datum, is still patient of its contrasts withthe datum. The process by which such contrasts are admitted or rejectedinvolves the stage of conceptual feeling; and consciousness is evidentlyonly a further exhibition of this stage of supplementary feeling. Concep-tual feelings do not necessarily involve consciousness. This point iselaborated in detail in Part III.

Again in this explanation, 'contrast' has appeared as the general case;while 'identification' is a sub-species arising when one and the sameeternal object is contrasted in its two modes of functioning.

Thus the two latter stages of feeling are constituted by the realization ofspecific modes of diversity and identity, the realization also involving anadjustment of intensities of relevance. Mere diversity, and mere identity,are generic terms. Two components in the constitution of an actual entityare specifically diverse and specifically identical by reason of the definitepotential contrast involved in the diversity of the implicated eternal ob-jects, and by reason of the definite self-identity of each eternal object. Thespecific identity arising from the synthesis of diverse modes of functioningof one eternal object is the 'individual essence' of that eternal object. Butthe concrescence reaches the goal required by the Category of Objective

166 Discussions and Applications

Unity, that in any subject one entity can only be felt once. Nothing can beduplicated. The many potentialities for one entity must be synthesizedtinto one fact. Hence arise the incompatibilities productive of elimination.

Properly speaking, modes of functioning are compared, thereby evokingspecific contrasts and specific identifications. The two latter stages of feel-ing are the stages of comparison; these stages involve comparisons, andcomparisons of comparisons; and the admission, or exclusion, of an in-definite complexity of potentialities for comparison, in ascending grades.

The ultimate attainment is 'satisfaction/ This is the final characteriza-tion of the unity of feeling of the one [252] actual entity, the 'superject'which is familiarly termed the 'subject/ In a sense this satisfaction is two-dimensional. It has a dimension of narrowness, and a dimension of width.The dimension of narrowness refers to the intensities of individual emo-tions arising out of individual components in the datum. In this dimen-sion, the higher levels of coordination are irrelevant. The dimension ofwidth arises out of the higher levels of coordination, by which the in-tensities in the dimension of narrowness become subordinated to a co-ordination which depends upon the higher levels of comparison. Thesavouring of the complexity of the universe can enter into satisfactiononly through the dimension of width. The emotional depths at the lowlevels have their limits: the function of width is to deepen the ocean offeeling, and to remove the diminutions of depth produced by the inter-ference of diverse emotions uncoordinated at a higher level. In the placeof the Hegelian hierarchy of categories of thought, the philosophy oforganism finds a hierarchy of categories of feeling.

SECTION V

The reformed subjectivist principle adopted by the philosophy of or-ganism is merely an alternative statement of the principle of relativity (thefourth Category of Explanation). This principle states that it belongs tothe nature of a 'being that it is a potential for every 'becoming/ Thus allthings are to be conceived as qualifications of actual occasions. Accordingto the ninth Category of Explanation, how an actual entity becomes con-stitutes what that actual entity is. This principle states that the being of ares vera is constituted by its 'becoming/ The way in which one actualentity is qualified by other actual entities is the 'experience' of the actualworld enjoyed by that actual entity, as subject. The subjectivist principle**is that the whole universe consists of elements disclosed in the analysis ofthe experiences of subjects. Process is the becoming of experience. [253] Itfollows that the philosophy of organism entirely accepts the subjectivistbias of modern philosophy. It also accepts Hume's doctrine that nothingis to be received into the philosophical scheme which is not discoverableas an element in subjective experience. This is the ontological principle.Thus Hume's demand that causation be describable as an element in ex-

The Subjectivist Principle 167

perience is, on these principles, entirely justifiable. The point of the crit-icisms of Hume's procedure is that we have direct intuition of inheritanceand memory: thus the only problem is, so to describe the general characterof experience that these intuitions may be included. It is here that Humefails. Also those modern empiricists who substitute law' for 'causation'fail even worse than Hume. For 'law' no more satisfies Hume's tests thandoes 'causation/ There is no 'impression' of law, or of lawfulness. Evenallowing memory, according to Humian principles what has happened inexperience has happened in experience, and that is all that can be said.Everything else is bluff, combined with the fraudulent insertion of 'prob-ability' into a conclusion which demands 'blank ignorance.'

The difficulties of all schools of modern philosophy lie in the fact that,having accepted the subjectivist principle,** they continue to use philosoph-ical categories derived from another point of view. These categories are notwrong, but they deal with abstractions unsuitable for metaphysical use.It is for this reason that the notions of the 'extensive continuum' and of'presentationalt immediacy' require such careful discussion from everypoint of view. The notions of the 'green leaf and of the 'round ball' areat the base of traditional metaphysics. They have generated two miscon-ceptions: one is the concept of vacuous actuality, void of subjective ex-perience; and the other is the concept of quality inherent in substance.In their proper character, as high abstractions, both of these notions are ofthe utmost pragmatic use. In fact, language has been formed chiefly toexpress such con- \2S4) cepts. It is for this reason that language, in itsordinary usages, penetrates but a short distance into the principles ofmetaphysics. Finally, the reformed subjectivist principle must be repeated:that apart from the experiences of subjects there is nothing, nothing,nothing, bare nothingness.

It is now evident that the final analogy to philosophies of the Hegelianschool, noted in the Preface, is not accidental. The universe is at once themultiplicity of res verae] and the solidarity of res verae. The solidarity isitself the efficiency of the macroscopic res vera, embodying the principleof unbounded permanence acquiring novelty through flux. The multiplicityis composed of microscopic res verae, each embodying the principle ofbounded flux acquiring 'everlasting' permanence. On one side, the onebecomes many; and on the other side, the many become one. But whatbecomes is always a res vera, and the concrescencet of a res vera is thedevelopment of a subjective aim. This development is nothing else thanthe Hegelian development of an idea. The elaboration of this aspect ofthe philosophy of organism, with the purpose of obtaining an interpre-tation of the religious experience of mankind, is undertaken in Part V ofthese lectures.

Cosmological story, in every part and in every chapter, relates the inter-play of the static vision and the dynamic history. But the whole story iscomprised within the account of the subjective concrescence of res verae.

CHAPTER VIIISYMBOLIC REFERENCE

SECTION I

[255] The pure mode of presentational immediacy gives no informationas to the past or the future. It merely presents an illustrated portion ofthe presented duration. It thereby defines a cross-section of the universe:hut does not in itself define on which side lies the past, and on whichside the future. In order to solve such questions we now come to theinterplay between the two pure modes. This mixed mode of perception ishere named 'symbolic reference/ The failure to lay due emphasis onsymbolic reference is one of the reasons for metaphysical difficulties; it hasreduced the notion of 'meaning' to a mystery.

The first principle, explanatory of symbolic reference, is that for suchreference a 'common ground' is required. By this necessity for a 'commonground' it is meant that there must be components in experience whichare directly recognized as identical in each of the pure perceptive modes.In the transition to a higher phase of experience, there is a concrescence inwhich prehensions in the two modes are brought into a unity of feeling:this concrescent unity arises from a congruity of their subjective forms invirtue of the identity relation between the two prehensions, owing to somecomponents in common. Thus the symbolic reference belongs to one ofthe later originative phases of experience. These later phases are dis-tinguished by their new element of originative freedom. Accordingly,while the two pure perceptive modes are incapable of error, symbolicreference introduces this possibility. When human experience is in ques-tion, 'per- \256] ception' almost always means 'perception in the mixedmode of symbolic reference/ Thus, in general, human perception is sub-ject to error, because, in respect to those components most clearly inconsciousness, it is interpretative. In fact, error is the mark of the higherorganisms, and is the schoolmaster by whose agency there is upwardevolution. For example, the evolutionary use of intelligence is that itenables the individual to profit by error without being slaughteredby it. But at present, we are not considering conceptual or intellectualfunctioning.

One main element of common ground, shared between the two puremodes, is the presented locus. This locus enters subordinately into theperceptive mode of causal efficacy, vaguely exemplifying its participationin the general scheme of extensive interconnection, involved in the real

168

potentiality. It is not disclosed by that perceptive mode in any other way;at least it is not directly disclosed. The further disclosure must be in-direct, since contemporary events are exactly those which are neithercausing, nor caused by, the percipient actual occasion. Now, although thevarious causal pasts (i.e., 'actual worlds') of the contemporary actual occa-sions are not wholly identical with the causal past of the percipient actualoccasion, yet, so far as important relevance is concerned, these causal pastsare practically identical. Thus there is, in the mode of causal efficacy, adirect perception of those antecedent actual occasions which are causallyefficacious both for the percipient and for the relevant events in the pre-sented locus. The percipient therefore, under the limitation of its ownperspective, prehends the causal influences to which the presented locus inits important regions is subjected. This amounts to an indirect perceptionof this locus, a perception in which the direct components belong to thepure mode of causal efficacy. If we now turn to the perceptive mode ofpresentational immediacy, the regions, perceived by direct and indirectknowledge respectively, are inverted in comparison with the other mode.The presented locus is directly illus- [257] trated by the sensa; while thecausal past, the causal future, and the other contemporary events, are onlyindirectly perceived by means of their extensive relations to the presentedlocus. It must be remembered that the presented locus has its fourthdimension of temporal thickness 'spatialized' as the specious present ofthe percipient. Thus the presented locus, with the animal body of thepercipient as the region from which perspectives are focussed, is the re-gional origin by reference to which in this perceptive mode the completescheme of extensive regions is rendered determinate. The respective rolesof the two perceptive modes in experience are aptly exemplified by thefact that all scientific observations, such as measurements, determinationsof relative spatial position, determinations of sense-data such as colours,sounds, tastes, smells, temperature feelings, touch feelings, etc., are madein the perceptive mode of presentational immediacy: and that great care isexerted to keep this mode pure, that is to say, devoid of symbolic referenceto causal efficacy. In this way accuracy is secured, in the sense that thedirect observation is purged of all interpretation. On the other hand allscientific theory is stated in terms referring exclusively to the scheme ofrelatedness, which, so far as it is observed, involves the percepta in thepure mode of causal efficacy. It thus stands out at once, that what wewant to know about, from the point of view either of curiosity or of tech-nology, chiefly resides in those aspects of the world disclosed in causalefficacy: but that what we can distinctly register is chiefly to be foundamong the percepta in the mode of presentational immediacy.

The presented locus is a common ground for the symbolic reference,because it is directly and distinctly perceived in presentational immediacy,and is indistinctly and indirectly perceived in causal efficacy. In the lattermode, the indistinctness is such that the detailed geometrical relationships

are, for the most part, incurably vague. Particular regions are, in this per-ceptive mode, [258] in general not distinguishable. In this respect, causalefficacy stands in contrast to presentational immediacy with its directillustration of certain distinct regions.

But there are exceptions to this geometrical indistinctness of causalefficacy. In the first place, the separation of the potential extensive schemeinto past and future lies with the mode of causal efficacy and not with thatof presentational immediacy. The mathematical measurements, derivablefrom the latter, are indifferent to this distinction; whereas the physicaltheory, expressed in terms of the former, is wholly concerned with it. Inthe next place, the animal body of the percipient is a region for whichcausal efficacy acquires some accuracy in its distinction of regions—not allthe distinctness of the other mode, but sufficient to allow of importantidentifications. For example, we see with our eyes, we taste with ourpalates, we touch with our hands, etc.: here the causal efficacy definesregions which are identified with themselves as perceived with greaterdistinctness by the other mode. To take one example, the slight eye-strainin the act of sight is an instance of regional definition by presentationalimmediacy. But in itself it is no more to be correlated with projected sightthan is a contemporary stomach-ache, or a throb in the foot. The obviouscorrelation of the eye-strain with sight arises from the perception, in theother mode, of the eye as efficacious in sight. This correlation takes placein virtue of the identity of the two regions, the region of the eye-strain, andthe region of eye-efficacy. But the eye-strain is so immeasurably the su-perior in its power of regional definition that, as usual, we depend uponit for explicit geometrical correlations with other parts of the body. Inthis way, the animal body is the great central ground underlying all sym-bolic reference. In respect to bodily perceptions the two modes achieve themaximum of symbolic reference, and pool their feelings referent to identi-cal regions. Every statement about the geometrical relationships of physi-cal bodies in the world is ultimately [259] referable to certain definitehuman bodies as origins of reference. A traveller, who has lost his way,should not ask, Where am I? What he really wants to know is, Where arethe other places? He has got his own body, but he has lost them.

SECTION II

The second 'ground' for symbolic reference is the connection betweenthe two modes effected by the identity of an eternal object ingredient inboth of them. It will be remembered that the former 'ground' was theidentity of the extensive region throughout such stages of direct percep-tion and synthesis, when there was a diversity of eternal objects, for ex-ample, eye-region, visual sensa, eye-strain. But now we pass to a diversity ofregions combined with an identity of the eternal object, for example, visualsensa given by efficacy of eye-region, and the region of the stone perceived

in the mode of presentational immediacy under the illustration of thesame visual sensa.t In this connection the 'make-believe' character of mod-ern empiricism is well shown by putting into juxtapositionf two widelyseparated passagesx from Hume's Treatise: "Impressions may be dividedinto two kinds, those of sensation, and those of reflection. The first kindarises in the soul originally, from unknown causes.7' And "If it be per-ceived by the eyes, it must be a colour; . . ."

The earlier passage is Hume's make-believe, when he is thinking of hisphilosophical principles. He then refers the visual sensations 'in the soul'to 'unknown causes.' But in the second passage, the heat of argumentelicits his real conviction—everybody's real conviction—that visual sensa-tions arise 'by the eyes.' The causes are not a bit 'unknown,' and amongthem there is usually to be found the efficacy of the eyes. If Hume hadstopped to investigate the alternative causes for the occurrence of visualsensations—for example, eye-sight, or excessive consumption of alcohol-he might have hesitated in his [260] profession of ignorance. If the causesbe indeed unknown, it is absurd to bother about eye-sight and intoxica-tion. The reason for the existence of oculists and prohibitionists is thatvarious causes are known.

We can now complete our account of presentational immediacy. In thisperceptive mode the sensa are 'given' for the percipient, but this donationis not to be ascribed to the spatial object which is thereby presented, thestone, for example. Now it is a primary doctrine that what is 'given' isgiven by reason of objectifications of actual entities from the settled past.We therefore seek for the actual occasions to whose objectifications thisdonation is to be ascribed. In this procedure we are only agreeing with thespirit of Descartes' fifty-second principle (Part I): "For this reason, whenwe perceive any attribute, we therefore conclude that some existing thingor substance to which it may be attributed, is necessarily present." Com-mon sense, physical theory, and physiological theory, combine to point outa historic route of inheritance, from actual occasion to succeeding actualoccasion, first physically in the external environment, then physiologi-cally—through the eyes in the case of visual data—up the nerves, into thebrain. The donation—taking sight as an example—is not confined to defi-nite sensa, such as shades of colour: it also includes geometrical relation-ships to the general environment. In this chain of inheritances, the eye ispicked out to rise into perceptive prominence, because another historicroute of physiological inheritance starts from it, whereby a later occa-sion (almost identical with the earlier) is illustrated by the sensum 'eye-strain' in the mode of presentational immediacy; but this eye-strain is an-other allied story. In the visual datum for the percipient there are first thesecomponents of colour-sensa combined with geometrical relationships tothe external world of the settled past: secondly, there are also in the datumthe general geometrical relationships forming the completion of this po-tential scheme into the contemporary world, and into [261] the future.

1 Book I, Part I, Sects. II and VI (italics mine).*

The responsive phase absorbs these data as material for a subjective unityof feeling: the supplemental stage heightens the relevance of the colour-sensa, and supplements the geometrical relationships of the past by pickingout the contemporary region of the stone to be the contemporary repre-sentative of the efficacious historic routes. There then results in the modeof presentational immediacy, the perception of the region illustrated by thesensum termed 'grey/ The term 'stone' is primarily applied to a certainhistoric route in the past, which is an efficacious element in this train ofcircumstance. It is only properly applied to the contemporary region il-lustrated by 'grey' on the assumption that this contemporary region is theprolongation, of that historic route, into the presented locus. This assump-tion may, or may not, be true. Further, the illustration of the contemporaryregion of *grey? may be due to quite other efficacious historic routes—forexample, to lighting effects arranged by theatrical producers—and in sucha case, the term 'stone' may suggest an even more violent error than in theformer example. What is directly perceived, certainly and without shadowof doubt, is a grey region of the presented locus. Any further interpretation,instinctive or by intellectual judgment, must be put down to symbolicreference.

This account makes it plain that the perceptive mode of presentationalimmediacy arises in the later, originative, integrative phases of the processof concrescence. The perceptive mode of causal efficacy is to be traced tothe constitution of the datum by reason of which there is a concrete per-cipient entity. Thus we must assign the mode of causal efficacy to thefundamental constitution of an occasion so that in germ this mode be-longs even to organisms of the lowest grade; while the mode of presenta-tional immediacy requires the more sophistical activity of the later stagesof process, so as to belong only to organisms of a relatively high grade. Sofar as we can judge, such high-grade organisms are relatively few, in [262]comparison with the whole number of organisms in our immediate en-vironment. Presentational immediacy is an outgrowth from the complexdatum implanted by causal efficacy. But, by the originative power of thesupplemental phase, what was vague, ill defined, and hardly relevant incausal efficacy, becomes distinct, well defined, and importantly relevant inpresentational immediacy. In the responsive phase, the grey colour,t andthe geometrical relations between the efficacious, bodily routes and thecontemporary occasions, were subjective sensationst associated with barelyrelevant geometrical relations: they represented the vivid sensational qual-ities in the enjoyment of which the percipient subject barely distinguishedvague indirect relationships to the external world. The supplemental phaselifts the presented duration into vivid distinctness, so that the vague effi-cacy of the indistinct external world in the immediate past is precipitatedupon the representative regions in the contemporary present. In the usuallanguage, the sensations are projected. This phraseology is unfortunate;for there never were sensations apart from these geometrical relations.

Presentational immediacy is the enhancement of the importance of rela-tionships which were already in the datum, vaguely and with slight rele-vance. This fact, that presentational immediacy' deals with the samedatum as does 'causal efficacy/ gives the ultimate reason why there is acommon 'ground' for 'symbolic reference/ The two modes express thesame datum under different proportions of relevance. The two genetic-processes involving presentational immediacy must be carefully distin-guished. There is first the complex genetic process in which presentationalimmediacy originates. This process extends downwards even to occasionswhich belong to the historic routes of certain types of inorganic enduringobjects, namely, to those enduring objects whose aggregates form thesubject-matter of the science of Newtonian dynamics.t Secondly, prehen-sions in the mode of presentational immediacy are involved as componentsin [263] integration with other prehensions which are usually, though notalways,f in other modes. These integrations often involve various types of'symbolic reference/ This symbolic reference is the interpretativet elementin human experience. Language almost exclusively refers to presentationalimmediacy as interpreted by symbolic reference. For example, we say that'we see the stone7 where stone is an interpretation of stone-image: alsowe say that 'we see the stone-image with our eyes'; this is an interpreta-tion arising from the complex integration of (i) the causal efficacy of theantecedent eye in the vision, (ii) the presentational immediacy of thestone-image, (iii) the presentational immediacy of the eye-strain. Whenwe say that 'we see the stone with our eyes/ the interpretations of thesetwo examples are combined.

SECTION III

The discussion of the problem constituted by the connection betweencausation and perceptiont has been conducted by the various schools ofthought derived from Hume and Kant under the misapprehension gen-erated by an inversion of the true constitution of experience. The inversionwas explicit in the writings of Hume and of Kant: for both of them presen-tational immediacy was the primary fact of perception, and any apprehen-sion of causation was, somehow or other, to be .elicited from this primaryfact. This view of the relation between causation and perception, as itemsin experience, was not original to these great philosophers. It is to be foundpresupposed in Locke and Descartes; and they derived it from mediaevalpredecessors. But the modern critical movement in philosophy arose whenHume and Kant emphasized the fundamental, inescapable, importancewhich this doctrine possesses for any philosophy admitting its truth. Thephilosophy of organism does not admit its truth, and thus rejects thetouchstone which is the neolithic weapon of 'criticaF philosophy. It mustbe remembered that clearness in consciousness is no evidence \264] forprimitiveness in the genetic process: the opposite doctrine is more nearlytrue.

Owing to its long dominance, it has been usual to assume as an obviousfact the primacy of presentational immediacy. We open our eyes and ourother sense-organs; we then survey the contemporary world decorated withsights, and sounds, and tastes; and then, by the sole aid of this informationabout the contemporary world, thus decorated, we draw what conclusionswe can as to the actual world. No philosopher really holds that this is thesole source of information: Hume and his followers appeal vaguely to'memory' and to 'practice/ in order to supplement their direct information;and Kant wrote other Critiques^ in order to supplement his Critique ofPure Reason. But the general procedure of modern philosophical 'criticism'is to tie down opponents strictly to the front door of presentational im-mediacy as the sole source of information, while one's own philosophymakes its escape by a back door veiled under the ordinary usages oflanguage.

If this 'Humian' doctrine be true, certain conclusions as to 'behaviour'tought to follow—conclusions which, in the most striking way, are notverified. It is almost indecent to draw the attention of philosophers to theminor transactions of daily life, away from the classic sources of philo-sophic knowledge; but, after all, it is the empiricists who began this appealto Caesar.

According to Hume, our behaviour presupposing causation is due to therepetition of associated presentational experiences. Thus the vivid present-ment of the antecedent percepts should vividly generate the behaviour,in action or thought, towards the associated consequent. The clear, dis-tinct, overwhelming perception of the one is the overwhelming reasonfor the subjective transition to the other. For behaviour, interpretable asimplying causation, is on this theory the subjective response to presenta-tional immediacy. According to Hume this subjective response is the be-ginning and the end of all that [26S] there is to be said about causation.In Hume's theory the response is response to presentational immediacy,and to nothing else. Also the situation elicited in response is nothing butan immediate presentation, or the memory of one. Let us apply this ex-planation to reflex action: In the dark, the electric light is suddenly turnedon and the man's eyes blink. There is a simple physiological explanationof this trifling incident.

But this physiological explanation is couched wholly in terms of causalefficacy: it is the conjectural record of the travel of a spasm of excitementalong nerves to some nodal centre, and of the return spasm of contractionback to the eyelids. The correct technical phraseology would not alter thefact that the explanation does not involve any appeal to presentationalimmediacy either for actual occasions resident in the nerves, or for theman. At the most there is a tacit supposition as to what a physiologist,who in fact was not there, might have seen if he had been there, and ifhe could have vivisected the man without affecting these occurrences, andif he could have observed with a microscope which also in fact was absent.

Thus the physiological explanation remains, from the point of view ofHume's philosophy, a tissue of irrelevancies. It presupposes a side of theuniverse about which, on Hume's theory, we must remain in blank ig-norance.

Let us now dismiss physiology and turn to the private experience of theblinking man. The sequence of percepts, in the mode of presentationalimmediacy, ist flash of light, feeling of eye-closure, instant of darkness.The three are practically simultaneous; though the flash maintains itspriority over the other two, and these two latter percepts are indistinguish-able as to priority. According to the philosophy of organism, the man alsoexperiences another percept in the mode of causal efficacy. He feels thatthe experiences of the eye in the matter of the flash are causal of the blink.The man himself will have no doubt of it. In fact, it is the feeling [266] ofcausality which enables the man to distinguish the priority of the flash;and the inversion of the argument, whereby the temporal sequence 'flashto blink' is made the premise for the 'causality' belief, has its origin inpure theory. The man will explain his experience by saying, "The flashmade me blink'; and if his statement be doubted, he will reply, 'I knowit, because I felt it.'

The philosophy of organism accepts the man's statement, that the flashmade him blink. But Hume intervenes with another explanation. He firstpoints out that in the mode of presentational immediacy there is no per-cept of the flash making the man blink. In this mode there are merelythe two percepts—the flash and the blink—combining the two latter ofthe three percepts under the one term 'blink.' Hume refuses to admit theman's protestation, that the compulsion to blink is just what he did feel.The refusal is based on the dogma t that all percepts are in the mode ofpresentational immediacy—a dogma not to be upset by a mere appeal todirect experience. Besides,! Hume has another interpretation of the man'sexperience: what the man really felt was his habit of blinking after flashes.The word 'association' explains it all, according to Hume. But how can a'habit' be felt, when a 'cause' cannot be felt? Is there any presentationalimmediacy in the feeling of a 'habit'? Hume by a sleight of hand confusesa 'habit of feeling blinks after flashes' with a 'feeling of the habit of feel-ing blinks after flashes/

We have here a perfect example of the practice of applying the test ofpresentational immediacy to procure the critical rejection of some doc-trines, and of allowing other doctrines to slip out by a back door, so asto evade the test. The notion of causation arose because mankind livesamid experiences in the mode of causal efficacy.

SECTION IV

We will keep to the appeal to ordinary experience, and \267] consideranother situation, which Hume's philosophy is ill equipped to explain.

The 'causal feeling' according to that doctrine arises from the long asso-ciation of well-marked presentations of sensa, one precedent to the other.It would seem therefore that inhibitions of sensa, given in presentationalimmediacy, should be accompanied by a corresponding absence of 'causalfeeling'; for the explanation of how there is 'causal feeling' presupposesthe well-marked familiar sensa, in presentational immediacy. Unfortu-nately the contrary is the case. An inhibition of familiar sensa is very aptto leave us a prey to vague terrors respecting a circumambient world ofcausal operations. In the dark there are vague presences, doubtfully feared:in the silence, the irresistible causal efficacy of nature presses itself uponus; in the vagueness of the low hum of insects in an August woodland, theinflow into ourselves of feelings from enveloping nature overwhelms us;in the dim consciousness of half-sleep, the presentations of sense fadeaway, and we are left with the vague feeling of influences from vaguethings around us. It is quite untrue that the feelings of various types ofinfluences are dependent upon the familiarity of well-marked sensa inimmediate presentment. Every way of omitting the sensa still leaves us aprey to vague feelings of influence. Such feelings, divorced from immediatesensa, are pleasant, or unpleasant, according to mood; but they are alwaysvague as to spatial and temporal definition, though their explicit domi-nance in experience may be heightened in the absence of sensa.

Further, our experiences! of our various bodily parts are primarily per-ceptions of them as reasons for 'projected' sensa: the hand] is the reasonfor the projected touch-sensum, the eye is the reason for the projectedsight-sensum. Our bodily experience is primarily an experience of the de-pendence of presentational immediacy upon causal efficacy. Hume's doc-trine inverts this relationship by making causal efficacy, as an experience,dependent upon presentational immediacy. This doc- [268] trine, whateverbe its merits, is not based upon any appeal to experience.

Bodily experiences, in the mode of causal efficacy, are distinguished bytheir comparative accuracy of spatial definition. The causal influences fromthe body have lost the extreme vagueness of those which inflow from theexternal world. But, even for the body, causal efficacy is dogged withvagueness compared to presentational immediacy. These conclusions areconfirmed if we descend* the scale of organic being. It does not seemto be the sense of causal awareness that the lower living things lack, somuch as variety of sense-presentation, and then vivid distinctness of presen-tational immediacy. But animals, and even vegetables, in low forms oforganism exhibit modes of behaviour directed towards self-preservation.There is every indication of a vague feeling of causal relationship withthe external world, of some intensity, vaguely defined as to quality, andwith some vague definition as to locality. A jellyfish advances and with-draws, and in so doing exhibits some perception of causal relationship withthe world beyond itself; a plant grows downwards to the damp earth, andupwards towards the light. There is thus some direct reason for attributing

dim, slow feelings of causal nexus, although we have no reason for anyascription of the definite percepts in the mode of presentational im-mediacy.

But the philosophy of organism attributes 'feeling' throughout the ac-tual world. It bases this doctrine upon the directly observed fact that'feeling' survives as a known element constitutive of the 'formal' existenceof such actual entities as we can best observe. Also when we observe thecausal nexus, devoid of interplay with sense-presentation, the influx offeeling with vague qualitative and 'vector' definitiont is what we find. Thedominance of the scalar physical quantity, inertia, in the Newtonianphysics obscured the recognition of the truth that all fundamental phys-ical quantities are vector and not scalar.

[269] When we pass to inorganic actual occasions, we have lost the twohigher originative phases in the 'process,' namely, the 'supplemental' phase,and the 'mental' phase. They are lost in the sense that, so far as our ob-servations go, they are negligible. The influx of objectifications of theactualities of the world as organized vehicles of feeling is responded to bya mere subjective appropriation of such elements of feeling in their re-ceived relevance. The inorganic occasions are merely what the causal pastallows them to be.

As we pass to the inorganic world, causation never for a moment seemsto lose its grip. What is lost is originativeness, and any evidence of im-mediate absorption in the present. So far as we can see, inorganic entitiesare vehicles for receiving, for storing in a napkin, and for restoring with-out loss or gain.

In the actual world we discern four grades of actual occasions, gradeswhich are not to be sharply distinguished from each other. First, andlowest, there are the actual occasions in so-called 'empty space'; secondly,there are the actual occasions which are moments in the life-histories ofenduring non-living objects, such as electrons or other primitive organ-isms; thirdly, there are the actual occasions which are moments in thelife-histories of enduring living objects; fourthly, there are the actual oc-casions which are moments in the life-histories of enduring objects withconscious knowledge.

We may imaginatively conjecture that the first grade is to be identifiedwith actual occasions for which 'presented durations' are negligible ele-ments among their data, negligible by reason of negligible presentationalimmediacy. Thus no intelligible definition of rest and motion is possiblefor historic routes including them, because they correspond to no inherentspatializationf of the actual world.

The second grade is to be identified with actual occasions for which'presented durations' are important elements in their data, but with a limi-tation only to be [270] observed in the lower moments of human experi-ence. In such occasions the data of felt sensa, derived "from the moreprimitive data of causal efficacy, are projected onto the contemporary

'presented locus' without any clear illustration of special regions in thatlocus. The past has been lifted into the present, but the vague differentia-tions in the past have not been transformed into any precise differentia-tions within the present. The enhancement of precision has not arrived.

The third grade is to be identified with occasions in which presentationalimmediacy has assumed some enhanced precision, so that 'symbolic trans-ference' has lifted into importance precisely discriminated regions in the'presented duration/ The delicate activities of self-preservation are nowbecoming possible by the transference of the vague message of the pastonto the more precisely discriminated regions of the presented duration.Symbolic transference is dependent upon the flashes of conceptual orig-inality constituting life.

The fourth grade is to be identified with the canalized importance offree conceptual functionings, whereby blind experience is analysed bycomparison with the imaginative realization of mere potentiality. In thisway, experience receives a reorganization in the relative importance of itscomponents by the joint operation of imaginative enjoyment and of judg-ment. The growth of reason is the increasing importance of critical judg-ment in the discipline of imaginative enjoyment.

SECTION V

One reason for the philosophical difficulties over causation is that Hume,and subsequently Kant, conceived the causal nexus as, in its primarycharacter, derived from the presupposed sequence of immediate presenta-tions. But if we interrogate experience, the exact converse is the case; theperceptive mode of immediate presentation affords information about thepercepta in the more aboriginal mode of causal efficacy.

[271] Thus symbolic reference, though in complex human experienceit works both ways, is chiefly to be thought of as the elucidation of per-cepta in the mode of causal efficacy by the fluctuating intervention ofpercepta in the mode of presentational immediacy.

The former mode produces percepta which are vague, not to be con-trolled, heavy with emotion: it produces the sense of derivation from animmediate past, and of passage to an immediate future; a sense of emo-tional feeling, belonging to oneself in the past, passing into oneself inthe present, and passing from oneself in the present towards oneself in thefuture; a sense of influx of influence from other vaguer presences in thepast, localized and yet evading local definition, such influence modifying,enhancing, inhibiting, diverting, the stream of feeling which we are re-ceiving, unifying, enjoying, and transmitting. This is our general senseof existence, as one item among others, in an efficacious actual world.

By diversion of attention we can inhibit its entry into consciousness;but, whether mentally analysed or no, it remains the given uncontrolledbasis upon which our character weaves itself. Our bodies are largely con-

trivances whereby some central actual occasion may inherit these basicexperiences of its antecedent parts. Thus organic bodies have their partscoordinated by a peculiar vividness in their mutual inheritance. In a sense,the difference between a living organism and the inorganic environmentis only a question of degree; but it is a difference of degree which makesall the difference—in effect, it is a difference of quality.

The percepta in the mode of presentational immediacy have the con-verse characteristics. In comparison, they are distinct, definite, controllable,apt for immediate enjoyment, and with the minimum of reference to past,or to future. We are subject to our percepta in the mode of efficacy, weadjust our percepta in the mode of immediacy. But, in fact, our processof self-construction for the achievement of unified experience produces!a new [272] product, in which percepta in one mode, and percepta in theother mode, are synthesized into one subjective feeling. For example, weare perceiving before our eyes a grey stone.

We shall find that generally—though not always—the adjectival wordsexpress information derived from the mode of immediacy, while the sub-stantives convey our dim percepts in the mode of efficacy. For example,'grey' refers to the grey shape immediately before our eyes: this perceptis definite, limited, controllable, pleasant or unpleasant, and with no ref-erence to past or to future. It is this sort of percept which has led to Des-cartes' definition of substances as 'requiring nothing but themselves inorder to exist/ and to his notion of 'extension' as the principalf attributeof a genus of substances. It has also led to Hume's notion of 'impressionsof sensation't arising from unknown sources, and in complete indepen-dence so far as any discerniblef nexus is concerned. But the other elementin the compound percept has a widely different character. The word'stone' is selected, no doubt, because its dictionary meaning will affordsome help in understanding the particular percepta meant. But the wordis meant to refer to particular feelings of efficacy in the immediate past,combined with anticipations for the immediate future; this feeling isvaguely localized, and conjecturallyt identified with the very definitelocalization of the 'grey' perceptum.

Thus, so far as concerns conscious judgment, the symbolic reference isthe acceptance of the evidence of percepta, in the mode of immediacy,as evidence for the localization and discrimination of vague percepta inthe mode of efficacy. So far as bodily feelings are concerned, there is somedirect check on this procedure; but, beyond the body, the appeal is to thepragmatic consequences, involving some future state of bodily feelingswhich can be checked up.

But throughout this discussion of perception there has been excessiveemphasis on the mental phase in the [273} experiential process. This isinevitable because we can only discuss experiences which have entered intoconscious analysis. But perception is a feeling which has its seat in the twoearlier phases of the experiential! process, namely, the 'responsive' phase,

and the 'supplemental' phase. Perception, in these phases, is the appropri-ation of the datum by the subject so as to transform the datum into aunity of subjective feeling. The mode of efficacy belongs to the responsivephase, in which the objectifications are felt according to their relevancein the datum: the mode of immediacy belongs to the supplemental phasein which the faint indirect relevance, in the datum, of relationships to re-gions of the presented locus ist lifted into distinct, prominent, relevance.The question as to which regions have their relatedness to other con-stituents of the datum—such as 'grey/ for instance—thus accentuated,depends upon the coordination of the bodily organs through which theroutes of inheritance pass. In a fortunately construed** animal body, thisselection is determined chiefly by the inheritance received by the super-ficial organst=the skin, the eyes, etc.—from the external environment,and preserves the relevance of the vector character of that externalinheritance. When this is the case, the perceptive mode of immediacyhas definite relevance to the future efficacy of the external environment,and then indirectly illustrates the inheritance which the presented locusreceives from the immediate past.

But this illustration does not gain its first importance from any rationalanalysis. The two modes are unified by a blind symbolic reference by whichsupplemental feelings derived from the intensive, but vague, mode ofefficacy are precipitated upon the distinct regions illustrated in the modeof immediacy. The integration of the two modes in supplemental feelingmakes what would have been vague to be distinct, and what would havebeen shallow to be intense. This is the perception of the grey stone, in themixed mode of symbolic reference.

[274] Such perception can be erroneous, in the sense that the feelingassociates regions in the presented locus with inheritances from the past,which in fact have not been thus transmitted into the present regions.In the mixed mode, the perceptive determination is purely due to thebodily organs, and thus there is a gap in the perceptive logic—so to speak.This gap is not due to any conceptual freedom on the part of the ultimatesubject. It is not a mistake due to consciousness. It is due to the fact thatthe body, as an instrument for synthesizing and enhancing feelings, isfaulty, in the sense that it produces feelings which have but slight referenceto the real state of the presented duration.

SECTION VI

Symbolic reference between the two perceptive modes affords the mainexample of the principles which govern all symbolism. The requisites forsymbolism are that there be two species of percepta; and that a perceptumof one species has some 'ground' in common with a perceptum of anotherspecies, so that a correlation between the pair of percepta is established.

The feelings, and emotions, and genera characteristics associated with themembers of one species are in some ways markedly diverse from those as-sociated with the other species. Then there is 'symbolic reference' betweenthe two species when the perception of a member of one species evokesits correlate in the other species, and precipitates upon this correlate thefusion of feelings, emotions, and derivate actions, which belong to eitherof the pair of correlates, and which are also enhanced by this correlation.The species from which the symbolic reference starts is called the 'speciesof symbols/ and the species withf which it ends is called the 'species ofmeanings/ In this way there can be symbolic reference between two speciesin the same perceptive mode: but the chief example of symbolism, uponwhich is based a great portion of the lives [275] of all high-grade animals,is that between the two perceptive modes.

Symbolism can be justified, or unjustified. The test of justification mustalways be pragmatic. In so far ast symbolism has led to a route of inheri-tance, along the percipient occasions forming the percipient 'person/which constitutes a fortunate evolution, the symbolism is justified; and,in so far as the symbolism has led to an unfortunate evolution, it is un-justified. In a slightly narrower sense the symbolism can be right or wrong;and Tightness or wrongness is also tested pragmatically. Along the 'historicroute' there is the inheritance of feelings derived from symbolic reference:now, if feelings respecting some definite element in experience be clueto two sources, one source being this inheritance, and the other sourcebeing direct perception in one of the pure modes, then, if the feelingsfrom the two sources enhance each other by synthesis, the symbolic ref-erence is right; but, if they are at variance so as to depress each other, thesymbolic reference is wrong. The Tightness, or wrongness, of symbolism isan instance of the symbolism being fortunate or unfortunate; but mere'rectitude/ in the sense defined above, does' not cover all that can be in-cluded in the more general concept of 'fortune/ So much of human ex-perience is bound up with symbolic reference, that it is hardly an exag-geration to say that the very meaning of truth is pragmatic. But thoughthis statement is hardly an exaggeration, still it is an exaggeration, for thepragmatic test can never work, unless on some occasion—in the future,or in the present—there is a definite determination of what is true on thatoccasion. Otherwise the poor pragmatist remains an intellectual Hamlet,perpetually adjourning decision of judgment to some later date. Accordingto the doctrines here stated, the day of judgment arrives when the 'mean-ing' is sufficiently distinct and relevant, as a perceptum in its proper puremode, to afford comparison with the precipitate of feeling derived[276] from symbolic reference. There is no inherent distinction betweenthe sort of percepta which are symbols f and the sort of percepta whichare meanings. When two species are correlated by a 'ground' of relatedness,it depends upon the experiential process, constituting the percipient!

182 Discussions and Applications

subject, as to which species is the group of symbols, and which is the groupof meanings. Also it equally depends upon the percipient as to whetherthere is any symbolic reference at all.

Language is the example of symbolism which most naturally presentsitself for consideration of the uses of symbolism. Its somewhat artificialcharacter makes the various constitutive elements in symbolism to be themore evident. For the sake of simplicity, only spoken language will be con-sidered here.

A single word is not one definite sound. Every instance of its utterancediffers in some respect from every other instance: the pitch of the voice,the intonation, the accent, the quality of sound, the rhythmic relationsof the component sounds, the intensity of sound, all vary. Thus a word isa species of sounds, with specific identity and individual differences. Whenwe recognize the species, we have heard the word. But what we have heardis merely the sound—euphonious or harsh, concordant with or discordantwith other accompanying sounds. The word is heard in the pure perceptivemode of immediacy, and primarily elicits merely the contrasts and iden-tities with other percepta in that mode. So far there is no symbolicinterplay.

If the meaning of the word be an event, then either that event is directlyknown, as a remembered perceptum in an earlier occasion of the percip-ient's life, or that event is only vaguely known by its dated spatio-temporalnexus with events which are directly known. Anyhow there is a chain ofsymbolic references (inherited along the historic route of the percipient'slife, and reinforced by the production of novel and symbolic referencesat various occasions along that route) whereby in the datum [277] for thepercipient occasion there is a faintly relevant nexus between the word inthat occasion of utterance and the event. The sound of the word,! inpresentational immediacy, by symbolic references elicits this nexus intoimportant relevance, and thence precipitates feelings, and thoughts, uponthe enhanced objectification of the event. Such enhanced relevance of theevent may be unfortunate, or even unjustified; but it is the function ofwords to produce it. The discussion of mentality is reserved for Part III:it is a mistake to think of words as primarily the vehicle of thoughts.

Language also illustrates the doctrine that, in regard to a couple of prop-erly correlated species of things, it depends upon the constitution of thepercipient subject to assign which species is acting as 'symbol' and whichas 'meaning.' The word 'forest' may suggest! memories of forests; butequally the sight of a forest, or memories of forests, may suggest the word'forest.' Sometimes we are bothered because the immediate experience hasnot elicited the word we want. In such a case the word with the right sortof correlation with the experience has failed to become importantly rele-vant in the constitution of our experience.

But we do not usually think of the things as symbolizing the words cor-related to them. This failure to invert our ideas arises from the most useful

Symbolic Reference 183

aspect of symbolism. In general the symbols are more handy elements inour experience than are the meanings. We can say the word 'forest' when-ever we like; but only under certain conditions can we directly experiencean existent forest. To procure such an experience usually involves a prob-lem of transportation only possible on our holidays. Also it is not so easyeven to remember forest scenes with any vividness; and we usually find thatthe immediate experience of the word 'forest' helps to elicit such recollec-tions. In such ways language is handy as an instrument of communicationalong the successive occasions of the historic route forming the life of oneindividual. By an [278] extension of these same principles of behaviour, itcommunicates from the occasions of one individual to the succeeding oc-casions of another individual. The same means which are handy for pro-curing the immediate presentation of a word to oneself are equally effec-tive for presenting it to another person. Thus we may have a two-waysystem of symbolic reference involving two persons, A and B. The forest,recollected by A, symbolizes the word 'forest' for A; then A, for his ownsake and for B's sake, pronounces the word 'forest'*; then by the efficacyof the environment and of B'$ bodily parts, and by the supplemental en-hancement due to B's experiential process, the word 'forest' is perceivedby B in the mode of immediacy; and, finally by symbolic reference, Brecollects vaguely various forest scenes. In this use of language for com-munication between two persons, there is in principle nothing which differsfrom its use by one person for communication along the route of his ownactual occasions.

This discussion shows that one essential purpose of symbols arises fromtheir handiness. For this reason the Egyptian papyrus made ink-writtenlanguage a more useful symbolism than the Babylonian language im-pressed on brick. It is easier to smell incense than to produce certainreligious emotions; so, if the two can be correlated, incense is a suitablesymbol for such emotions. Indeed, for many purposes, certain aestheticexperiences which are easy to produce make better symbols than do words,written or spoken. Quarrels over symbolism constitute one of the manycauses of religious discord. One difficulty in symbolism is that the unhandymeanings are often vague. For instance, this is the case with the perceptain the mode of efficacy which are symbolized by percepta in the mode ofimmediacy: also, as another instance, the incense is definite, but the re-ligious emotions are apt to be indefinite. The result is that the meaningsare often shifting and indeterminate. This happens even in the case ofwords: other people misun- [279] derstand their import. Also, in the caseof incense the exact religious emotions finally reached are very uncertain:perhaps we would prefer that some of them were never elicited.

Symbolism is essential for the higher grades of life; and the errors ofsymbolism can never be wholly avoided.

CHAPTER IXTHE PROPOSITIONS

SECTION I

[280] A living occasion is characterized by a flash of novelty among theappetitions of its mental pole. Such 'appetitions/ i.e., 'conceptual prehen-sions/ can be 'pure' or 'impure/ An 'impure' prehension arises from theintegration of a 'pure7 conceptual prehension with a physical prehensionoriginating in the physical pole. The datum of a pure conceptual prehen-sion is an eternal object; the datum of an impure prehension is a proposi-tion, otherwise termed a 'theory/

The integration of a conceptual and physical prehension need not issuein an impure prehension: the eternal object as a mere potentiality, un-determined as to its physical realization, may lose its indetermination, i.e.,its universality, by integration with itself as an element in the realizeddefiniteness of the physical datum of the physical prehension. In this casewe obtain what in Part III is termed a 'physical purpose/ In a physicalpurpose the subjective form has acquired a special appetition—adversionor aversion—in respect to that eternal object as a realized element ofdefiniteness in that physical datum. This acquisition is derived from theconceptual prehension. The 'abruptness* of mental operations is here il-lustrated. The physical datum in itself illustrates an indefinite numberof eternal objects. The 'physical purpose7 has focussed appetition upon anabruptly selected eternal object.

But with the growth of intensity in the mental pole, evidenced by theflash of novelty in appetition, the appetition takes the form of a 'preposi-tional prehension/ [281] These prehensions will be studied more partic-ularly in Part III. They are the prehensions of 'theories/ It is evident, how-ever, that the primary function of theories is as a lure for feeling, therebyproviding immediacy of enjoyment and purpose. Unfortunately theories,under their name of 'propositions/ have been handed over to logicians,who have countenanced the doctrine that their one function is to bejudged as to their truth or falsehood. Indeed Bradley does not mention'propositions' in his Logic.t He writes only of 'judgments/ Other authorsdefine propositions as a component in judgment. The doctrine here laidclown is that, in the realization of propositions, 'judgment7 is at very rarecomponent, and so is 'consciousness/ The existence of imaginative litera-

184

ture should have warned logicians that their narrow doctrine is absurd.It is difficult to believe that all logicians as they read Hamlet's speech,"To be, or not to be: . . ." commence by judging whether the initialproposition be true or false, and keep up the task of judgment through-out the whole thirty-five lines. Surely, at some point in the reading, judg-ment is eclipsed by aesthetic delight. The speech, for the theatre audience,is purely theoretical, a mere lure for feeling.

Again, consider strong religious emotion—consider a Christian medi-tating on the sayings in the Gospels. He is not judging 'true or false'; heis eliciting their value as elements in feeling. In fact, he may ground hisjudgment of truth upon his realization of value. But such a procedure isimpossible, if the primary function of propositions is to be elements injudgments.

The 'lure for feeling' is the final cause guiding the concrescence offeelings. By this concrescence the multifold datum of the primary phaseis gathered into the unity of the final satisfaction of feeling. The 'objectivelure' is that discrimination among eternal objects introduced into theuniverse by the real internal constitutions of the actual occasions formingthe datum of the concrescence under review. This discrimination alsoin- \282] volves eternal objects excluded from value in the temporal occa-sions of that datum, in addition to involving the eternal objects includedfor such occasions.

For example, consider the Battle of Waterloo. This battle resulted inthe defeat of Napoleon, and in a constitution of our actual world groundedupon that defeat. But the abstract notions, expressing the possibilities ofanother course of history which would'have followed upon his victory,are relevant to the facts which actually happened. We may not think itof practical importance that imaginative historians should dwell uponsuch hypothetical alternatives. But we confess their relevance in thinkingabout them at all, even to the extent of dismissing them. But some imag-inative writers do not dismiss such ideas. Thus, in our actual world oftoday, there is a penumbra of eternal objects, constituted by relevance tothe Battle of Waterloo. Some people do admit elements from this pen-umbral complex into effective feeling, and others wholly exclude them.Some are conscious of this internal decision of admission or rejection; forothers the ideas float into their minds as day-dreams without consciousnessof deliberate decision; for others, their emotional tone, of gratificationor regret, of friendliness or hatred, is obscurely influenced by this pen-umbra of alternatives, without any conscious analysis of its content. Theelements of this penumbra are prepositional prehensions, and not pureconceptual prehensions; for their implication of the particular nexus whichist the Battle of Waterloo is an essential factor.

Thus an element in this penumbral complex is what is termed a 'propo-sition/ A proposition is at new kind of entity. It is a hybrid between pure

potentialities and actualities. A 'singular' proposition is the potentialityof an actual world including a definite set of actual entities in a nexus ofreactions involving the hypothetical ingression of a definite set of eternalobjects.

A 'general' proposition only differs from a 'singular' proposition by thegeneralization of 'one definite set of [283] actual entities' into "any setbelonging to a certain sort of sets.' If the sort of sets includes all sets withpotentiality for that nexus of reactions, the proposition is called 'universal.'

For the sake of simplicity, we will confine attention to singular propo-sitions; although a slight elaboration of explanation will easily extend thediscussion to include general and universal propositions.

The definite set of actual entities involved are called the 'logical sub-jects of the proposition'; and the definite set of eternal objects involvedare called the 'predicates of the proposition.' The predicates define apotentiality of relatedness for the subjects. The predicates form one com-plex eternal object: this is 'the complex predicate.' The 'singular' propo-sition is the potentiality of this complex predicate finding realization inthe nexus of reactions between the logical subjects, with assigned stationsin the pattern for the various logical subjects.

In a proposition the various logical subjects involved are impartiallyconcerned. The proposition is no more about one logical subject than an-other logical subject. But according to the ontological principle, everyproposition must be somewhere. The 'locus' of a proposition consists ofthose actual occasions whose actual worlds include the logical subjectsof the proposition. When an actual entity belongs to the locus of a propo-sition, then conversely the proposition is an element in the lure for feelingof that actual entity. If by the decision of the concrescence, the proposi-tion has been admitted into feeling, then the proposition constitutes whatthe feeling has felt. The proposition constitutes a lure for a member ofits locus by reason of the germaneness of the complex predicate to thelogical subjects, having regard to forms of definiteness in the actual worldof that member, and to its antecedent phases of feeling.

The interest in logic, dominating overintellectualized philosophers, hasobscured the main function of propositions in the nature of things. Theyare not primarily [284] for belief, but for feeling at the physical level ofunconsciousness. They constitute a source for the origination of feelingwhich is not tied down to mere datum. A proposition is 'realized' by amember of its locus, when it is admitted into feeling.

There are two types of relationship between a proposition and the actualworld of a member of its locus. The proposition may be conformal ornon-con formal to the actual world, true or false.

When a conformal proposition is admitted into feeling, the reactionto the datum has simply resulted in the conformation of feeling to fact,with some emotional accession or diminution, by which the feelings in-

herent in alien fact are synthesized in a new individual valuation. Theprehension of the proposition has abruptly emphasized one form of defi-niteness illustrated in fact.

When a non-conformal proposition is admitted into feeling, the re-action to the datum has resulted in the synthesis of fact with the alterna-tive potentiality of the complex predicate. A novelty has emerged intocreation. The novelty may promote or destroy order; it may be good orbad. But it is new, a new type of individual, and not merely a new inten-sity of individual feeling. That member of the locus has introduced a newform into the actual world; or,t at least, an old form in a new function.

The conception of propositions as merely material for judgments is fatalto any understanding of their role in the universe. In that purely logicalaspect, non-conformal propositions aret merely wrong, and therefore worsethan useless. But in their primary role, they pave the way along whichthe world advances into novelty. Error is the price which we pay forprogress.

The term 'proposition' suits these hybrid entities, t provided that wesubstitute the broad notion of 'feeling' for the narrower notions of 'judg-ment' and 'belief/ A proposition is an element in the objective lure pro-posed for feeling, and when admitted into feeling it constitutes [2851 whatis felt. The 'imaginative' feeling (cf. Part III) of a proposition is one ofthe ways of feeling it; and intellectual belief is another way oft feeling theproposition, a way which presupposes imaginative feeling. Judgment isthe decision admitting a proposition into intellectual belief.

Anyone who at bedtime consciously reviews the events of the day issubconsciously projecting them against the penumbral welter of alterna-tives. He is also unconsciously deciding feelings so as to maximize his pri-mary feeling, and to secure its propagation beyond his immediate presentoccasion. In considering the life-history of occasions, forming the historicroute of an enduring physical object, there are three possibilities as to thesubjective aims which dominate the internal concrescence of the separateoccasions. Either (i), the satisfactionsf of the antecedent occasions maybe uniform with each other, and each internally without discord or incite-ment to novelty. In such a case, apart from novel discordance introducedby the environment, there is the mere conformal transformation of thefeeling belonging to the datum into the identical feeling belonging to theimmediate subject. Such pure conformation involves the exclusion of allthe contraries involved in the lure, with their various grades of proximityand remoteness. This is an absolute extreme of undifferentiated endurance,of which we have no direct evidence. In every instance for which we cananalyse, however imperfectly, the formal constitutions of successive oc-casions, these constitutions are characterized by contraries superveningupon the aboriginal data, butt with a regularity of alternation which pro-cures stability in the life-history. Contrast is thus gained. Tn physical sci-

ence, this is vibration/ This is the main character of the life-histories ofan inorganic physical object, stabilized in type.

Or (ii), there is a zest for the enhancement of some dominant elementof feeling, received from the data, enhanced by decision admitting non-conformation of [286] conceptual feeling to other elements in the data,and culminating in a satisfaction transmitting enhancement of the dom-inant element by reason of novel contrasts and inhibitions. Such a life-historyinvolves growth dominated by a single final end. This is the main characterof a physical object in process of growth. Such physical objects are mainly'organic/ so far as concerns our present knowledge of the world.

Or (iii), there is a zest for the elimination of all dominant elements offeeling, received from the data. In such a case, the route soon loses itshistoric individuality. It is the case of decay.

The first point to be noticed is that the admission of the selected ele-ments in the lure, as felt contraries, primarily generates purpose; it thenissues in satisfaction; and satisfaction qualifies the efficient causation. Buta felt 'contrary' is consciousness in germ. When the contrasts and identi-ties of such feelings are themselves felt, we have consciousness. It is theknowledge of ideas, in Locke's sense of that term. Consciousness requiresmore than the mere entertainment of theory. It is the feeling of the con-trast of theory, as mere theory, with fact, as mere fact. This contrast holdswhether or no the theory be correct.

A proposition, in abstraction from any particular actual entity whichmay be realizing it in feeling, is a manner of germaneness of a certainset of eternal objects to a certain set of actual entities. Every propositionpresupposes those actual entities which are its logical subjects. It also pre-supposes certain definite actual entities, or a certain type of actual entities,!within a wide systematic nexus. In an extreme case, this nexus may com-prise any actual entity whatsoever.

The presupposed logical subjects may not be in the actual world ofsome actual entity. In this case, the proposition does not exist for thatactual entity. The pure concept of such a proposition refers in the hypo-thetical future beyond that actual entity. The propo- [287] sition itself awaitsits logical subjects. Thus propositions grow with the creative advance of theworld. They are neither pure potentials, nor pure actualities; they are amanner of potential nexus involving pure potentials and pure actualities.They are a new type of entities. Entities of this impure type presupposethe two pure types of entities.

The primary mode of realization of a proposition in an actual entitytis not by judgment, but by entertainment. A proposition is entertainedwhen it is admitted into feeling. Horror, relief, purpose, are primarilyfeelings involving the entertainment of propositions.

In conclusion, there are four main types of entities in the universe, ofwhich two are primary types and two are hybrid types. The primary typesare actual entities and pure potentials (eternal objects); the hybrid types

are feelings and propositions (theories). Feelings are the 'real' componentsof actual entities. Propositions are only realizable as one sort of 'objective'datum for feelings.

The primary element in the 'lure for feeling' is the subject's prehensionof the primordial nature of God. Conceptual feelings are generated, andby integration with physical feelings a subsequent phase of prepositionalfeelings supervenes. The lure for feeling develops with the concrescentphases of the subject in question. I have spoken of it elsewhere (cf. Scienceand the\ Modern World, Ch. XI).

It is this realized extension of eternal relatedness beyond the mutualrelatedness of the actual occasions which prehends into each occasionthe full sweep of eternal relatedness. I term this abrupt* realizationthe 'graded envisagement' which each occasion prehends into its syn-thesis. This gradedt envisagement is how the actual includes what(in one sense) is 'not-being' as a positive factor in its own achieve-ment. It is the source of error, of truth, of art, of ethics, and of re-ligion. By it, fact is confronted with alternatives. [288]

SECTION lit

All metaphysical theories which admit a disjunction between thecomponent elements of individual experience on the one hand.t and on theother hand the component elements of the external world, must inevitablyrun into difficulties over the truth and falsehood of propositions, andover the grounds for judgment. The former difficulty is metaphysical, thelatter epistemological. But all difficulties as to first principles are onlycamouflaged metaphysical difficulties. Thus also the epistemological dif-ficulty is only solvable by an appeal to ontology. The first difficulty posesthe question as to the account of truth and falsehood, and the seconddifficulty poses the question as to the account of the intuitive perceptionof truth and falsehood. The former concerns propositions, the latter con-cerns judgments. There is a togetherness of the component elements inindividual experience. This 'togetherness' has that special peculiar meaningof 'togetherness in experience.' It is a togetherness of its own kind, ex-plicable by reference to nothing else. For the purpose of this discussionit is indifferent whether we speak of a 'stream' of experience, or of an'occasion' of experience. With the former alternative there is togethernessin the stream, and with the latter alternative there is togetherness in theoccasion. In either case, there is the unique 'experiential togetherness.'

The consideration of experiential togetherness raises the final metaphysi-cal question: whether there is any other meaning of 'togetherness.' Thedenial of any alternative meaning, that is to say, of any meaning notabstracted from the experiential meaning, is the 'subjectivist' doctrine.This reformed version of the subjecfivist doctrine is the doctrine of thephilosophy of organism.

The contrary doctrine, that there is a 'togetherness' not derivative fromexperiential togetherness, leads to the disjunction of the components ofsubjective experience from the community of the external world. Thisdis- [289] junction creates the insurmountable difficulty for epistemology.For intuitive judgment is concerned with togetherness in experience, andthere is no bridge between togetherness in experience, and togethernessof the non-experiential sort.

This difficulty is the point of Kant's 'transcendental' criticism. Headopted a subjectivist position, so that the temporal world was merelyexperienced. But according to his form of the subjectivist doctrine, in theCritique of Pure Reason, no element in the temporal world could itselfbe an experient. His temporal world, as in that Critique, was in its essencedead, phantasmal, phenomenal. Kant was a mathematical physicist, andhis cosmological solution was sufficient for the abstractions to which math-ematical physics is confined.

The difficulties of the subjectivist doctrine arise when it is combinedwith the 'sensationalist' doctrine concerning the analysis of the compo-nents which are together in experience. According to that analysis in sucha component the only elements not stamped with the particularity of thatindividual 'occasion'—or 'stream'—of experience are universals such as'redness' or 'shape,' With the sensationalist assumption, or with any gen-eralization of that doctrine, so long as the elements in question are uni-versals, the only alternatives are, either Bradley's doctrine of a single ex-perient, the absolute, or Leibniz's doctrine of many windowless monads.Kant, in his final metaphysics, must either retreat to Leibniz, or advanceto Bradley. Either alternative stamps experience with a certain air ofillusoriness.t The Leibnizian solution can mitigate the illusoriness onlyby recourse to a pious dependence upon God. This principle was invokedby Descartes and by Leibniz, in order to help out their epistemology. It isa device very repugnant to a consistent rationality. The very possibility ofknowledge should not be an accident of God's goodness; it should dependon the interwoven natures of things. After all, God's knowledge has equallyto be explained.

[290] The philosophy of organism admits the subjectivist doctrine (ashere stated), but rejects the sensationalist doctrine: hence its doctrine ofthe objectification of one actual occasion in the experience of anotheractual occasion. Each actual entity is a throb of experience including theactual world within its scope. The problems of efficient causation and ofknowledge receive a common explanation by reference to the texture ofactual occasions. The theory of judgment in the philosophy of organismcan equally well be described as a 'correspondence' theory or as a 'coher-ence' theory. It is a correspondence theory, because it describes judgmentas the subjective form of the integral prehension of the conformity, or of thenon-conformity, of at proposition and an objectified nexus. The prehen-sion in question arises from the synthesis of two prehensions, one physical

and the other mental. The physical prehension is the prehension of thenexus of objectified actual occasions. The mental prehension is the pre-hension of the proposition. This latter prehension is necessarily 'impure/and it arises from a history of antecedent synthesis whereby a pure con-ceptual prehension transfers its datum as a predicate of hypothetical re-latedness for the actualities in the datum of some physical prehension(cf. Part III). But the origination of a propositional prehension does notconcern us in this description of judgment. The sole point is the synthesisof a physical prehension and propositional prehension into an 'intellectual'prehension (cf. Part III) whose subjective form involves judgment.

This judgment is concerned with a conformity of two componentswithin one experience. It is thus a 'coherence' theory. It is also concernedwith the conformity of a proposition, not restricted to that individual ex-perience, with a nexus whose relatedness is derived from the various ex-periences of its own members and not from that of the judging experient.tIn this sense there is a 'correspondence' theory. But, at this point of theargument, a distinction must be made. We shall say that a [291] proposi-tion can be true or false, and that a judgment can be correct, or incorrect,or suspended. With this distinction we see that there is a 'correspondence'theory of the truth and falsehood of propositions, and a 'coherence' theoryof the correctness, incorrectness and suspensiont of judgments.

In the 'organic' doctrine, a clear distinction between a judgment anda proposition has been made. A judgment is a feeling in the 'process' ofthe judging subject, and it is correct or incorrect respecting that subject.It enters, as a value, into the satisfaction of that subject; and it can onlybe criticized by the judgments of actual entities in the future. A judgmentconcerns the universe in process of prehension by the judging subject. Itwill primarily concern a definite selection of objectified actual entities, andof eternal objects; and it affirms the physical objectification—for the judg-ing subject—of those actual entities by the ingression of those eternal ob-jects; so that there is one objectified nexus of those actual entities, judgedto be really interconnected, and qualified, by those eternal objects. Thisjudgment affirms, correctly or incorrectly, a real fact in the constitution ofthe judging subject. Here there is no room for any qualification of thecategorical character of the judgment. The judgment is made about itselfby the judging subject, and is at feeling in the constitution of the judgingsubject. The actual entities, with which the judgment is explicitly con-cerned, comprise the 'logical' subjects of the judgment, and the selectedeternal objects form the 'qualities' and 'relations' which are affirmed ofthe logical subjects.

This affirmation about the logical subjects is obviously 'affirmation' in asense derivative from the meaning of 'affirmation' about the judging sub-ject. Identification of the two senses will lead to error. In the latter** sensethere is abstraction from the judging subject. The subjectivist principlehas been transcended, and the judgment has shifted its emphasis from

the objectified nexus [292] to the truth-value of the proposition in ques-tion. Having regard to the fact that judgment concerns the subjective formof an impure feeling arising from the integration of simpler feelings, wenote that judgments are divisible into two sorts. These are (i) intuitivejudgments and (ii) derivative judgments. In an intuitive judgment theintegration of the physical datum with the proposition elicits into feelingthe full complex detail of the proposition in its comparison of identity,or diversity, in regard to the complex detail of the physical datum. Theintuitive judgment is the consciousness of this complex detailed com-parison involving identity and diversity. Such a judgment is in its naturecorrect. For it is the consciousness of what is.

In a derivative judgment the integration of the physical datum withthe proposition elicits into feeling the full complex detail of the proposi-tion, but does not elicit into feeling the full comparison of this detail withthe complex detail of the physical fact. There is some comparison involv-ing the remainder of the detail. But the subjective form embraces thetotality of the proposition, instead of assuming a complex pattern whichdiscriminates between the compared and the uncompared components. Inderivative judgments there can be error. Logic is the analysis of the rela-tionships between propositions in virtue of which derivative judgmentswill not introduce errors, other than those already attaching to the judg-ments in+ the premises. Most judgments are derivative; such judgmentsillustrate the doctrine that the subjective form of a feeling is affected bythe totality of the actual occasion. This has been termed the 'sensitivity' offeelings in one occasion. In an intuitive judgment the subjective form ofassent or dissent has been restrained, so as to derive its character solelyfrom the contrasts in the datum. Even in this case, the emotional force ofthe judgment, as it passes into purpose, is derived from the whole judgingsubject

Further, the judging subject and the logical subjects [293] refer to a uni-verse with the general metaphysical character which represents its 'pa-tience' for those subjects, and also its 'patience' for those eternal objects.In each judgment the universe is ranged in a hierarchy of wider and widersocieties, as explained above (cf. Part II, Ch. III). It follows that thedistinction between the logical subjects, with their qualities and relations,and the universe as systematic background, is not quite so sharply definedas the previous explanation suggests. For it is a matter of convention asto which of the proximate societies are reckoned as logical subjects andwhich as background. Another way of stating this shading off of logicalsubjects into backgroundt is to say that the patience of the universe for areal fact in a judging subject is a hierarchical patience involving systematicgradations of character. This discussion substantiates the statement madeabove (cf. Part I, Ch. I, Sect. V), that a verbal statement is never the fullexpression of a proposition.

We now recur to the distinction between a proposition and a judgment.

A proposition emerges in the analysis of a judgment; it is the datum ofthe judgment in abstraction from the judging subject and from the sub-jective form. A judgmentx is a synthetic feeling, embracing two subordinatefeelings in one unity of feeling. Of these subordinate feelings one is propo-sitional, merely entertaining the proposition which is its datum. The sameproposition can constitute the content of diverse judgments by diversejudging entities respectively. The possibility of diverse judgments by di-verse actual entities, having the same content (of 'proposition' in con-trast with 'nexus'), requires that the same complex of logical subjects, ob-jectified via the same eternal objects, can enter as a partial constituentinto the 'real' essences of diverse actual entities. The judgment is a de-cision of feeling, the proposition is what is felt; but it is only part of thedatum felt.

But, since each actual world is relative to standpoint, [294] it is onlysome actual entities which will have the standpoints so as to include,! intheir actual world, the actual entities which constitute the logical subjectsof the proposition. Thus every proposition defines the judging subjectsfor which it is a proposition. Every proposition presupposes some definitesettled actual entities in the actual world of its judging subject; and thusits possible judging subjects must have these actual entities in the actualworld of each of them. All judgment requires knowledge of the pre-supposed actual entities. Thus in addition to the requisite composition ofthe actual world presupposed by a proposition, there must be the requi-site knowledge of that world presupposed by a judgment, whether thejudgment be correct or incorrect. For actual entities, whose actual worldshave not the requisite composition, the proposition is non-existent; foractual entities, without the requisite knowledge, the judgment is im-possible. It is quite true that a more abstract proposition can be modelledon the lines of the original proposition, so as to avoid the presupposition ofsome or all of these settled actual entities which are the logical subjectsin the original proposition. This new proposition will have meaning for awider group of possible subjects than the original proposition. Some propo-sitions seem to us to have meaning for all possible judging subjects. Thismay be the case; but I do not dare to affirm that our metaphysical capac-ities are sufficiently developed to warrant any certainty on this question.Perhaps we are always presupposing some wide society beyond which ourimaginations cannot leap. But the vagueness of verbal statements is suchthat the same form of words is taken to represent a whole set of alliedpropositions of various grades of abstractness.

A judgment weakens or strengthens the decision whereby the judgedproposition, as a constituent in the lure, is admitted as an efficient elementm the concrescence, with the reinforcement of knowledge. A judgment isthe critique of a lure for feeling.

1 Cf. Part III, Ch. V.f

SECTION III

[295] It now remains to consider the sense in which the actual world,in some systematic aspect, enters into each proposition. This investigationis wholly concerned with the notion of the logical subjects of the proposi-tion. These logical subjects are, in the old sense of the term, 'particulars.'They are not concepts in comparison with other concepts; they are par-ticular facts in a potential pattern.

But particulars must be indicated; because the proposition concerns justthose particulars and no others. Thus the indication belongs to the propo-sition; namely, 'Those particulars as thus indicated in such-and-such apredicative pattern' constitutes the proposition. Apart from the indicationthere is no proposition because there are no determinate particulars. Thuswe have to study the theory of indication.

Some definitions are required:

A 'relation' between occasions is an eternal object illustrated in thecomplex of mutual prehensions by virtue of which those occasions con-stitute a nexus.

A relation is called a 'dual relation' when the nexus in which it is real-ized consists of two, and only two, actual occasions. It is a 'triple relation'when there are three occasions, and so on.

There will, in general, be an indefinite number of eternal objects thusillustrated in the mutual prehensions of the occasions of any one nexus;that is to say, there are an indefinite number of relations realized betweenthe occasions of any particular nexus.

A 'general principle' is an eternal object which is only illustrated throughits 'instances,' which are also eternal objects. Thus the realization of aninstance is also the realization of the general principle of which that eter-nal object is an instance. But the converse is not true; namely, the realiza-tion of the general principle does not involve the realization of any par-ticular instance, though [296] it does necessitate the realization of someinstance. Thus the instances each involve the general principle, but thegeneral principle only involves at least one instance. In general, the in-stances of a general principle are mutually exclusive, so that the realiza-tion of one instance involves the exclusion of the other instances. Forexample, colour is a general principle and colours are the instances. So ifall sensible bodies exhibit the general principle, which is colour, each bodyexhibits some definite colour. Also each body exhibiting a definite colouris thereby 'coloured.'

A nexus exhibits an 'indicative system' of dual relations among its mem-bers, when (i) one, and only one, relation of the system relates each pairof its members; and (ii) these relations are instances of a general prin-ciple; and (iii) the relation (in the system) between any member A andanv other member B does not also relate A and a member of the nexus

other than B; and (iv) the relations (in the system) between A and Band between A and C suffice to define the relation (in the system) be-tween B and C, where A, B, and C are any three members of the nexus.

Thus if A and X be any two members of the nexus, and if X has knowl-edge of A's systematic relation to it and also of A's systematic relations toB? C, and D, where B, C, and D are members of the nexus, then X hasknowledge of its own systematic relations to B, C, and D, and of themutual systematic relations between B, C, and D. Such a nexus admits ofthe precise indication of its members from the standpoint of any one ofthem. The relative where' presupposes a nexus exhibiting an indicativesystem. More complex types of indicative systems can be defined; but thesimplest type suffices to illustrate the principle involved. We have beendefining Aristotle's category of 'position/ It will be noticed that in a nexuswith an indicative system of relations, the subjective aspect of experiencecan be eliminated from propositions involved. For a knowledge of B andC and D as from A [297] yields a proposition concerning C and D as fromB. Thus the prevalent notion, that the particular subject of experience can,in the nature of the case, never be eliminated from the experienced fact,is quite untrue.

Every proposition presupposes some general nexus with an indicativerelational system. This nexus includes its locus of judging subjects andalso its logical subjects. This presupposition is part of the proposition, andthe proposition cannot be entertained by any subject for which the pre-supposition is not valid. Thus in a proposition certain characteristics arepresupposed for the judging subject and for the logical subjects. This pre-supposition of character can be carried further than the mere requirementsof indication require. For example, in 'Socrates is mortal' the mere spatio-temporal indicative system may be sufficient to indicate 'Socrates/ Butthe proposition may mean 'The man Socrates is mortal/ or 'The philoso-pher Socrates is mortal/ The superfluous indication may be part of theproposition. Anyhow, the principle that a proposition presupposes theactual world as exhibiting some systematic aspect has now been explained.

This discussion can be illustrated by the proposition, 'Caesar has crossedthe Rubicon/ This form of words symbolizes an indefinite number of di-verse propositions. In its least abstract form 'Caesar stands for a society ofsettled actual entities in the actual world from the standpoint of the judg-ing subject, with their objectifications consciously perceived by the sub-ject. The whole theory of perception will come up for further discussionin a later chapter (cf. Part III); at this point it can be assumed. The word'Rubicon' is to be explained in the same way as the word 'Caesar/ Theonly points left ambiguous respecting 'Caesar' and 'Rubicon' are thatthese societies—either or both, and each with its defining characteristic-may be conjecturally supposed to be prolonged up to the world contem-porary with the judging subject, or, even more conjecturally, into thefuture [298] world beyond the subject. The past tense of the word 'has'

shows that this point of ambiguity is irrelevant, so that the proposition canbe framed so as to ignore it. But it need not be so framed: one of Caesar'sold soldiers may in later years have sat on the bank of the river and medi-tated on the assassination of Caesar, and on Caesar's passage over thelittle river tranquilly flowing before his gaze. This would have been adifferent proposition from the more direct one which I am now consider-ing. Nothing could better illustrate the hopeless ambiguity of language;since both propositions fit the same verbal phraseology. There is yet athird proposition: a modern traveller sitting on the bank of the Rubicon,and meditating on his direct perceptions of actual occasions can locate,relatively to himself by spatio-temporal specifications, an event whichinferentially and conjecturally he believes to include a portion of the pasthistory of the Rubicon as directly known to him. He also, by an analogousprocess of inference and conjecture, and of spatio-temporal specification,locates relatively to himself another event which he believes to containthe life of Caesar of whom he has no direct knowledge. The propositionmeditated on by this traveller sitting on the bank of the modern river isevidently a different proposition to that in the mind of Caesar's old soldier.Then there is the proposition which might have been in the mind of oneof the crowd who listened to Antony's speech, a man who had seen Caesarand not the Rubicon.

It is obvious that in this way an indefinite number of highly specialpropositions can be produced, differing from each other by fine gradations.Everything depends upon the differences in direct perceptive knowledgewhich these various propositions presuppose for their subjects. But thereare propositions of at more general type, for which 'Caesar' and 'Rubicon'have more generalized, vaguer meanings. In these vaguer meanings. 'Caesar'and 'Rubicon' indicate the entities, if any, located by any one member ofa type of routes, starting from a [299] certain type of inference and con-jecture. Also there are some such propositions in which the fact of therebeing such entities, to be thus located, is part of the content whereby thejudgment is true or false; and there are other propositions in which eventhis requisite is evaded, so far as truth or falsehood is concerned. It is byreason of these various types of more abstract propositions that we canconceive the hypothetical existence of the more special propositions whichfor some of us, as judging subjects, would be meaningless.

This discussion should show the futility of taking any verbal statement,such as 'Caesar has crossed the Rubicon/ and arguing about the meaning.Also any proposition, which satisfies the verbal form so as to be one of itspossibilities of meaning, defines its own locus of subjects; and only forsuch subjects is there the possibility of a judgment whose content is thatproposition.

A proposition is the potentiality of the objectification of certain pre-supposed actual entities via certain qualities and relations, the objectifi-cation being for some unspecified subject for which the presupposition has

meaning in direct experience. The judgment is the conscious affirmationby a particular subject—for which the presupposition holds—that thispotentiality is, or is not, realized for it. It must be noticed that 'realized'does not mean 'realized in direct conscious experience/ but does mean'realized as being contributory to the datum out of which that judgingsubject originates/ Since directt conscious experience is usually absent, ajudgment can be erroneous.

Thus a proposition is an example of what Locke calls an 'idea deter-mined to particular existences/ It is the potentiality of such an idea; therealized idea, admitted to decision in a given subject, is the judgment,which may be a true or false idea about the particular things. The discus-sion of this question must be resumed (cf. Part III) when conceptualactivity is examined. But it is evident that a proposition is a complexentity which [300] stands between the eternal objects and the actual oc-casions. Compared to eternal objects a proposition shares in the concreteparticularity of actual occasions; and compared to actual occasions a propo-sition shares in the abstract generality of eternal objects. Finally, it mustbe remembered that propositions enter into experience in other ways thanthrough judgment-feelings. +

SECTION IV

A metaphysical proposition—in the proper, general sense of the termt'metaphysical— signifies a proposition which (i) has meaning for any-actual occasion, as a subject entertaining it, and (ii) is 'general/ in thesense that its predicate potentially relates any and every set of actual oc-casions, providing the suitable number of logical subjects for the predi-cative pattern, and (iii) has a 'uniform' truth-value, in the sense that, byreason of its form and scope, its truth-value is identical with the truth-value of each of the singular propositions to be obtained by restricting theapplication of the predicate to any one set of logical subjects. It is obviousthat, if a metaphysical proposition be true, the third condition is un-necessary. For a general proposition can only be true if this condition befulfilled. But if the general proposition be false, then it is only metaphysicalwhen in addition each of the derivate singular propositions is false. Thegeneral proposition would be false, if any one of the derivate singularpropositions were false. But the third condition is expressed in the propo-sition without any dependence upon the determination of the proposition'struth or falsehood.

There can be no cosmic epoch for which the singular propositions de-rived from a metaphysical proposition differ in truth-valuet from those ofany other cosmic epoch.

We certainly think that we entertain metaphysical propositions: but,having regard to the mistakes of the past respecting the principles ofgeometry, it is wise to [30J] reserve some scepticism on this point The

propositions which seem to be most obviously metaphysical are the arith-metical theorems. I will therefore illustrate the justification both for thebelief, and for the residual scepticism, by an examination of one of thesimplest of such theorems: One and one make two.2

Certainly, this proposition, construed in the sense 'one entity and an-other entity make two entities/" seems to be properly metaphysical withoutany shadow of limitation upon its generality, or truth. But we must hesi-tate even here, when we notice that it is usually asserted, with equal con-fidence as to the generality of its metaphysical truth, in a sense which iscertainly limited, and sometimes untrue. In our reference to the actualworld, we rarely consider an individual actual entity. The objects of ourthoughts are almost always societies, or looser groups of actual entities.Now, for the sake of simplicity, consider a society of the 'personal' type.Such a society will be a linear succession of actual occasions forming ahistorical route in which some defining characteristic is inherited by eachoccasion from its predecessors. A society of this sort is an 'enduring ob-ject/ Probably, a simple enduring object is simpler than anything whichwe ordinarily perceive or think about. It is the simplest type of society;and for any duration of its existence it requires that its environment belargely composed of analogous simplef enduring objects. What we nor-mally consider is the wider society in which many strands of enduringobjects are to be found, a 'corpuscular society/

Now consider two distinct enduring objects. They will be easier tothink about if their defining characteristics are different. We will call thesedefining characteristics a and by and also will use these letters, a and b,as the names of the two enduring objects. Now the proposition 'one entityand another entity make two [302] entities' is usually construed in thesense that, given two enduring objects, any act of attention which con-sciously comprehends an actual occasion from each of the two historicroutes will necessarily discover two actual occasions, one from each of thetwo distinct routes. For example, suppose that a cup and a saucer are twosuch enduring objects, which of course they are not; we always assumethat, so long as they are both in existence and are sufficiently close to beseen in one glance, any act of attention, whereby we perceive the cup andperceive the saucer, will thereby involve the perception of two actual en-tities, one the cup in one occasion of its existence and the other the saucerin one occasion of its existence. There can be no reasonable doubt as tothe truth of this assumption in this particular example. But in makingit, we are very far from the metaphysical proposition from which westarted. We are in fact stating a truth concerning the wide societies ofentities amid which our lives are placed. It is a truth concerning thiscosmos, but not a metaphysical truth.

Let us return to the two truly simple enduring objects, a and b. Also

2 For the proof of this proposition, cf. Principia Mathematical Vol. II,*110.643.

let us assume that their defining characteristics, a and b, are not con-traries, so that both of them can qualify the same actual occasion. Thenthere is no general metaphysical reason why the distinct routes of a and bshould not intersect in at least one actual occasion. Indeed, having regardto the extreme generality of the notion of a simple enduring object, it ispractically certain that—with the proper choice for the defining character-istics, a and b—intersecting historic routes for a and b must have fre-quently come into existence. In such a contingency a being who couldconsciously distinguish the two distinct enduring objects a and b, so asto have knowledge of their distinct defining characteristics and their dis-tinct historic routes, might find a and b exemplified in one actual entity.It is as though the cup and the saucer were at one instant identical; andthen, later on, resumed their distinct existence.

[303] We hardly ever apply arithmetic in its pure metaphysical sense,without the addition of presumptions which depend for their truth on thecharacter of the societies dominating the cosmic epoch in which we live.It is hardly necessary to draw attention to the fact, that ordinary verbalstatements make no pretence of discriminating the different senses in whichan arithmetical statement can be understood.

There is no difficulty in imagining a world—i.e., a cosmic epoch—inwhich arithmetic would be an interesting fanciful topic for dreamers, butuseless for practical people engrossed in the business of life. In fact, weseem to have been only barely rescued from such a state of things. Foramid the actual occasions located in the wilds of so-called 'empty space/and well removed from the enduring objects which go to form the en-during material bodies, it is quite probable that the contemplation ofarithmetic would not direct attention to any very important relations ofthings. It is, of course, a mere speculation that any actual entity, occurringin such an environment of faintly coordinated achievement, achieves theintricacy of constitution required for conscious mental operations.

SECTION V

We ask the metaphysical question, What is there in the nature ofthings, whereby an inductive inference, or a judgment of general truth,can be significantly termed 'correct' or Incorrect'? For example, we believenow—July 1, 1927—that the railway time-tables for the United States,valid for the previous months of May and June, represent the facts as tothe past running of the trains, within certain marginal limits of unpunc-tuality, and allowing for a few individual breakdowns. Also we believethat the current time-tables for July will be exemplified, subject to thesame qualifications. On the evidence before us our beliefs are justified,provided that we introduce into our judgments some estimate of the[304] high probability which is all that we mean to affirm. If we are con-sidering astronomical events, our affirmations will include an estimate of

a higher probability. Though even here some margin of uncertainty mayexist The computers of some famous observatory may have made an un-precedented error; or some unknown physical law may have importantrelevance to the condition of the star mainly concerned, leading to itsunexpected explosion.3

This astronomical contingency, and the beliefs which cluster round it,have been stated with some detail, because—as thus expressed—theyillustrate the problem as it shapes itself in philosophy. Also the exampleof the railway time-tables illustrates another point. For it is possiblemomentarily, in Vermont on July 1, 1927, to forget that the unprecedentedMississippi floods happened during that May and June; so that althoughthe estimate as to error in punctuality was justified by the evidence con-sciously before us, it did not in fact allow for the considerable derange-ment of the traffic in some states in the Union.4 The point of this illus-tration from railway trains is that there is a conformity to matter of factwhich these judgments exhibit, even if the events concerned have nothappened, or will not happen. These considerations introduce the funda-mental principle concerning 'judgment/ It is that all judgment is categor-ical; it concerns a proposition true or false in its application to the actualoccasion which is the subject making the judgment. This doctrine is notso far from Bradley's doctrine of judgment, as explained in his Logic.According to Bradley, the ultimate subject of every judgment is the oneultimate substance, the absolute. Also, according to him, the judgingsubject is a mode of the absolute, self-contradictory if taken to be inde-pendently actual. For Bradley, the judging subject has only a [305] deriva-tive actuality, which is the expression of its status as an affection of theabsolute. Thus,! in Bradley's doctrine, a judgment is an operation by whichthe absolute, under the limitations of one of its affections, enjoys self-consciousness of its enjoyment of affections. It will be noticed that inthis bald summary of Bradley's position, I am borrowing Spinoza's phrase,'affeciiones substantial

In the philosophy of organism, an actual occasion—as has been statedabove—is the whole universe in process of attainment of a particularsatisfaction. Bradley's doctrine of actuality is simply inverted. The finalactuality is the particular process with its particular attainment of satis-faction. The actuality of the universe is merely derivative from its soli-darity in each actual entity. It must be held that judgment concerns theuniverse as objectified from the standpoint of the judging subject. It con-cerns the universe through that subject.

With this doctrine in mind, we pass to the discussion of the sense inwhich probability can be a positive fact in an actual entity; so that a propo-

8 Since this sentence was written in July, 1927, a star has unexpectedly splitin two, in March, 1928.

4 Still less, at the time of writing this sentence, were the Vermont floods ofNovember, 1927, foreseen.

sition expressing the probability of some other proposition can in thisrespect agree or disagree with the constitution of the judging entity. Thenotion of 'probability/ in the widest sense of that term, presents a puzzlingphilosophical problem. The mathematical theory of probability is basedupon certain statistical assumptions. When these assumptions hold, themeaning of probability is simple; and the only remaining difficulties areconcerned with the technical mathematical development. But it is noteasy to understand how the statistical theory can apply to all cases towhich the notion of more or less probability is habitually applied. Forexample, when we consider—as we do consider—the probability of somescientific conjecture as to the internal constitution of the stars, or as tothe future of human society after some unprecedented convulsion, weseem to be influenced by some analogy which it is very difficult to convertinto an appeal to any definite statistical fact. We may consider that it isprobable [306] that the judgment could be justified by some statisticalappeal, if we only knew where to look. This is the belief that the statisticalprobability is itself probable. But here, evidently, there is an appeal to awider meaning of probability in order to support the statistical probabilityapplicable to the present case. It is arguable that this wider probabilityis itself another statistical probability as to the existence of the specialstatistics relevant to such types of scientific argument. But in this explana-tion puzzling questions are accumulating; and it is impossible to avoid thesuspicion that we are being put off with one of those make-believe ex-planations, so useful to reasoners who are wedded to a theory. The phi-losophy of organism provides two distinct elements in the universe fromwhich an intuition of probability can originate. One of them is statistical.In this and the next two sections, + an attempt will be made to justifythe statistical theory. It is therefore the more imperative to survey care-fully the difficulties which have to be met.

In the first place, probability is always relative* to evidence; so, onthe statistical theory, the numerical probability will mean the numericalratio of favourable to unfavourable cases in the particular class of 'cases'selected as the 'ground7 for statistical comparison. But alternative 'grounds'certainly exist. Accordingly we must provide a reason,f not based upon'probability/ why one 'ground' is selected rather than another. We mayadmit such a chain of vaguer and vaguer probabilities, in which our firstground is selected as statistically probable in respect to its superiority toother 'grounds' of other types. We are thus driven back to a second-orderground' of probability. We may logically proceed to third-order 'grounds/and so on. But if the statistical theory is to be substantiated, after a finitenumber of steps we must reach a 'ground' which is not selected for anyreason of probability. It must be selected because it is the 'ground' pre-supposed in all our reasonings. [307] Apart from some such ultimate'ground,' the statistical theory, viewed as an ultimate explanation for allour uses of the notion of 'probability/ must inevitably fail. This failure

arises by reason of the complete arbitrariness of the ultimate 'ground'upon which the whole estimate of probability finally rests.

Secondly, the primary requisite for a 'ground' suitable for statisticalprobability seems itself to appeal to probability. The members of theclass, called the 'ground/ must themselves be 'cases of equal probability/some favourable and some unfavourable, with the possibility of the limit-ing types of 'ground' in which all members are favourable, or all membersare unfavourable. The proposition in question, whose probability is to beestimated, must be known to be a member of the 'ground'; but no otherevidence, as to the set—favourable or unfavourable—to whicht the propo-sition belongs, enters into consideration. It is evident that7 for the ulti-mate ground, the phrase 'cases of equal probability' must be explicablewithout reference to any notion of probability. The principle of such anexplanation is easily found by reference to the six faces of dice. A die isa given fact; and its faces do not differ, qua faces, in any circumstancerelative to their fall with one face upwards or another face upwards. Alsobeyond this given fact, there is ignorance. Thus again we are driven to anultimate fact: there must be an ultimate species, and the specific charactermust be irrelevant to the 'favourableness' or 'unfavourableness' of themembers of the species in their capacity of cases. All this must be givenin direct knowledge without any appeal to probability. Also there mustbe equally direct knowledge of the proportion of favourable or unfavour-able cases within the species—at least within the limits of precision orvagueness presupposed in the conclusion.

Thirdly, it is another requisite for a 'ground' that the number of in-stances which it includes be finite. The whole theory of the ratios of car-dinal numbers, on which [308] statistical probability depends, breaks downwhen the cardinal numbers are infinite.

Fourthly, the method of 'sampling' professes to evade two objections.One of them is the breakdown, mentioned above, when the number ofcases in the ground' is infinite. The other objection, thus evaded, is thatin practice the case in question is novel and does not belong to the'ground' which is in fact examined. According to this second objection,unless there is some further evidence, the statistical state of the 'ground'is bogus evidence as to the probability of the case in question. To sumup: The method of sampling professes to overcome! (i) the difficultyarising from the infinity of the ground; and (ii) that arising from thenovelty of the case in question, whereby it does not belong to the groundexamined. In the discussion it must be remembered that we are con-sidering that ultimate ground which must not require any appeal to prob-ability beyond itself. Thus the statistical facts as to the ground! must be'given' and not merely 'probable.'

(i) When we have ant infinite 'ground/ containing an infinite numberof favourable cases and an infinite number of unfavourable cases, 'random'sampling can give no help towards the establishment of statistical proba-

bility; for one reason because no such notion of ratios can apply to theseinfinities; and for another reason, no sample is 'random'; it has only fol-lowed a complex method. A finite number of samples each following somemethod of its own, however complex each method may be, will give astatistical result entirely dependent upon those methods. In so far asrepetitions of so-called random samplings give concordant results, the onlyconclusion to be drawn is that there is a relevant, though concealed, anal-ogy between the 'random' methods. Thus a finite 'ground' is essential forstatistical probability. It must be understood that this argument impliesno criticism on a properly interpreted method of sampling applied to afinite 'ground/

[309] (ii) When the 'case' in question does not belong to the groundexamined, theret can, apart from further information, be no rational in-ference from the 'ground' to the novel case. If probability be in truthpurely statistical, and if there be no additional information, there can beno escape from this conclusion. But we certainly do unhesitatingly arguefrom a 'ground'' which does not include the case in question, to a probableconclusion concerning the case in question. Thus either such an inferenceis irrational, futile, useless; or, when there is justification, there is additionalinformation. This is the famous dilemma which perplexes the theories ofinductiont and of probability.

SECTION VI

It is evident that the ultimate 'ground' to which all probable judgmentsmust refer can be nothing else than the actual world as objectified in judg-ing subjects. A judging subject is always passing a judgment upon its owndata. Thus, if the statistical theory is to hold, the relations between thejudging subject and its data must be such as to evade the difficulties whichbeset that theory.

Every actual entity is in its nature essentially social; and this in twoways. First, the outlines of its own character are determined by the datawhich its environment provides for its process of feeling. Secondly, thesedata are not extrinsic to the entity; they constitute that display of theuniverse which is inherent in the entity. Thus the data upon which thesubject passes judgment are themselves components conditioning thecharacter of the judging subject. It follows that any general presupposi-tion as to the character of the experiencing subject also implies a generalpresupposition as to the social environment providing the display for thatsubject. In other words, a species of subject requires a species of data asits preliminary phase of concrescence. But such data are nothing but thesocial environment under the [310] abstraction effected by objectification.Also the character of the abstraction itself depends on the environment.The species of data requisite for the presumed judging subject presupposesan environment of a certain social character.

Thus, according to the philosophy of organism, inductive reasoninggains its validity by reason of a suppressed premise. This tacit presuppo-sition is that the particular future which is the logical subject of thejudgment, inductively justified, shall include actualities which have closeanalogy to some contemporary subject enjoying assigned experience; forexample, an analogy to the judging subject in question, or to some sortof actuality presupposed as in the actual world which is the logical subjectof the inductive judgment. It is also presumed that this future is derivedfrom the present by a continuity of inheritance in which this conditionis maintained. There is thus the presupposition of the maintenance of thegeneral social environment—-eft/ier by reference to judging subjects, orby more direct reference to the preservation of the general type of materialworld requisite for the presupposed character of one or more of the logicalsubjects of the proposition.

In this connection, I can only repeat, as a final summary, a paragraphfrom my Science and the Modern World (Ch. Ill):You will observe that I do not hold induction to be in its essence thedivinationt of general laws. It is the derivation of some characteristicsof a particular future from the known characteristics of a particularpast. The wider assumption of general laws holding for all cognizableoccasions appears a very unsafe addendum to attach to this limitedknowledge. All we can ask of the present occasion is that it shalldetermine a particular community of occasions, which are in somerespects mutually qualified by reason of their inclusion within thatsame community.It is evident that, in this discussion of induction, the philosophy of or-ganism [311] appears as an enlargement of the premise in ethical discus-sions: that man is a social animal. Analogously, every actual occasion issocial, so that when we have presumed the existence of any persistent typeof actual occasions, we have thereby made presumptions as to types ofsocieties comprised in its environment. Another way of stating this ex-planation of the validity of induction is, that in every forecast there is apresupposition of a certain type of actual entities, and that the questionthen asked is, Under what circumstances will these entities find them-selves? The reason that an answer can be given is that the presupposedtype of entities requires a presupposed type of data for the primary phasesof these actual entities; and that a presupposed type of data requires apresupposed type of social environment. But the laws of nature are theoutcome of the social environment. Hence when we have presupposed atype of actual occasions, we have already some information as to the lawsof nature in operation throughout the environment.

In every inductive judgment, there is therefore contained a presupposi-tion of the maintenance of the general order of the immediate environ-ment, so far as concerns actual entities within the scope of the induction.The inductive judgment has regard to the statistical probabilities inherentin this given order. The anticipations are devoid of meaning apart from

the definite cosmic order which they presuppose. Also survival requiresorder, and to presuppose survival, apart from the type of order which thattype of survival requires, is a contradiction. It is at this point that theorganic philosophy differs from any form of Cartesian 'substance-philoso-phy/ For if a substance requires nothing but itself in order to exist, itssurvival can tell no tale as to the survival of order in its environment. Thusno conclusion can be drawn respecting the external relationships of thesurviving substance to its future environment. For [312] the organic phi-losophy, anticipations as to the future of a piece of rock presuppose anenvironment with the type of order which that piece of rock requires.Thus the completely unknown environment never enters into an inductivejudgment. The induction is about the statistical probabilities of this en-vironment, or about the graded relevance to it of eternal objects.

Thus the appeal to the mere unknown is automatically ruled out. Thequestion, as to what will happen to an unspecified entity in an unspecifiedenvironment, has no answer. Induction always cocerns societies of actualentities which are important for the stability of the immediate en-vironment.

SECTION VII

In the preceding section there has been a covert appeal to probability.It is the purpose of this section to explain how the probability, thus in-voked, can be explained according to the statistical theory. First, we haveto note exactly where this appeal to probability enters into the notion ofinduction. An inductive argument always includes a hypothesis, namely,that the environment which is the subject-matter considered contains asociety of actual occasions analogous to a society in the present. Butanalogous societies require analogous data for their several occasions; andanalogous data can be provided only by the objectifications provided byanalogous environments. But the laws of nature are derived from thecharacters of the societies dominating the environment. Thus the laws ofnature dominating the environment in question have some analogy tothe laws of nature dominating the immediate environment.

Now the notions of 'analogy' and of 'dominance7 both leave a marginof uncertainty. We can ask, How far analogous? and How far dominant?If there were exact analogy, and complete dominance, there would be amixture of certainty as to general conditions and of complete ignoranceas to specific details. But such a descrip- [313] tion does not apply eitherto our knowledge of the immediate present, or of the past, or to our in-ductive knowledge of the future. Our conscious experience involves abaffling mixture of certainty, ignorance, and probability.

Now it is evident that the theory of cosmic epochs, due to the domi-nance of societies of actual occasions, provides the basis for a statisticalexplanation of probability. In any one epoch there are a definite set of

206 Discussions and Applications

dominant societies in certain ordered interconnections. There is also anadmixture of chaotic occasions which cannot be classified as belonging toany society. But, having regard to the enornious extension of any cosmicepoch, we are practically dealing with infinities, so that some method ofsampling is required, rooted in the nature of the case and not arbitrarilyadopted.

This natural method of sampling is provided by the data which formthe primary phase of any one actual occasion. Each actual occasion ob-jectifies the other actual occasions in its environment. This environmentcan be limited to the relevant portion of the cosmic epoch. It is a finiteregion of the extensive continuum, so far as adequate importance is con-cerned in respect to individual differences among actual occasions. Also,in respect to the importance of individual differences, we may assumethat there is a lower limit to the extension of each relevant occasion withinthis region. With these two presumptions, it follows that the relevantobjectifications, forming the relevant data for any one occasion, refer toa finite sample of actual occasions in the environment. Accordingly ourknowledge of the external world, and of the conditions upon which itslaws depend,t is, through and through, of that numerical character whicha statistical theory of probability requires. Such a theory does not requirethat exact statistical calculations bet made. All that is meant by such atheory is that our probability judgments are ultimately derivable fromvague estimates of 'more or less' in a numerical sense. [314] We have anunprecise intuition of the statistical basis of the sort of way in whichthings happen.

Note.—By far the best discussion of the philosophical theory of probabilityis to be found in Mr. }. Maynard Keynes' book, A Treatise on Probability. Thistreatise must long remain the standard work on the subject. My conclusions inthis chapter do not seem to me to differ fundamentally from those of Mr.Keynes as set out towards the conclusion of his Chapter XXI. But Mr. Keyneshere seems to revert to a view of probability very analogous to that form of the'frequency theory' which, as suggested by me,f he criticized acutely (and rightly,so far as concerned that special form) in his Chapter VIII.

SECTION VIII

So far the argument of the three! preceding sections has been devotedto the explanation of the statistical ground for a probability judgment. Butthe same discussion also discloses an alternative non-statistical ground forsuch a judgment.

The main line of thought has been (i) that each actual occasion has atthe base of its own constitution the environment from which it springs;(ii) that in this function of the environment abstraction has been madefrom its indefinite multiplicity of forms of definiteness, so as to obtain aconcordant experience of the elements retained; (in) that any actual oc-casion belonging to an assigned species requires an environment adapted

The Propositions 207

to that species, so that the presupposition of a species involves a pre-supposition concerning the environment; (iv) that in every inductive judg-ment, and in every judgment of probability, there is a presupposition, im-plicit or explicit, of one, or more, species of actual occasions implicated inthe situation considered, so that, by (iii),t there is a presupposition ofsome general type of environment.

Thus the basis of all probability and induction is the fact of analogybetween an environment presupposed and an environment directly ex-perienced.

The argument, as to the statistical basis of probability, then recurred tothe doctrine of social order. According to this doctrine, all social orderdepends on the statistical dominance in the environment of occasions be-longing [315] to the requisite societies. The laws of nature are statisticallaws derived from this fact. Thus the judgment of probability can bederived from an intuition—in general vague and imprecise—as to the sta-tistical basis of the presupposed environment. This judgment can be de-rived from the analogy with the experienced environment. There will besuch factors in experience adequate to justify a judgment of the inductivetype.

But there is another factor from which, in combination with the fourpremises, a non-statistical judgment of probability can be derived. Theprinciple of the graduated 'intensive relevance' of eternal objects to theprimary physical data of experience expresses a real fact as to the pref-erential adaptation of selected eternal objects to novel occasions originat-ing from an assigned environment.

This principle expresses the prehension by every creature of the grad-uated order of appetitions constituting the primordial nature of God.There can thus be an intuition of an intrinsic suitability of some definiteoutcome from a presupposed situation. There will be nothing statistical inthis suitability. It depends upon the fundamental graduation of appeti-tions which lies at the base of things, and which solves all indeterminationsof transition.

In this way, there can be an intuition of probability respecting the origi-nation of some novelty. It is evident that the statistical theory entirelyfails to provide any basis for such judgments.

It must not be thought that these non-statistical judgments are in anysense religious. They lie at a far lower level of experience than do thereligious emotions. The secularization of the concept of God's functionsin the world is at least as urgent a requisite of thought as is the seculariza-tion of other elements in experience. The concept of God is certainly oneessential element in religious feeling. But the converse is not true; theconcept of religious feeling is not an essential element in the con- [316] ceptof God's function in the universe. In this respect religious literature hasbeen sadly misleading to philosophic theory, partly by attraction and partlyby repulsion.

CHAPTER XPROCESS

SECTION I

[317] That all things flow' is the first vague generalization which theunsystematized, barely analysed, intuition of men has produced. It is thetheme of some of the best Hebrew poetry in the Psalms; it appears as oneof the first generalizations of Greek philosophy in the form of the sayingof Heraclitus; amid the later barbarism of Anglo-Saxon thought it reappearsin the story of the sparrow flitting through the banqueting? hall of theNorthumbrian king; and in all stages of civilization its recollection lendsits pathos to poetry. Without doubt, if we are to go back to that ultimate,integral experience, unwarped by the sophistications of theory, that ex-perience whose elucidation is the final aim of philosophy, the flux of thingsis one ultimate generalization around which we must weave our philo-sophical system.

At this point we have transformed the phrase, 'all things flow/ into thealternative phrase, 'the flux of things.' In so doing, the notion of the 'flux'has been held up before our thoughts as one primary notion for furtheranalysis. But in the sentence 'all things flow,' there are three words—andwe have started by isolating the last word of the three. We move back-ward to the next word 'things' and ask. What sort of things flow? Finallywe reach the first word 'all' and ask, What is the meaning of the 'many'things engaged in this common flux, and in what sense, if any, can theword 'all' refer to a definitely indicated set of these many things?

The elucidation of meaning involved in the phrase 'all things flow't isone chief task of metaphysics.

[318] But there is a rival notion, antithetical to the former. I cannotat the moment recall one immortal phrase which expresses it with thesame completeness as that with which! the alternative notion has beenrendered by Heraclitus. This other notion dwells on permanences ofthings—the solid earth, the mountains, the stones, the Egyptian Pyramids,the spirit of man, God,

The best rendering of integral experience, expressing its general formdivested of irrelevant details, is often to be found in the utterances ofreligious aspiration. One of the reasons of the thinness of so much modernmetaphysics is its neglect of this wealth of expression of ultimate feeling.

208

Accordingly we find in the first two lines of a famous hymn a full ex-pression of the union of the two notions in one integral experience:

Abide with me;

Fast falls the eventide.

Here the first line expresses the permanences, 'abide/ 'me' and the 'Being'addressed; and the second line sets these permanences amid the inescapableflux. Here at length we find formulated the complete problem of meta-physics. Those philosophers who start with the first line have given us themetaphysics of 'substance7; and those who start with the second line havedeveloped the metaphysics of 'flux/ But, in truth, the two lines cannot betorn apart in this way; and we find that a wavering balance between thetwo is a characteristic of the greater number of philosophers. Plato foundhis permanences in a static, spiritual heaven, and his flux in the entangle-ment of his forms amid the fluent imperfections of the physical world.Here I draw attention to the word 'imperfection/ In any assertion as toPlato I speak under correction; but I believe that Plato's authority can beclaimed for the doctrine that the things that flow are imperfect in thesense of 'limited' and of 'definitely exclusive of much that they might beand are not/ The lines quoted from the hymn are an almost perfectexpres- [3J 9] sion of the direct intuition from which the main position ofthe Platonic philosophy is derived. Aristotle corrected his Platonism intoa somewhat different! balance. He was the apostle of 'substance and at-tribute/ and of the classifiestory logic which this notion suggests. But, onthe other side, he makes a masterly analysis of the notion of 'generation/Aristotle in his own person expressed a useful protest against the Platonictendency to separate a static spiritual world from a fluent world of super-ficial experience. The later Platonic schools stressed this tendency: just asthe mediaeval Aristotelian thought allowed the static notions of Aristotle'slogic to formulate some of the main metaphysical problems in terms whichhave lasted till today.

On the whole, the history of philosophy supports Bergson's charge thatthe human intellect 'spatializes the universe'; that is to say, that it tendsto ignore the fluency, and to analyse the world in terms of static categories.Indeed Bergson went further and conceived this tendency as an inherentnecessity of the intellect. I do not believe this accusation; but I do holdthat 'spatialization' is the shortest route to a clear-cut philosophy expressedin reasonably familiar language. Descartes gave an almost perfect exampleof such a system of thought. The difficulties of Cartesianism with itsthree clear-cut substances, and with its 'duration' and 'measured time'well in the background, illustrate the result of the subordination of fluency.This subordination is to be found in the unanalysed longing of the hymn,in Plato's vision of heavenly perfection, in Aristotle's logical concepts,and in Descartes' mathematical mentality. Newton, that Napoleon of theworld of thought, brusquely ordered fluency back into the world, regi-

merited into his 'absolute mathematical time, flowing equably withoutregard to anything external/ He also gave it a mathematical uniform inthe shape of his Theory of Fluxions.

At this point the group of seventeenth- and eighteenth- [320] centuryphilosophers practically made a discovery, which, although it lies on thesurface of their writings, they only half-realized. The discovery is thatthere are two kinds of fluency. One kind is the concrescence\ which, inLocke's language, is 'the real internal constitution of a particular existent/The other kind is the transition from particular existent to particularexistent. This transition, again in Locke's language, is the 'perpetuallyperishing' which is one aspect of the notion of time; and in another aspectthe transition is the origination of the present in conformity with the'power' of the past.

The phrase 'the real internal constitution of a particular existent/ thedescription of the human understanding as a process of reflection upondata, the phrase 'perpetually perishing/ and the word 'power' togetherwith its elucidation are all to be found in Locke's Essay. Yet owing to thelimited scope of his investigation Locke did not generalize or put hisscattered ideas together. This implicit notion of the two kinds of flux findsfurther unconscious illustration in Hume, It is all but explicit in Kant,though—as I think—misdescribed. Finally, it is lost in the evolutionarymonism of Hegel and of his derivative schools. With all his inconsistencies,Locke is the philosopher to whom it is most useful to recur, when we de-sire to make explicit the discovery of the two kinds of fluency, required forthe description of the fluent world. One kind is the fluency inherent in theconstitution of the particular existent. This kind I have called 'concres-cence.' The other kind is the fluency whereby the perishing of the process,on the completion of the particular existent, constitutes that existent asan original element in the constitutions of other particular existentselicited by repetitions of process. This kind I have called 'transition/ Con-crescence moves towards its final cause, which is its subjective aim; transi-tion is the vehicle of the efficient cause, which is the immortal past.

The discussion of how the actual particular occasions become originalelements for a new creation is termed [321] the theory of objectification.The objectified particular occasions together have the unity of a datum forthe creative concrescence. But in acquiring this measure of connection,their inherent presuppositions of each other eliminate certain elementsin their constitutions, and elicit into relevance other elements. Thus ob-jectification is an operation of mutually adjusted abstraction, or elimina-tion, whereby the many occasions of the actual world become one complexdatum. This fact of the elimination by reason of synthesis is sometimestermed the perspective of the actual world from the standpoint ofthat concrescence. Each actual occasion defines its own actual worldfrom which it originates. No two occasions can have identical actualworlds.

SECTION II

'Concrescence' is the name for the process in which the universe ofmany things acquires an individual unity in a determinate relegation ofeach item of the 'many' to its subordination in the constitution of thenovel 'one/

The most general term 'thing'—or, equivalently, 'entity'—means nothingelse than to be one of the 'many' which find their niches in each instanceof concrescence. Each instance of concrescence is itself the novel indi-vidual 'thing' in question. There are not 'the concrescence' and 'the! novelthing': when we analyse the novel thing we find nothing but the concres-cence. 'Actuality' means nothing else than this ultimate entry into theconcrete, in abstraction from which there is mere nonentity. In otherwords, abstraction from the notion of 'entry into the concrete' is a self-contradictory notion, since it asks us to conceive a thing as not a thing.

An instance of concrescence is termed an 'actual entity'—or, equiva-lently, an 'actual occasion.' There is not one completed set of things whichare actual occasions. For the fundamental inescapable fact is the creativity[322] in virtue of which there can be no 'many things' which are not sub-ordinated in a concrete unity. Thus a set of all actual occasions is by thenature of things a standpoint for another concrescence which elicits a con-crete unity from those many actual occasions. Thus we can never surveythe actual world except from the standpoint of an immediate concrescencewhich is falsifying the presupposed completion. The creativity in virtue ofwhich any relative** complete actual world is, by the nature of things, thedatum for a new concrescencet is termed 'transition.' Thus, by reason oftransition, 'the actual world' is always a relative term, and refers to thatbasis of presupposed actual occasions which is a datum for the novelconcrescence.

An actual occasion is analysable. The analysis discloses operations trans-forming entities which are individually alien t into components of a com-plex which is concretely one. The term 'feeling' will be used as the genericdescription of such operations. We thus say that an actual occasion is aconcrescence effected by a process of feelings.

A feeling can be considered in respect to (i) the actual occasions felt,(ii) the eternal objects felt, (hi) the feelings felt, and (iv) its own sub-jective forms of intensity. In the process of concrescence the diverse feel-ings pass on to wider generalities of integral feeling.

Such a wider generality is a feeling of a complex of feelings, includingtheir specific elements of identity and contrast. This process of the integra-tion of feeling proceeds until the concrete unity of feeling is obtained. Inthis concrete unity all indetermination as to the realization of possibilitieshas been eliminated. The many entities of the universe, including thoseoriginating in the concrescence itself, find their respective roles in this

final unity. This final unity is termed the 'satisfaction.' The 'satisfaction'is the culmination of the concrescence into a completely determinatematter of fact. In any of its antecedent stages the concrescence exhibitssheer inde- [323] termination as to the nexus between its many components.

SECTION III

An actual occasion is nothing but the unity to be ascribed to a particularinstance of concrescence. This concrescence is thus nothing else than the'real internal constitution' of the actual occasion in question. The analysisof the formal constitution of an actual entity has given three stages in theprocess of feeling: (i) the responsive phase, (ii) the supplemental stage,and (hi) the satisfaction.

The satisfaction is merely the culmination marking the evaporation ofall indetermination; so that, in respect to all modes of feeling and to allentities in the universe, the satisfied actual entity embodies a determinateattitude of 'yes' or 'no/ Thus the satisfaction is the attainment of theprivate ideal which is the final cause of the concrescence. But the processitself lies in the two former phases. The first phase is the phase of purereception of the actual world in its guise of objective datum for aestheticsynthesis. In this phase there is the mere reception of the actual world asa multiplicity of private centres of feeling, implicated in a nexus of mutualpresupposition. The feelings are felt as belonging to the external centres,and are not absorbed into the private immediacy. The second stage isgoverned by the private ideal, gradually shaped in the process itself;whereby the many feelings, derivatively felt as alien, are transformed intoa unity of aesthetic appreciation immediately felt as private. This is theincoming of 'appetition/ which in its higher exemplifications we term'vision.' In the language of physical science, the 'scalar' form overwhelmsthe original 'vector' form: the origins become subordinate to the individualexperience. The vector form is not lost, but is submerged as the founda-tion of the scalar superstructure.

In this second stage the feelings assume an emotional [324] characterby reason of this influx of conceptual feelings. But the reason why theorigins are not lost in the private emotion is that there is no element inthe universe capable of pure privacy. If we could obtain a complete analy-sis of meaning, the notion of pure privacy would be seen to be self-contradictory. Emotional feeling is still subject to the third metaphysicalprinciple,** that to be 'something' is 'to have the potentiality for acquiringreal unity with other entities.' Hence, 'to be a real component of an actualentity' is in some way 'to realize this potentiality.' Thus 'emotion' is 'emo-tional feeling; and Vhat is felt' is the presupposed vector situation. Inphysical science this principle takes the form which should never be lostsight of in fundamental speculation, that scalar quantities are constructsderivative from vector quantities. In more familiar language, this prin-

ciple can be expressed by the statement that the notion of 'passing on' ismore fundamental than that of a private individual fact. In the abstractlanguage here adopted for metaphysical statement, 'passing on7 becomes'creativity/ in the dictionary sense of the verb create, 'to bring forth, beget,produce/ Thus, according to the third principle, no entity can be divorcedfrom the notion of creativity. An entity is at least a particular formcapable of infusing its own particularity into creativity. An actual entity,or a phase of an actual entity, is more than that; but, at least, it is that.

Locke's 'particular ideas' are merely the antecedent actual entities exer-cising their function of infusing with their own particularity the 'passingon/t which is the primary phase of the 'real internal constitution' of theactual entity in question. In obedience to a prevalent misconception,'Locke termed this latter entity the 'mind'; and discussed its 'furniture/when he should have discussed 'mental operations' in their capacity oflater phases in the constitutions of actual entities. Locke himself flittinglyexpresses this fundamental vector function of his 'ideas/ In a paragraph,forming a portion of a quotation already [325] made, he writes: "I confesspower includes in it some kind of relation,—a relation to action or change;as, indeed, which of our ideas, of what kind soever, when attentively con-sidered, does not?" x

SECTION IV

The second phase, that of supplementation, divides itself into twosubordinate phases. Both of these phases may be trivial; also they are nottruly separable, since they interfere with each other by intensification orinhibition. If both phases are trivial, the whole second phase is merely thedefinite negation of individual origination; and the process passes passivelyto its satisfaction. The actual entity is then the mere vehicle for the trans-ference of inherited constitutions of feeling. Its private immediacy passesout of the picture. Of these two sub-phases, the former—so far as there isan order—is that of aesthetic supplement, and the latter is that of intel-lectual supplement.

In the aesthetic supplement there is an emotional appreciation of thecontrasts and rhythms inherent in the unification of the objective contentin the concrescence of one actual occasion. In this phase perception isheightened by its assumption of pain and pleasure, beauty and distaste.It is the phase of inhibitions and intensifications. It is the phase in whichblue becomes more intense by reason of its contrasts, and shape acquiresdominance by reason of its loveliness. What was received as alien, hasbeen recreated as private. This is the phase of perceptivity, includingemotional reactions to perceptivity. In this phase, private immediacy haswelded the data into a new fact of blind feeling. Pure aesthetic supple-

1 Essay, II, XXI, 3.t

214 Discussions and Applications

ment has solved its problem. This phase requires an influx of conceptualfeelings and their integration with the pure physical feelings.

But 'blindness' of the process, so far, retains an indetermination. Theremust be either a determinate nega- [326] tion of intellectual 'sight/ or anadmittance of intellectual 'sight/ The negationt of intellectual sight isthe dismissal into irrelevancet of eternal objects in their abstract status ofpure potentials. 'What might be' has the capability of relevant contrastwith 'what is/ If the pure potentials, in this abstract capacity, are dis-missed from relevance, the second sub-phase is trivial. The process thenconstitutes a blind actual occasion, 'blind' in the sense that no intellectualoperations are involved; though conceptual operations are always involved.Thus there is always mentality in the form of 'vision/ but not alwaysmentality in the form of conscious 'intellectuality/

But if some eternal objects, in their abstract capacity, are realized asrelevant to actual fact, there is an actual occasion with intellectual opera-tions. The complex of such intellectual operations is sometimes termed the'mind' of the actual occasion; and the actual occasion is also termed'conscious/ But the term 'mind' conveys the suggestion of independentsubstance. This is not meant here: a better term is the 'consciousness'belonging to the actual occasion.

An eternal object realized in respect to its pure potentiality as relatedto determinate logical subjects is termed a 'prepositional feeling' in thementality of the actual occasion in question. The consciousness belongingto an actual occasion is its sub-phase of intellectual supplementation, whenthat sub-phase is not purely trivial. This sub-phase is the eliciting, intofeeling, oft the full contrast between mere propositional potentiality andrealized fact.

SECTION V

To sum up: There are two species of process, macroscopic! process, andmicroscopic process. The macroscopic process is the transition from at-tained actuality to actuality in attainment; while the microscopic processis the conversion of conditions which are merely real into determinateactuality. The former process effects the [327] transition from the 'actual'to the 'merely real'; and the latter process effects the growth from the realto the actual. The former process is efficient; the latter process ist teleo-logical. The future is merely real, without being actual; whereas the pastis a nexus of actualities. The actualities are constituted by their real geneticphases. The present is the immediacy of teleological process wherebyreality becomes actual. The former process provides the conditions whichreally govern attainment; whereas the latter process provides the endsactually attained. The notion of 'organism' is combined with that of'process' in a twofold manner. The community of actual things is anorganism; but it is not a static organism. It is an incompletion in process

Process 215

of production. Thus the expansion of the universe in respect to actualthings is the first meaning of 'process'; and the universe in any stage ofits expansion is the first meaning of 'organism/ In this sense, an organismis a nexus.

Secondly, each actual entity is itself only describable as an organic pro-cess. It repeats in microcosm what the universe is in macrocosm. It is aprocess proceeding from phase to phase, each phase being the real basisfrom which its successor proceeds towards the completion of the thingin question. Each actual entity bears in its constitution the 'reasons' whyits conditions are what they are. These 'reasons' are the other actual en-tities objectified for it.

An 'object' is a transcendent element characterizing that definitenessto which our 'experience' has to conform. In this sense, the future hasobjective reality in the present, but no formal actuality. For it is inherentin the constitution of the immediate, present actuality that a future willsupersede it. Also conditions to which that future must conform, includ-ing real relationships to the present, are really objective in the immediateactuality.

Thus each actual entity, although complete so far as concerns its micro-scopic process, is yet incomplete by reason of its objective inclusion ofthe macroscopicf [328] process. It really experiences a future which mustbe actual, although the completed actualities of that future are undeter-mined. In this sense, each actual occasion experiences its own objectiveimmortality.

Note.—The function here ascribed to an 'object' is in general agreement witha paragraph (p. 249, 2nd! edition) in Professor Kemp Smith's Commentary onKant's Critique, where he is considering Kant's 'Objective Deduction' as in thefirst edition of the Critique: "When we examine the objective, we find that theprimary characteristic distinguishing it from the subjective is that it lays a com-pulsion upon our minds, constraining us to think about it in a certain way. Byan object is meant something which will not allow us to think at haphazard."

There is of course the vital difference, among others, that where Kemp Smith,expounding Kant, writes 'thinking/ the philosophy of organism substitutes'experiencing.'

PART IIITHE THEORY OF PREHENSIONS

CHAPTER ITHE THEORY OF FEELINGS

SECTION I

[334] The philosophy of organism is a cell-theory of actuality. Each ul-timate unit of fact is a cell-complex, not analysable into components withequivalent completeness of actuality.

The cell can be considered genetically and morphologically. The ge-netic theoryt is considered in this part; [335] the morphological theory isconsidered in Part IV, under the title of the 'extensive analysis' of anactual entity.

In the genetic theory, the cell is exhibited as appropriating for thefoundation of its own existence, the various elements of the universe outof which it arises. Each process of appropriation of a particular elementis termed a prehension. The ultimate elements of the universe, thus ap-propriated, are the already constituted! actual entities, and the eternalobjects. All the actual entities are positively prehended, but only a selec-tion of the eternal objects. In the course of the integrations of thesevarious prehensions, entities of other categoreal types become relevant;and some new entities of these types, such as novel propositions andgeneric contrasts, come into existence. These relevant entities of theseother types are also prehended into the constitution of the concrescentcell. This genetic process has now to be traced in its main outlines.

An actual entity is a process in the course of which many operationswith incomplete subjective unity terminate in a completed unity of opera-tion, termed the 'satisfaction/ The 'satisfaction' is the contentment ofthe creative urge by the fulfilment of its categoreal demands. The analysisof these categories is one aim of metaphysics.

The process itself is the constitution of the actual entity; in Locke'sphrase, it is the 'real internal constitution' of the actual entity. In theolder phraseology employed by Descartes, the process is what the actualentity is in itself, Jormaliter.7 The terms 'formal' and 'formally' are hereused in this sense.

The terminal unity of operation, here called the 'satisfaction/ embodieswhat the actual entity is beyond itself. In Locke's phraseology, the 'powers'of the actual entity are discovered in the analysis of the satisfaction. InDescartes' phraseology, the satisfaction is the actual entity considered asanalysable in respect to its existence [336] 'objective,'* It is the actualentity as a definite, determinate, settled fact, stubborn and with unavoid-

219

able consequences. The actual entity as described by the morphology ofits satisfaction is the actual entity 'spatialized/ to use Bergson's term. Theactual entity, thus spatialized, is at given individual fact actuated by itsown 'substantial form/ Its own process, which is its own internal existence,has evaporated, worn out and satisfied; but its effects are all to be describedin terms of its "satisfaction/ The 'effects' of an actual entity are its in-terventions in concrescent processes other than its own. Any entity, thusintervening in processes transcending itself, is said to be functioning as an'object/ According to the fourth Category of Explanation it is the onegeneral metaphysical character of all entities of all sorts, that they functionas objects. It is this metaphysical character which constitutes the solidarityof the universe. The peculiarity of an actual entity is that it can be con-sidered both 'objectively' and 'formally/ The 'objective' aspect is mor-phological so far as that actual entity is concerned: by this it is meantthat the process involved is transcendent relatively to it, so that the esseof its satisfaction is sentiri. The 'formal' aspect is functional so far as thatactual entity is concerned: by this it is meant that the process involved isimmanent in it. But the objective consideration is pragmatic. It is theconsideration of the actual entity in respect to its consequences. In thepresent chapter the emphasis is laid upon the formal consideration of anactual entity. But this formal consideration of one actual entity requiresreference to the objective intervention of other actual entities. This ob-jective intervention of other entities constitutes the creative characterwhich conditions the concrescence in question. The satisfaction of eachactual entity is an element in the givenness of the universe: it limits bound-less, abstract possibility into the particular real potentiality from whicheach novel concrescence originates. The 'boundless, abstract possibility'means the creativity [337] considered solely in reference to the possibilitiesof the intervention of eternal objects, and in abstraction from the ob-jective intervention of actual entities belonging to any definite actualworld, including God among the actualities abstracted from.

SECTION II

The possibility of finite truths depends on the fact that the satisfactionof an actual entity is divisible into a variety of determinate operations.The operations are 'prehensions/ But the negative prehensions which con-sist of exclusions from contribution to the concrescence can be treatedin their subordination to the positive prehensions. These positive prehen-sions are termed 'feelings/ The process of concrescence is divisible intoan initial stage of many feelings, and a succession of subsequent phasesof more complex feelings integrating the earlier simpler feelings, up tothe satisfaction which is one complex unity of feeling. This is the genetic'analysis of the satisfaction. Its 'coordinate' analysis will be given later,in Part IV.

Thus a component feeling in the satisfaction is to be assigned, for itsorigination, to an earlier phase of the concrescence.

This is the general description of the divisible character of the satis-faction, from the genetic standpoint. The extensiveness which underliesthe spatio-temporal relations of the universe is another outcome of thisdivisible character. Also the abstraction from its own full formal consti-tution involved in objectifications of one actual entity in the constitu-tions of other actual entities equally depends upon this same divisiblecharacter, whereby the actual entity is conveyed in the particularity ofsome one of its feelings. A feeling—i.e., a positive prehension—is essen-tially a transition effecting a concrescence. Its complex constitution isanalysable into five factors which express what that transition consists of,and effects. The factors are: (i) the 'subject' which feels, (ii) the 'initial[338] data' which are to be felt, (iii) the 'elimination' in virtue of nega-tive prehensions, (iv) the 'objective datum7 which is felt, (v) the 'sub-jective form* which is how that subject feels that objective datum.

A feeling is in all respects determinate, with a determinate subject,determinate initial data, determinate negative prehensions, a determinateobjective datum, and a determinate subjective form. There is a transitionfrom the initial data to the objective datum effected by the elimination.The initial data constitute a 'multiplicity/ or merely one 'proper' entity,while the objective datum is a 'nexus/ a proposition, or a 'proper' entityof some categoreal type. There is a concrescence of the initial data into theobjective datum, made possible by the elimination, and effected by thesubjective form. The objective datum is the perspective of the initial data.iThe subjective form receives its determination from the negative prehen-sions, the objective datum, and the conceptual origination of the subject.The negative prehensions are determined by the categoreal conditionsgoverning feelings, by the subjective form, and by the initial data. Thismutual determination of the elements involved in a feeling is one expres-sion of the truth that the subject of the feeling is causa sui. The partialnature of a feeling, other than the complete satisfaction, is manifest by theimpossibility of understanding its generation without recourse to the wholesubject. There is a mutual sensitivity of feelings in one subject, governed bycategoreal conditions. This mutual sensitivity expresses the notion of finalcausation in the guise of a pre-established harmony.

SECTION III

A feeling cannot be abstracted from the actual entity entertaining it.This actual entity is termed the 'subject' of the feeling. It is in virtue ofits subject that the feeling is one thing. If we abstract the subject fromthe feeling we are left with many things. Thus a feeling is [339] a particu-lar in the same sense in which each actual entity is a particular. It is oneaspect of its own subject.

The term 'subject' has been retained because in this sense it is familiarin philosophy. But it is misleading. The term 'superject* would be better.The subject-superject is the purpose of the process originating the feelings.The feelings are inseparable from the end at which they aim; and this endis the feeler. The feelings aim at the feeler, as their final cause. The feelingsare what they are in order that their subject may be what it is. Thentranscendently, since the subject is what it is in virtue of its feelings, it isonly by means of its feelings that the subject objectively conditions thecreativity transcendent beyond itself. In our own relatively high gradeof human existence, this doctrine of feelings and their subject is best il-lustrated by our notion of moral responsibility. The subject is responsiblefor being what it is in virtue of its feelings. It is also derivatively respon-sible for the consequences of its existence because they flow from itsfeelings.

If the subject-predicate form of statement be taken to be metaphysicallyultimate, it is then impossible to express this doctrine of feelings and theirsuperject. It is better to say that the feelings aim at their subject, thanto say that they are aimed at their subject. For the latter mode of expres-sion removes the subject from the scope of the feeling and assigns it toan external agency. Thus the feeling would be wrongly abstracted from itsown final cause. This final cause is an inherent element in the feeling,constituting the unity of that feeling. An actual entity feels as it doesfeel in order to be the actual entity which it is. In this way an actual en-tity satisfies Spinoza's notion of substance: it is causa sui. The creativityis not an external agency with its own ulterior purposes. All actual entitiesshare with God this characteristic of self-causation. For this reason everyactual entity also shares with God the characteristic of transcending allother actual entities, including God. The [340] universe is thus a creativeadvance into novelty. The alternative to this doctrine is a static morpho-logical universe.

SECTION IV

There are three main categoreal conditions which flow from the finalnature of things. These three conditions are: (i) the Category of SubjectiveUnity, (ii) the Category of Objective Identity, and (iii) the Category ofObjective Diversity. Later we shall isolate five** other categoreal conditions.But the three conditions mentioned above have an air of ultimate meta-physical generality.

The first category has to do with self-realization. Self-realization is theultimate fact of facts. An actuality is self-realizing, and whatever is self-realizing is an actuality. An actual entity is at once the subject of self-realization, and the superject which is self-realized.

The second and third categories have to do with objective determina-tion. All entities, including even other actual entities, enter into the self-realization of an actuality in the capacity of determinants of the definite-

ness of that actuality. By reason of this objective functioning of entitiesthere is truth and falsehood. For every actuality is devoid of a shadow ofambiguity: it is exactly what it is, by reason of its objective definition atthe hands of other entities. In abstraction from actualization, truth andfalsehood are meaningless: we are in the region of nonsense, a limbo wherenothing has any claim to existence. But definition is the soul of actuality:the attainment of a peculiar definiteness is the final cause which animatesa particular process; and its attainment halts its process, so that by tran-scendence it passes into its objective immortality as a new objective con-dition added to the riches of definiteness attainable, the 'real potentiality'of the universe.

A distinction must here be made. Each task of creation is a social effort,employing the whole universe. Each novel actuality is a new partner add-ing a new con- [341] dition. Every new condition can be absorbed into ad-ditional fullness of attainment. On the other hand, each condition is ex-clusive, intolerant of diversities; except so far as it finds itself in a webof conditions which convert its exclusions into contrasts. A new actualitymay appear in the wrong society, amid which its claims to efficacy actmainly as inhibitions. Then a weary task is set for creative function, by anepoch of new creations to remove the inhibition. Insistence on birth atthe wrong season is the trick of evil. In other words, the novel fact maythrow back, inhibit, and delay. But the advance, when it does arrive, willbe richer in content, more fully conditioned, and more stable. For in itsobjective efficacy an actual entity can only inhibit by reason of its alterna-tive positive contribution.

A chain of facts is like a barrier reef. On one side there is wreckage,and beyond it harbourage and safety. The categories governing the deter-mination of things are the reasons why there should be evil; and are alsothe reasons why, in the advance of the world, particular evil facts are finallytranscended.

SECTION V

Category I. The many feelings which belong to an incomplete phase inthe process of an actual entity, though unintegrated by reason of the in-completeness of the phase, are compatible for synthesis by reason of theunity of their subject.

This is the Category of 'Subjective Unity/ This category is one expressionof the general principle that the one subject is the final end which condi-tions each component feeling. Thus the superject is already present as acondition, determining how each feeling conducts its own process. Al-though in any incomplete phase there are many unsynthesized feelings,yet each of these feelings is conditioned by the other feelings. The processof each feeling is such as to render that feeling integrable with the otherfeelings.

[342] This Category of Subjective Unity is the reason why no feeling can

be abstracted from its subject. For the subject is at work in the feeling, inorder that it may be the subject with that feeling. The feeling is an epi-sode in self-production, and is referent to its aim. This aim is a certaindefinite unity with its companion feelings.

This doctrine of the inherence of the subject in the process of its pro-duction requires that in the primary phase of the subjective process therebe a conceptual feeling of subjective aim: the physical and other feelingsoriginate as steps towards realizing this conceptual aim through theirtreatment of initial data. This basic conceptual feeling suffers simplifica-tion in the successive phases of the concrescence. It starts with conditionedalternatives, and by successive decisions is reduced to coherence. The doc-trine of responsibility is entirely concerned with this modification. In eachphase the corresponding conceptual feeling is the 'subjective end* charac-teristic of that phase. The many feelings, in any incomplete phase, arenecessarily compatible with each other by reason of their individual con-formity to the subjective end evolved for that phase.

This Category of Subjective Unity is a doctrine of pre-established har-mony, applied to the many feelings in an incomplete phase. If we recurtherefore to the seven kinds of 'proper' entities, and ask how to classifyan incomplete phase, we find that it has the unity of a proposition. In ab-straction from the creative urge by which each such phase is merely anincident in a process, this phase is merely a proposition about its com-ponent feelings and their ultimate superject. The pre-established harmonyis the self-consistency of this proposition, that is to say, its capacity forrealization. But such abstraction from the process does violence to itsnature; for the phase is an incident in the process. When we try to dojustice to this aspect of the phase, we must say that it is a propositionseeking truth. It is a lure to the supervention of those integrating feel-ings by which the mere [343] potentiality of the proposition, with its out-standing indeterminations as to its setting amid the details of the universe,is converted intof the fully determinate actuality.

The ground, or origin, of the concrescent process! is the multiplicityof data in the universe, actual entities and eternal objects and propositionsand nexus. Each new phase in the concrescence means the retreat of merepropositional unity before the growing grasp of real unity of feeling. Eachsuccessive propositional phase is a lure to the creation of feelings whichpromote its realization. Each temporal entity, in one sense, originates fromits mental pole, analogously to God himself. It derives from God its basicconceptual aim, relevant to its actual world, yet with indeterminationsawaiting its own decisions. This subjective aim, in its successive modifi-cations, remains the unifying factor governing the successive phases ofinterplay between physical and conceptual feelings. These decisions areimpossible for the nascent creature antecedently to the novelties in thephases of its concrescence. But this statement in its turn requires amplifi-

cation. With this amplification the doctrine, that the primary phase of atemporal actual entity is physical, is recovered. A 'physical feeling' is heredefined to be the feeling of another actuality. If the other actuality beobjectified by its conceptual feelings, the physical feeling of the subjectin question is termed 'hybrid/ Thus the primary phase is a hybrid physicalfeeling of God, in respect to God's conceptual feeling which is immedi-ately relevant to the universe 'given' for that concrescence. There is then,according to the Category of Conceptual Valuation, i.e., Categoreal Obliga-tion IV, a derived conceptual feeling which reproduces for the subject thedata and valuation of God's conceptual feeling. This conceptual feelingis the initial conceptual aim referred to in the preceding statement. In thissense, God can be termed the creator of each temporal actual entity. Butthe phrase is apt to be misleading by [344] its suggestion that the ultimatecreativity of the universe is to be ascribed to God's volition. The truemetaphysical position is that God is the aboriginal instance of this creativ-ity, and is therefore the aboriginal condition which qualifies its action. Itis the function of actuality to characterize the creativity, and God is theeternal primordial character. But,t of course, there is no meaning to'creativity' apart from its 'creatures,' and no meaning to 'God' apart fromthe 'creativity' and the 'temporal creatures,' and no meaning to the 'tem-poral creatures't apart from 'creativity' and 'God.'

Category II. There can be no duplication of any element in the ob-jective datum of the satisfaction of an actual entity, so far as concerns thefunction of that element in that satisfaction.

This is the 'Category of Objective Identity.' This category asserts the es-sential self-identity of any entity as regards its status in each individuali-zation of the universe. In such a concrescence one thing has one rdle,and cannot assume any duplicity. This is the very meaning of self-identity,that, in any actual confrontation of thing with thing, one thing cannotconfront itself in alien rdles. Any one thing remains obstinately itselfplaying a part with self-consistent unity. This category is one ground ofincompatibility.

Category III. There can be no 'coalescence' of diverse elements in theobjective datum of an actual entity, so far as concerns the functions ofthose elements in that satisfaction.

This is the 'Category of Objective Diversity.' Here* the term 'coalescence'means the self-contradictory notion of diverse elements exercising an ab-solute identity of function, devoid of the contrasts inherent in their di-versities. In other words, in a real complex unity each particular componentimposes its own particularity on its status. No entity can have an abstractstatus in a real unity. Its status must be such that only it can fill and onlythat actuality can supply.

[345] The neglect of this category is a prevalent error in metaphysicalreasoning. This category is another ground of incompatibility.

SECTION VI

The importance of these categories can only be understood by consider-ing each actual world in the light of a 'medium' leading up to the con-crescence of the actual entity in question. It will be remembered that thephrase actual world' has always reference to some one concrescence.

Any actual entity, which we will name A, feels other actual entities, fwhich we will name B, C, and D. Thus B, C, and D all lie in the actualworld of A. But C and D may lie in the actual world of B, and are thenfelt by it; also D may lie in the actual world of C and be felt by it. Thisexample might be simplified, or might be changed to one of any degree ofcomplication. Now B, as an initial datum for A's feeling, also presents Cand D for A to feel through its mediation. Also C, as an initial datum forA?s feeling, also presents D for A to feel through its mediation. Thus, inthis artificially simplified example, A has D presented for feeling throughthree distinct sources: (i) directly as a crude datum, (ii) by the mediationof B, and (iii) by the mediation of C. This threefold presentation is D, inits function of an initial datum for A's feeling of it, so far as concerns themediation of B and C. But, of course, the artificial simplification of themedium to two intermediaries is very far from any real case. The mediumbetween D and A consists of all those actual entities which lie in theactual world of A and not in the actual world of D. For the sake of sim-plicity the explanation will continue in terms of this threefold presen-tation.

There are thus three sources of feeling, D direct, D in its nexus withC, and D in its nexus with B. Thus in the basic phase of A's concresencethere arise three prehensions of the datum D. According to the first cate-gory [346] these prehensions are not independent. This subjective unityof the concrescence introduces negative prehensions, so that D in the di-rect feeling is not felt in its formal completeness, but objectified with theelimination of such of its prehensions as are inconsistent with D feltthrough the mediation of B, and through the mediation of C. Thus thethree component feelings of the first phasef are consistent, so as to passinto the integration of the second phase in which there is A's one feelingof a coherent objectification of D. Since D is necessarily self-consistent,the inconsistencies must arise from the subjective forms of the prehen-sions of D by B directly, by C directly, and by A directly. These incon-sistencies lead to the eliminations in A's total prehension of D.

In this process, the negative prehensions which effect the elimination arenot merely negligible. The process through which a feeling passes in con-stituting itself! also records itself in the subjective form of the integralfeeling. The negative prehensions have their own subjective forms whichthey contribute to the process. A feeling bears on itself the scars of itsbirth; it recollects as a subjective emotion its struggle for existence; it re-

tains the impress of what it might have been, but is not. It is for thisreason that what an actual entity has avoided as a datum for feeling mayyet be an important part of its equipment. The actual cannot be reducedto mere matter of fact in divorce from the potential.

The same principle of explanation also holds in the case of a con-ceptual prehension, in which the datum is an eternal object. In the firstphase of this conceptual prehension, there is this eternal object to befelt as a mere abstract capacity for giving definiteness to a physical feeling.But also there are the feelings of the objectifications of innumerable actualentities. Some of these physical feelings illustrate this same eternal objectas an element providing their definiteness. There are in this way diverseprehensions of the same eternal object; and by the first category thesevarious prehensions must be [347] consistent, so as to pass into the inte-gration of the subsequent phase in which there is one coherent complexfeeling, namely, a conceptual feeling of that eternal object. This sub-jective insistence on consistency may, from the beginning, replace thepositive feelings by negative prehensions.

SECTION VII

In the explanations of the preceding section, only the first categoryhas been explicitly alluded to. It must now be pointed out how the othercategories have been tacitly presupposed.

The fact that there is integration at all arises from the condition ex-pressed by the Category of Objective Identity. The same entity, be it actualentity or be it eternal object, cannot be felt twice in the formal constitu-tion of one concrescence. The incomplete phases with their many feelingsof one object are only to be interpreted in terms of the final satisfactionwith its one feeling of that one object Thus objective identity requiresintegration of the many feelings of one object into the one feeling ofthat object. The analysis of an actual entity is only intellectual, or, to speakwith a wider scope, only objective. Each actual entity is a cell with atomicunity. But in analysis it can only be understood as a process; it can onlybe felt as a process, that is to say, as in passage. The actual entity is divis-ible; but is in fact undivided. The divisibility can thus only refer to itsobjectifications in which it transcends itself. But such transcendence isself-revelation.

[348] +The third category is concerned with the antithesis to oneness,namely, diversity. An actual entity is not merely one; it is also definitelycomplex. But, to be definitely complex is to include definite diverse ele-ments in definite ways. The category of objective deversity expresses theinexorable condition—that a complex unity must provide for each of itscomponents a real diversity of status, with a reality which bears the samesense as its own reality and is peculiar to itself. In other words, a real unitycannot provide sham diversities of status for its diverse components.

This category is in truth only a particular application of the secondcategory. For a 'status' is after all something; and, according to the Cate-gory of Objective Identity, it cannot duplicate its r61e. Thus if the 'status7be the status of this, it cannot in the same sense be the status of that. Theprohibition of sham diversities of status sweeps away the 'class-theory't ofparticular substances, which was waveringly suggested by Locke (II,XXIII, 1), was more emphatically endorsed by Hume (Treatise, Bk. I,tPart I, Sect. 6), and has been adopted by Hume's followers. For the es-sence of a class is that it assigns no diversity of function to the membersof its extension. The members of a class are diverse members in virtueof mere logical disjunction. The 'class/ thus appealed to, is a mere mul-tiplicity. But in the prevalent discussion of classes, there are illegitimatetransitions to the notions of a 'nexus' and of a 'proposition.' The appeal toa class to perform the services of a proper entity is exactly analogous toan appeal to an imaginary terrier to kill a real rat.

+Thus the process of integration, which lies at the very heart of theconcrescence, is the urge imposed on the concrescent unity of that uni-verse by the three Categories of Subjective Unity, of Objective Identity, andof Objective Diversity. The oneness of the universe, and the oneness ofeach element in the universe, repeat themselves to the crack of doom inthe creative advance from creature to creature, each creature including initself the whole of history and exemplifying the self-identity of things andtheir mutual diversities.

SECTION VIII

This diversity of status, combined with the real unity of the components,means that the real synthesis of two component elements in the objectivedatum of a feeling [349] must be infected with the individual particulari-ties of each of the relata. Thus the synthesis in its completeness expressesthe joint particularities of that pair of relata, and can relate no others. Acomplex entity with this individual definiteness, arising out of determinate-ness of eternal objects, will be termed a 'contrast/ A contrast cannot beabstracted from the contrasted relata.

The most obvious examples of a contrast are to be found by confiningattention purely to eternal objects. The contrast between blue and redcannot be repeated as that contrast between any other pair of colours,or any pair of sounds, or between a colour and a sound. It is just the con-trast between blue and red, that and nothing else. Certain abstractions fromthat contrast, certain values inherent in it, can also be got from othercontrasts. But they are other contrasts, and not that contrast; and theabstractions are not 'contrasts' of the same categoreal type.

In another sense, a 'nexus' falls under the meaning of the term 'con-trast'; though we shall avoid this application of the term. What are or-dinarily termed 'relations' are abstractions from contrasts. A relation can

be found in many contrasts; and when it is so found, it is said to relatethe things contrasted. The term 'multiple contrast7 will be used whenthere are or may be more than two elements jointly contrasted, and it isdesired to draw attention to that fact. A multiple contrast is analysableinto component dual contrasts. But a multiple contrast is not a mere ag-gregation of dual contrasts. It is one contrast, over and above its com-ponent contrasts. This doctrine that a multiple contrast cannot be con-ceived as a mere disjunction of dual contrasts is the basis of the doctrineof emergent evolution. It is the doctrine of real unities being more thana mere collective disjunction of component elements. This doctrine hasthe same ground as the objection to the class-theory of particular sub-stances. The doctrine is a commonplace of art.

Bradley's discussions of relations are confused by his [350] failure todistinguish between relations and contrasts. A relation is a genus of con-trasts. He is then distressed—or would have been distressed if he had notbeen consoled by the notion of 'mereness' as in 'mere appearance'—tofind that a relation will not do the work of a contrast. It fails to contrast.Thus Bradley's argument proves that relations, among other things, are'mere'; that is to say, are indiscretions of the absolute, apings of realitywithout self-consistency.

SECTION IX

One use of the term 'contrast' is to mean that particularity of conjointunity which arises from the realized togetherness of eternal objects. Butthere is another, and more usual, sense of 'particularity/ This is the sensein which the term 'particular' is applied to an actual entity.

One actual entity has a status among other actual entities, not expres-sible wholly in terms of contrasts between eternal objects. For example,the complex nexus of ancient imperial Rome to European history is notwholly expressible in universals. It is not merely the contrast of a sort ofcity, imperial, Roman, ancient, with a sort of history of a sort of con-tinent, sea-indented, river-diversified, with alpine divisions, begirt by largercontinental masses and oceanic wastes, civilized, barbarized, christianized,commercialized, industrialized. The nexus in question does involve sucha complex contrast of universals. But it involves more. For it is the nexusof that Rome with that Europe. We cannot be conscious of this nexuspurely by the aid of conceptual feelings. This nexus is implicit, below con-sciousness, in our physical feelings. In part we are conscious of suchphysical feelings, and of that particularity of the nexus between particularactual entities. This consciousness takes the form of our consciousness ofparticular spatial and temporal relations between things directly perceived.But, as in the case of Rome and Europe, so far as con- \3S1] cerns the massof our far-reaching knowledge, the particular nexus between the partic-ular actualities in question ist only indicated by constructive referenceto the physical feelings of which we are conscious.

This peculiar particularity of the nexus between actual entities can beput in another way. Owing to the disastrous confusion, more especiallyby Hume, of conceptual feelings with perceptual feelings, the truismthat we can only conceive in terms of universals has been stretched tomean that we can only feel in terms of universals. This is untrue. Ourperceptual feelings feel particular existents; that is to say, a physicalfeeling, belonging to the percipient, feels the nexus between two otheractualities, A and B. It feels feelings of A which feel B, and feels feelingsof B which feel A. It integrates these feelings, so as to unify their identityof elements. These identical elements form the factor defining the nexusbetween A and B, a nexus also retaining the particular diversity of A andB in its uniting force.

Also the more complex multiple nexus between many actual entities inthe actual world of a percipient is felt by that percipient. But this nexus,as thus felt, can be abstracted from that particular percipient. It is thesame nexus for all percipients which include those actual entities in theiractual worlds. The multiple nexus is how those actual entities are reallytogether in all subsequent unifications of the universe, by reason of theobjective immortality of their real mutual prehensions of each other.

We thus arrive at the notion of the actual world of any actual entity,as a nexus whose objectification constitutes the complete unity of ob-jective datum for the physical feeling of that actual entity. This actualentity is the original percipient of that nexus. But any other actual entitywhich includes in its own actual world that original percipientf also in-cludes that previous nexus as a portion of its own actual world. Thus eachactual world is a nexus which in this sense is independent of its original[352] percipient. It enjoys an objective immortality in the future beyonditself.

Every nexus is a component nexus, first accomplished in some later phaseof concrescence of an actual entity, and ever afterwards having its statusin actual worlds as an unalterable fact, dated and located among theactual entities connected in itself. If in a nexus there be a realized con-trast of universals, this contrast is located in that actual entity to whichit belongs as first originated in one of its integrative feelings. Thus everyrealized contrast has a location, which is particular with the particularityof actual entities. It is a particular complex matter of fact, realized; and,because of its reality, a standing condition in every subsequent actualworld from which creative advance must originate.

It is this complete individual particularity of each actuality, and of eachnexus, and of each realized contrast, which is the reason for the threeCategoreal Conditions—of Subjective Unity, of Objective Identity, and ofObjective Diversity. The word 'event* is used sometimes in the sense of anexus of actual entities, and sometimes in the sense of a nexus as objecti-fied by universals. In either sense, it is a definite fact with a date.

The initial data of a complex feeling, as mere data, are many; though

as felt they are one in the objective unity of a pattern. Thus a nexus is arealized pattern of the initial data: though this pattern is merely relative tothe feeling, expressive of those factors in the many data by reason of whichthey can acquire their unity in the feeling. This is the second use of theterm nexus, mentioned above.

Thus, just as the 'feeling as one' cannot bear the abstraction from it ofthe subject, so the 'data as one' cannot bear the abstraction from it ofevery feeling which feels it as such. According to the ontological principle,the impartial nexus is an objective datum in the consequent nature of God;since it is somewhere and yet not by any necessity of its own nature im-plicated in the [353] feelings of any determined actual entity of the actualworld. The nexus involves realization somewhere. This is the first use ofthe term nexus.

In two extreme cases the initial data of a feeling have a unity of theirown. In one case, the data reduce to a single actual entity, other than thesubject of the feeling; and in the other case the data reduce to a singleeternal object. These are called 'primary feelings/ A particular feelingdivorced from its subject is nonsense.

There are thus two laws respecting the feelings constituting the com-plex satisfaction of an actual entity: (i) An entity can only be felt once,and (ii) the diverse feelings, in the same subject, of the same entity asdatum which are to be unified into one feeling, must be compatible in theirtreatment of the entity felt. In conformity with this pre-established har-mony, 'incompatibility' would have dictated from the beginning that some'feeling' be replaced by a negative prehension.

SECTION X

The subjective forms of feelings are best discussed in connection withthe different types of feelings which can arise. This classification into typeshas regard to the differences among feelings in respect to their initial data,their objective data, and their subjective forms. But these sources of dif-ference cannot wholly be kept separate.

A feeling is the appropriation of some elements in the universe to becomponents in the real internal constitution of its subject. The elementsare the initial data; they are what the feeling feels. But they are felt underan abstraction. The process of the feeling involves negative prehensionswhich effect elimination. Thus the initial data are felt under a 'perspective'which is the objective datum of the feeling.

In virtue of this elimination the components of the complex objectivedatum have become 'objects' intervening in the constitutiont of the sub-ject of the feeling. In the phraseology of mathematical physics a feelinghas a [354] 'vector' character. A feeling is the agency by which other thingsare built into the constitution of its one subject in process of concrescence.Feelings are constitutive of the nexus by reason of which the universe findsits unification ever renewed by novel concrescence. The universe is always

one, since there is no surveying it except from an actual entity which uni-fies it. Also the universe is always new, since the immediate actual entity isthe superject of feelings which are essentially novelties.

The essential novelty of a feeling attaches to its subjective form. Theinitial data, and even the nexus which is the objective datum, may haveserved other feelings with other subjects. But the subjective form is theimmediate novelty; it is how that subject is feeling that objective datum.There is no tearing this subjective form from the novelty of this con-crescence. It is enveloped in the immediacy of its immediate present. Thefundamental example of the notion 'quality inhering inf particular sub-stance' is afforded by 'subjective form inhering in feeling/ If we abstractthe form from the feeling, we are left with an eternal object as the rem-nant of subjective form.

A feeling can be genetically described in terms of its process of origina-tion, with its negative prehensions whereby its many initial data becomeits complex objective datum. In this process the subjective form originates,and carries into the feeling its own history transformed into the way inwhich the feeling feels. The way in which the feeling feels expresses howthe feeling came into being. It expresses the purpose which urged it for-ward, and the obstacles which it encountered, and the indeterminationswhich were dissolved by the originative decisions of the subject.

There are an indefinite number of types of feeling according to thecomplexity of the initial data which the feeling integrates, and accordingto the complexity of the objective datum which it finally feels. But thereare three primary types of feeling which enter into the forma- [355] tion ofall the more complex feelings. These types are: (i) that of simple physicalfeelings, (ii) that of conceptual feelings, and (iii) that of transmutedfeelings. In a simple physical feeling, the initial datum is a single actualentity; in a conceptual feeling, the objective datum is an eternal object;!in a transmuted feeling, the objective datum is a nexus of actual entities.Simple physical feelings and transmuted feelings make up the class ofphysical feelings.

In none of these feelings, taken in their original purity devoid of ac-cretions from later integrations, does the subjective form involve conscious-ness. Although in a propositional feeling the subjective form may involvejudgment, this element in the subjective form is not necessarily present.

One final remark must be added to the general description of a feeling.A feeling is a component in the concrescence of a novel actual entity. Thefeeling is always novel in reference to its data; since its subjective form,though it must always have reproductive reference to the data, is notwholly determined by them. The process of the concrescence is a progres-sive integration of feelings controlled by their subjective forms. In thissynthesis, feelings of an earlier phase sink into the components of somemore complex feeling of a later phase. Thus each phase adds its elementof novelty, until the final phase in which the one complex 'satisfaction' is

reached. Thus the actual entity, as viewed morphologically through its'satisfaction/ is novel in reference to any one of its component feelings. Itpresupposes those feelings. But conversely, no feeling can be abstractedeither from its data, or its subject. It is essentially a feeling aiming at thatsubject, and motivated by that aim. Thus the subjective form embodiesthe pragmatic aspect of the feeling; for the datum is felt with that subjec-tive form in order that the subject may be the superject which it is.

In the analysis of a feeling, whatever presents itself as also ante rem is adatum, whatever presents itself as \}S6] exclusively in re is subjective form,whatever presents itself in re and post rem is 'subject-superject/ This doc-trine of 'feeling' is the central doctrine respecting the becoming of anactual entity. In a feeling the actual world, selectively appropriated, is thepresupposed datum, not formless but with its own realized form selectivelygermane, in other words 'objectified/ The subjective form is the ingressionof novel form peculiar to the new particular fact, and with its peculiarmode of fusion with the objective datum. The subjective form in abstrac-tion from the feeling is merely a complex eternal object. In the becoming,it meets the 'data' which are selected from the actual world. In otherwords, the data are already 'in being/ There the term 'in being' is for themoment used as equivalent to the term 'in realization/

SECTION XI

**A subjective form has two factors, its qualitative pattern and its patternof intensive quantity. But these two factors of pattern cannot wholly beconsidered in abstraction from each other. For the relative intensities ofthe qualitative elements in the qualitative pattern are among the relationalfactors which constitute that qualitative pattern. Also conversely, there arequalitative relations among the qualitative elements and they constitute anabstract qualitative pattern for the qualitative relations. The pattern ofintensities is not only the variety of qualitative elements with such-and-such intensities; but it is also the variety of qualitative elements, as insuch-and-such an abstract qualitative pattern, with such-and-such inten-sities. Thus the two patterns are not really separable. It is true that thereis an abstract qualitative pattern, and an abstract intensive pattern; but inthe fused pattern the abstract qualitative pattern lends itselft to the in-tensities, and the abstract intensive pattern lends itself to the qualities.

Further, the subjective form cannot be absolutely dis- [357] joined fromthe pattern of the objective datum. Some elements of the subjective formcan be thus disjoined; and they form the subjective form as in abstractionfrom the patterns of the objective datum. But the full subjective form can-not be abstracted from the pattern of the objective datum. The intel-lectual disjunction is not a real separation. Also the subjective form, amidits own original elements, always involves reproduction of the pattern ofthe objective datum.

As a simple example of this description of a feeling, consider the audi-

234 The Theory of Prehensions

tion of sound. In order to avoid unnecessary complexity, let the sound beone definite note. The audition of this note is a feeling. This feeling hasfirst an auditor, who is the subject of the feeling. But the auditor would notbe the auditor that he is apart from this feeling of his.

Secondly, there is the complex ordered environment composed of certainother actual entities which, however vaguely, is felt by reason of this audi-tion. This environment is the datum of this feeling. It is the externalworld, as grasped systematically in this feeling. In this audition it is feltunder the objectification of vague spatial relations, and as exhibiting musi-cal qualities. But the analytic discrimination of this datum of the feelingis in part vague and conjectural, so far as consciousness is concerned: thereis the antecedent physiological functioning of the human body, and thepresentational immediacy of the presented locus.

There is also an emotional sensory pattern, the subjective form, which ismore definite and more easily analysable. The note, in its capacity of aprivate sensation, has pitch, quality, and intensity. It is analysable into itsfundamental tone, and a selection of its overtones. This analysis reveals anabstract qualitative pattern which is the complex relatedness of the funda-mental tone-quality* with the tone-qualities of its select overtones. Thisqualitative pattern may, or may not, include relations of a spatial type, ifsome of the overtones come [358] from instruments spatially separate—f forexample, from a spatial pattern of tuning forks.

The fundamental tone, and its overtones, have, each of them, their ownintensities. This pattern of intensities can be analysed into the relativeintensities of the various tones and the absolute intensity which is thetotal loudness. The scale of relative intensities enters into the final qualityof the note, with some independence of its absolute loudness.

Also the spatial pattern of the tuning forks and the resonance of the mu-sic chamber enter into this quality. But these also concern the datum of thefeeling. Also in this integration of feeling we must include the qualitativeand quantitative auditory contributions derived from various nerve-routes ofthe body. In this way the animal body, as part of the external world, takesa particularly prominent place in the pattern of the datum of the feeling.Also in the subjective form we must reckon qualities of joy and distaste, ofadversion and of aversion, which attach integrally to the audition, and alsodifferentially to various elements of the audition. In an earlier phase of theauditor, there is audition divested of such joy and distaste. This earlier,bare audition does not in its own nature determine this additional qualifi-cation. It originates as the audition becomes an element in a higher syn-thesis, and yet it is an element in the final component feeling. Thus theaudition gains complexity of subjective form by its integration with otherfeelings. Also, though we can discern three patterns, namely, the pattern ofthe datum, the pattern of emotional quality, and the pattern of emotionalintensity, we cannot analyse either of the latter patterns in completeseparation either from the pattern of the datum, or from each other.

The Theory of Feelings 235

The final concrete component in the satisfaction is the audition with itssubject, its datum, and its emotional pattern as finally completed. It is aparticular fact not to be torn away from any of its elements.

SECTION XII

[359] Prehensions are not atomic; they can be divided into other pre-hensions and combined into other prehensions. Also prehensions are notindependent of each other. The relation between their subjective forms isconstituted by the one subjective aim which guides their formation. Thiscorrelation of subjective forms is termed 'the mutual sensitivity' of prehen-sions (cf. Part I, Ch. II, Sect. HI, Categoreal Obligation VII, The Cate-gory of Subjective Harmony7).

The prehensions in disjunction are abstractions; each of them is its sub-ject viewed in that abstract objectification. The actuality is the totality ofprehensions with subjective unity in process of concrescence into concreteunity.

There are an indefinite number of prehensions, overlapping, subdividing,and supplementary to each other. The principle, according to which a pre-hension can be discovered, is to take any component in the objectivedatum of the satisfaction; in the complex pattern of the subjective formof the satisfaction there will be a component with direct relevance to thiselement in the datum. Then in the satisfaction, there is a prehension ofthis component of the objective datum with that component of the totalsubjective form as its subjective form.

The genetic growth of this prehension can then be traced by consideringthe transmission of the various elements of the datum from the actualworld, and—in the case of eternal objects—their origination in the con-ceptual prehensions. There is then a growth of prehensions, with integra-tions, eliminations, and determination of subjective forms. But the deter-mination f of successive phases of subjective forms, whereby the integra-tions have the characters that they do have, depends on the unity of thesubject imposing a mutual sensitivity upon the prehensions. Thus a pre-hension, considered genetically, can never free itself from the incurableatomicity [360] of the actual entity to which it belongs. The selection of asubordinate prehension from the satisfaction—as described above—involvesa hypothetical, propositional point of view. The fact is the satisfaction asone. There is some arbitrariness in taking a component from the datumwith a component from the subjective form, and in considering them, onthe ground of congruity, as forming a subordinate prehension. The justifi-cation is that the genetic process can be thereby analysed. If no suchanalysis of the growth of that subordinate prehension can be given, thenthere has been a faulty analysis of the satisfaction. This relation betweenthe satisfaction and the genetic process is expressed in the eighth and ninthcategories of explanation (cf. Part I, Ch. II, Sect. II).

CHAPTER IITHE PRIMARY FEELINGS

SECTION I

[361] A 'simple physical feeling' entertained in one subject is a feelingfor which the initial datum is another single actual entity, and the ob-jective datum is another feeling entertained by the latter actual entity.

Thus in a simple physical feeling there are two actual entities con-cerned. One of them is the subject of that feeling, and the other is theinitial datum of the feeling. A second feeling is also concerned, namely,the objective datum of the simple physical feeling. This second feeling isthe 'objectification' of its subject for the subject of the simple physicalfeeling. The initial datum is objectified as being the subject of the feelingwhich is the objective datum: the objectification is the 'perspective' of theinitial datum.

A simple physical feeling is an act of causation. The actual entity whichis the initial datum is the 'cause/ the simple physical feeling is the 'effect/and the subject entertaining the simple physical feeling is the actual entity'conditioned' by the effect. This 'conditioned' actual entity will also becalled the 'effect.' All complex causal action can be reduced to a complexof such primary components. Therefore simple physical feelings will alsobe called 'causal' feelings.

But it is equally true to say that a simple physical feeling is the mostprimitive type of an act of perception, devoid of consciousness. The actualentity which is the initial datum is the actual entity perceived, the ob-jective datum is the 'perspective' under which that actual entity is per-ceived, and the subject of the simple physical feeling [362] is the perceiver.This is not an example of conscious perception. For the subjective formof a simple physical feeling does not involve consciousness, unless acquiredin subsequent phases of integration. It seems as though in practice, forhuman beings at least, only transmuted feelings acquire consciousness,never simple physical feelings. Consciousness originates in the higherphases of integration and illuminates those phases with the greater clarityand distinctness.

Thus a simple physical feeling is one feeling which feels another feeling.But the feeling felt has a subject diverse from the subject of the feelingwhich feels it. A multiplicity of simple physical feelings entering into thepropositional unity of a phase constitutes the first phase in the concres-cence of the actual entity which is the common subject of all these feel-

ings. The limitation, whereby the actual entities felt are severally reducedto the perspective of one of their own feelings, is imposed by the Gate-goreal Condition of Subjective Unity, requiring a harmonious compatibilityin the feelings of each incomplete phase. Thus the negative prehensions,involved in the production of any one feeling, are not independent of theother feelings. The subjective forms of feelings depend in part on thenegative prehensions. This primary phase of simple physical feelings con-stitutes the machinery by reason of which the creativity transcends theworld already actual, and yet remains conditioned by that actual world inits new impersonation.

Owing to the vagueness of our conscious analysis of complex feelings,perhaps we never consciously discriminate one simple physical feeling inisolation. But all our physical relationships arc made up of such simplephysical feelings, as their atomic bricks. Apart from inhibitions or additions,weakenings or intensifications, due to the history of its production, thesubjective form of a physical feeling is re-enaction of the subjective formof the feeling felt. Thus the cause passes on its feeling to be reproducedby the new subject as its own, and yet [363] as inseparable from the cause.There is a flow of feeling. But the re-enaction is not perfect. The cate-goreal demands of the concrescence require adjustments of the pattern ofemotional intensities. The cause is objectively in the constitution of theeffect, in virtue of being the feeler of the feeling reproduced in the effectwith partial equivalence of subjective form. Also the cause's feeling has itsown objective datum, and its own initial datum. Thus this antecedentinitial datum has now entered into the datum of the effect's feeling atsecond-hand through the mediation of the cause.

The reason why the cause is objectively in the effectt is that the cause'sfeeling cannot, as a feeling, be abstracted from its subject which is thecause. This passage of the cause into the effect is the cumulative characterof time. The irreversibility of time depends on this character.

Note that in the 'satisfaction' there is an integration of simple physicalfeelings. No simple physical feeling need be distinguished in consciousness.Physical feelings may be merged with feelings of any type, and of whatevercomplexity. A simple physical feeling has the dual character of being thecause's feeling re-enacted for the effect as subject. But this transference offeeling effects a partial identification of cause with effect, and not a mererepresentation of the cause. It is the cumulation of the universe and not astage-play about it. In a simple feeling there is a double particularity inreference to the actual world, the particular cause and the particular ef-fect. In Locke's language (III, III, 6), and with his limitation of thought,a simple feeling is an idea in one mind 'determined to this or that particu-lar existent.' Locke is here expressing what only metaphysicians can doubt.

By reason of this duplicity in a simple feeling there is a vector characterwhich transfers the cause into the effect. It is a feeling from the causewhich acquires the subjectivity of the new effect without loss of its original

[364] subjectivity in the cause. Simple physical feelings embody the re-productive character of nature, and also the objective immortality of thepast. In virtue of these feelings time is the conformation of the immediatepresent to the past. Such feelings are 'conformar feelings.

The novel actual entity, which is the effect, is the reproduction of themany actual entities of the past. But in this reproduction there is abstrac-tion from their various totalities of feeling. This abstraction is required bythe categoreal conditions for compatible synthesis in the novel unity. Thisabstractive 'objectification' is rendered possible by reason of the 'divisible'character of the satisfactions of actual entities. By reason of this 'divisible'character causation is the transfer of a feeling, and not of a total satisfac-tion. The other feelings are dismissed by negative prehensions, owing totheir lack of compliance with categoreal demands.

A simple physical feeling enjoys a characteristic which has been variouslydescribed as 're-enaction/ 'reproduction/ and 'conformation/ This charac-teristic can be more accurately explained in terms of the eternal objectsinvolved. There are eternal objects determinant of the definiteness of theobjective datum which is the 'cause/ and eternal objects determinant ofthe definiteness of the subjective form belonging to the 'effect/ Whenthere is re-enaction there is one eternal object with two-way functioning,namely, as partial determinant of the objective datum, and as partial de-terminant of the subjective form. In this two-way role, the eternal objectis functioning relationally between the initial data on the one hand andthe concrescent subject on the other. It is playing one self-consistent role inobedience to the Category of Objective Identity.

Physical science is the science investigating spatio-temporal and quan-titative characteristics of simple physical feelings. The actual entities of theactual world are bound together in a nexus of these feelings. Also in thecreative advance, the nexus proper to an antecedent [365] actual world isnot destroyed. It is reproduced and added to, by the new bonds of feelingwith the novel actualities which transcend it and include it. But thesebonds have always their vector character. Accordingly the ultimate physicalentities for physical science are always vectors indicating transference. Inthe world there is nothing static. But there is reproduction; and hence thepermanence which is the result of order, and the cause of it. And yet thereis always change; for time is cumulative as well as reproductive, and thecumulation of the many is not their reproduction as many.

This section on simple physical feelings lays the foundation of the treat-ment of cosmology in the philosophy of organism. It contains the discus-sion of the ultimate elements from which a more complete philosophicaldiscussion of the physical world—that is to say, of nature—must be derived.In the first place an endeavour has been made to do justice alike to theaspect of the world emphasized by Descartes and to the atomism of themodern quantum theory. Descartes saw the natural world as an extensivespatial plenum, enduring through time. Modern physicists see energy

transferred in definite quanta. This quantum theory also has analogues inrecent neurology. Again fatigue is the expression of cumulation- it is phys-ical memory. Further,! causation and physical memory spring from thesame root: both of them are physical perception. Cosmology must doequal justice to atomism, to continuity, to causation, to memory, to percep-tion, to qualitative and quantitative forms of energy, and to extension.But so far there has been no reference to the ultimate vibratory charactersof organisms and to the 'potential' element in nature.

SECTION II

Conceptual feelings and simple causal feelings constitute the two mainspecies of 'primary' feelings. All other feelings of whatever complexityarise out of a process of integration which starts with a phase of these[366] primary feelings. There is, however, a difference between the species.An actual entity in the actual world of a subject must enter into the con-crescence of that subject by some simple causal feeling, however vague,trivial, and submerged. Negative prehensions may eliminate its distinctiveimportance. But in some way, by some trace of causal feeling, the remoteactual entity is prehended positively. In the case of an eternal object,there is no such necessity. In any given concrescence, it may be includedpositively by means of a conceptual feeling; but it may be excluded by anegative prehension. The actualities have to be felt, while the pure po-tentials can be dismissed. So far as concerns their functionings as objects,this is the great distinction between an actual entity and an eternal object.The one is stubborn matter of fact; and the other never loses its 'accent7 ofpotentiality.

In each concrescence there is a twofold aspect of the creative urge. Inone aspect there is the origination of simple causal feelings; and in theother aspect there is the origination of conceptual feelings. These con-trasted aspects will be called the physical and the mental poles of an ac-tual entity. No actual entity is devoid of either pole; though their relativeimportance differs in different actual entities. Also conceptual feelings donot necessarily involve consciousness; though there can be no consciousfeelings which do not involve conceptual feelings as elements in thesynthesis.

Thus an actual entity is essentially dipolar, with its physical and mentalpoles; and even the physical world cannot be properly understood withoutreference to its other side, which is the complex of mental operations. Theprimary mental operations are conceptual feelings.

A conceptual feeling is feeling an eternal object in the primary meta-physical character of being an 'object/ that is to say, feeling its capacityfor being a realized determinant of process. Immanence and transcendenceare the characteristics of an object: as a realized determinant it [367] isimmanent; as a capacity for determination it is transcendent; in both roles

it is relevant to something not itself. There is no character belonging tothe actual apart from its exclusive determination by selected eternal ob-jects. The definiteness of the actual arises from the exclusiveness of eternalobjects in their function as determinants. If the actual entity be this, thenby the nature of the case it is not that or that. The fact of incompatiblealternatives is the ultimate fact in virtue of which there is definite charac-ter. A conceptual feeling is the feeling of an eternal object in respect to itsgeneral capacity as a determinant of character, including thereby its ca-pacity of exclusiveness. In the technical phraseology of these lectures, aconceptual feeling is a feeling whose 'datum' is an eternal object. Anal-ogously a negative prehension is termed 'conceptual'! when its datum isan eternal object. In a conceptual feeling there is no necessary progressfrom the 'initial data' to the 'objective datum/ The two may be identical,except in so far as conceptual feelings with diverse sources of originationacquire integration.

Conceptual prehensions, positive or negative, constitute the primaryoperations among those belonging to the mental pole of an,actual entity.

SECTION III

The subjective form of a conceptual feeling has the character of a Val-uation/ and this notion must now be explained.

A conceptual feeling arises in some incomplete phase of its subject andpasses into a supervening phase in which it has found integration withother feelings. In this supervening phase, the eternal object, which is thedatum of the conceptual feeling, is an ingredient in some sort of datum inwhich the other components are the objective data of other feelings in theearlier phase. This new datum is the integrated datum; it will be some sortof 'contrast/ By the first categoreal condition the feelings [368] of theearlier phase are compatible for integration. Thus the supervention of thelater phase does not involve elimination by negative prehensions; sucheliminations of positive prehensions in the concrescent subject woulddivide that subject into many subjects, and would divide these many sub-jects from the superject. But, though there can be no elimination from thesupervening phase as a whole, there may be elimination from some newintegral feeling which is merely one component of that phase.

But in the formation of this integrated datum there must be determina-tion of exactly how this eternal object has ingress into that datum con-jointly with the remaining eternal objects and actual entities derived fromthe other feelings. This determination is effected by the subjective formsof the component conceptual feelings. Again it is to be remembered that,by the first categoreal condition, this subjective form is not independent ofthe other feelings in the earlier phase, and thus is such as to effect thisdetermination. Also the integral feeling has its subjective form with itspattern of intensiveness. This patterned intensiveness regulates the dis-

tinctive lelative importance of each element of the datum as felt in thatfeeling. This intensive regulation of that eternal objectf as felt in the in-tegrated datum, is determined by the subjective form of the conceptualfeeling. Yet again, by reference to the first, and seventh, categoreal condi-tions, this intensive form of the conceptual feeling has dependence also inthis respect on the other feelings of the earlier phase. Thus, according asthe valuation of the conceptual feeling is a Valuation up' or a Valuationdown/ the importance of the eternal object as felt in the integrated feel-ing is enhanced, or attenuated. Thus the valuation is both qualitative, de-termining how the eternal object is to be utilized, and is also intensive,determining what importance that utilization is to assume.

Thus a valuation has three characteristics:

(i) According to the Categories of Subjective Unity, and [369] of Sub-jective Harmony, the valuation is dependent on the other feelings in itsphase of origination.

(ii) The valuation determines in what status the eternal object has in-gression into the integrated nexus physically felt.

(iii) The valuation values up, or down, so as to determine the intensiveimportance accorded to the eternal object by the subjective form of theintegral feeling.

These three characteristics of an integral feeling, derived from its con-ceptual components, are summed up in the term 'valuation/

But though these three characteristics are included in a valuation, theyare merely the outcome of the subjective aim of the subject, determiningwhat it is itself integrally to be, in its own character of the superject of itsown process.

SECTION IV

Consciousness concerns the subjective form of a feeling. But such a sub-jective form requires a certain type of objective datum. A subjective formin abstraction loses its reality, and sinks into an eternal object capable ofdetermining a feeling into that distinctive type of definiteness. But whenthe eternal object 'informs' a feeling it can only so operate in virtue of itsconformation to the other components which jointly constitute the defi-niteness of the feeling. The moral of this slight discussion must now beapplied to the notion of 'consciousness/ Consciousness is an element infeeling which belongs to its subjective form. But there can only be thatsort of subjective form when the objective datum has an adequate charac-ter. Further, the objective datum can only assume this character when it isderivate from initial data which carry in their individual selves the re-ciprocal possibilities of this objective synthesis.

A pure conceptual feeling in its first mode of origination never involvesconsciousness. In this respect a pure mental feeling, conceptual or proposi-tional, is analogous [370] to a pure physical feeling. A primary feeling of

242 The Theory of Prehensions

either type, or a propositional feeling, can enrich its subjective form withconsciousness only hy means of its alliances.

Whenever there is consciousness there is some element of recollection.It recalls earlier phases from the dim recesses of the unconscious. Long agothis truth was asserted in Plato's doctrine of reminiscence. No doubt Platowas directly thinking of glimpses of eternal truths lingering in a soulderivate from a timeless heaven of pure form. Be that as it may, then in awider sense consciousness enlightens experience which precedes it, andcould be without it if considered as a mere datum.

Hume, with opposite limitations to his meaning, asserts the same doc-trine. He maintains that we can never conceptually entertain what we havenever antecedently experienced through impressions of sensation. Thephilosophy of organism generalizes the notion of 'impressions of sensation'into that of 'pure physical feeling/ Even then Hume's assertion is too un-guarded according to Hume's own showing. But the immediate point isthe deep-seated alliance of consciousness with recollection both for Platoand for Hume.

Here we maintain the doctrine that, in the analysis of the origination ofany conscious feeling, some component physical feelings are to be found;and conversely, whenever there is consciousness, there is some componentof conceptual functioning. For the abstract element in the concrete fact isexactly what provokes our consciousness. The consciousness is what arisesin some process of synthesis of physical and mental operations. In histdoctrine of ideas, Locke goes further than Hume and is, as I think, moreaccurate in expressing the facts; though Hume adds something whichLocke omits.

Locke upholds the direct conscious apprehension of 'things without'(e.g.,t Essay, II, XXI, 1), otherwise termed 'exterior things' (II, XXIII, 1),or 'this or that particular existence' (III, III, 6), and illustrated by an in-dividual nurse and an individual mother (III, III, 7). [371] In the philos-ophy of organism the nexus, which is the basis for such direct apprehen-sion, is provided by the physical feelings. The philosophy of organismhere takes the opposite road to that taken alike by Descartes and by Kant.Both of these philosophers accepted (Descartes with hesitations, and Kantwithout question) the traditional subjectivist sensationalism, and assignedthe intuition of 'things without' peculiarly to the intelligence.

Hume's addition consists in expressing and discussing, with the utmostclarity, the traditional sensationalist dogma. Thus for Hume, as for Lockewhen he remembers to speak in terms of this doctrine, an 'impression' isthe conscious apprehension of a universal. For example, he writes {Trea-tise, Bk. I,t Part I, Ch. I), "That idea of red, which we form in the dark,and that impression which strikes our eyes in sunshine, differ only in de-gree, not in nature."t This means that a consistent sensationalism cannotdistinguish between a percept and a concept. Hume had not in his mind(at least when philosophizing, though he admits it for other sorts of 'prac-

The Primary Feelings 243

tice') the fourth category of explanation, that no entity can be abstractedfrom its capacity to function as an object in the process of the actual world.To function as an object' is 'to be a determinant of the definiteness of anactual occurrence/ According to the philosophy of organism, a pure con-cept does not involve consciousness, at least in our human experience.Consciousness arises when a synthetic feeling integrates physical and con-ceptual feelings. Traditional philosophy in its account of conscious per-ception has exclusively fixed attention on its pure conceptual side; andthereby has made difficulties for itself in the theory of knowledge. Locke,with his naive good sense, assumes that perception involves more than thisconceptual side; though he fails to grasp the inconsistency of this assump-tion with the extreme subjectivist sensational doctrine. Physical feelingsform the non-conceptual element in our awareness of [372] nature.1 Also,all awareness, even awareness of concepts, requires at least the synthesis ofphysical feelings with conceptual feeling. In awareness actuality, as aprocess in fact, is integrated with the potentialities which illustrate eitherwhat it is and might not be, or what it is not and might be. In otherwords, there is no consciousness without reference to definiteness, affirma-tion, and negation. Also affirmation involves its contrast with negation,and negation involves its contrast with affirmation. Further, affirmationand negation are alike meaningless apart from reference to the definitenessof particular actualities. Consciousness is how we feel the affirmation-negation contrast. Conceptual feeling is the feeling of an unqualified nega-tion; that is to say, it is the feeling of a definite eternal object with thedefinite extrusion of any particular realization. Consciousness requires thatthe objective datum should involve (as one side of a contrast) a qualifiednegative determined to some definite situation. It will be found later (cf.Ch. IV) that this doctrine implies that there is no consciousness apartfrom propositions as one element in the objective datum.

1 Cf. The Concept of Nature, Ch. I.

CHAPTER IIITHE TRANSMISSION OF FEELINGS

SECTION I

[373] According to the ontological principle there is nothing whichfloats into the world from nowhere. Everything in the actual world is re-ferable to some actual entity. It is either transmitted from an actual entityin the past, or belongs to the subjective aim of the actual entity to whoseconcrescence it belongs. This subjective aim is both an example and a limi-tation of the ontological principle. It is an example, in that the principle ishere applied to the immediacy of concrescent fact. The subject completesitself during the process of concrescence by a self-criticism of its ownincomplete phases. In another sense the subjective aim limits the on-tological principle by its own autonomy. But the initial stage of its aim isan endowment which the subject inherits from the inevitable ordering ofthings, conceptually realized in the nature of God. The immediacy of theconcrescent subject is constituted by its living aim at its own self-constitu-tion. Thus the initial stage of the aim is rooted in the nature of God, andits completion depends on the self-causation of the subject-superject. Thisfunction of God is analogous to the remorseless working of things inGreek and in Buddhist thought. The initial aim is the best for that im-passe. But if the best be bad, then the ruthlessness of God can be personi-fied as Ate, the goddess of mischief. The chaff is burnt. What is inexorablein God, is valuation as an aim towards 'order'; and 'order' means 'societypermissive of actualities with patterned intensity of feeling arising fromadjusted con- [374] trasts/t In this sense God is the principle of concretion;namely, he is that actual entity from which each temporal concrescencereceives that initial aim from which its self-causation starts. That aimdetermines the initial gradations of relevance of eternal objects for con-ceptual feeling; and constitutes the autonomous subject in its primaryphase of feelings with its initial conceptual valuations, and with its initialphysical purposes. Thus the transition of the creativity from an actualworld to the correlate novel concrescence is conditioned by the relevanceof God's all-embracing conceptual valuations to the particular possibilitiesof transmission from the actual world, and by its relevance to the variouspossibilities of initial subjective form available for the initial feelings. Inthis way there is constituted the concrescent subject in its primary phasewith its dipolar constitution, physical and mental, indissoluble.

244

If we prefer the phraseology, we can say that God and the actual worldjointly constitute the character of the creativity for the initial phase of thenovel concrescence. The subject, thus constituted, is the autonomous mas-ter of its own concrescence into subject-superject. It passes from a sub-jective aim in concrescence into a superject with objective immortality. Atany stage it is subject-superject. According to this explanation, self-deter-mination is always imaginative in its origin. The deterministic efficientcausation is the inflow of the actual world in its own proper character ofits own feelings, with their own intensive strength, felt and re-enacted bythe novel concrescent subject. But this re-enaction has a mere character ofconformation to pattern. The subjective valuation is the work of novelconceptual feeling; and in proportion to its importance, acquired in com-plex processes of integration and reintegration, this autonomous concep-tual element modifies the subjective forms throughout the whole range offeeling in that concrescence and thereby guides the integrations.

In so far as there is negligible autonomous energy, the [375] subjectmerely receives the physical feelings, confirms their valuations according tothe 'order' of that epoch, and transmits by reason of its own objective im-mortality. Its own flash of autonomous individual experience is negligiblefor the science which is tracing transmissions up to the conscious ex-perience of a final observer. But as soon as individual experience is notnegligible, the autonomy of the subject in the modification of its initialsubjective aim must be taken into account. Each creative act is the uni-verse incarnating itself as one, and there is nothing above it by way of finalcondition.

SECTION II

The general doctrine of the previous section requires an examination ofprinciples regulating the transmission of feelings into data for novel feel-ings in a new concrescence. Since no feeling can be abstracted from its sub-ject, this transmission is merely another way of considering the objectifica-tion of actual entities. A feeling will be called 'physical' when its datuminvolves objectifications of other actual entities. In the previous chapterthe special case of 'simple physical feelings' was discussed. A feeling be-longing to this special case has as its datum only one actual entity, andthis actual entity is objectified by one of its feelings. All the more com-plex kinds of physical feelings arise in subsequent phases of concrescence,in virtue of integrations of simplet physical feelings with each other andwith conceptual feelings. But before proceeding to these more complexphysical feelings, a subdivision of simple physical feelings must be con-sidered. Such feelings are subdivided into 'pure physical feelings' and 'hy-brid physical feelings/ In a 'pure physical feeling' the actual entity whichis the datum is objectified by one of its own physical feelings. Thus havingregard to the 're-enaction' which is characteristic of the subjective form of

a simple physical feeling, we have—in the case of the simpler actual en-tities—an example of the transference of energy in the physical [376]world. When the datum is an actual entity of a highly complex grade, thephysical feeling by which it is objectified as a datum may be of a highlycomplex character, and the simple notion of a transference of some formof energy to the new subject may entirely fail to exhaust the importantaspects of the pure physical feeling in question.

In a 'hybrid physical feeling' the actual entity forming the datum isobjectified by one of its own conceptual feelings. Thus having regard tothe element of autonomy which is characteristic of the subjective form ofa conceptual feeling, we have—in the case of the more complex actualentities—an example of the origination and direction of energy in thephysical world. In general, this simplified aspect of a hybrid physical feel-ing does not exhaust its role in the concrescence of its subject.

The disastrous separation of body and mind, characteristic of philo-sophical systems which are in any important respect derived from Car-tesianism, is avoided in the philosophy of organism by the doctrines ofhybrid physical feelings and of the transmuted feelings. In these waysconceptual feelings pass into the category of physical feelings. Also con-versely, physical feelings give rise to conceptual feelings, and conceptualfeelings give rise to other conceptual feelings—according to the doctrinesof the Categories of Conceptual Valuation (Category IV), and of Con-ceptual Reversion (Category V), to be discussed in the subsequent sec-tions of this chapter.

One important characteristic of a hybrid feeling is the intensity of theconceptual feeling which originates from it, according to the Category ofSubjective Valuation. In the next section, this Categoreal Condition of'Conceptual Valuation' is considered in relation to all physical feelings,'pure' and 'hybrid' alike. The present section will only anticipate that dis-cussion so far as hybrid feelings are concerned. Thus the part of the generalcategory now relevant can be formulated:

[377] A hybrid physical feeling originates for its subject a conceptualfeeling with the same datum as that of the conceptual feeling of the ante-cedent subject. But the two conceptual feelings in the two subjects re-spectively may have different subjective forms.

There is an autonomy in the formation of the subjective forms of con-ceptual feelings, conditioned only by the unity of the subject as expressedin categoreal conditions I, VII, and VIII. These conditions for unity cor-relate the sympathetic subjective form of the hybrid feeling with theautonomous subjective form of the derivative conceptual feeling with thesame subject.

There are evidently two sub-species of hybrid feelings: (i) those whichfeel the conceptual feelings of temporal actual entities, and (ii) thosewhich feel the conceptual feelings of God.

The objectification of God in a temporal subject is effected by the hy-

brid feelings with God's conceptual feelings as data. Those of God's feel-ings which are positively prehended are those with some compatibility ofcontrast, or of identity, with physical feelings transmitted from the tem-poral world. But when we take God into account, then we can assert with-out any qualification Hume's principle, that all conceptual feelings arederived from physical feelings. The limitation of Hume's principle intro-duced by the consideration of the Category of Conceptual Reversion(cf. Sect. Ill of this chapter) is to be construed as referring merely to thetransmission from the temporal world, leaving God out of account. Apartfrom the intervention of God, there could be nothing new in the world,and no order in the world. The course of creation would be a dead levelof ineffectiveness, with all balance and intensity progressively excluded bythe cross currents of incompatibility. The novel hybrid feelings derivedfrom God, with the derivative sympathetic conceptual valuations, are thefoundations of progress. [378]

SECTION III

Conceptual feelings are primarily derivate from physical feelings, andsecondarily from each other. In this statement, the consideration of God'sintervention is excluded. When this intervention is taken into account,all conceptual feelings must be derived from physical feelings. Unfetteredconceptual valuation, 'infinite' in Spinoza's sense of that term, is onlypossible once in the universe; since that creative act is objectively immortalas an inescapable condition characterizing creative action.

But, unless otherwise stated, only the temporal entities of the actualworld will be considered. We have to discuss the categoreal conditions forsuch derivation of conceptual feelings from the physical feelings relatingto the temporal world. By the Categoreal Condition of Subjective Unity-Category I—the initial phase of physical feelings has the propositionalunity of feelings compatible for integration into one feeling of the actualworld. But the completed determination of the subjective form of thisfinal ''satisfaction' awaits the origination of conceptual feelings whosesubjective forms introduce the factor of Valuation/ that is, Valuation up'or Valuation down/

Thus a supplementary phase succeeds to the initial purely physicalphase. This supplementary phase starts with two subordinate phases ofconceptual origination, and then passes into phases of integration, and ofreintegration, in which propositional feelings, and intellectual feelings, mayemerge. In the present chapter we are concerned with the first two phasesof merely conceptual origination. These are not phases of conceptualanalysis, but of conceptual valuation. The subsequent analytic phases in-volve propositional feelings, and in certain circumstances issue in con-sciousness. But in this chaptert we are merely concerned with blind con-ceptual valuation, and with the effect of such valuation upon physical

feel- [379] ings which lie in the future beyond the actual entities in whichsuch valuations occur.

The initial problem is to discover the principles according to whichsome eternal objects are prehended positively and others are prehendednegatively. Some are felt and others are eliminated.

In the solution of this problem five* additional categoreal conditionsmust be added to the three such conditions which have already been ex-plained. The conditions have regard to the origination, and coordination,of conceptual feelings. They govern the general process of 'conceptualimagination/ so far as concerns its origination from physical experience.

Category IV. The Category of Conceptual Valuation. From each physi-cal feeling there is the derivation of a purely conceptual feeling whosedatum is the eternal object exemplified in the definiteness of the actualentity, or oft the nexus, physically felt.

This category maintains the old principle that mentality originates fromsensitive experience. It lays down the principle that all sensitive experienceoriginates mental operations. It does not, however, mean that there is noorigination of other mental operations derivative from these primary men-tal operations. Nor does it mean that these mental operations involveconsciousness, which is the product of intricate integration.

The mental pole originates as the conceptual counterpart of operationsin the physical pole. The two poles are inseparable in their origination.The mental pole starts with the conceptual registration of the physicalpole. This conceptual registration constitutes the sole datum of experienceaccording to the sensationalist school. Writers of this school entirelyneglect physical feelings, originating in the physical pole. Hume's 'im-pressions of sensation' and Kant's sensational data are considered in termsonly applicable to conceptual registration. Hence Kant's notion of thechaos of such ulti- [380] mate data. Also Hume—at least, in his Treatise-can only find differences of 'force and vivacity/

The subjective form of a conceptual feeling is valuation. These valua-tions are subject to the Category of Subjective Unity. Thus the conceptualregistration is conceptual valuation; and conceptual valuation introducescreative purpose. The mental pole introduces the subject as a determinantof its own concrescence. The mental pole is the subject determining itsown ideal of itself by reference to eternal principles of valuation autono-mously modified in their application to its own physical objective datum.Every actual entity is 'in time' so far as its physical pole is concerned, andis 'out of time' so far as its mental pole is concerned. It is the union oftwo worlds, namely, the temporal world, and the world of autonomousvaluation. The integration of each simple physical feeling with its con-ceptual counterpart produces in a subsequent phase a physical feelingwhose subjective form of re-enaction has gained or lost subjective intensityaccording to the valuation up, or the valuation down, in the conceptualfeeling. So far there is merely subjective readjustment of the subjective

forms. This is the phase of physical purpose. The effect of the conceptualfeeling is thus, so far, merely to provide that the modified subjective formis not merely derived from the re-enaction of the objectified actual entity.Also, in the complex subsequent integrations, we find that the conceptualcounterpart has a role in detachment from the physical feeling out ofwhich it originates.

Category V. The Category of Conceptual Reversion. There is sec-ondary origination of conceptual feelings with data which are partiallyidentical with, and partially diverse from, the eternal objects forming thedata in the primary phase of the mental pole; the determination of iden-tity and diversity depending on the subjective aim at attaining depth ofintensity by reason of contrast.

Thus the first phase of the mental pole is conceptual [381] reproduction,and the second phase is a phase of conceptual reversion. In this secondphase the proximate novelties are conceptually felt. This is the process bywhich the subsequent enrichment of subjective forms, both in qualitativepattern, and in intensity through contrast, is made possible by the positiveconceptual prehension of relevant alternatives.1 There is a conceptual con-trast of physical incompatibles. This is the category which, as thus stated,seems to limit the strict application of Plato's principle of reminiscence,and of Hume's principle of recollection. Probably it does not contradictanything that Plato meant by his principle. But it does limit the rigidapplication of Hume's principle. Indeed Hume himself admitted excep-tions. It is the category by which novelty enters the world; so that evenamid stability there is never undifferentiated endurance. But, as the cate-gory states, reversion is always limited by the necessary inclusion of ele-ments identical with elements in feelings of the antecedent phase. By theCategory of Subjective Unity, and by the seventh Category of SubjectiveHarmony, to be explained later, all origination of feelings is governedby the subjective imposition of aptitude for final synthesis. Also by theCategory of Objective Identity this aptitude always has its ground in thetwo-way functionings of self-identical elements. Then in synthesis theremust always be a ground of identity and an aim at contrast. The aim atcontrast arises from the depth of intensity promoted by contrast. Thejoint necessity of this ground of identity, and this aim at contrast, ispartially expressed in this Category of Conceptual Reversion, This 'aimat contrast' is the expression of the ultimate creative purpose that eachunification shall achieve some maximum depth of intensity of feeling,subject to the conditions of its concrescence. This ultimate purpose isformulated in Category VIII.

The question, how, and in what sense, one unrealized [382] eternal ob-ject can be more, or less, proximate to an eternal object in realized ingres-sion—that is to say, in comparison with any other unfelt eternal object—

1 For another discussion of this topic, cf. my Religion in the Making, Ch. Ill,Sect. VII.

is left unanswered by this Category of Reversion. In conformity with theontological principle, this question can be answered only by reference tosome actual entity. Every eternal object has entered into the conceptualfeelings of God. Thus, a more fundamental account must ascribe the re-verted conceptual feeling in a temporal subject to its conceptual feeling de-rived, according to Category IV, from the hybrid physical feeling of therelevancies conceptually ordered in God's experience. In this way, by therecognition of God's characterization of the creative act, a more completerational explanation is attained. The Category of Reversion is then abol-ished;* and Hume's principle of the derivation of conceptual experiencefrom physical experience remains without any exception.

SECTION IV

The two categories of the preceding section concerned the efficacy ofphysical feelings, pure or hybrid, for the origination of conceptual feelingsin a later phase of their own subject. The present section considers analo-gous feelings with diverse subjects 'scattered' throughout members of anexus. It considers a single subject, subsequent to the nexus, prehendingthis multiplicity of scattered feelings as the data for a corresponding mul-tiplicity of its own simple physical feelings, some pure and some hybrid.It then formulates the process by which in that subject an analogy betweenthese various feelings—constituted by one eternal object, of whatever com-plexity, implicated in the various analogous data of these feelings—is, bya supervening process of integration, converted into one feeling havingfor its datum the specific contrast between the nexus as one entity andthat eternal object. This contrast is what is familiarly known as the quali-fication of the nexus by that eternal object. An inter- [383] mediate stagein this process of integration is the formation in the final subject of oneconceptual feeling with that eternal object as its datum. This conceptualfeeling has an impartial relevance to the above-mentioned various simplephysical feelings of the various members of the nexus. It is this impartialityof the conceptual feeling which leads to the integration in which the manymembers of the nexus are collected into the one nexus which they form,and in which that nexus is set in contrast to the one eternal object whichhas emerged from their analogies.

Thus pure, and hybrid, physical feelings, issuing into a single concep-tual feeling, constitute the preliminary phase of this transmutation in theprehending subject. The integration of these feelings in that subject leadsto the transmuted physical feeling of a nexus as qualified by that eternalobject which is the datum of the single conceptual feeling. In this way theworld is physically felt as a unity, and is felt as divisible into parts whichare unities, namely, nexus. Each such unity has its own characteristicsarising from the undiscriminated actual entities which are members ofthat nexus. In some cases objectification of the nexus has only indirect

reference to the characteristics of its individual atomic actualities. In sucha case the objectification may introduce new elements into the world, for-tunate or unfortunate. Usually the objectification gives direct informa-tion, so that the prehending subject shapes itself as the direct outcome ofthe order prevalent in the prehended nexus. Transmutation is the wayin which the actual world is felt as a community, and is so felt in virtueof its prevalent order. For it arises by reason of the analogies between thevarious members of the prehended nexus, and eliminates their differences.Apart from transmutation our feeble intellectual operations would fail topenetrate into the dominant characteristics of things. We can only under-stand by discarding. Transmutation depends upon a categoreal condition.

[384] Category VI. The Category of Transmutation. When (in accord-ance with Category IV, or with Categories IV and V) one and the sametconceptual feeling is derived impartially by a prehending subject fromits analogous simple physical feelings of various actual entities, then ina subsequent phase of integration—of these simple physical feelings to-gether with the derivate conceptual feeling—the prehending subject maytransmute the datum of this conceptual feeling into a contrast with thenexus of those prehended actual entities, or of some part of that nexus;so that the nexus (or its part), thus qualified, is the objective datum of afeeling entertained by this prehending subject.

Such a transmutation of simple physical feelings of many actualitiesinto one physical feeling of a nexus as one, is called a 'transmuted feeling/The origination of such a feeling depends upon intensities, valuations, andeliminations conjointly favourable.

In order to understand this categoreal condition, it must be noted thatthe integration of simple physical feelings into a complex physical feelingonly provides for the various actual entities of the nexus being felt as sep-arate entities requiring each other. We have to account for the substitu-tion of the one nexus in place of its component actual entities. This isLeibniz's problem which arises in his Monadology. He solves the problemby an unanalysed doctrine of 'confusion/ Some category is required to pro-vide a physical feeling of a nexus as one entity with its own categorealtype of existence. This one physical feeling in the final subject is derivedby transmutation from the various analogous physical feelings entertainedby the various members of the nexus, together with their various analogousconceptual feelings (with these various members as subjects) originatedfrom these physical feelings, either directly according to Category IV,or indirectly according to Category V. The analogy of the physical feel-ings consists in the fact that their definite character exhibits the same in-gredient [385] eternal object. The analogy of the conceptual feelings con-sists in the fact that this one eternal object, or one reversion from thiseternal object, is the datum for the various relevant conceptual feelingsentertained respectively by members of the nexus. The final prehendingsubject prehends the members of the nexus, (i) by 'pure' physical feelings

in which the members are severally objectified by these analogous physicalfeelings, and (ii) by hybrid physical feelings in which the members areseverally objectified by these analogous conceptual feelings.

In the prehending subject, these analogous, pure physical feelings origi-nate a conceptual feeling, according to Category IV; and, according toCategory V, there may be a reverted conceptual feeling. There will beonly one direct conceptual feeling; for the simple physical feelings (in thefinal subject) are analogous in the sense of exemplifying the same eternalobject. (If there be no reversion, this analogy extends over the pure andthe hybrid physical feelings. If there be important reversion, this analogyonly extends over the hybrid feelings with the reverted conceptual feel-ings as data. This latter case is only important when the reverted feelingsinvolve the predominantly intense valuation.) Thus these many physicalfeelings of diverse actualities originate in the final subject one conceptualfeeling. This single conceptual feeling has therefore an impartial referencethroughout the actualities of the nexus. Also reverted conceptual feelingsin the nexus are, in this connection, negligible unless they preserved thisimpartiality of reference throughout the nexus. Excluding for the momentthe consideration of reverted feelings in the actualities of the nexus, thehybrid physical feelings in the prehending subject also, by Category IV,generate one conceptual feeling with impartial reference; also it is the sameconceptual feeling as that generated by the pure physical feelings (in thefinal subject). Thus (with no reversion) the influence of the hybridphysical feelings [386] is to enhance the intensity of the conceptual feelingderived from the pure physical feelings. But there may be reversions tobe considered, that is to say, reversions with impartial reference throughoutthe nexus. The reversion may originate in the separate actualities of thenexus, or in the final prehending subject, or there may be a double rever-sion involving both sources. Thus we must allow for the possibility of di-verse reverted feelings, each with impartial reference. In so far as thereis concordance and the reversions are dominant, there will issue one con-ceptual feeling of enhanced intensity. When there is discordance amongthese various conceptual feelings, there will be elimination, and in generalno transmutation. But when, from some (or all) of these sources of im-partial conceptual feelings, one dominant impartial conceptual feelingemerges with adequate intensity, transmutation will supervene.

This impartiality of reference has then been transmuted into the physi-cal feeling of that nexus, whole or partial, contrasted with some one eternalobject. It will be noted that this one impartial conceptual feeling is anessential element of the process, whereby an impartial reference to thewhole nexus is introduced. Otherwise there would be no element to trans-mute particular relevancies to the many members into general relevanceto the whole.

The eternal object which characterizes the nexus in this physical feeling

may be an eternal object characterizing the analogous physical feelings,belonging to all, or some, of the members of the nexus. In this case, thenexus as a whole derives a character which in some way belongs to itsvarious members.

Again in the transmuted feeling only part of the original nexus maybe objectified, and the eternal object may have been derived from mem-bers of the other part of the original nexus. This is the case for perceptionin the mode of 'presentational immediacy/ to be further discussed in alater chapter (Part IV, Ch. V; cf. alsof [387] Part II, Ch. II, Sect. I, andPart II, Ch. IV, Sect. VII, and Part II, Ch. VIII).

Also the eternal object may be the datum of a reverted conceptual feel-ing, only indirectly derived from the members of the original nexus. Inthis case, the transmuted feeling of the nexus introduces novelty; and inunfortunate cases this novelty may be termed 'error/ But all the same,the transmuted feeling, whatever be its history of transmutation, is a definitephysical fact whereby the final subject prehends the nexus. For example,considering the example of presentational immediacy, colour-blindnessmay be called 'error'; but nevertheless, it is a physical fact. A transmutedfeeling comes under the definition of a physical feeling.

Our usual way of consciously prehending the world is by these trans-muted physical feelings. It is only when we are consciously aware of alienmentalities that we even approximate to the conscious prehension of asingle actual entity. It will be found that transmuted feelings are veryanalogous to prepositional feelings, and to conscious perceptions andjudgments in their sequence of integration. Vagueness has its origin intransmuted feelings. For a quality, characterizing the mutual prehen-sions of all the members of a nexus, is transmuted into a predicate of thenexus. The intensity arising from the force of repetition makes this trans-muted perception to be the prominent type of those feelings which infurther integrations acquire consciousness as an element in their subjectiveforms. It represents a simplification of physical feeling, effected in thecourse of integration.

According to this category the conceptual feelings entertained in anynexus modify the future role of that nexus as a physical objective datum.This category governs the transition from conceptual feelings in one actualentity to physical feelings either in a supervening phase of itself or in alater actual entity. What is conceptual earlier is felt physically later in anextended role. Thus, for instance, a new 'form' has its emergent ingres-sion con- [388] ceptually by reversion, and receives delayed exemplificationphysically when the other categoreal conditions permit.

This joint operation of Categories IV and VI produces what has beentermed 'adversion' and 'aversion/ For the conceptual feelings in the ac-tualities of the nexus, produced according to Category IV, have dataidentical with the pattern exemplified in the objective data of the many

254 The Theory of Prehensions

physical feelings. If in the conceptual feelings there is valuation upward,then the physical feelings are transmittedt to the new concrescence withenhanced intensity in its subjective form. This is 'adversion/

But if in the conceptual feelings there is valuation downward, then thephysical feelings are (in the later concrescence) either eliminated, or aretransmitted to it with attenuated intensity. This is 'aversion/ Thus 'adver-sion' and 'aversion' are types of 'decision/

Thus the conceptual feeling with its valuation has primarily the charac-ter of purpose, since it is the agent whereby the decision is made as tothe causal efficacy of its subject in its objectifications beyond itself. But itonly achieves this character of purpose by its integration with the physicalfeeling from which it originates. This integration is considered in ChapterV on 'Comparative Feelings/

It is evident that ad version and aversion, and also the Category ofTransmutation, only have importance in the case of high-grade organ-isms. They constitute the first step towards intellectual mentality, thoughin themselves they do not amount to consciousness. But an actual entitywhich includes these operations must have an important intensity of con-ceptual feelings able to mask and fuse the simple physical feelings.

Also the examination of the Category of Transmutation shows that theapproach to intellectuality consists in the gain of a power of abstraction.The irrelevant multiplicity of detail is eliminated, and emphasis is laidon the elements of systematic order in the actual world. In [389] so faras there is trivial order, there must be trivialized actual entities. The rightcoordination of the negative prehensions is one secret of mental progress;but unless some systematic scheme of relatedness characterizes the en-vironment, there will be nothing left whereby to constitute vivid pre-hension of the world. The low-grade organism is merely the summationof the forms of energy which flow in upon it in all their multiplicity ofdetail. It receives, and it transmits; but it fails to simplify into intelligiblesystem. The physical theory of the structural flow of energy has to dowith the transmission of simple physical feelings from individual actualityto individual actuality. Thus some sort of quantum theory in physics,relevant to the existing type of cosmic order, is to be expected. The physicaltheory of alternative forms of energy, and of the transformation from oneform to another form, ultimately depends upon transmission conditionedby some exemplification of the Categories of Transmutation and Reversion.

SECTION V

The seventh categoreal condition governs the efficacy of conceptualfeelings both in the completion of their own subjects, and also in theobjectifications of their subjects in subsequent concrescence. It is theCategory of 'Subjectivet Harmony/

Category VII. The Category of Subjective Harmony. The valuations of

The Transmission of Feelings 255

conceptual feelings are mutually determined by their adaptation to bejoint elements in a satisfaction aimed at by the subject.

This categoreal condition should be compared with the Category of'Subjective Unity/ and also with the Category of 'Conceptual Reversion/ Inthe former category the intrinsic inconsistencies, termed logical/ are theformative conditions in the pre-established harmony. In this seventhcategory, and in the Category of Reversion, aesthetic adaptation for anend is the formative condition in the pre-established harmony. These threecategories [390] express the ultimate particularity of feelings. For thesuperject which is their outcome is also the subject which is operative intheir production. They are the creation of their own creature. The pointto be noticed is that the actual entity, in a state of process during which itis not fully definite, determines its own ultimate definiteness. This is thewhole point of moral responsibility. Such responsibility is conditioned bythe limits of the data, and by the categoreal conditions of concrescence.

But autonomy is negligible unless the complexity is such that there isgreat energy in the production of conceptual feelings according to theCategory of Reversion. This Category of Reversion has to be considered inconnection with the Category of Aesthetic Harmony.** For the contrastsproduced by reversion are contrasts required for the fulfillment of theaesthetic ideal. Unless there is complexity, ideal diversities lead to physicalimpossibilities, and thence to impoverishment. It requires a complex con-stitution to stage diversities as consistent contrasts.

It is only by reason of the Categories of Subjective Unity, and of Subjec-tive Harmony, that the process constitutes the character of the product,and that conversely the analysis of the product discloses the process.J

CHAPTER IVPROPOSITIONS AND FEELINGS

SECTION I

[391] The nature of consciousness has not yet been adequately ana-lysed. The initial basic feelings, physical and conceptual, have been men-tioned, and so also has the final synthesis into the affirmation-negationcontrast. But between the beginning and the end of the integration intoconsciousness, there lies the origination of a 'propositional feeling/ Apropositional feeling is a feeling whose objective datum is a proposition.Such a feeling does not in itself involve consciousness. But all forms ofconsciousness arise from ways of integration of propositional feelings withother feelings, either physical feelings or conceptual feelings. Conscious-ness belongs to the subjective forms of such feelings.

A proposition enters into experience as the entity forming the datum ofa complex feeling derived from the integration of a physical feeling witha conceptual feeling.1 Now a conceptual feeling does not refer to the actualworld, in the sense that the history of this actual world has any peculiarrelevance to its datum. This datum is an eternal object; and an eternalobject refers only to the purely general any among undetermined actualentities. In itself an eternal object evades any selection among actualitiesor epochs. You cannot know what is red by merely thinking of redness.You can only find red things by adventuring amid physical experiencesin this actual world. This doctrine is the ultimate ground of empiricism;namely, that eternal objects tell no tales as to their ingressions.

[392] But now a new kind of entity presents itself. Such entities are thetales that perhaps might be told about particular actualities. Such entitiesare neither actual entities, nor eternal objects, nor feelings. They are prop-ositions. A proposition must be true or false. Herein a proposition differsfrom an eternal object; for no eternal object is ever true or false. Thisdifference between propositions and eternal objects arises from the factthat truth and falsehood are always grounded upon a reason. But accordingto the ontological principle (the eighteenth! 'category of explanation'),a reason is always a reference to determinate actual entities. Now an eter-nal object, in itself, abstracts from all determinate actual entities, includ-ing even God. It is merely referent to any such entities, in the absolutelygeneral sense of any. Then there can be no reason upon which to found

1 Cf.t also 'Physical Purposes' considered in Ch. V.

the truth or falsehood of an eternal object. The very diversity of eternalobjects has for its reason their diversity of functioning in this actual world.

Thus the endeavour to understand eternal objects in complete abstrac-tion from the actual world results in reducing them to mere undifferen-tiated nonentities. This is an exemplification of the categoreal principle,that the general metaphysical character of being an entity is *'to be a deter-minant in the becoming of actualities/ Accordingly the differentiatedrelevance of eternal objects to each instance of the creative process re-quires their conceptual realization in the primordial nature of God. Hedoes not create eternal objects; for his nature requires them in the samedegree that they require him. This is an exemplification of the coherenceof the categoreal types of existence. The general relationships of eternalobjects to each other, relationships of diversity and of pattern, are theirrelationships in God's conceptual realization. Apart from this realization,there is mere isolation indistinguishable from nonentity.

But a proposition, while preserving the indeterminateness of an eternalobject, makes an incomplete abstrac- [393] tion from determinate actualentities. It is a complex entity, with determinate actual entities among itscomponents. These determinate actual entities, considered formaliter andnot as in the abstraction of the proposition, do afford a reason determiningthe truth or falsehood of the proposition. But the proposition in itself,apart from recourse to these reasons, tells no tale about itself; and in thisrespect it is indeterminate like the eternal objects.

A propositional feeling (as has been stated) arises from a special typeof integration synthesizing a physical feeling with a conceptual feeling.The objective datum of the physical feeling is either one actual entity,if the feeling be simple, or is a determinate nexus of actual entities, if thephysical feeling be more complex. The datum of the conceptual feeling isan eternal object which is referent (qua possibility) + to any actual entities,where the any is absolutely general and devoid of selection. In the in-tegrated objective datum the physical feeling provides its determinate setof actual entities, indicated by their felt physical relationships to the sub-ject of the feeling. These actual entities are the logical subjects of theproposition. The absolute generality of the notion of any, inherent in aneternal object, is thus eliminated in the fusion. In the proposition, theeternal object, in respect to its possibilities as a determinant of nexus,f isrestricted to these logical subjects. The proposition may have the restrictedgenerality of referring to any among these provided logical subjects; orit may have the singularity of referring to the complete set of providedlogical subjects as potential relata, each with its assigned status, in thecomplex pattern which is the eternal object. The proposition is the poten-tiality of the eternal object, as a determinant of denniteness, in somedeterminate mode of restricted reference to the logical subjects. Thiseternal object is the 'predicative pattern' of the proposition. The set oflogical subjects is either completely singled out as these logical subjects in

this predicative pattern or is collec- [394] tively singled out as any of theselogical subjects in this pattern, or as some of these logical subjects in thispattern. Thus the physical feeling indicates the logical subjects and pro-vides them respectively with that individual definition necessary to assignthe hypothetic status of each in the predicative pattern. The conceptualfeeling provides the predicative pattern. Thus in a proposition the logicalsubjects are reduced to the status of food for a possibility. Their real rolein actuality is abstracted from; they are no longer factors in fact, exceptfor the purpose of their physical indication. Each logical subject becomesa bare 'W among actualities, with its assigned hypothetical relevance tothe predicate.2

It is evident that the datum of the conceptual feeling reappears as thepredicate in the proposition which is the datum of the integral, preposi-tional feeling. In this synthesis the eternal object has suffered the elimina-tion of its absolute generality of reference. The datum of the physicalfeeling has also suffered elimination. For the peculiar objectification ofthe actual entities, really effected in the physical feeling, is eliminated,except in so far as it is required for the services of the indication. Theobjectification remains only to indicate that definiteness which the logicalsubjects must have in order to be hypothetical food for that predicate.This necessary indication of the logical subjects requires the actual worldas a systematic environment. For there can be no definite position in pureabstraction. The proposition is the possibility of that predicate applyingin that assigned way to those logical subjects. In every proposition, assuch and without going beyond it, there is complete indeterminatenessso far as concerns its own realization in a propositional feeling, and asregards its own truth. The logical subjects are, nevertheless, in fact actualentities which are definite in their realized mutual relatedness. Thus theproposition is in fact true, or false. But its own [395] truth, or its ownfalsity, is no business of a proposition. That question concerns only asubject entertaining a propositional feeling with that proposition for itsdatum. Such an actual entity is termed a 'prehending subject' of theproposition. Even a prehending subject is not necessarily judging theproposition. That particular case has been discussed earlier in ChapterIX of Part II. In that chapter the term 'judging subject' was used in placeof the wider term 'prehending subject/

To summarize this discussion of the general nature of a proposition:A proposition shares with an eternal object the character of indeterminate-ness, in that both are definite potentialities for actuality with undeter-mined realization in actuality. But they differ in that an eternal objectrefers to actuality with absolute generality, whereas a proposition refersto indicated logical subjects. Truth and falsehood always require someelement of sheer givenness. Eternal objects cannot demonstrate what they

2 Cf. my Concept of Nature, Ch. I, for another exposition of this train ofthought.

are except in some given fact. The logical subjects of a proposition supplythe element of givenness requisite for truth and falsehood.

SECTION II

A proposition has neither the particularity of a feeling, nor the realityof a nexus. It is at datum for feeling, awaiting a subject feeling it. Itsrelevance to the actual world by means of its logical subjects makes it alure for feeling. In fact many subjects may feel it with diverse feelings,and with diverse sorts of feelings. The fact that propositions were firstconsidered in connection with logic, and the moralistic preference fortrue propositions, have obscured the role of propositions in the actualworld. Logicians only discuss the judgment of propositions. Indeed somephilosophers fail to distinguish propositions from judgments; and mostlogicians consider propositions as merely appanages to judgments. Theresult is that false propositions have fared badly, thrown into the dust-heap, neglected. But in the real world it is more important [396] that aproposition be interesting than that it be true. The importance of truth is,that it adds to interest. The doctrine here maintained is that judgment-feelings form only one subdivision of propositional feelings: and arisefrom the special sort of integration of propositional feelings with otherfeelings. Propositional feelings are not, in their simplest examples, con-scious feelings. Consciousness only arises in some integrations in whichpropositional feelings are among the components integrated. Another pointto notice is that the physical feeling, which is always one component inthe history of an integral propositional feeling, has no unique relation tothe proposition in question, nor has the subject of that feeling, which isalso a subject prehending the proposition. Any subject with any physicalfeeling which includes in its objective datum the requisite logical subjects!can in a supervening phase entertain a propositional feeling with thatproposition as its datum. It has only to originate a conceptual feeling withthe requisite predicative pattern as its datum, and then to integrate thetwo feelings into the required propositional feeling.

Evidently new propositions come into being with the creative advance ofthe world. For every proposition involves its logical subjects; and it cannotbe the proposition which it is, unless those logical subjects are the actualentities which they are. Thus no actual entity can feel a proposition, if itsactual world does not include the logical subjects of that proposition. Theproposition 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon' could not be felt by Hannibalm any occasion of his existence on earth. Hannibal could feel propositionswith certain analogies to this proposition, but not this proposition. It is,farther, to be noticed that the form of words in which propositions areframed also includes an incitement to the origination of an affirmativejudgment-feeling. In imaginative literature, this incitement is inhibitedby the general context, and even by the form and make-up of the material

book. Sometimes there is even a form of words designed [397] to inhibitthe formation of a judgment-feeling, such as 'once upon a time/ Theverbal statement also includes words and phrases to symbolize the sort ofphysical feelings necessary to indicate the logical subjects of the proposi-tion. But language is always elliptical, and depends for its meaning uponthe circumstances of its publication. For example, the word 'Caesar' maymean a puppy dog, or a negro slave, or the first Roman emperor.

The actual entities whose actual worlds include the logical subjects ofa proposition will be said to fall within the 'locus' of that proposition.The proposition is prehensible by them. Of those actual entities whichfall within the locus of a proposition, only some will prehend it positively.There are two kinds of pure propositional feelings, namely, 'imaginativefeelings' and 'perceptive feelings/ These kinds are not sharply distin-guished, but their extreme instances function very differently.

SECTION III

A propositional feeling can arise only in a late phase of the process ofthe prehending subject. For it requires, in earlier phases: (a) a physicalfeeling whose objective datum includes the requisite logical subjects; and(/?) a physical feeling involving a certain eternal object among the deter-minants of the definiteness of its datum; and (y) the conceptual feelingof this eternal object, necessarily derivate from the physical feeling underheading (/?), according to categoreal condition IV; and perhaps (8), someconceptual feeling which is a reversion from the former conceptual feeling,according to categoreal condition V, involving another eternal object asits datum.

The physical feeling under the heading (a) will be termed the 'indica-tive feeling'; the physical feeling under heading (/?) will be called the'physical recognition/ The physical recognition is the physical basis of theconceptual feeling which provides the predicative pattern.

[398] The 'predicative pattern' is either the eternal object which is thedatum of the conceptual feeling under the heading (y), or it is the eternalobject which is the datum of the conceptual feeling under the heading (8).In the former case, the second conceptual feeling, namely, that under theheading (8), is irrelevant to the consideration of the propositional feeling.In either case, that conceptual feeling whose datum is the predicativepattern is called the 'predicative feeling/

In this account of the origin of the predicative feeling, we are in gen-eral agreement with Locke and Hume, who hold that every conceptualfeeling has a physical basis. But Hume lays down the principle that alleternal objects are first felt physically, and thus would only allow of theorigination of the predicative feeling under heading (y). However hemakes two concessions which ruin his general principle. For he allows theindependent origination of intermediate 'shades' in a scale of shades, and

also of new 'manners' of pattern. Both of these cases are allowed for bythe principle of 'reversion/ which is appealed to under heading (8). Thepropositional feeling arises in the later phase in which there is integrationof the 'indicative feeling' with the 'predicative feeling/ In this integra-tion the two data are synthesized by a double elimination involving bothdata. The actual entities involved in the datum of the indicative feelingare reduced to a bare multiplicity in which each is a bare 'it' with the elimi-nation of the eternal object really constituting the definiteness of thatnexus. But the integration rescues them from this mere multiplicity byplacing them in the unity of a proposition with the given predicative!pattern. Thus the actualities, which were first felt as sheer matter of fact,have been transformed into a set of logical subjects with the potentialityfor realizing an assigned predicative pattern. The predicative pattern hasalso been limited by elimination. For as a datum in the conceptual feeling,it held its possibility for realization in respect to absolutely any actual en-tities; but in [399] the proposition its possibilities are limited to justthese logical subjects.

The subjective form of the propositional feeling will depend on cir-cumstances, according to categoreal condition VII. It may, or may not,involve consciousness; it may, or may not, involve judgment. It will involveaversion, or adversion, that is to say, decision. The subjective form willonly involve consciousness when the 'affirmation-negation* contrast hasentered into it. In other words, consciousness enters into the subjectiveforms of feelings, when those feelings are components in an integral feel-ing whose datum is the contrast between a nexus which is, and a propo-sition which in its own nature negates the decision of its truth or false-hood. The logical subjects of the proposition are the actual entities in thenexus. Consciousness is the way of feeling that particular real nexus, as incontrast with imaginative freedom about it. The consciousness may con-fer importance upon what the real thing is, or upon what the imaginationis, or upon both.

SECTION IV

A proposition, as such, is impartial between its prehending subjects,and in its own nature it does not fully determine the subjective forms ofsuch prehensions. But the different propositional feelings, with the sameproposition as datum, in different prehending subjects, are widely differentaccording to differences of their histories in these subjects. They can bedivided into two main types, here termed, respectively, 'perceptive feel-ings' and 'imaginative feelings/ This difference is founded on the com-parison between the 'indicative feeling' from which the logical subjectsare derived, and the 'physical recognition' from which the predicativepattern is derived.

[400] t These physical feelings are either identical or different. If they

be one and the same feeling, the derived propositional feeling is herecalled a 'perceptive feeling/ For in this case, as will be seen, the proposi-tion predicates of its logical subjects a character derived from the way inwhich they are physically felt by that prehending subject.

If the physical feelings be different, the derived propositional feelingis here called an 'imaginative feeling: For in this case, as will be seen, theproposition predicates of its logical subjects a character without any guar-antee of close relevance to the logical subjects. Since these physical feel-ings are complex, there are degrees of difference between them. Twophysical feelings may be widely diverse or almost identical. Thus thedistinction between the two types of propositional feelings is not as sharp-cut as it might be. This distinction is still further blurred by noting thatthree distinct cases arise which differentiate perceptive feelings into threespecies, which in their turn shade off into each other.

Since we are now dealing with perceptive feelings, we have on hand onlyone physical feeling which enjoys the role both of the indicative feeling,and of the physical recognition. In the first place, suppose that the predica-tive pattern is derived straight from the physical recognition under theheading (y), so that there is no reversion and the heading (8) is irrelevant.In this case the derived propositional feeling will be termed an 'authen-tic perceptive feeling/ Such a feeling, by virtue of its modes of origination,has as its datum a proposition whose predicate is in some way realized inthe real nexus of its [401] logical subjects. Thus the proposition felt pro-poses a predicate derived from the real nexus, and not refracted by theprehending subject. But nevertheless the proposition need not be true, sofar as concerns the way in which it implicates the logical subjects withthe predicate. For the primary physical feeling of that nexus by the pre-hending subject may have involved 'transmutation' according to categorealcondition VI. In this case, the proposition ascribes to its logical subjectsthe physical enjoyment of a nexus with the definition of its predicate;whereas that predicate may have only been enjoyed conceptually by theselogical subjects. Thus, what the proposition proposes as a physical factin the nexus, was in truth only a mental fact. Unless it is understood forwhat it is, error arises. Such understanding belongs to the subjective form.

But if the primary physical feeling involves no reversion in any stage,then the predicate of the proposition is that eternal object which con-stitutes the definiteness of that nexus. In this case, the proposition is, with-out qualification, true. The authentic perceptive feeling will then betermed 'direct/ Thus there are 'indirect' perceptive feelings (when 're-version' is involved), and 'direct' perceptive feelings; and feelings of boththese species are termed 'authentic/ In the case of these 'authentic' feelings,the predicate has realization in the nexus, physically or ideally, apart fromany reference to the prehending subject.

+Thirdly, and lastly, the predicative feeling may have arisen in the pre-hending subject by reversion, according to the heading (8) of the previous

section. In this case the predicate has in it some elements which reallycontribute to the definiteness of the nexus; but it has also some elementswhich contrast with corresponding elements in the nexus. These latterelements have been introduced in the concrescence of the prehendingsubject. The predicate is thus distorted from the truth by the subjectivityof the prehending subject. Such a perceptive feeling will be termed 'un-authentic/

Unauthentic feelings are feelings derived from a 'tied' imagination, inthe sense that there is only one physical basis for the whole origination,namely, that physical feeling which is both the 'indicative' feeling! andthe 'physical recognition/ The imagination is tied to one ultimate fact.

SECTION V

Imaginative feelings belong to the general case when the indicativefeeling and the physical recognition differ. [402] But there are degreesof difference, which can vary from the case when the two nexus, formingthe objective data of the two feelings respectively, enjoy the extreme ofremote disconnection, to the case at the other extreme when the twonexus are almost identical. But in so far as there is diversity between thefeelings, there is some trace of a free imagination. The proposition whichis the objective datum of an imaginative feeling has a predicate derived,with or without reversions, from a nexus which in some respects differsfrom the nexus providing the logical subjects. Thus the proposition is feltas an imaginative notion concerning its logical subjects. The propositionin its own nature gives no suggestion as to how it should be felt. In oneprehending subject it may be the datum of a perceptive feeling, and inanother prehending subject it may be the datum of an imaginative feeling.But the subjective forms of the two feelings will differ according to thedifferences in the histories of the origination of those feelings in theirrespective subjects.

The subjective forms of propositional feelings are dominated by valua-tion, rather than by consciousness. In a pure propositional feeling thelogical subjects have preserved their indicated particularity, but have losttheir own real modes of objectification. The subjective form lies in thetwilight zone between pure physical feeling and the clear consciousnesswhich apprehends the contrast between physical feeling and imaginedpossibility. A propositional feeling is a lure to creative emergence in thetranscendent future. When it is functioning as a lure, the propositionalfeeling about the logical subjects of the proposition may in some subse-quent phase promote decision involving intensification of some physicalreeling of those subjects in the nexus. Thus, according to the variouscategoreal conditions, propositions intensify, attenuate, inhibit, or trans-mute, without necessarily entering into clear consciousness, or encounter-ing judgment.

264 The Theory of Prehensions

It follows that in the pursuit of truth even physical [403] feelings mustbe criticized, since their evidence is not final apart from an analysis oftheir origination. This conclusion merely confirms what is a commonplacein all scientific investigation, that we can never start from dogmatic cer-tainty. Such certainty is always an ideal to which we approximate as theresult of critical analysis. When we have verified that we depend upon anauthentic perceptive feeling, whose origination involves no reversions,then we know that the proposition which is the datum of that feeling istrue. Thus there can be no immediate guarantee of the truth of a propo-sition, by reason of the mode of origination of the propositional feeling,apart from a critical scrutiny of that mode of origination.

The feeling has to be (i) perceptive, (ii) authentic, and (iii) direct,where a definite meaning has, in the preceding section, been assigned toeach of these conditions.

tThere is, however, always this limitation to the security of directknowledge, based on direct physical feeling, namely, that the creativeemergence can import into the physical feelings of the actual worldpseudo-determinants which arise from the concepts entertained in thatactual world, and not from the physical feelings in that world.

This possibility of error is peculiarly evident in the case of that specialclass of physical feelings which belong to the mode of 'presentationalimmediacy/

The proposition which is the datum of an imaginative feeling may betrue. The two questions of the origination of consciousness in the sub-jective forms of feelings, and of the intuitive judgment of a proposition,apart from the mode of origination of the feeling of it, must now beconsidered.

SECTION VI

Language, as usual, is always ambiguous as to the exact propositionwhich it indicates. Spoken language is merely a series of squeaks. Its func-tion is (a) to arouse in the prehending subject some physical feeling in-dicative of the logical subjects of the proposition, (/?) to arouse in theprehending subject some physical feeling which plays the part of the'physical recognition/ (y) to promote the sublimation of the 'physicalrecognition' into the conceptual 'predicative feeling/ (8) to promote theintegration of the indicative feeling and the predicative feeling into therequired propositional feeling. But in this complex function there is alwaysa tacit reference to [404] the environment of the occasion of utterance.Consider the traditional example, 'Socrates is mortal/

This proposition may mean It is mortal/ In this case the word 'Socrates'in the circumstances of its utterance merely promotes a physical feelingindicating the it which is mortal.

The proposition may mean 'It is Socratic and mortal'; where 'Socraticis an additional element in the predicative pattern.

Propositions and Feelings 265

We now turn to the words denoting the predicative pattern, namely,either 'mortal,' or 'Socratic and mortal.' The slightest consideration dis-closes the fact that it is pure convention to suppose that there is onlyone logical subject to the proposition. The word 'mortal' means a certainrelationship to the general nexus of actual entities in this world which isfpossible for any one of the actual entities. 'Mortal' does not mean 'mortalin any possible world/ it means 'mortal in this world.' Thus there is ageneral reference to this actual world as exemplifying a scheme of thingswhich render 'mortality' realizable in it.

The word 'Socratic' means 'realizing the Socratic predicate in Atheniansociety.' It does not mean 'Socratic, in any possible world'; nor does itmean 'Socratic, anywhere in this world': it means 'Socratic, in Athens.'Thus 'Socratic,' as here used, refers to a society of actual entities realizingcertain general systematic properties such that the Socratic predicate isrealizable in that environment. Also the 'Athenian society' requires thatthis actual world exemplifies a certain systematic scheme, amid which'Athenianism' is realizable.

Thus in the one meaning of the phrase 'Socrates is mortal,' the logicalsubjects are one singular It (Socrates) and the actual entities of this actualworld, forming a society amid which mortality is realizable and includingthe former 'IV In the other meaning, there are also included among thelogical subjects the actual entities forming the Athenian society. Theseactual entities are [405] required for the realization of the predicativepattern 'Socratic and mortal' and are the definitely indicated logical sub-jects. They also require that the general scheme of this actual world besuch as to support 'Athenianism' in conjunction with 'mortality.'+

CHAPTER VTHE HIGHER PHASES OF EXPERIENCE

SECTION I

[406] 'Comparative feelings' are the result of integrations not yet con-sidered: their data are generic contrasts. The infinite variety of the morecomplex feelings come under the heading 'comparative feelings/

We have now to examine two simple types of comparative feelings.One type arises from the integration of a 'propositional feeling' with the'indicative feeling' from which it is partly derived. Feelings of this typewill be termed 'intellectual feelings/ This type of comparative feelings issubdivided into two species: one species consists of 'conscious percep-tions'; and the other species consists of 'intuitive judgments/ The sub-jective forms of intuitive judgments also involve consciousness. Thus'conscious perceptions' and 'intuitive judgments' are alike 'intellectualfeelings/ Comparative feelings of the other type are termed 'physical pur-poses/ Such a feeling arises from the integration of a conceptual feelingwith the basic physical feeling from which it is derived, either directlyaccording to categoreal condition IV (the Category of Conceptual Valua-tion), or indirectly according to categoreal condition V (the Categoryof Conceptual Reversion). But this integration is a more primitive typeof integration than that which produces, from the same basic physicalfeeling, the species of propositional feelings termed 'perceptive/ Thesubjective forms of these physical purposes are either 'adversions' or'aversions/ The subjective forms of physical purposes do not involveconsciousness unless these feelings acquire integration with consciousperceptions or intuitive judgments. \407]

SECTION II

In an intellectual feeling the datum is the generic contrast between anexus of actual entities and a proposition with its logical subjects members of the nexus. In every generic contrast its unity arises from the two-way functioning of certain entities which are components in each of thecontrasted factors. This unity expresses the conformation to the secondcategoreal condition (the Category of Objective Identity). The common'subject' entertaining the two feelings effects an integration whereby eachof these actual entities obtains its one role of a two-way functioning inthe one generic contrast. As an element in the subject no objectified actual

266

entity can play two disconnected parts. There can only be one analysablepart. Thus what in origination is describable as a pair of distinct ways offunctioning of each actual entity in the two factors of the generic con-trast respectivelyt is realized in the subject as one r61e with a two-wayaspect. This two-way aspect is unified as 'contrast/ This one analysablepart involves in itself the contrast between the sheer matter of fact, namely,what the objectified actual entity in question contributes to the objecti-fied nexus in the physical feeling, and the mere potentiality of the sameactual entity for playing its assigned part in the predicative pattern of theproposition, in the eventuality of the proposition's realization. This con-trast is what has been termed the 'affirmation-negation contrast/ It is thecontrast between the affirmation of objectified fact in the physical feeling,and the mere potentiality, which is the negation of such affirmation, inthe propositional feeling. It is the contrast between 'in fact' and 'might be,'in respect to particular instances in this actual world. The subjective formof the feeling of this contrast is consciousness. Thus in experience, con-sciousness arises by reason of intellectual feelings, and in proportion tothe variety and intensity of such feelings. But, in conformity with theseventh [408] categoreal condition (the Category of Subjective Harmony),subjective forms, which arise as factors in any feeling, are finally in thesatisfaction shared in the unity of all feelings;f all feelings acquire theirquota of irradiation in consciousness.

This account agrees with the plain facts of our conscious experience.Consciousness flickers; and even at its brightest, there is a small focalregion of clear illumination, and a large penumbral region of experiencewhich tells of intense experience in dim apprehension. The simplicity ofclear consciousness is no measure of the complexity of complete experi-ence. Also this character of our experience suggests that consciousness isthe crown of experience, only occasionally attained, not its necessarybase.

SECTION III

A feeling is termed a 'belief/ or is said to include an element of 'belief/when its datum is a proposition, and its subjective form includes, as thedefining element in its emotional pattern, a certain form, or eternal object,associated with some gradation of intensity. This eternal object is 'belief-character/ When this character enters into the emotional pattern, then,according to the intensity involved, the feeling, whatever else it be, is tosome degree a belief.

This variation in the intensity of belief-character is insisted on by Lockein his Essay. He writes (IV, XV, 3):The entertainment the mind gives this sort of propositions is called"belief/' "assent/' or "opinion/' which is the admitting or receiving anyproposition for true, upon arguments or proofs that are found to per-suade us to receive it as true, without certain knowledge that it is so.

And herein lies the difference between probability and certainty,faith and knowledge, that in all thef parts of knowledge there is intui-tion; each immediate idea, each step has its visible and certain connec-tion: in belief not so.

[409] Locke's distinction between certainty and uncertain belief is ad-mirable. But it is not nearly so important as it looks. For it is not the im-mediate intuition that we are usually concerned with. We only have itsrecollection recorded in words. Whether the verbal record of a recollec-tion recalls to our minds a true proposition must always be a matter ofgreat uncertainty. Accordingly our attitude towards an immediate intuitionmust be that of the gladiators, "morituri te salutamus," as we pass into thelimbo where we rely upon the uncertain record. It must be understoodthat we are not speaking of the objective probability of a proposition,expressing its relation to certain other propositions. Comparative firmnessof belief is a psychological fact which may, or may not, be justified by theobjective evidence. This belief-character takes various forms from its fusionwith consciousness derived from the various types of intellectual feelings.

SECTION IV

Conscious perception is the feeling of what is relevant to immediatefact in contrast with its potential irrelevance. This general descriptionmust now be explained in detail.

"Conscious perceptions' are of such importance that it is worth whileto rehearse the whole sequence of their origination. It will be seen thatalternative modes of origination are involved, and that some of thesemodes produce erroneous perceptions. Thus the criticism of conscious per-ceptions has the same importance as the criticism of judgments, intuitiveand inferential.

In the first place, there is one basic physical feeling, from which thewhole sequence of feelings originates for the 'subject' in question. Fromthis physical feeling, the propositional feeling of the sort termed 'percep-tive' arises. The conscious perception is the comparative feeling arisingfrom the integration of the perceptive feeling with this original physicalfeeling.

[410] In the account of the origination of the 'perceptive' feeling (PartIII, Ch. IV, Sect. IV), the various species of such feelings are analysedfirst into 'authentic' feelings and 'unauthentic' feelings; and secondly,'authentic' feelings are analysed into 'direct' feelingsf and 'indirect' feel-ings. Without qualification a direct perceptive feeling feels its logical sub-jects as potentially invested with a predicate expressing an intrinsic char-acter of the nexus which is the initial datum of the physical feeling; withqualification this statement is also true of an indirect feeling. The qualifi-cation is that the secondary conceptual feelings, entertained in the nexus

by reason of reversion (cf. categoreal condition V), have been trans-muted so as to be felt in the 'subject' (the final subject of the consciousperception) as if they had been physical facts in the nexus. Of coursesuch transmutation of physical feeling only arises when no incompatibili-ties are involved.

Thus, in general, a transmuted physical feeling only arises as the out-come of a complex process of incompatibilities and inhibitions. Apartfrom exceptional circumstances only to be found in few high-grade organ-isms, transmutation only accounts for physical feelings of negligible in-tensity. It is, however, important to note that even authentic physicalfeelings can distort the character of the nexus felt by transmuting feltconcept into felt physical fact. In this way authentic perceptive feelingscan introduce error into thought; and transmuted physical feelings canintroduce novelty into the physical world. Such novelty may be either for-tunate or disastrous. But the point is that novelty in the physical world,and error in authentic perceptive feeling, arise by conceptual functioning,according to the Category of Reversion.

Putting aside the case when these transmuted perceptive feelings haveimportance, consider the prehending subject with its direct perceptivefeeling. The subject has its concrescent phase involving two factors, theorig- [411] inal physical feeling, and the derived perceptive feeling. In theearlier factor the nexus, physically felt, is objectified through its own properphysical bonds. There are no incompatibilities between fact and revertedconcept to produce attenuation. The objective datum is therefore feltwith its own proper intensities, transmitted to the subjective form of thephysical feeling. The other factor in the integration is the 'perceptive'feeling. The datum of this feeling is the proposition with the actual en-tities of the nexus as its logical subjects, and with its predicate also de-rived from the nexus. The whole origination of this perceptive feeling hasits sole basis in the physical feeling, which plays the part both of 'indicativefeeling' and of 'physical recognition' (cf. Part III, Ch. IV, Sect. III).

The integration of the two factors into the conscious perception thusconfronts the nexus as fact, with the potentiality derived from itself, lim-ited to itself, and exemplified in itself. This confrontation is the genericcontrast which is the objective datum of the integral feeling. The sub-jective form thus assumes its vivid immediate consciousness of what thenexus really is in the way of potentiality realized. In Hume's phraseology,there is an 'impression' of the utmost 'force and vivacity/

There are therefore two immediate guarantees of the correctness of aconscious perception: one is Hume's test of 'force and vivacity,' and theother is the illumination by consciousness of the various feelings involvedm the process. Thus the fact, that the physical feeling has not transmutedconcept into physical bond, lies open for inspection. Neither of thesetests is infallible. There is also the delayed test, that the future conforms

to expectations derived from this assumption. This latter test can be re-alized only by future occasions in the life of an enduring object, the en-during percipient.

It is to be observed that what is in doubt is not the immediate percep-tion of a nexus which is a fragment of [412] the actual world. The du-bitable element is the definition of this nexus by the observed predicate.

An unauthentic perceptive feeling arises in the subject when its ownconceptual origination from its own basic physical feeling passed on tothe secondary stage of producing a reverted conceptual feeling to play thepart of predicative feeling. The physical feeling may, or may not, have alsosuffered loss of direct relevance by reason of derivation from conceptualreversions in the nexus. But anyhow the subject by its own process ofreversion has produced for the logical subjects a predicate which has noimmediate relevance to the nexus, either as physical fact or as conceptualfunctioning in the nexus. Thus the comparative feeling which integratesthe physical feeling with the unauthentic perceptive feeling has for itsdatum the generic contrast of the nexus with a proposition, whose logicalsubjects comprise the actualities in the nexus, and whose predicate partlyagrees with the complex pattern exemplified in the nexus and partly dis-agrees with it This case is really the conscious perception of a propositionimaginatively arrived at, which concerns the nexus and disagrees with thefacts. The case is in fact more analogous to intellectual feelings of thesecond species, namely, to intuitive judgments. But by reason of the useof one basic physical feeling, in the double function of indicative feelingand of physical recollection, the proposition in the comparative feelingwill have some of the vivid relevance to the nexus in the same feeling,which arises in the case of authentic perceptions. Practically, however, thiscase is an intuitive judgment in which there is consciousness of a proposi-tion as erroneous.

SECTION V

The term 'judgment' refers to three species among the comparativefeelings with which we are concerned. In each of these feelings the datumis the generic contrast between an objectified nexus and a propositionwhose logical subjects make up the nexus. The three species [413] are com-posed of (i) those feelings in the 'yes-form/ (ii) those feelings in the'no-form/ and (iii) those feelings in the 'suspense-form.'

In all three species of felt contrast, the datum obtains its unity by reasonof the objective identify of the actual entities on both sides of the con-trast In the yes-form' there is the further ground of unity by reason ofthe identity of the pattern of the objectified nexus with the predicate. Inthe 'no-form' this latter ground of unity is replaced by a contrast involvingincompatible diversity. In the 'suspense-form't the predicate is neitheridentical, nor incompatible, with the pattern. It is diverse from, and com-

patible with, the pattern in the nexus as objectified: the nexus, in its own'formal' existence, may, or may not, in fact exemplify both the patternand the predicate. In this species of comparative feeling there is thereforecontrast between pattern and predicate, without incompatibility.

In intuitive judgments, as has been stated, the comparative feeling isthe integration of the physical feeling of a nexus with a propositional feel-ing whose logical subjects are the actual entities in the nexus. So far asthis general description is concerned intuitive judgments and consciousperceptions do not differ, and are therefore classed together as 'intellectual'feelings. But in the case of intuitive judgments there is a more complexprocess of origination. There are two distinct physical feelings, the in-dicative feeling and the physical recollection (Part III, Ch. IV, Sect. III).The predicative feeling originates from the physical recollection, eitherimmediately according to categoreal condition IV or mediately accordingto categoreal condition V. The integration of the predicative feeling withthe indicative feeling produces the 'imaginative feeling'f (cf. Part III,Ch. IV, Sect. V). This is a propositional feeling with the logical subjectsof its datum* derived from the indicative feelingf and with the predica-tive pattern derived from the! physical recollection. These two physicalfeelings may be relatively \414) disconnected in their origination. Thus theimaginative feeling may have in its subjective form no bias as to belief ordisbelief; or, if there be such bias, the intensity of the emotion may beslight.

The intuitive judgment is the comparative feeling with its datum con-stituted by the generic contrast between the nexus involved in the indica-tive feeling and the proposition involved in the imaginative feeling. In thisgeneric contrast each actual entity has its contrast of two-way functioning.One way is its functioning in the exemplified pattern of the nexus, andthe other way is its functioning in the potential pattern of the proposition.If in addition to the contrast between exemplification and potentiality,there be identity as to pattern and predicate, then by the Category of Ob-jective Unity there is also the single complex eternal object in its two-way functioning, namely, as exemplified and as potential. In this case, theproposition coheres with the nexus and this coherence is its truth. Thus'truth' is the absence of incompatibility or of any 'material contrast' inthe patterns of the nexus and of the proposition in their generic contrast.The sole contrast, involving the Category of Objective Diversity, is merelythat between exemplification and potentiality, and in all other respectsthe coherence is governed by the Category of Objective Identity.

If a contrast arise in any respect other than that between exemplifica-tion and potentiality, then the two patterns are not identical. Then theproposition in some sense, important or unimportant, is not felt as true.

It will be noted that the intuitive judgment in its subjective form con-forms to what there is to feel in its datum. Thus error cannot arise fromthe subjective form of the integration constituting the judgment. But it

can arise because the indicative feeling, which is one of the factors in-tegrated, may in its origin have involved [415] reversion. Thus error arisesby reason of operations which lie below consciousness, though they mayemerge into consciousness and lie open for criticism.

Finally, what differentiates an intuitive judgment from a consciousperception is that a conscious perception is the outcome of an originativeprocess which has its closest possible restriction to the fact, thus con-sciously perceived. But the distinction between the two species is notabsolute. Among the conscious perceptions we find transmutations bywhich concepts entertained in the nexus are transmuted into physicalfeelings in the nexus, and also the unauthentic propositional feelings inwhich a proposition with a 'reverted' predicate has arisen. These are casesin which conscious perceptions take on the general character of intuitivejudgments. On the other hand the diversity between the two physicalfeelings—when they are diverse—may be trivial. The nexus which is thedatum of the one may be practically identical with the nexus which isthe datum of the other. In such a case an intuitive judgment approximatesto a conscious perception.

The condensed analysis of the stages of origination of an intuitive judg-ment is (i) the 'physical recollection' and the 'indicative feeling/ (ii) the'predicative feeling/ derived from the 'physical recollection/f (iii) the'imaginative feeling/I derived by integration of the 'predicative feeling'with the 'indicative feeling/ (iv) the 'intuitive judgment/f derived byintegration of the 'imaginative feeling' with the 'indicative feeling.'t

It is a great mistake to describe the subjective form of an intuitivejudgment as necessarily including definite belief or disbelief in the propo-sition. Three cases arise. The generic contrast which is the datum of theintuitive judgment may exhibit the predicate of the proposition as exem-plified in the objectified nexus. In this case, the subjective form will in-clude definite belief. Secondly, the predicate may be exhibited as incom-patible with the [416] eternal objects exemplified in the objectified nexus.In this case, the subjective form will include definite disbelief. But there isa third case, which is in fact the more usual one: the predicate may beexhibited as irrelevant, wholly or partially, to the eternal objects exem-plified in the objectified nexus. In this case, the subjective form need ex-hibit neither belief nor disbelief. It may include one or the othert of thesedecisions, but it need not do so. This third case will be termed the caseof 'suspended judgment,' Thus an intuitive judgment may be a belief, ora disbelief, or a suspended judgment It is the task of the inferential pro-cess sometimes to convert a suspended judgment into a belief, or a dis-belief, so far as the final satisfaction is concerned.

But the main function of intellectual feelings is neither belief, nor dis-belief, nor even suspension of judgment. The main function of thesefeelings is to heighten the emotional intensity accompanying the valua-tions in the conceptual feelings involved, and in the mere* physical

purposes which are more primitive than any intellectual feelings. They per-form this function by the sharp-cut way in which they limit abstractvaluation to express possibilities relevant to definite logical subjects.In so far as these logical subjects, by reason of other prehensions, aretopics of interest, the proposition becomes a lure for the conditioning ofcreative action. In other words, its prehension effects a modification of thesubjective aim.

Intellectual feelings, in their primary function, are concentration ofattention involving increase of importance. This concentration of atten-tion also introduces the criticism of physical purposes, which is the intel-lectual judgment of truth or falsehood. But intellectual feelings are notto be understood unless it be remembered that they already find at work'physical purposes' more primitive than themselves. Consciousness follows,and does not precede, the entry of the conceptual prehensions of therelevant universals. [417]

SECTION VI

It is evident that an affirmative intuitive judgment is very analogous toa conscious perception. A conscious perception is a very simplified typeof affirmative intuitive judgment; and a direct affirmative intuitive judg-ment is a very sophisticated case of conscious perception. The differencebetween the two has its origin in the fact that one involves a perceptivefeeling, and the other involves an imaginative feeling. Only one set ofactual entities is involved in the formation of the perceptive feeling. Theseactual entities are the logical subjects of the proposition which is felt.But two sets of actual entities are involved in the formation of an imagi-native feeling. Only one of these sets provides the logical subjects of theproposition which is felt: the other set is finally eliminated in the processof origination. The difference between the two feelings, the perceptivefeeling and the imaginative feeling, does not therefore lie in the proposi-tion which is felt. It lies in the emotional patterns of the two feelings. Ineither case this emotional pattern is derivative from the process of origina-tion. In the case of the perceptive feeling, the emotional pattern reflectsthe close connection of the predicate with the logical; subjects, throughoutthe process of origination. In the case of the imaginative feeling, this emo-tional pattern reflects the initial disconnection of the predicate from thelogical subjects. This example illustrates that in the integration of feelings,components which are eliminated from the matter of the integral feelingmay yet leave their mark on its emotional pattern. The triumph of con-sciousness comes with the negative intuitive judgment. In this case thereis a conscious feeling of what might be, and is not. The feeling directlyconcerns the definite negative prehensions enjoyed by its subject. It is thefeeling of absence, and it feels this absence as produced by the definiteexclusiveness of what is really present. Thus, the explicitness of negation,

[418] which is the peculiar characteristic of consciousness, is here at its

maximum.The two cases of intuitive judgment, namely, the affirmative intuitive

judgment and the negative intuitive judgment, are comparatively rare.

These two cases of intuitive judgment, together with conscious perception,

correspond to what Locke calls 'knowledge/ Locke's section (IV, XIV, 4)t

on this subject is short enough to be quoted in full:Judgment is the presuming things to be so without perceiving it.—Thus the mind has two faculties conversant about truth and false-hood,—

First, Knowledge, whereby it certainly perceives, and is undoubt-edly satisfied of the agreement or disagreement of any ideas.

Secondly, Judgment, which is the putting ideas together, or separat-ing them from one another in the mind, when their certain agree-ment or disagreement is not perceived, but presumed to be so; whichis, as the word imports, taken to be so before it certainly appears.And if it so unites or separates them as in reality things are, it is rightjudgment

What Locke calls 'judgment' is here termed 'inferential judgment/The process of origination of a suspended judgment consists in (i) the'physical recollection' and the 'indicative feeling/ (ii) the 'conceptualimagination/ derivative from the 'physical recollection/ (iii) the 'preposi-tional imagination/ derived by integration of the 'indicative feeling' withthe 'conceptual imagination/ (iv) the 'suspended judgment,* derived byintegration of the 'indicative feeling' with the 'propositional imagination/the relation between the objectifying predicate and the imagined predi-cate} being such as to preclude either case of direct judgment.

The suspended judgment thus consists of the integration of the imagi-native feeling with the indicative feeling, in the case where the imaginedpredicate fails to find identification with the objectifying predicate, orwith [419] any part of it; but does find compatible contrast with it. It isthe feeling of the contrast between what the logical subjects evidently are,and what the same subjects in addition may be. This suspended judgmentis our consciousness of the limitations involved in objectification. If, in thecomparison of an imaginative feeling with fact, we merely knew what isand what is not, then we should have no basis for discovering the work ofobjectification in effecting omissions from the formal constitutions ofthings. It is this additional knowledge of the compatibility of what weimagine with what we physically feel, that gives this information. We mustnot oversimplify the formal constitutions of the higher grade of acts ofconcrescence by construing a suspended judgment as though it were anegative judgment. Our whole progress in scientific theory, and even insubtility of direct observation, depends on the use of suspended judgments.It is to be noted that a suspended judgment is not a judgment of proba-bility. It is a judgment of compatibility. The judgment tells us what maybe additional information respecting the formal constitutions of the logical

subjects, information which is neither included nor excluded by our directperception. This is a judgment of fact concerning ourselves. Suspendedjudgments are weapons essential to scientific progress. But in intuitivejudgments the emotional pattern may be dominated by indifference totruth or falsehood. We have then 'conscious imagination/ We are feelingthe actual world with the conscious imputation of imagined predicatesbe they true or false.

When we compare these three cases of intuitive judgment (involvingattention to truth) with conscious imagination (involving inattention totruth), that is to say, with 'imputative feeling/ we note that, except in thecase of negative judgments, the datum of the conscious imagination isidentical with the datum of the corresponding judgment. Nevertheless,the feelings are very different in their emotional patterns. One emotional[420] pattern is dominated by indifference to truth; and the other emo-tional pattern by attention to truth. This indifference to truth is other-wise to be expressed as readiness to eliminate the true objectifying pat-tern exemplified in the objective datum of the physical feeling in question;while the attention to truth is merely the refusal to eliminate this pattern.But these emotional elements in the subjective forms are not dictatedby any diversity of data in the two feelings. For except in the case of thedirect negative judgment, the datum is the same in both types of feeling.The emotional form of a feeling cannot be merely deduced from datumfelt, though it has close relation to it. The emotional pattern in the sub-jective form of any one feeling arises from the subjective aim dominatingthe entire concrescent process. The other feelings of the subject may beconceived as catalytic agents. They are intellectually separable from thefeeling in question. But that feeling is in fact the outcome of the subjec-tive aim of the subject which is its locus; and the emotional pattern is thepeculiar way in which the subject asserts itself in its feeling. This explana-tion of the status of the emotional pattern is merely an application of thedoctrine that a feeling appropriates elements of the universe, which inthemselves are other than the subject; and absorbs these elements intothe real internal constitution of its subject by synthesizing them in theunity of an emotional pattern expressive of its own subjectivity.

This mutual dependence of the emotional pattern of a feeling on theother feelings of the same subjectf may be termed the 'mutual sensitivity'of feelings. It is also one aspect of the incurable 'particularity' of a feeling,in the sense that no feeling can be abstracted from its subject.

SECTION VII

'Physical purposes' constitute a type of comparative feelings more primi-tive than the type of intellectual feel- \421] ings. In general, it seems asthough intellectual feelings are negligible, so as only to obtain importancein exceptional actual entities. We have no means of testing this assump-

tion in any crucial way. It is however the assumption usually made; andtherefore it may be presumed that there is some evidence which persuadespeople to embrace the doctrine. But in fact no evidence, one way or theother, has ever been produced. We know that there are some few entitieson the surface of this earth with intellectual feelings; and there our knowl-edge ends, so far as temporal entities are concerned.

In the more primitive type of comparative feelings indetermination asto its own ingressions—so prominent in intellectual feelings—is the aspectof the eternal object which is pushed into the background. In such a typeof physical purposes the integration of a physical feeling and a conceptualfeeling does not involve the reduction of the objective datum of the physi-cal feeling to a multiplicity of bare logical subjects. The objective datumremains the nexus that it is, exemplifying the eternal objects whose in-gression constitutes its definiteness. Also the indeterminateness as to itsown ingressions is eliminated from the eternal object which is the datumof the conceptual} feeling. In the integral comparative feeling the datumis the contrast of the conceptual datum with the reality of the objectifiednexus. The physical feeling is feeling a real fact; the conceptual feeling isvaluing an abstract possibility. The new datum is the compatibility or in-compatibility of the fact as felt with the eternal object as a datum infeeling. This synthesis of a pure abstraction with a real fact, as in feeling,is a generic contrast. In respect to physical purposes, the cosmologicalscheme which is here being developed requiresf us to hold that all actualentities include physical purposes. The constancy of physical purposes ex-plains the persistence of the order of nature, and in particular of 'enduringobjects/

[422] The chain of stages in which a physical purpose originates is sim-pler than in the case of intellectual feelings: (i) there is a physical feeling;(ii) the primary conceptual correlate of the physical feeling is generated,according to categoreal condition IV; (iii) this physical feeling is in-tegrated with its conceptual correlate to form the physical purpose. Suchphysical purposes are called physical purposes of the first species.

In such a physical purpose, the datum is the generic contrast betweenthe nexus, felt in the physical feeling, and the eternal object valued in theconceptual feeling. This eternal object is also exemplified as the pattern ofthe nexus. Thus the conceptual valuation now closes in upon the feelingof the nexus as it stands in the generic contrast, exemplifying the valuedeternal object. This valuation accorded} to the physical feeling endowsthe transcendent creativity with the character of adversion, or of aversion.The character of adversion secures the reproduction of the physical feeling,as one element in the objectification of the subject beyond itself. Such re-production may be thwarted by incompatible objectification derived fromother feelings. But a physical feeling, whose valuation produces adversion,is thereby an element with some force of persistence into the future be-yond its own subject. It is felt and re-enacted down a route of occasions

forming an enduring object. Finally this chain of transmission meets withincompatibilities, and is attenuated, or modified, or eliminated from fur-ther endurance.

When there is aversion, instead of adversion, the transcendent creativityassumes the character that it inhibits, or attenuates, the objectification ofthat subject in the guise of that feeling. Thus aversion tends to eliminateone possibility by which the subject may itself be objectified in the future.Thus adversions promote stability; and aversions promote change withoutany indication of the sort of change. In itself an aversion [423] promotesthe elimination of content, and the lapse into triviality.

The bare character of mere responsive re-enaction constituting the origi-nal physical feeling in its first phaset is enriched in the second phase bythe valuation accruing from integration with the conceptual correlate. Inthis way, the dipolar character of concrescent experience provides in thephysical pole for the objective side of experience, derivative from an ex-ternal actual world, and provides in the mental pole for the subjective sideof experience, derivative from the subjective conceptual valuations cor-relate to the physical feelings. The mental operations have a double office.They achieve, in the immediate subject, the subjective aim of that subjectas to the satisfaction to be obtained from its own initial data. In this waythe decision derived from the actual world, which is the efficient cause, iscompleted by the decision embodied in the subjective aim,f which is thefinal cause. Secondly, the physical purposes of a subject by their valuationsdetermine the relative efficiency of the various feelings to enter into theobjectifications of that subject in the creative advance beyond itself. Inthis function, the mental operations determine their subject in its charac-ter of an efficient cause. Thus the mental pole is the link whereby thecreativity is endowed with the double character of final causation, andefficient causation. The mental pole is constituted by the decisions in vir-tue of which matters of fact enter into the character of the creativity. Ithas no necessary connection with consciousness; though, where there isorigination of intellectual feelings, consciousness does in fact enter intothe subjective forms.

SECTION VIII

The second species of physical purposes is due to the origination ofreversions in the mental pole. It is due to this second species that vibrationand rhythm have a [424] dominating importance in the physical world.Reversions are the conceptions which arise by reason of the lure of con-trast, as a condition for intensity of experience. This lure is expressible asa categoreal condition.

Categoreal Condition VIII. The Category of Subjective Intensity. Thesubjective aim, whereby there is origination of conceptual feeling, is at+intensity of feeling (a) in the immediate subject, and (p) in the relevantfuture.

We first note (i) that intensity of feeling due to any realized ingressionof an eternal object is heightened when that eternal object is one elementin a realized contrast between eternal objects, and (ii) that two or morecontrasts may be incompatible for joint ingression, or may jointly enterinto a higher contrast.

It follows that balanced complexity is the outcome of this* Category ofSubjective Aim. Here 'complexity' means the realization of contrasts, ofcontrasts of contrasts, and so on; and 'balance' means the absence of at-tenuations due to the elimination of contrasts which some elements in thepattern would introduce and other elements inhibit.

Thus there is the urge towards the realization of the maximum numberof eternal objects subject to the restraint that they must be under condi-tions of contrast. But this limitation to 'conditions of contrast' is the de-mand for 'balance/ For 'balance' here means that no realized eternal ob-ject shall eliminate potential contrasts between other realized eternal ob-jects. Such eliminations attenuate the intensities of feeling derivable fromthe ingressions of the various elements of the pattern. Thus so far as theimmediate present subject is concerned, the origination of conceptual val-uation according to Category IV is devoted to such a disposition of em-phasis as to maximize the integral intensity derivable from the most fa-vourable balance. The subjective aim is the selection of the balance amidthe given materials. But one element in the immediate feelings of theconcrescent [425] subject is comprised of the anticipatory feelings of thetranscendent future in its relation to immediate fact. This is the feelingof the objective immortality inherent in the nature of actuality. Such an-ticipatory feelings involve realization of the relevance of eternal objects asdecided in the primordial nature of God. In so far as these feelings in thehigher organisms rise to important intensities there are effective feelingsof the more remote alternative possibilities. Such feelings are the con-ceptual feelings which arise in accordance with the Category of Reversion(Category Vt).

But there must be 'balance/ and 'balance' is the adjustment of identitiesand diversities for the introduction of contrast with the avoidance of in-hibitions by incompatibilities. Thus this secondary phase, involving thefuture, introduces reversion and is subject to Category VIII.t Each re-verted conceptual feeling hast its datum largely identical with that of itscorrelate primary feeling of the same pole. In this way, readiness for syn-thesis is promoted. But the introduction of contrast is obtained by thedifferences, or reversions, in some elements of the complex data. Thecategory expresses the rule that what is identical, and what is reverted, aredetermined by the aim at a favourable balance. The reversion is due tothe aim at complexity as one condition for intensity.

When this reverted conceptual feeling acquires a relatively high in-tensity of upward valuation in its subjective form, the resulting integra-tion of physical feeling, primary conceptual feeling, and secondary con-

The Higher Phases of Experience 279

ceptual feeling, produces a more complex physical purpose than in theformer case when the reverted conceptual feeling was negligible. There isnow the physical feeling as valued by its integration with the primaryconceptual feeling, the integration with the contrasted secondary concep-tual feeling, the heightening of the scale of subjective intensity by theintroduction of conceptual contrast, and the concentration of this height-ened intensity upon the reverted \426] feeling in virtue of its being thenovel factor introducing the contrast. The physical purpose thus providesthe creativity with a complex character, which is governed (i) by theCategory of Conceptual Reversion, in virtue of which the secondary concep-tual feeling arises, (ii) bv the Category of Transmutation, in virtue of whichconceptual feeling can be transmitted as physical feeling, (iii) by theCategory of Subjective Harmony, in virtue of which the subjective forms ofthe two conceptual feelings are adjusted to procure the subjective aim,and (iv) bv the Category of Subjective Intensity, in virtue of which theaim is determined to the attainment of balanced intensity from feelingsintegrated in virtue of near-identity, and contrasted in virtue of reversions.

Thus in the successive occasions of an enduring object in which theinheritance is governed by this complex physical purpose, the revertedconceptual feeling is transmitted into the next occasion as physical feeling,and the pattern of the original physical feeling now reappears as the datumin the reverted conceptual feeling. Thus along the route of the life-historythere is a chain of contrasts in the physical feelings of the successive occa-sions. This chain is inherited as a vivid contrast of physical feelings, andin each occasion there is the physical feeling with its primary valuation incontrast with the reverted conceptual feeling.

Thus an enduring object gains the enhanced intensity of feeling arisingfrom contrast between inheritance and novel effect, and also gains the en-hanced intensity arising from the combined inheritance of its stablerhythmic character throughout its life-history. It has the weight of repeti-tion, the intensity of contrast, and the balance between the two factors ofthe contrast. In this way the association of endurance with rhythm andphysical vibration ist to be explained. They arise out of the conditionsfor intensity and stability. The subjective aim is seeking width with itscontrasts, within the unity of a general design. An intense experience isan aesthetic fact, and [427] its categoreal conditions are to be generalizedfrom aesthetic laws in particular arts.

T .ie categoreal conditions, appealed to above, can be summarized thus:1

1. The novel consequent must be graded in relevance so as to pre-serve some identity of character with the ground.

2. The novel consequent must be graded in relevance so as to pre-serve some contrast with the ground in respect to that same identityof character,

1 My Religion in the Making, Ch. Ill, Sect. VIl.t

280 The Theory of Prehensions

These two principles are derived from the doctrine that an actualfact is a fact of aesthetic experience. All aesthetic experience is feelingarising out of the realization of contrast under identity.In the expansion of this account which has been given here, a thirdprinciple has been added, that new forms enter into positive realizationsfirst as conceptual experience, and are then transmuted into physicalexperience. But conceptual experience does not in itself involve con-sciousness; its essence is valuation.

Between physical purposes and the conscious purposes introduced bythe intellectual feelings there lie the propositional feelings which havenot acquired consciousness in their subjective forms by association withintellectual feelings. Such propositional feelings mark a stage of existenceintermediate between the purely physical stage and the stage of consciousintellectual operations. The propositions are lures for feelings, and giveto feelings a definiteness of enjoyment and purpose which is absent inthe blank evaluation of physical feeling into physical purpose. In thisblank evaluation we have merely the determination of the comparativecreative efficacies of the component feelings of actual entities. In a proposi-tional feeling there is the 'hold up'—or, in its original sense, the epoch—of the valuation of the predicative pattern in its relevance to the definitelogical subjects which are otherwise felt as definite elements in experience.\428] There is the arrest of the emotional pattern round this sheer factas a possibility, with the corresponding gain in distinctness of its relevanceto the future. The particular possibility for the transcendent creativity—in the sense of its advance from subject to subject—this particular possi-bility has been picked out, held up, and clothed with emotion. The stageof existence in which propositional feelings are important apart from in-tellectual feelings, may be identified with Bergson's stage of pure and in-stinctive intuition. There are thus three stages, the stage of pure physicalpurpose, the stage of pure instinctive intuition, and the stage of intellectualfeelings. But these stages are not sharply distinguished. There are stagesin which there are propositional feelings with every degree of importanceor of unimportance; there are stages in which there are intellectual feelingswith every degree of importance or of unimportance. Also,f even in a higherstage, there are whole recesses of feeling which in the final satisfactionacquire merely the characteristics of their own proper stage, physical orpropositional.

PART IVTHE THEORY OF EXTENSION

CHAPTER ICOORDINATE! DIVISION

SECTION I

[433] There are two distinct ways of 'dividing' the satisfaction of anactual entity into component feelings, genetically and coordinately. Geneticdivision is division of the concrescence; coordinate division is division ofthe concrete. In the 'genetic' mode, the prehensions are exhibited in theirgenetic relationship to each other. The actual entity is seen as a process;there is a growth from phase to phase; there are processes of integrationand of [434] reintegration. At length a complex unity of objective datumis obtained, in the guise of a contrast of actual entities, eternal objects,and propositions, felt with corresponding complex unity of subjective form.This genetic passage from phase to phase is not in physical time: theexactly converse point of view expresses the relationship of concrescenceto physical time. It can be put shortly by saying, that physical time ex-presses some features of the growth, but not the growth of the features.The final complete feeling is the "'satisfaction.'

Physical time makes its appearance in the 'coordinate' analysis of the'satisfaction/ The actual entity is the enjoyment of a certain quantum ofphysical time. But the genetic process is not the temporal succession:such a view is exactly what is denied by the epochal theory of time. Eachphase in the genetic process presupposes the entire quantum, and so doeseach feeling in each phase. The subjective unity dominating the processforbids the division of that extensive quantum which originates with theprimary phase of the subjective aim. The problem dominating the con-crescence is the actualization of the quantum in solidoA The quantum isthat standpoint in the extensive continuum which is consonant with thesubjective aim in its original derivation from God. Here 'God' is thatactuality in the world, in virtue of which there is physical law/

There is a spatial element in the quantum as well as a temporal ele-ment. Thus the quantum is an extensive region. This region is the deter-minate basis which the concrescence presupposes. This basis governs theobjectifications of the actual world which are possible for the novel con-crescence. The coordinate divisibility of the satisfaction is the 'satisfaction'considered in its relationship to the divisibility of this region.

The concrescence presupposes its basic region, and not the region itsconcrescence. Thus the subjective unity of the concrescence is irrelevant

283

to the divisibility of the [435] region. In dividing the region we are ignoringthe subjective unity which is inconsistent with such division. But the re-gion is, after all, divisible, although in the genetic growth it is undivided.

So this divisible character of the undivided region is reflected into thecharacter of the satisfaction. When we divide the satisfaction coordinately,we do not find feelings which are separate, but feelings which might beseparate. In the same way, the divisions of the region are not divisionswhich are; they are divisions which might be. Each such mode of divisionof the extensive region yields 'extensive quanta': also an 'extensive quan-tum' has been termed a 'standpoint/ This notion of a 'standpoint' mustnow be briefly explained.

The notion has reference to three allied doctrines. First, there is thedoctrine of 'the actual world' as receiving its definition from the immediateconcrescent actuality in question. Each actual entity arises out of its ownpeculiar actual world. Secondly, there is the doctrine of each actual worldas a 'medium/ According to this doctrine, if S be the concrescent subjectin question, and A and B be two actual entities in its actual world, theneither A is in the actual world of B, or B is in the actual world of A, or Aand B are contemporaries. If, for example, A be in the actual world of B,then for the immediate subject S there are (1) the direct objectificationof A in S, and (2) the indirect objectification by reason of the chain ofobjectification, A in B and B in S. Such chains can be extended to anylength by the inclusion of many intermediate actualities between Aand S.

Thirdly, it is to be noticed that 'decided' conditions are never such asto banish freedom. They only qualify it. There is always a contingencyleft open for immediate decision. This consideration is exemplified by anindetermination respecting 'the actual world' which is to decide the con-ditions for an immediately novel concrescence. There are alternatives as toits determination, which are left over for immediate decision. Some actual[436] entities may be either in the settled past, or in the contemporarynexus, or even left to the undecided future, according to immediate de-cision. Also the indirect chains of successive objectifications will be modi-fied according to such choice. These alternatives are represented by theindecision as to the particular quantum of extension to be chosen for thebasis of the novel concrescence.

SECTION II

The sense in which the coordinate divisions of the satisfaction are'feelings which might be separated has now to be discussed.

Each such coordinate division corresponds to a definite sub-region ofthe basic region. It expresses that component of the satisfaction whichhas the character of a unified feeling of the actual world from the stand-point of that sub-region. In so far as the objectification of the actual world

from this restricted standpoint is concerned, there is nothing to distinguishthis coordinate division from an actual entity. But it is only the physicalpole of the actual entity which is thus divisible. The mental pole is in-curably one. Thus the subjective form of this coordinate division is de-rived from the origination of conceptual feelings which have regard tothe complete region, and are not restricted to the sub-region in question.In other words, the conceptual feelings have regard to the complete actualentity, and not to the coordinate division in question. Thus the wholecourse of the genetic derivation of the coordinate division is not explicableby reference to the categoreal conditions governing the concrescence offeeling arising from the mere physical feeling of the restricted objectivedatum. The originative energy of the mental pole constitutes the urgewhereby its conceptual prehensions adjust and readjust subjective formsand thereby determine the specific modes of integration terminating inthe 'satisfaction/

It is obvious that in so far as the mental pole is trivial [437] as to orig-inality, what is inexplicable in the coordinate division (taken as actuallyseparate) becomes thereby trivial. Thus for many abstractions concerninglow-grade actual entities, the coordinate divisions approach the characterof being actual entities on the same level as the actual entity from whichthey are derived.

It is thus an empirical question to decide in relation to special topics,whether the distinction between a coordinate division and a true actualentity is, or is not, relevant. In so far as it is not relevant we are dealingwith an indefinitely subdivisible extensive universe.

A coordinate division is thus to be classed as a generic contrast. The twocomponents of the contrast are, (i) the parent actual entity, and (ii) theproposition which is the potentiality of that superject having arisen fromthe physical standpoint of the restricted sub-region. The proposition isthus the potentiality of eliminating from the physical pole of the parententity all the objectified actual world, except those elements derivable fromthat standpoint; and yet retaining the relevant elements of the subjectiveform.

The unqualified proposition is false, because the mental pole, whichis in fact operative, would not be the mental pole under the hypothesisof the proposition. But, for many purposes, the falsity of the propositionis irrelevant. The proposition is very complex; and with the relevant quali-fications depending on the topic in question, it expresses the truth. Inother words, the unqualified false proposition is a matrix from which anindefinite number of true qualified propositions can be derived. The req-uisite qualification depends on the special topic in question, and ex-presses the limits of the application of the unqualified proposition rele-vantly to that topic.

The unqualified proposition expresses the indefinite divisibility of theactual world; the qualifications express the features of the world which

are lost sight of by the [438] unguarded use of this principle. The actualworld is atomic: but in some senses it is indefinitely divisible.

SECTION III

The atomic actual entities individually express the genetic unity of theuniverse. The world expands through recurrent unifications of itself, each,by the addition of itself, automatically recreating the multiplicity anew.

The other type of indefinite multiplicity, introduced by the indefinitecoordinate divisibility of each atomic actuality, seems to show that, atleast for certain purposes, the actual world is to be conceived as a mereindefinite multiplicity.

But this conclusion is to be limited by the principle of 'extensive order'which steps in. The atomic unity of the world, expressed by a multiplicityof atoms, is now replaced by the solidarity of the extensive continuum.This solidarity embraces not only the coordinate divisions within eachatomic actuality, but also exhibits the coordinate divisions of all atomicactualities from each other in one scheme of relationship.

In an earlier chapter (Part II, Ch. IV, Sects. IV to IXt) the sense inwhich the world can be conceived as a medium for the transmission of in-fluences! has been discussed. This orderly arrangement of a variety ofroutes of transmission, by which alternative objectifications of an ante-cedent actuality A can be indirectly received into the constitution of a sub-sequent actuality B, is the foundation of the extensive relationship amongdiverse actual entities. But this scheme of external extensive relationshipslinks itself with the schemes of internal division which are internal to theseveral actual entities. There is, in this way, one basic scheme of extensiveconnection which expresses on one uniform plant (i) the general condi-tions to which the bonds, uniting the atomic actualities into a nexus, con-form, and (ii) the general conditions to which the bonds, uniting theinfinite num- [439] ber of coordinate subdivisions of the satisfaction of anyactual entity, conform.

As an example of (ii), suppose that P is a coordinate division of anactual occasion A. Then P can be conceived as an actual occasion with itsown actual world forming its initial datum in its first phase of geneticorigination. In fact, P is the hypothetical satisfaction of a hypotheticalprocess of concrescence with this standpoint. The other coordinate divi-sions of A are either in the 'actual world' for P, or are contemporary withP, or are coordinate divisions of P, or have a complex relation to P ex-pressed by the property that each one of them is coordinately divisibleinto prehensions Q^ Q2 . . ., such that each of them has one or othertof the three above-mentioned relations to P.

Further, in addition to the merely potential subdivisions of a satisfactioninto coordinate feelings, there is the merely potential aggregation of actualentities into a super-actuality in respect to which the true actualities play

the part of coordinate subdivisions. In other words, just as,f for some pur-poses, one atomic actuality can be treated as though it were many co-ordinate actualities, in the same way, for other purposes,t a nexus of manyactualities can be treated as though it were one actuality. This is what wehabitually do in the case of the span of life of a molecule, or of a piece ofrock, or of a human body.

This extensiveness is the pervading generic form to which the morpho-logical structurest of the organisms of the world conform. These organismsare of two types: one type consists of the individual actual entities; theother type consists of nexus of actual entities. Both types are correlatedby their common extensiveness. If we confine our attention to the sub-division of an actual entity into coordinate parts, we shall conceive ofextensiveness as purely derived from the notion of 'whole and part/ thatis to say, 'extensive whole and extensive part/ This was the view takenby me in myt two earlier investigations of the [440] subject.1 This defectof starting-point revenged itself in the fact that the 'method of extensiveabstraction' developed in those works was unable to define a 'point't with-out the intervention of the theory of 'duration/ Thus what should havebeen a property of 'durations' became the definition of a point. By thismode of approach the extensive relations of actual entities mutually ex-ternal to each other were pushed into the background; though they areequally fundamental.

Since that date Professor T. de Laguna 2 has shown that the somewhatmore general notion of 'extensive connection' can be adopted as the start-ing-point for the investigation of extension; and that the more limitednotion of 'whole and part7 can be defined in terms of it. In this way, asProfessor de Laguna has shown, my difficulty in the definition of a point,without recourse to other considerations, can be overcome.

This whole question is investigated in the succeeding chapters of thisPart.t Also I there give a definition of a straight line, and of 'flat' loci gen-erally, in terms of purely extensive principles without reference to measure-ment or to durations.

SECTION IV

An actual entity, in its character of being a physical occasion, is an actof blind perceptivity of the other physical occasions of the actual world.When we consider such an occasion morphologically, as a given entity,its perceptive bonds are divisible by reason of the extensive divisibility ofits own standpoints, and by reason of the extensive divisibility of the otheractual occasions. Thus we reach perceptive bonds involving one sub-regionof the basic region of the perceiver, and one subdivision of the basic region

1 Cf. The Principles of Natural Knowledge, 1919, and The Concept of Nature,1920, Cambridge University Press, England.

2 Cf. Professor de Laguna'sf three articles in the Journal of Philosophy, Psy-chology, and Scientific Method, Vol. XIX, 1922, especially the third article.

of the perceived. The relationship between these sub-regions involves thestatus of inter- [441] mediate regions functioning as agents in the processof transmission. In other words, the perspective of one sub-region fromthe other is dependent on the fact that the extensive relations expressthe conditions laid on the actual world in its function of a medium.

These extensive relations do not make determinate what is transmitted;but they do determine conditions to which all transmission must conform.They represent the systematic scheme which is involved in the real poten-tiality from which every actual occasion arises. This scheme is also involvedin the attained fact which every actual occasion is. The 'extensive' schemeis nothing else than the generic morphology of the internal relations whichbind the actual occasions into a nexus, and which bind the prehensions ofany one actual occasion into a unity, coordinately divisible.

For Descartes the primary attribute of physical bodies is extension; forthe philosophy of organism the primary relationship of physical occasionsis extensive connection. This ultimate relationship is sui generis7 and can-not be defined or explained. But its formal properties can be stated. Also,tin view of these formal properties, there are definable derivative notionswhich are of importance in expressing the morphological structure. Somegeneral character of coordinate divisibility is probably an ultimate meta-physical character, persistent in every cosmic epoch of physical occasions.Thus some of the simpler characteristics of extensive connection, as herestated, are probably such ultimate metaphysical necessities.

But when we examine the characteristics considered in the next chapter,it is difficult to draw the line distinguishing characteristics so general thatwe cannot conceive any alternatives, from characteristics so special that weimagine them to belong merely to our cosmic epoch. Such an epoch maybe, relatively to our powers, of immeasurable extent, temporally and spa-tially. But in reference to the ultimate nature of things, it is a limitednexus. Beyond that nexus, entities with new relationships, unrealized inour experiences and unforeseen by our imagi- [442} nations, will make theirappearance, introducing into the universe new types of order.

But, for our epoch, extensive connection with its various characteristicsis the fundamental organic relationship whereby the physical world isproperly described as a community. There are no important physical rela-tionships outside the extensive scheme. To be an actual occasion in thephysical world means that the entity in question is a relatum in thisscheme of extensive connection. In this epoch, the scheme defines whatis physically actual.

The more ultimate side of this scheme, perhaps that side which is meta-physically necessary, is at once evident by the consideration of the mutualimplication of extensive whole and extensive part. If you abolish thewhole, you abolish its parts; and if you abolish any part, then that wholeis abolished.

In this general description of the states of extension, nothing has been

said about physical time or physical space, or of the more general notionof creative advance. These are notions which presuppose the more gen-eral relationship of extension. They express additional facts about theactual occasions. The extensiveness of space is really the spatialization ofextension; and the extensiveness of time is really the temporalization ofextension. Physical time expresses the reflection of genetic divisibility intocoordinate divisibility.

So far as mere extensiveness is concerned, space might as well havethree hundred and thirty-three dimensions, instead of the modest threedimensions of our present epoch. The three dimensions of space forman additional fact about the physical occasions. Indeed the sheer dimen-sionality of space, apart from the precise number of dimensions, is suchan additional fact, not involved in the mere notion of extension. Also theseriality of time, unique or multiple, cannot be derived from the sole no-tion of extension.

[443] The notion of nature as an organic extensive community omitsthe equally essential point of view that nature is never complete. It isalways passing beyond itself. This is the creative advance of nature. Herewe come to the problem of time. The immediately relevant point to noticeis that time and space are characteristics of nature which presuppose thescheme of extension. But extension does not in itself determine the specialfacts which are true respecting physical time and physical space.

SECTION V

The consideration of coordination and genesis raises a question widerthan any yet discussed in this chapter.

The theory of 'prehensions' embodies a protest against the 'bifurcation'of nature. It embodies even more than that: its protest is against thebifurcation of actualities. In the analysis of actuality the antithesis be-tween publicity and privacy obtrudes itself at every stage. There are ele-ments only to be understood by reference to what is beyond the fact inquestion; and there are elements expressive of the immediate, private, per-sonal, individuality of the fact in question. The former elements expressthe publicity of the world; the latter elements express the privacy of theindividual.

An actual entity considered in reference to the publicity of things is asuperjecf; namely, it arises from the publicity which it finds, and it addsitself to the publicity which it transmits. It is a moment of passage fromdecided public facts to a novel public fact. Public facts are, in their nature,coordinate.

An actual entity considered in reference to the privacy of things is a'subject'; namely, it is a moment of the genesis of self-enjoyment. It con-sists of a purposed self-creation out of materials which are at hand in vir-tue of their publicity.

Eternal objects have the same dual reference. An eternal object con-sidered in reference to the publicity [444] of things is at 'universal';namely, in its own nature it refers to the general public facts of the worldwithout any disclosure of the empirical details of its own implication inthem. Its own nature as an entity requires ingression—positive or negative—in every detailed actuality; but its nature does not disclose the privatedetails of any actuality.

An eternal object considered in reference to the privacy of things is a'quality' or 'characteristic'; namely, in its own nature, as exemplified in anyactuality, it constitutes an element in the private definiteness of that ac-tuality. It refers itself publicly; but it is enjoyed privately.

The theory of prehensions is founded upon the doctrine that there areno concrete facts which are merely public, or merely private. The dis-tinction between publicity and privacy is a distinction of reason, and isnot a distinction between mutually exclusive concrete facts. The soleconcrete facts, in terms of which actualities can be analysed, are prehen-sions; and every prehension has its public side and its private side. Itspublic side is constituted by the complex datum prehended; and its privateside is constituted by the subjective form through which a private qualityis imposed on the public datum. The separations of perceptual fact fromemotional fact; and of causal fact from emotional fact, and from per-ceptual fact;t and of perceptual fact, emotional fact, and causal fact, frompurposive fact; have constituted a complex of bifurcations, fatal to a satis-factory cosmology. The facts of nature are the actualities; and the factsinto which the actualities are divisible are their prehensions, with theirpublic origins, their private forms, and their private aims. But the actuali-ties are moments of passage into a novel stage of publicity; and the co-ordination of prehensions expresses the publicity of the world, so far asit can be considered in abstraction from private genesis. Prehensions havepublic careers, but they are born privately. [445]

SECTION VI

The antithesis between publicity and privacy is reflected in the classi-fication of eternal objects according to their primary modes of ingressioninto actual entities. An eternal object can only function in the con-crescence of an actual entity in one of three ways: (i) it can be an elementin the definiteness of some objectified nexus, or of some single actual entity,which is the datum of a feeling; (ii) it can be an element in the definite-ness of the subjective form of some feeling; or (iii) it can be an elementin the datum of a conceptual, or propositional, feeling. AH other modesof ingression arise from integrations which presuppose these modes.

Now the third mode is merely the conceptual valuation of the potentialingression in one of the other two modes. It is a real ingression into actu-

ality; but it is a restricted ingression with mere potentiality withholdingthe immediate realization of its function of conferring definiteness.

The two former modes of ingression thus constitute the ways in whichthe functioning of an eternal object is unrestrictedly realized. But wenow ask whether either mode is indifferently open to each eternal object.The answer is the classification of eternal objects into two species, the'objective' species, and the 'subjective' species.

An eternal object of the objective species can only obtain ingression inthe first mode, and never in the second mode. It is always, in its un-restricted realization, an element in the definiteness of an actual entity,or a nexus, which is the datum of a feeling belonging to the subject inquestion.

Thus a member of this species can only function relationally: by anecessity of its nature it is introducing one actual entity, or nexus, intothe real internal constitution of another actual entity. Its sole avocationis to be an agent in objectification. It can never be an element in [446] thedefiniteness of a subjective form. The solidarity of the world rests uponthe incurable objectivity of this species of eternal objects. A member ofthis species inevitably introduces into the immediate subject other actu-alities. The definiteness with which it invests the external world may, ormay not, conform to the real internal constitutions of the actualities ob-jectified. But conformably, or non-conformably, such is the character ofthat nexus for that actual entity. This is a real physical fact, with itsphysical consequences. Eternal objects of the objective species are themathematical Platonict forms. They concern the world as a medium.

But the description of sensa given above (Part II, Ch. IV,t Sect. Ill)will include some members of the subjective species.

A member of the subjective species is, in its primary character, an ele-ment in the definiteness of the subjective form of a feeling. It is a deter-minate way in which a feeling can feel. It is an emotion, or an intensity, oran adversion, or an aversion, or a pleasure, or a pain. It defines the sub-jective form of feeling of one actual entity. Aj may be that component ofA's constitution through which A is objectified for B. Thus when B feelsAb it feels 'A with that feeling/ In this way, the eternal object which con-tributes to the definiteness of A's feeling becomes an eternal object con-tributing to the definiteness of A as an objective datum in B?s prehensionof A. The eternal object can then function both subjectively and relatively.It can be a private element in a subjective form, and also an agent in theobjectification. In this latter character it may come under the operationof the Category of Transmutation and become a characteristic of a nexusas objectified for a percipient.

In the first stage of B's physical feeling, the subjective form of B's feel-ing is conformed to the subjective form of A's feeling. Thus this eternalobject in B's experience will have a two-way mode of functioning. It willbe among the determinants of A for B, and it will be among [447] the

292 The Theory of Extension

determinants of B's way of sympathy with A. The intensity of physicalenergy belongs to the subjective species of eternal objects, but the peculiarform of the flux of energy belongs to the objective species.

For example, 'redness* may first be the definiteness of an emotion whichis a subjective form in the experience of A; it then becomes an agentwhereby A is objectified for B, so that A is objectified in respect to itsprehension with this emotion. But A may be only one occasion of a nexus,such that each of its members is objectified for B by a prehension with ananalogous subjective form. Then by the operation of the Category ofTransmutation, the nexus is objectified for B as illustrated by the charac-teristic 'redness/ The nexus will also be illustrated by its mathematicalforms which are eternal objects of the objective species.

SECTION VII

The feelings—or, more accurately, the quasi-feelings—introduced bythe coordinate division of actual entities eliminate the proper status of thesubjects entertaining the feelings. For the subjective forms of feelings areonly explicable by the categoreal demands arising from the unity of thesubject. Thus the coordinate division of an actual entity produces feelingswhose subjective forms are partially eliminated and partially inexplicable.But this mode of division preserves undistorted the elements of deflnite-ness introduced by eternal objects of the objective species.

Thus in so far as the relationships of these feelings require an appealto subjective forms for their explanation, the gap must be supplied by theintroduction of arbitrary laws of nature regulating the relations of inten-sities. Alternatively, the subjective forms become arbitrary epiphenomenalfacts, inoperative in physical nature, though claiming operative importance.

The order of nature, prevalent in the cosmic epoch in question, exhibitsitself as a morphological scheme in- [448] volving eternal objects of the ob-jective species. The most fundamental elements in this scheme are thoseeternal objects in terms of which the general principles of coordinate divi-sion itself are expressed. These eternal objects express the theory of exten-sion in its most general aspect. In this theory the notion of the atomicityof actual entities, each with its concrescent privacy, has been entirelyeliminated. We are left with the theory of extensive connection, of wholeand part, of points, lines, and surfaces, and of straightness and flatness.

The substance of this chapter can be recapitulated in a summary: Ge-netic division is concerned with an actual occasion in its character of aconcrescent immediacy. Coordinate division is concerned with an actualoccasion in its character of a concrete object. Thus for genetic divisionthe primary fact about an occasion is its initial 'dative7 phase; for coordi-nate division the primary fact is the final 'satisfaction/ But with the at-tainment of the 'satisfaction/ the immediacy of final causation is lost, andthe occasion passes into its objective immortality, in virtue of which efE-

Coordinate Division 293

cient causation is constituted. Thus in coordinate division we are analysingthe complexity of the occasion in its function of an efficient cause. It isin this connection that the morphological scheme of extensiveness attainsits importance. In this way we obtain an analysis of the dative phase interms of the 'satisfactions* of the past world. These satisfactions are sys-tematically disposed in their relative status, according as one is, or is not,in the actual world of another. Also they are divisible into prehensionswhich can be treated as quasi-actualities with the same morphologicalsystem of relative status. This morphological system gains special orderfrom the defining characteristic of the present cosmic epoch. The ex-tensive continuum is this specialized ordering of the concrete occasionsand of the prehensions into which they are divisible.

CHAPTER IIEXTENSIVE CONNECTION

SECTION I

[449] In this chapter we enumerate the chief characteristics of thephysical relationship termed 'extensive connection/ We also enumeratethe derivative notions which are of importance in our physical experience.This importance has its origin in the characteristics enumerated. The defi-nitions of the derivative notions, as mere definitions, are equally applicableto any scheme of relationship whatever its characteristics. But they areonly of importance when the relationship in question has the character-istics here enumerated for extensive connection.

No attempt will be made to reduce these enumerated characteristics toa logical minimum from which the remainder can be deduced by strictdeduction. There is not a unique set of logical minima from which therest can be deduced. There are many such sets. The investigation of suchsets has great logical interest and has an importance which extends beyondlogic. But it is irrelevant for the purposes of this discussion.

For the sake of brevity the terms 'connection' and 'connected' will beused in the place of 'extensive connection' and Extensively connected/The term 'region' will be used for the relata which are involved in thescheme of 'extensive connection/ Thus, in the shortened phraseology,regions are the things which are connected.

A set of diagrams will illustrate the type of relationship meant by 'con-nection/ The two areas, A and B, in each diagram exhibit an instance ofconnection with each other,

[450] Such diagrams are apt to be misleading: t for one reason, becausethey introduce features as obvious, which it is our business to define interms of our fundamental notion of 'connection'; for another reason, be-cause they introduce features which are special to the two-dimensional,spatial extensiveness of a sheet of paper.

In the three diagrams of Set II, the areas, A and B, are not connected;but they are 'mediately' connected by the area C.

SECTION II

Definition Li Two regions are 'mediately' connected when they areboth connected with a third region.

294

295

DIAGRAMS I

(vi)

Assumption 1. Connection and mediate connection are both of themsymmetrical relations; that is to say, if region A is connected, or mediatelyconnected, with region B, then region B is connected, or mediately con-nected, with region A.

[451] It is obvious that the part of this assumption which concerns medi-ate connection can be proved from the terms of the definition. In the sub-sequent development of definitions and assumptions we shall not draw at-tention to such instances of the possibility of proof.

Assumption 2. No region is connected with all the other regions; andany two regions are mediately connected.

Assumption 3. Connection is not transitive; that is to say, if A be con-nected with B, and B with C, it does not thereby follow that A is con-nected with C; though in certain cases it does happen that A is connectedwith C.

Assumption 4, No region is connected, or mediately connected, withitself.

[452] This assumption is merely a convenient arrangement of nomen-clature.

Definition 2. Region A is said to 'include' region B when every regionconnected with B is also connected with A. As an alternative nomen-clature, region B will be said to be 'part' of region A.

This definition of 'inclusion' is due to Professor de Laguna; it constitutesan important addition to the theory of extension. In such investigations,as the present one, the definitions are the really vital portion of the subject.

The Theory of Extension

(i)

DIAGRAMS II t

(ii)

Assumption 5. When one region includes another, the two regions areconnected.

Assumption 6. The relation of inclusion is transitive.

Assumption 7. A region does not include itself.

Assumption 8. The relation of inclusion is asymmetrical: that is to say,if A includes B, then B does not include A.

Assumption 9. Every region includes other regions; and a pair of regionsthus included in one region are not necessarily connected with each other.Such pairs can always be found, included in any given region.

Definition 3, Two regions are said to 'overlap/ when there is a third re-gion which they both include.

Assumption 10. The relation of overlapping is symmetrical.

Assumption J J. If one region includes another region, the two regionsoverlap.

Assumption 12. Two regions which overlap are connected.

Definition 4. A 'dissection' of any given region A, is a set of regions,which is such that (i) all its members are included in A, (ii) no two ofits members overlap, (iii) any region included in A, but not a member ofthe set, either is included in one member of the set, or overlaps more thanone member of the set.

Assumption 13. t There are many dissections of any given region.

[453] Assumption 14A A dissection of a region is not a dissection of anyother region.

Definition 5. A region is called an 'intersect' of two overlapping regions,A and B, when (i) either it is included in both A and B, or it is one of thetwo regions and is included in the other, and (ii) no region, also includedin both A and B, can overlap it without being included in it.

Definition 6A If there be one, and only one, intersect of two regions, Aand B, those regions are said to overlap with 'unique intersection'; if therebe more than one intersect, they are said to overlap with 'multipleintersection/

Assumption ISA Any region included in both of two overlapping re-gions, and not itself an intersect, is included in one, and only one, inter-sect.

Assumption 16A If A includes B, then B is the sole intersect of A and B.

Assumption 17A An intersect of two regions, which is not one of thetwo regions, is included in both regions.

Assumption 18A Each pair of overlapping regions has at least oneintersect.

Definition 7. Two regions are 'externally' connected when (i) they areconnected, and (ii) they do not overlap. The possibility of this definitionis another of the advantages gained from the adoption of Professor deLaguna's starting-point, 'extensive connection/ over my original starting-point,1 'extensive whole and extensive part/ External connection is il-lustrated by diagrams (v) and (vi) in Set I of the diagrams. So far, wehave not discriminated between the two cases illustrated respectively bythese two diagrams. The notion of external connection is a long steptowards the elaboration of the notion of a 'surface/ which has not yet beentouched upon.

Definition 8, A region B is 'tangentially' included in a region A, when(i) B is included in A, and (ii) there are \454] regions which are externallyconnected with both A and B.

Definition 9. A region B is 'non-tangentially' included in a region Awhen (i) B is included in A, and (ii) there is no third region which isexternally connected with both A and B.

The possibility, at this stage, of the three definitions 7, 8, and 9, con-stitutes the advantage to be gained by starting from Professor de Laguna'snotion of 'extensive connection/ Non-tangential inclusion is illustrated bydiagram (i) of the first set; and the two cases—as yet undiscriminated—of tangential inclusion are illustrated by diagrams (ii) and (iii).

SECTION III

Definition 10. A set of regions is called an 'abstractive set/ when (i) anytwo members of the set are such that one of them includes the other

1 Cf. my Principles of Natural Knowledge, and Concept of Nature.

non-tangentially, andf (ii) there is no region included in every member ofthe set.

This definition practically limits abstractive sets to those sets which weretermed 'simple abstractive sets' in iiiy Principles of Natural Knowledge(paragraph 37.6). Since every region includes other regions, and since therelation of inclusion is transitive, it is evident that every abstractive setmust be composed of an infinite number of members.

By reference to the particular case of three-dimensioned space, we seethat abstractive sets can have different types of convergence. For in thiscase, an abstractive set can converge either to a point, or to a line, or to anarea. But it is to be noted that we have not defined either points, or lines,or areas; and that we propose to define them in terms of abstractive sets.Thus we must define the various types of abstractive sets without referenceto the notions, point, line, area.

Definition 11. An abstractive set a is said to 'cover' an [455] abstractiveset p, when every member of the set a includes some members of theset p.

It is to be noticed that each abstractive set is to be conceived with itsmembers in serial order, determined by the relation of inclusion. Theseries starts with a region of any size, and converges indefinitely towardssmaller and smaller regions, without any limiting region. When the set acovers the set p7 each member of a includes all the members of the con-vergent tail of p,\ provided that we start far enough down in the serialarrangement of the set p. It will be found that, though an abstractive setmust start with some region at its big end, these initial large-sized regionsnever enter into our reasoning. Attention is always fixed on what relationsoccur when we have proceeded far enough down the series. The only re-lations which are interesting are those which, if they commence anywhere,continue throughout the remainder of the infinite series.

Definition 12. Two abstractive sets are said to be 'equivalent' when eachset covers the other.

Thus if a and p be the two equivalent abstractive sets, and A1 be anymember of a, there is some member of p, B± say, which is included in Aijfalso there is some member of a, A2 say, which is included in B^ alsothere is some member of p, B2 say, which is included in A2;t and soon indefinitely. Two equivalent abstractive sets are equivalent in respect totheir convergence. But, in so far as the two sets are diverse, there will berelationships and characteristics in respect to which those sets are notequivalent, in a more general sense of the term 'equivalence/ The connec-tion of this special sense of 'equivalence' to physical properties is explainedmore particularly in Chapter IV of the Concept of Nature.

Assumption 19A An abstractive set is equivalent to itself. This assump-tion is merely a convenient arrangement of nomenclature. An abstractiveset obviously satisfies the conditions for such reflexive equivalence.

Definition 13. A geometrical element is a complete [456] group of ab-

stractive sets equivalent to each other, and not equivalent to any abstrac-tive set outside the group.

Assumption 20 A The relation of equivalence is transitive and sym-metrical.

Thus any two members of a geometrical element are equivalent to eachother; and an abstractive set, not belonging to the geometrical element, isnot equivalent to any member of that geometrical element. It is evidentthat each abstractive set belongs to one, and only one, geometrical element.

Definition 14. The geometrical element to which an abstractive setbelongs! is called the geometrical element 'associated' with that abstrac-tive set. Thus a geometrical element is 'associated* with each of itsmembers.

Assumption 21A Any abstractive set which covers any member of a geo-metrical elementf also covers every member of that element.

Assumption 22 A An abstractive set which is covered by any member ofa geometrical elementf is also covered by every member of that element.

Assumption 23A If a and b be two geometrical elements, either everymember of a covers every member of b, or no member of a covers anymember of b.

Definition IS. The geometrical element a is said to be 'incident* in thegeometrical element 6, when every member of b covers every member of a,but a and b are not identical.

Assumption 24A A geometrical element is not incident in itself.

This assumption is merely a convenient arrangement of nomenclature.

When the geometrical element a is incident in the geometrical element6, the members of a will be said to have a 'sharper convergence* than thoseof 6.

Definition 16. A geometrical element is called a 'point/ when there is nogeometrical element incident in it. This definition of a 'point* is to becompared with Euclid's definition: 'A point is without parts.*

[457} Definition 16.1. The members of a geometrical element are said tobe 'prime* in reference to assigned conditions, when (i) every member ofthat geometrical element satisfies! those conditions; (ii) if any abstractiveset satisfies those conditions, every member of its associated geometricalelement satisfies them; (iii) there is no geometrical element, with mem-bers satisfying those conditions, which is also incident in the given geo-metrical element.

The term 'prime* will also be applied to a geometrical element, whenits members are 'prime* in the sense defined above.

It is obvious that a point is, in a sense, an 'absolute* prime. This is, infact, the sense in which the definition! of a point, given here, conforms toEuclid's definition.

Definition 17. An abstractive set which is a member of a point will becalled punctual.*

Definition 18. A geometrical element is called a 'segment between two

300 The Theory of Extension

points P and QJ when its members are prime in reference to the conditionthat the points P and O are incident in it.

Definition 19. When a geometrical element is a segment between twopoints, those points are called the 'end-points' of the segment.

Definition 20. An abstractive set which is a member of a segment iscalled 'segmental/

Assumption 25. f There are many diverse segments with the same end-points; t but a segment has only one pair of end-points.

This assumption illustrates the fact that there can be many geometricalelements which are prime in reference to some given conditions. There are,however, conditions such that there is only one geometrical element primeto any one of them. For example, the set of points incident in one geo-metrical element uniquely defines that geometrical element. Also anotherinstance of uniqueness is to be found in the theory of 'flat' geometricalelements, to be considered in the next chapter. A particular instance ofsuch 'flat' elements is afforded \458] by straight lines. The whole theory ofgeometry depends upon the discovery of conditions which correspond toone, and only one, prime geometrical element. The Greeks, with theirusual fortunate intuition, chanced upon such conditions in their notions ofstraight lines and planes. There is every reason, however, to believe that,in other epochs, widely different types of conditions with this property maybe important—perhaps even in this epoch. The discovery of them is ob-viously of the first importance. It is possible that the modern Einsteinianreconstruction of physics is best conceived as the discovery of the inter-weaving in nature of different types of such conditions.

SECTION IV

Definition 21. A point is said to be 'situated' in a region, when theregion is a member of one of the punctual abstractive sets which composethat point.

Assumption 26A If a point be situated in a region, the regions, suf-ficiently far down the convergent tails of the various abstractive sets com-posing that point, are included in that region non-tangentially.

Definition 22, A point is said to be situated in the 'surface' of a region,when all the regions in which it is situated overlap that region but arenot included in it.

Definition 23. A 'complete locus' is a set of points which compose either(i) all the points situated in a region, or (ii) all the points situated in thesurface of a region, or (hi) all the points incident in a geometrical element

A 'locus' always means a 'locus of points.7

Assumption 27X A 'complete locus,' as defined in Definition 23, consistsof an infinite number of points.

Definition 24. When a complete locus consists of all the points situatedin a region, it is called the 'volume' of that region; when a complete locusconsists of all the points in the surface of a region, the locus itself is called

Extensive Connection 301

the 'surface* of that region; when a complete locus consists of all the pointsincident in a segment between end- [459] points, the locus is called a linearstretch* between those end-points.

Assumption 28 A There is a one-to-one correlation between volumes andregions, between surfaces and regions, and between linear stretches andsegments, and between any geometrical element and the locus of pointsincident in it.

Assumption 29 A If two points lie in a given volume, there are linearstretches joining those two points, whose points all lie in that volume.

Assumption 30 A If two points lie in a given surface, there are linearstretches joining those two points, whose points all lie in that surface.

Assumption 31A If two points lie in a given linear stretch, there is one,and only one, linear stretch with those points as end-points, whose pointslie wholly in the given linear stretch.

It should be noted that the terms 'volume' and 'surface* are not meantto imply that volumes are three-dimensional, or that surfaces are two-di-mensional. In the application of this theory of extension to the existingphysical world of our epoch, volumes are four-dimensional, and surfacesare three-dimensional. But linear stretches are one-dimensional.

+A sufficient number of assumptions, some provable and some axio-matic, have now been stated; so as to make clear the sort of developmentof the theory required for this stage of the definitions. In particular, thenotion of the order of points in a linear stretch can now be elaboratedfrom the definition of the notion of 'between/ But such investigations willlead us too far into the mathematical principles of geometry. +

[S46]i An explanatory paragraph is required at the end of this chapter tomake clear the principle that a certain determinate boundedness is re-quired for the notion of a region—i.e., for the notion of an extensivestandpoint in the real potentiality for actualization. The inside of a re-gion, its volume, has a complete boundedness denied to the extensive po-tentiality external to it. The boundedness applies both to the spatial andthe temporal aspects of extension. Wherever there is ambiguity as to thecontrast of boundedness between inside and outside, there is no properregion. In the next chapter all the ovals, members of one ovate class, pre-serve this property of boundedness, in the same sense for each of the ovals.Thus in the case of Elliptic Geometry (page 330) no oval can includehalf a straight line. On page 304, Condition vii has been expressed care-lessly, so as to apply only to the case of infinite spatiality, i.e., to Euclideanand Hyperbolic Geometry.

CHAPTER IIIFLAT LOCI

SECTION I

[460] Modern physical science, with its dependence on the exact no-tions of mathematics, began with the foundation of Greek Geometry. Thefirst definition of Euclid's Elements runs,

"A point is that of which there is no part/'

The second definition runs,

"A line is breadthless length."

The fourth definition runs,

"A straight line is any line which lies evenly with the points on itself."

These translations are taken from Euclid In Greek, Book I, edited withnotes by Sir Thomas L. Heath, the greatest living authority on Euclid'sElements. Heath ascribes the second definition "to the Platonic school, ifnot to Plato himself/'f For the Greek phrase translated 'evenly' Heathalso suggests the alternatives 'on a footing of equality,' 'evenly placed/'without bias/

Euclid's first 'postulate* is (Heath's translation):

"Let the following be postulated: to draw a straight line from any pointto any point."

Heath points out that this postulate was meant to imply f existence anduniqueness.

As these statements occur in Greek science, a muddle arises between'forms' and concrete physical things. Geometry starts with the purpose ofinvestigating cer- [461] tain forms of physical things. But in its initial defini-tions of the 'point' and the 'line,' it seems immediately to postulate certainultimate physical things of a very peculiar character. Plato himself ap-pears to have had some suspicion of this confusion when (Heath, loc.cit.) he "objected to recognizing points as a separate class of things atall."t He ought to have gone further, and have made the same objection toall the geometrical entities, namely, points, lines, and surfaces. He wanted'forms,' and he obtained new physical entities.

According to the previous chapter, "extension' should be construed interms of 'extensive connection'; that is to say, extension is a form ofrelationship between the actualities of a nexus. A point is a nexus of actualentities with a certain 'form'; and so is a 'segment/ Thus geometry is theinvestigation of the morphology of nexus.

302

SECTION II

The weak point of the Euclidean definition of a straight line is, thatnothing has been deduced from it. The notion expressed by the phrases'evenly/ or 'evenly placed/ requires definition. The definition should besuch that the uniqueness of the straight segment between two points canbe deduced from it. Neither of these demands has ever been satisfied, withthe result that in modern times the notion of 'straightness' has been basedon that of measurement. A straight line has, in modern times, been definedas the shortest distance between two points. In the classic geometry, theconverse procedure was adopted, and measurement presupposed straightlines. But, with the modern definition, the notion of the 'shortest distance'in its turn requires explanation.1 This notion is practically defined to meanthe line which is the route of certain physical occurrences.

In this section it will be shown that the gap in the old [462] classicaltheory can be remedied. Straight lines will be defined in terms of theextensive notions, developed in the preceding chapter; and the uniquenessof the straight line joining two points will be proved to follow from theterms of the definition.

A class of 'oval' regions must first be defined. Now the only weaponwhich we have for this definition is the notion of regions which overlapwith a unique intersect (cf. Def. 6 of previous chapter). It is evidently aproperty of a pair of ovals that they can only overlap with a unique inter-sect. But it is equally evident that some regions which are not ovals alsooverlap with a unique intersect. However the class of ovals has the prop-erty that any region, not a member of it, intersects some ovals with mul-tiple intersects. Also sub-sets of ovals can be found satisfying variousconditions.

Thus we proceed to define a class whose region shall have those relationsto each other, and to other regions, which we ascribe to the class of ovals.In other words,! we cannot define a single oval, but we can define a classof ovals. Such a class will be called 'ovate/ The definition of an ovate classproceeds by enumerating all those peculiar properties possessed by in-dividual members of the class, or by sub-sets of members of the class. It willbe found in the course of this enumeration that an extensive continuumwhich possesses an ovate class is dimensional in respect to that class. Thusexistence of straight lines in an extensive continuum is bound up with thedimensional character of the continuum; and both characteristics are rela-tive to a particular ovate class of regions in the continuum. It seems prob-able that an extensive continuum will possess only one ovate class. But Ihave not succeeded in proving that property; nor is it necessary for theargument.

A preliminary definition is convenient:

1 Cf. Part IV, Ch. V, on 'Measurement.'

Definition 0.1. An 'ovate abstractive set' is an abstractive set whosemembers all belong to the complete ovate class under consideration.

[463] The characteristics of an ovate class will be divided into twogroups: (a) the group of non-abstractive conditions, and (b) the group ofabstractive conditions.

Definition 1. A class of regions is called 'ovate/ when it satisfies theconditions belonging to the two following groups, (a) and (b):

(a) The Non-Abstractive Group

(i) Any two overlapping regions of the ovate class have a unique inter-sect which also belongs to that ovate class.

(ii) Any region, not a member of the ovate class, overlaps some membersof that class with 'multiple intersection' (cf. Def. 6 of previous chapter).

(iii) Any member of the ovate class overlaps some regions, not of thatclass, with multiple intersection.

(iv) Any pair of members of the ovate class, which are externally con-nected, have their surfaces touching either in a 'complete locus' of points(cf. Ch. II, Def. 23 and Ass. 27t), or in a single point.

(v) Any region, not belonging to the ovate class, is externally con-nected with some member of that class so that their surfaces touch in aset of points which does not form a 'complete locus/

(vi) Any member of the ovate class is externally connected with someregion not of that class so that their surfaces touch in a set of points whichdoes not form a 'complete locus/

(vii) Any finite number of regions are jointly included in some memberof the ovate class.*

(viii) If A and B be members of the ovate class, and A include B, thenthere are members of the class which include B and are included in A.

(ix) There are dissections (cf. Def. 4 of the previous chapter) of everymember of the ovate class, which consist wholly of members of that class;and there are dissections consisting wholly or partly of members not be-longing to that class.

[464] (b) The Abstractive Group

(i) Among the members of any point, there are ovate abstractive sets.

(ii) If any set of two, or of three, or of four, points be considered, thereare abstractive sets 'prime in reference to the twofold condition, (a) ofcovering the points in question, and (b) of being equivalent to an ovateabstractive set.

(iii) Theret are sets of five points such that no abstractive set existsprime in reference to the twofold condition, (a) of covering the points inquestion, and (b) oi being equivalent to an ovate abstractive set.

By reason of the definitions of this latter group, the extensive continuumin question is called 'four-dimensional/ Analogously, an extensive con-

tinuum of any number of dimensions can be defined. The physical ex-tensive continuum with which we are concerned in this cosmic epoch isfour-dimensional. Notice that the property of being 'dimensional* is rela-tive to a particular ovate class in the extensive continuum. There may be'ovate' classes satisfying all the conditions with the exception of the 'di-mensional* conditions. Also a continuum may have one number of dimen-sions relating to one ovate class, and another number of dimensions relat-ing! to another ovate class.

Possibly physical laws, of the type presupposing continuity, depend onthe interwoven properties of two, or more, distinct ovate classes.

SECTION III

Assumption 1. In the extensive continuum of the present epoch there isat least one ovate class, with the characteristics of the two groups, (a) and(b), of the previous section.

Definition 2. One such ovate class will be denoted by a: all definitionswill be made relatively to this selected ovate class.

[465] It is indifferent to the argument whether or no there be an al-ternative ovate class. If there be, the derivative entities defined in referenceto this alternative class are entirely different to those defined in reference toa. It is sufficient for us, that one such class interests us by the importanceof its physical relations.

Assumption 2. If two abstractive sets are prime in reference to the sametwofold condition, (a) of covering a given group of points, and (b) of be-ing equivalent to some ovate abstractive set, then they are equivalent

By reason of the importance of this proposition a proof is given.

Proof. The two abstractive sets are either equivalent to the same ovateabstractive set, or to different ovate abstractive sets. In the former al-ternative, the required conclusion is obvious. In the latter alternative, let/a and v be the two different ovate abstractive sets. Each of these sets,/a and v, satisfies the twofold condition. We have to prove that they areequivalent to each other. Let M and N be any regions belonging to ju. andv respectively. Then since the convergent portions of the abstractive setsbelonging to the various points of the given group must ultimately consistof regions all lying in M and all lying in N, it follows that M and N inter-sect. But, being oval, M and N have only one intersect, and all the pointsin question must be situated in it. Also this intersect is oval. Hence, byselecting such intersects, a third abstractive set can be found which satisfiesthe twofold condition and is covered both by //, and by v. But since/* and v are prime in reference to this condition, they are both of themequivalent to this third abstractive class. Hence they are equivalent to eachother. Q.E.D.

Corollary, It follows that all abstractive sets, prime with respect to thesame twofold condition of this type, belong to one geometrical element.

Definition 3. The single geometrical element defined, as in the enuncia-tion of Assumption 2, by a set of two points is called a 'straight' segmentbetween those end- [466] points. If the set comprise more than two points,the geometrical element is called 'flat/ 'Straight7 segments are also in-cluded under the designation 'flat geometrical elements/

If a set of points define a flat geometrical element, as in the enunciationof Assumption 2, it may happen that the same geometrical element isdefined by some sub-set of those points. Hence we have the followingdefinition:

Definition 4. A set of points, defining a flat geometrical element, is saidto be in its lowest terms when it contains no sub-set defining the sameflat geometrical element.

Assumption 3. No two sets of a finite number of points, both in theirlowest terms, define the same flat geometrical element.

Definition 5. The locus of points incident in a 'straight segment' is calledthe 'straight line' between the end-points of the segment.

Definition 6. The locus of points incident in a flat geometrical elementis called the 'content' of that element. It is also called a 'flat locus/

Assumption 4. If any sub-set of points lief in a flat locus, that sub-set alsodefines a flat locus contained within the given locus.

Definition 6.1 A A complete straight line is a locus of points such that,(i) the straight line joining any two members of the locus lies whollywithin the locus, (ii) every sub-set in the locus, which is in its lowest terms,consists of a pair of points, (iii) no points can be added to the locus with-out loss of one, or both, of the characteristics (i) and (ii).

Definition 7. A triangle is the flat locus defined by three points whichare not collinear. The three points are the angular points of the triangle.

Definition 8. A plane is a locus of non-collinear points such that, (i) thetriangle defined by any three non-collinear members of the locus lieswholly within the locus, [467] (ii) any finite number of points in thelocus lie in some triangle wholly contained in the locus, (iii) no set ofpoints can be added to the locus without loss of one, or both, of thecharacteristics (i) and (ii).

Definition 9. A tetrahedron is the flat locus defined by four points whichare not coplanar. The four points are called the corners of the tetrahedron.

Definition 10. A three-dimensional flat space is a locus of non-coplanarpoints such that, (i) the tetrahedron defined by any four non-coplanarpoints of the locus lies wholly within the locus, (ii) any finite number ofpoints in the locus lief in some tetrahedron wholly contained in thelocus, (iii) no set of points can be added to the locus without the loss ofone, or both, of the characteristics (i) and (ii).

Any further development of definitions and propositions will lead tomathematical details irrelevant to our immediate purposes. It suffices tohave proved that characteristic properties of straight lines, planes, andthree-dimensional flat spaces are discoverable in the extensive continuum

without any recourse to measurement. The systematic character of a con-tinuum depends on its possession of one or more ovate classes. Here, theparticular case of a 'dimensional' ovate class has been considered.

SECTION IV

The importance of the notion of 'external connection* requires furtherdiscussion.

First, there is a purely geometrical question to be noted. The theory ofthe external connection of oval regions throws light on the Euclideanconcept of 'evenness/ A pair of ovals (cf. Sect. Ill) can only be externallyconnected in a 'complete locus/ or in a single point. We now consider thatspecies of 'complete loci' which can be the points common to the surfacesof a pair of ovals externally connected. We exclude the case of one-pointcontact. The species seems to have what the [468] Greeks meant by theirterm 'even* (taoq). On either side of such a locus, there is the interior ofone oval and the exterior of another oval, so that the locus is 'even' inrespect to the contrasted notions of 'concavity' and 'convexity/ It is anextra 'assumption'—provable or otherwise according to the particular log-ical development of the subject which may have been adopted—that all'even' loci are 'flat/ and that all 'flat' loci are 'even/

The second question for discussion concerns the physical importance of'external connection/ So long as the atomic character of actual entities isunrecognized, the application of Zeno's method of argument makes itdifficult to understand the notion of continuous transmission which reignsin physical science. But the concept of 'actual occasions/ adopted in thephilosophy of organism, allows of the following explanation of physicaltransmission.

Let two actual occasions be termed 'contiguous' when the regions con-stituting their 'standpoints' are externally connected. Then by reason ofthe absence of intermediate actual occasions, the objectification of theantecedent occasion in the later occasion is peculiarly complete. There willbe a set of antecedent, contiguous occasions objectified in any given occa-sion; and the abstraction which attends every objectification will merely bedue to the necessary harmonizations of these objectifications. The ob-jectifications of the more distant past will be termed 'mediate'; the con-tiguous occasions will have 'immediate' objectification. The mediate ob-jectifications will be transmitted through various routes of successive im-mediate objectifications. Thus the notion of continuous transmission inscience must be replaced by the notion of immediate transmission througha route of successive quanta of extensiveness. These quanta of extensive-ness are the basic regions of successive contiguous occasions. It is not neces-sary for the philosophy of organism entirely to deny that there [469] isdirect objectification of one occasion in a later occasion which is notcontiguous to it. Indeed, the contrary opinion would seem the more nat-

308 The Theory of Extension

ural for this doctrine. Provided that physical science maintains its denialof 'action at a distance/ the safer guess is that direct objectification ispractically negligible except for contiguous occasions; but that this prac-tical negligibility is a characteristic of the present cosmic epoch, withoutany metaphysical generality. Also a further distinction should be intro-duced. Physical prehensions fall into two species, pure physical prehen-sions and hybrid physical prehensions. A pure physical prehension is aprehension whose datum is an antecedent occasion objectified in respect toone of its own physical prehensions. A hybrid prehension has as its datuman antecedent occasion objectified in respect to a conceptual prehension.Thus a pure physical prehension is the transmission of physical feeling,while hybrid prehension is the transmission of mental feeling.

There is no reason to assimilate the conditions for hybrid prehensions tothose for pure physical prehensions. Indeed the contrary hypothesis is themore natural. For the conceptual pole does not share in the coordinatedivisibility of the physical pole, and the extensive continuum is derivedfrom this coordinate divisibility. Thus the doctrine of immediate objecti-fication for the mental poles and of mediate objectification for the physi-cal poles seems most consonant to the philosophy of organism in its ap-plication to the present cosmic epoch. This conclusion has some empiricalsupport, both from the evidence for peculiar instances of telepathy, andfrom the instinctive apprehension of a tone of feeling in ordinary socialintercourse.

But of course such immediate objectification is also reinforced, or weak-ened, by routes of mediate objectification. Also pure and hybrid prehen-sions are integrated and thus hopelessly intermixed. Hence it will only bein exceptional circumstances that an immediate hybrid {470} prehensionhas sufficient vivid definition to receive a subjective form of clear con-scious attention.

SECTION V

We have now traced the main characteristics of that real potentialityfrom which the first phase of a physical occasion takes its rise. Thesecharacteristics remain inwoven in the constitution of the subject through-out its adventure of self-formation. The actual entity is the product of theinterplay of physical pole with mental pole. In this way, potentiality passesinto actuality, and extensive relations mould qualitative content and ob-jectifications of other particulars into a coherent finite experience.

In general, consciousness is negligible; and even the approach to it invivid propositional feelings has failed to attain importance. Blind physicalpurposes reign. It is now obvious that blind prehensions, physical andmental, are the ultimate bricks of the physical universe. They are boundtogether within each actuality by the subjective unity of aim which governstheir allied genesis and their final concrescence. They are also bound to-

Flat Loci 309

gether beyond the limits of their peculiar subjects by the way in which theprehension in one subject becomesf the objective datum for the prehen-sion in a later subject, thus objectifying the earlier subject for the latersubject. The two types of interconnection of prehensions are themselvesbound together in one common scheme, the relationship of extension.

It is by means of 'extension' that the bonds between prehensions takeon the dual aspect of internal relations, which are yet in a sense externalrelations. It is evident that if the solidarity of the physical world is to berelevant to the description of its individual actualities, it can only be byreason of the fundamental internality of the relationships in question. Onthe other hand, if the individual discreteness of the actualities is to haveits weight, there must be an aspect in these relationships [471] from whichthey can be conceived as external, that is, as bonds between divided things.The extensive scheme serves this double purpose.

The Cartesian subjectivism in its application to physical science becameNewton's assumption of individually existent physical bodies, with merelyexternal relationships. We diverge from Descartes by holding that what hehas described as primary attributes of physical bodiest are really the formsof internal relationships between actual occasions, and within actual occa-sions. Such a change of thought is the shift from materialism to organism,as the basic idea of physical science.

In the language of physical science, the change from materialism to'organic realism'—as the new outlook may be termed—is the displacementof the notion of static stuff by the notion of fluent energy. Such energyhas its structure of action and flow, and is inconceivable apart from suchstructure. It is also conditioned by 'quantum' requirements. These are thereflections into physical science of the individual prehensions, and of theindividual actual entities to which these prehensions belong. Mathematicalphysics translates the saying of Heraclitus, 'AH things flow,' into its ownlanguage. It then becomes, All things are vectors. Mathematical physicsalso accepts the atomistic doctrine of Democritus. It translates it into thephrase, All flow of energy obeys 'quantum' conditions.

But what has vanished from the field of ultimate scientific conceptionsis the notion of vacuous material existence with passive endurance, withprimary individual attributes, and with accidental adventures. Some fea-tures of the physical world can be expressed in that way. But the conceptis useless as an ultimate notion in science, and in cosmology.

CHAPTER IVSTRAINS

SECTION I

[472] There is nothing in the real world which is merely an inert fact.Every reality is there for feeling: it promotes feeling; and it is felt. Alsothere is nothing which belongs merely to the privacy of feeling of oneindividual actuality. All origination is private. But what has been thusoriginated, publicly pervades the world. Thus the geometrical facts con-cerning straight and flat loci are public facts characterizing the feelings ofactual entities. It so happens that in this epoch of the universe the feelingsinvolving them are of dominating importance. A feeling in which theforms exemplified in the datum concern geometrical, straight, and flatloci will be called a 'strain/ In a strain qualitative elements, other than thegeometrical forms, express themselves as qualities implicated in thoseforms; also the forms are the forms ingredient in particular nexus formingthe objective data of the physical feelings in question. It is to be remem-bered that two points determine a complete straight line, that three non-collinear points determine a complete plane, and that four non-coplanarpoints determine a complete three-dimensional flat locus.

Thus a strain has a complex distribution of geometrical significance.There is the geometrical 'seat' which is composed of a limited set of lociwhich are certain sets of points. These points belong to the volume de-fining the standpoint of the experient subject. A strain is a complex in-tegration of simpler feelings; and it includes in its complex character sim-pler feelings in which the qualities concerned are more particularly asso-ciated with [473] this seat. But the geometrical interest which dominatesthe growth of a strain lifts into importance the complete lines, planes, andthree-dimensional flats, which are defined by the seat of the strain. In theprocess of integration, these wider geometrical elements acquire implica-tion with the qualities originated in the simpler stages. The process is anexample of the Category of Transmutation; and is to be explained by theintervention of intermediate conceptual feelings. Thus extensive regions,which are penetrated by the geometrical elements concerned, acquire ob-jectification by means of the qualities and geometrical relations derivedfrom the simpler feelings. This type of objectification is characterized bythe close association of qualities and definite geometrical relations. It is thebasis of the so-called 'projection' of sensa. This projection of sensa in astrain takes many forms according to the differences among various strains.

Sometimes the 'seat' retains its individual importance; sometimes in thefinal synthesis it has been almost eliminated from the final synthesis offeelings into the one strain. Sometimes the whole extensive region indi-cated by the wider geometrical elements is only vaguely geometricized. Inthis case, there is feeble geometrical indication: the strain then takes thevague form of feeling certain qualities which are vaguely external. Some-times the extensive region is geometricized without any correspondingelimination of importance from the seat. In this case,f there is a dualreference, to the seat here, and to some objectified region there. The hereis usually some portion of an animal body; whereas the geometricizedregion may be within, or without, the animal body concerned.

It is obvious that important feelings of strain involve complex processesof concrescence. They are accordingly only to be found in comparativelyhigh-grade actual entities. They do not in any respect necessarily involveconsciousness, or even that approach to consciousness which we associatewith life. But we shall find that the [474] behaviour of enduring physicalobjects is only explicable by reference to the peculiarities of their strains.On the other hand, the occurrences in empty space require less emphasison any peculiar ordering of strains. But the growth of ordered physicalcomplexity is dependent on the growth of ordered relationships amongstrains. Fundamental equations in mathematical physics, such as Maxwell'selectromagnetic equations, are expressions of the ordering of strainsthroughout the physical universe.

SECTION II

Presentational immediacy is our perception of the contemporary worldby means of the senses. It is a physical feeling. But it is a physical feelingof a complex type to the formation of which conceptual feelings, moreprimitive physical feelings, and transmutation have played their parts amidprocesses of integration. Its objective datum is a nexus of contemporaryevents, under the definite illustration of certain qualities and relations:these qualities and relations are prehended with the subjective form de-rived from the primitive physical feelings, thus becoming our 'private' sen-sations. Finally, as in the case of all physical feelings, this complex deriva-tive physical feeling acquires integration with the valuation inherent in itsconceptual realization! as a type of experience.

Naive common sense insists, first, on the 'subject* entertaining thisfeeling; and, secondly, on the analytic components in the order: (i) regionin contemporary world as datum, (ii) sensations as derivative from, andillustrative of, this datum, (Hi) integral feeling involving these elements,(iv) appreciative subjective form, (v) interpretative subjective form, (vi)purposive subjective form. But this analysis of presentational immediacyhas not exhausted the content of the feeling. For we feel with the body.

There may be some further specialization into a particular organ of sen-sation; but in any case the 'withness' of the body is an ever-present, [475]though elusive, element in our perceptions of presentational immediacy.This 'withness' is the trace of the origination of the feeling concerned,enshrined by that feeling in its subjective form and in its objective datum.But in itself this 'withness of the body? can be isolated as a componentfeeling in the final 'satisfaction/ From this point of view, the body, or itsorgan of sensation, becomes the objective datum of a component feeling;and this feeling has its own subjective form. Also this feeling is physical,so that we must look for an eternal object, to be a determinant of thedefiniteness of the body, as objective datum. This component feeling willbe called the feeling of bodily efficacy. It is more primitive than the feel-ing of presentational immediacy which issues from it. Both in commonsense and in physiological theory, this bodily efficacy is a component pre-supposed by the presentational immediacy and leading up to it. Thus, inthe immediate subject, the presentational immediacy is to be conceived asoriginated in a late phase, by the synthesis of the feeling of bodily efficacywith other feelings. We have now to consider the nature of the otherfeelings, and the complex eternal object concerned in the feeling of bodilyefficacy.

In the first place, this eternal object must be partially identified with theeternal object in the final feeling of presentational immediacy. The wholepoint of the connection between the two feelings is that the presentationalimmediacy is derivative from the bodily efficacy. The present perception isstrictly inherited from the antecedent bodily functioning, unless all phys-iological teaching is to be abandoned. Both eternal objects are highly com-plex; and the complex elements of the second eternal object must at leastbe involved in the complex elements of the former eternal object.

This complex eternal object is analysable into a sense-datum and a geo-metrical pattern. In physics, the geometrical pattern appears as a state ofstrain of that actual occasion in the body which is the subject of the \476)feeling. But this feeling of bodily efficacy in the final percipient is the re-enaction of an antecedent feeling by an antecedent actual entity in thebody. Thus in this antecedent entity there is a feeling concerned with thesame sense-datum and a highly analogous state of strain. The feeling mustbe a 'strain* in the sense defined in the previous section. Now this straininvolves a geometricized region, which in this case also involves a 'focal'region as part of itself. This 'focal' region is a region of dense concurrenceof straight lines defined by the 'seat/ It is the region onto which there isso-called 'projection/

These lines enter into feeling through a process of integration of yetsimpler feelings which primarily concern the 'seat' of the pattern. Theselines have a twofold function as determinants of the feeling. They de-fine the 'strain* of the feeler, and they define the focal region which theythus relate to the feeler. In so far as we are merely considering an abstract

pattern, we are dealing with an abstract eternal object. But as a deter-minant of a concrete feeling in a concrete percipient we are dealing withthe feeling as relating its subject (which includes the 'seat' in its volume)to a definite spatial region (the focal region) external to itself. This defi-nite contemporary focal region is a nexus which is part of the objectivedatum. Thus the feeling of bodily efficacy is the feeling of the sense-da-tum as generally implicated in the whole region (of antecedent 'seats' andfocal regions) geometrically defined by the inherited strains. This pat-terned region is peculiarly dominated by the final 'seat' in the body of thefeeler, and by the final 'focal' region. Thus the sense-datum has a generalspatial relation, in which two spatial regions are dominant. Feelings ofthis sort are inherited by man}' strands from the antecedent bodily nerves.But in considering one definite feeling of presentational immediacy, thesemany strands of transmission of bodily efficacy, in their final deliverance tothe ultimate percipient, converge upon the same focal region as picked outby the many bodily 'strains/

\477] In the integration of these feelings a double act of transmutationis achieved. In each of the successive feelings transmitted along the suc-cessive actual entities of a bodily nervous strand there are two regionsmainly concerned; and there is a relation between them constituted byintermediate regions picked out by the linkage of the pattern. One regionis the focal region already discussed, the other region is the seat in theimmediate subject, constituting its geometrical standpoint. The 'strain' ofthe final actual entity defines the 'seat' and the 'focal region' and the in-termediarv regions, and more vaguely the whole of a 'presented' space.This final feeling of bodily strain—in the sense of 'strain' defined in theprevious section—is the last of a route of analogous feelings inherited onefrom the other along the series of bodily occasions along some nerve, orother path in the body. There will be parallel routes of such analogousfeelings, which finally converge with concurrent reinforcement upon thesingle occasion, or route of occasions, which is the ultimate percipient.

Each of these bodily strain-feelings defines its own seat and its ownfocal region and intermediaries. The sense-datum is vaguely associatedwith the external world as thus felt and defined. But as such feelings are'transmuted,' either gradually, or at critical nodes in the body, there is anincreasing development of special emphasis. Now emphasis is valuation,and can only be changed by renewed valuation. But valuation arises inconceptual feelings. The conceptual counterpart of these physical feelingscan be analysed into many conceptual feelings, associating the sense-datumwith various regions defined by the strain. This conceptual feeling, by itsreference to definite regions, belongs to the secondary type termed 'propo-sitional feelings.' One subordinate propositionai feeling associates thesense-datum with the 'seat' of the feeler, another with the 'focal' region ofthe feeler, another with the intermediary region of the feeler, another withthe seats of the antecedent elements of the [478] nervous strand, and so

on. The total association of the sense-datum with space-time is analysableinto a bewildering variety of associations with definite regions, contem-porary and antecedent. In general, and apart from high-grade organisms,this spatio-temporal association of the sense-datum is integrated into avague sense of externality. The component valuations have in such casesfailed to differentiate themselves into grades of intensity. But in high-gradet cases, in which presentational immediacy is prominent, one ofthree cases happens. Either (i) the association of the sense-datum withthe seats of some antecedent sets of feelers is exclusively emphasized, or(ii) the association of the sense-datum with the focal region of the finalpercipient is exclusively emphasized, or (iii) the association of the sense-datum both with the seats of antecedent feelers and with the focal regionof the immediate feeler is emphasized.

But these regions are not apprehended in abstraction from the generalspatio-temporal continuum. The prehension of a region is always the pre-hension of systematic elements in the extensive relationship between theseat of the immediate feeler and the region concerned. When these valua-tions have been effected, the Category of Transmutation provides for thetransmission to the succeeding subject of a feeling of these regions quali-fied by (i.e., contrasted with) that sense-datum. In the first case, there arepurely bodily sensations; in the second case, there are 'projected' sensations,involving regions of contemporary space beyond the body; in the thirdcase, there are both bodily feelings and sensations externally projected.Thus in the case of all sensory feeling, there is initial privacy of concep-tual emphasis passing into publicity of physical feeling.

Thus, by the agency of the Category of Transmutation, there are twotypes of feelings, for which the objective datum is a nexus with undiscrim-inated actual entities. The feelings of the first type are feelings of 'causalefficacy'; and those of the second type are those of 'presenta- [479] tionalimmediacy/ In the first type, the analogous elements in the various feelingsof the various actualities of the bodily nexus are transmuted into a feelingascribed to the bodily nexus as one entity. In the second type, the trans-mutation is more elaborate and shifts the nexus concerned from the ante-cedent bodily nexus (i.e., the 'seat') to the contemporary focal nexus.

Both these types of feeling are the outcome of a complex process ofmassive simplification which is characteristic of higher grades of actualentities. They apparently have but slight importance in the constitutionsof actual occasions in empty space; but they have dominating importancein the physical feelings belonging to the life-historyt of enduring organisms—the inorganic and organic, alike.

In respect to the sensa concerned, there is a gradual transformation oftheir functions as they pass from occasion to occasion along a route of in-heritance up to some final high-grade experient. In their most primitiveform of functioning, a sensum is felt physically with emotional enjoyment

of its sheer individual essence. For example, red is felt with emotional en-joyment of its sheer redness. In this primitive prehension we have aborig-inal physical feeling in which the subject feels itself as enjoying redness.This is Hume's 'impression of sensation' stripped of all spatial relationswith other such impressions. In so far as they spring up in this primitive,aboriginal way, they—in Hume's words—"arise in the soul from unknowncauses." But in fact we can never isolate such ultimate irrationalities. Inour experience, as in distinct analysis, physical feelings are always derivedfrom some antecedent experient. Occasion B prehends occasion A as anantecedent subject experiencing a sensum with emotional intensity. AlsoB's subjective form of emotion is conformed to A's subjective form. Thusthere is a vector transmission of emotional feeling of a sensum from A toB. In this way B feels the sensum as derived from A and feels it with anemotional form [480] also derived from A. This is the most primitive formof the feeling of causal efficacy. In physics it is the transmission of a formof energy. In the bodily transmission from occasion to occasion of a high-grade animal body, there is a gradual modification of these functions ofsensa. In their most primitive functioning for the initial occasions withinthe animal body, they are qualifications of emotion—types of energy, inthe language of physics;f in their final functioning for the high-gradeexperient occasion at the end of the route, they are qualities 'inherent' ina presented, contemporary nexus. In the final percipient any consciousfeeling of the primitive emotional functioning of the sensum is often en-tirely absent. But this is not always the case; for example, the perceptionof a red cloak may often be associated with a feeling of red irritation.

To return to Hume's doctrine (cf. Treatise, Part III, Sect. V) of theorigination of 'impressions of sensation' from unknown causes, it isfirst necessary to distinguish logical priority from physical priority. Un-doubtedly an impression of sensation is logically the simplest of physicalprehensions. It is the percipient occasion feeling the sensum as participat-ing in its own concrescence. This is the enjoyment of a private sensation.

There is a logical simplicity about such a sensation which makes it theprimitive, aboriginal type of physical feeling. But there are two objectionsto Hume's doctrine which assigns to them a physical priority. First, thereis the empirical objection. Hume's theory of a complex of such impres-sions elaborated into a supposition of a common physical world is entirelycontrary to naive experience. We find ourselves in the double role of agentsand patients in a common world, and the conscious recognition of impres-sions of sensation is the work of sophisticated elaboration. This is alsoLocke's doctrine in the third and fourth books of his Essay. The childfirst dimly elucidates the complex externality of particu- [481] lar thingsexhibiting a welter of forms of definiteness, and then disentangles his im-pressions of these forms in isolation. A young man does not initiate hisexperience by dancing with impressions of sensation, and then proceed

to conjecture a partner. His experience takes the converse route. The un-empirica! character of the philosophical school derived from Hume can-not be too often insisted upon. The true empirical doctrine is that physi-cal feelings are in their origin vectors, and that the genetic process of con-crescence introduces the elements which emphasize privacy.

Secondly, Hume's doctrine is necessarily irrational. For if the impres-sions of sensation arise from unknown causes (cf. Hume, loc. cit.) a stopis put to the rationalistic search for a rational cosmology. Such a cos-mology requires that metaphysics shall provide a doctrine of relevancebetween a form and any occasion in which it participates. If there be nosuch doctrine, all hope of approximating to a rational view of the worldvanishes.

Hume's doctrine has no recommendation except the pleasure which itgives to its adherents.

The philosophy of organism provides for this relevance by means oftwo doctrines, (i) the doctrine of God embodying a basic completenessof appetition, and (ii) the doctrine of each occasion effecting a concres-cence of the universe, including God. Then, by the Category of ConceptualReproduction, the vector prehensions of God's appetition, and of otheroccasions, issue in the mental pole of conceptual prehensions; and byintegration of this pole with the pure physical prehensions there arise theprimitive physical feelings of sensa, with their subjective forms,t emotionaland purposive. These feelings, with their primitive simplicity, arise intodistinctness by reason of the elimination effected by this integration of thevector prehensions with the conceptual appetitions. Such primitive feel-ings cannot be separated from their subjective forms. The subject neverloses its triple character of recipient, patient, and agent. These primitivefeel- [482] ings have already been considered under the name of 'physicalpurposes' (cf. Part III, Ch. V). They correspond to Hume's 'impressionsof sensation/ But they do not originate the process of experience.

We see that a feeling of presentational immediacy comes into beingby reason of an integration of a conceptual feeling drawn from bodily effi-cacy with a bare regional feeling which is also a component in a complexfeeling of bodily efficacy. Also this bare regional feeling is reinforced withthe general regional feeling which is the whole of our direct physical feel-ing of the contemporary world: and the conceptual feeling is reinforcedby the generation of physical purpose. This integration takes the form ofthe creative imputation of the complex eternal object, ingredient in thebodily efficacy, onto some contemporary focal region felt in the strain-feeling. Also the subjective form is transmitted from the conceptual valu-ation and the derivate physical purpose.' But this subjective form is thatsuitable to the bodily efficacy out of which it has arisen. Thus the mereregion with its imputed eternal object is felt as though there had been afeeling of its efficacy. But there is no mutual efficacy of contemporary

regions. This transference of subjective form is termed 'symbolic trans-ference/ *

An additional conceptual feeling, with its valuation, arises from thisphysical feeling of presentational immediacy. It is the conceptual feelingof a region thus characterized. This is the aesthetic valuation proper tothe bare objective datum of the presentational immediacy. But this valua-tion is less primitive than that gained from the conceptual prehensionby symbolic transference. The primitive subjective form includes a valua-tion as though the contemporary region, by its own proper constitution,were causally effective on the percipient sub- [483] ject. The secondaryvaluation is the aesthetic appreciation of the bare fact: this bare fact ismerely that region, thus qualified. Thus the contemporary world, as feltthrough the senses, is valued for its own sake, by means of a later concep-tual feeling; but it is also valued for its derivation from antecedent effi-cacy, by means of transmutation from earlier conceptual feeling com-bined with derivate 'physical purpose/

But none of these operations can be segregated from nature into thesubjective privacy of a mind. Mental and physical operations are incurablyintertwined; and both issue into publicity, and are derived from publicity.The vector character of prehension is fundamental.

SECTION III

It is the mark of a high-grade organism to eliminate, by negative pre-hension, the irrelevant accidents in its environment, and to elicit massiveattention to every variety of systematic order. For this purpose, the Cate-gory of Transmutation is the master-principle. By its operation each nexuscan be prehended in terms of the analogies among its own members, orin terms of analogies among the members of other nexus but yet relevantto it. In this way the organism in question suppresses the mere multi-plicities of things, and designs its own contrasts. The canons of art aremerely the expression, in specialized forms, of the requisites for depth ofexperience. The principles of morality are allied to the canons of art, inthat they also express, in another connection, the same requisites. Owingto the principle that contemporary actual entities occur in relative inde-pendence, the nexus of contemporary actual entities are peculiarly favour-able for this transference of systematic qualities from other nexus to them-selves. For a difficulty arises in the operation of the Category of Transmuta-tion, when a characteristic prevalent among the individual entities of onenexus is to be transferred to another nexus treated as a unity. The diffi-culty is that the individual actuali- \484] ties of the recipient nexus are also

1 Cf. my three Barbour-Page lectures, Symbolism, at the University of Virginia(New York: Macmillan, 1927, and Cambridge University Press, 1928) ;t andalso above, Part II, Ch. VIII.

respectively objectified in the percipient subject by systematic character-istics which equally demand the transference to their own nexus; but thisis the nexus which should be the recipient of the other transference. Thusthere are competing qualities struggling to effect the objectification of thesame nexus. The result is attenuation and elimination.

When the recipient nexus is composed of entities contemporary withthe percipient subject, this difficulty vanishes. For the contemporary en-tities do not enter into the constitution of the percipient subject by ob-jectification through any of their own feelings. Thus their only direct con-nection with the subject is their implication in the same extensive scheme.Thus a nexus of actual entities, contemporary with the percipient subject,puts up no alternative characteristics to inhibit the transference to it ofcharacteristics from antecedent nexus.

A high-grade percipient is necessarily an occasion in the historic routeof an enduring object. If this route is to propagate itself successfully intothe future, it is above all things necessary that its decisions in the imme-diate occasion should have the closest relevance to the concurrent hap-penings among contemporary occasions. For these contemporary entitieswill, in the near future, form the 'immediate past' for the future embodi-ment of the enduring object. This 'immediate past' is of overwhelming in-fluence; for all routes of transmission from the more remote past mustpass through it. Thus the contemporary occasions tell nothing; and yetare of supreme importance for the survival of the enduring object.

This gap in the experience of the percipient subject is bridged by presen-tational immediacy. This type of experience is the lesson of the past re-flected into the present. The more important contemporary occasionsare those in the near neighborhood. Their actual worlds \485] are prac-tically identical with that of the percipient subject. The percipient pre-bends the nexus of contemporary occasions by the mediation of eternalobjects which it inherits from its own past. Also it selects the contemporarynexus thus prehended by the efficacy of strains whose focal regions areimportant elements in the past of those nexus. Thus, for successful orga-nisms, presentational immediacy—though it yields no direct experienceabout the contemporary world, and though in unfortunate instances theexperience which it does yield may be irrelevant—does yield experiencewhich expresses how the contemporary world has in fact emerged fromits own past.

Presentational immediacy works on the principle that it is better to ob-tain information about the contemporary world, even if occasionally it bemisleading.

SECTION IV

Depth of experience is gained by concentrating emphasis on the sys-tematic structural systems in the environment, and discarding individualvariations. Every element of systematic structure is emphasized, every in-

dividual aberration is pushed into the background. The variety sought isthe variety of structures, and never the variety of individuals. For example,twe neglect empty space in comparison with the structural systematicnexus which is the historic route of an enduring object. In every possibleway, the more advanced organisms simplify their experience so as to em-phasize those nexus with some element of tightness of systematic structure.

In pursuance of this principle, the regions, geometricized by the variousstrains in such an organism, not only lie in the contemporary world,t butthey coalesce so as to emphasize one unified locus in the contemporaryworld. This selected locus is penetrated by the straight lines, the planes,and the three-dimensional flat loci associated with the strains. This is the'strain-locus' belonging to an occasion in the history of an enduring object.\486] This occasion is the immediate percipient subject under considera-tion. Each such occasion has its one strain-locus which serves for all itsstrains. The focal regions of the various strains all lie within this strain-locus, and are in general distinct. But the strain-locus as a whole is com-mon to all the strains. Each occasion lies in its own strain-locus.

The meaning of the term 'rest' is the relation of an occasion to itsstrain-locus, if there be one. An occasion with no unified strain-locus hasno dominating locus with which it can have the relationship of 'rest/ Anoccasion 'rests' in its strain-locus. This is why it is nonsense to ask of anoccasion in empty space whether it be 'at rest' in reference to some locus.For, since such occasions have no strain-loci? the relationship of 'rest' doesnot apply to them. The strain-locus is the locus which is thoroughly geo-metricized by the strain-feelings of the percipient occasion. It must havethe property of being continent of straight lines, and of flat loci of alldimensions. Thus its boundaries will be three-dimensionalt flat loci, non-intersecting. A strain-locus approximates to a three-dimensional flat locus;but in fact it is four-dimensional, with a time-thickness.

SECTION V

Reviewing the discussion in the preceding sections of this chapter andof Chapter IV of Part II, we note that, in reference to any one actualoccasion M, seven (but cf. Section VHIt) distinct considerations defineloci composed of other actual occasions. In the first place, there are threeloci defined by causal efficacy, namelv, the 'causal past' of M, the 'causalfuture' of M, and the 'contemporaries' of M. An actual occasion P, be-longing to M's causal past, is objectified for M by a perspective represen-tation of its own (i.e., P's) qualities of feeling and intensities of feeling.There is a quantitative and qualitative vector flow of feeling from P to M;and in this way, what P is subjectively, belongs to M objectively. An [487]actual occasion Q, belonging to M's causal future, is in the converse rela-tion to M, compared to P's relation. For the causal future is composed ofthose actual occasions which will have M in their respective causal pasts.t

320 The Theory of Extension

Actual occasions R and S,t which are contemporary with M, are thoseactual occasions which lie neither in M's causal past, nor in M's causalfuture. The peculiarity of the locus of contemporaries of M is that any twoof its members, such as R and S, need not be contemporaries of each other.They may be mutually contemporaries, but not necessarily. It is evidentfrom the form of the definition of 'contemporary/ that if R be contem-porary with M, then M is contemporary with R. This peculiarity of thelocus of JVTs contemporaries—that R and S may be both contemporariesof M, but not contemporaries of each other—points to another set of loci.A 'duration' is a locus of actual occasions, such that (a) any two membersof the locus are contemporaries, and (/?) that any actual occasion, notbelonging to the duration, is in the causal past or causal future of somemembers of the duration.

A duration is a complete locus of actual occasions in 'unison of becom-ing/ or in 'concrescent unison.7 It is the old-fashioned 'present state ofthe world/ In reference to a given duration, D, the actual world is dividedinto three mutually exclusive loci. One of these loci is the duration D it-self. Another of these loci is composed of actual occasions which lie in thepast of some members of D: this locus is the 'past of the duration D/ Theremaining locus is composed of actual occasions which lie in the future ofsome members of D: this locus is the 'future of the duration D/

By its definition, a duration which contains an occasion Mf must liewithin the locus of the contemporaries of M. According to the classicalpre-relativistic notions of time, there would be only one duration includingM, and it would contain all M's contemporaries. According to modernrelativistic views,t we must admit that there are many durations includingM—in fact, an infinite [488] number, so that no one of them contains allM's contemporaries.

Thus the past of a duration D includes the whole past of any actualoccasion belonging to D, such as M for example, and it also includes someof ivis contemporaries. Also the future of the duration D includes thewhole future of M, and also includes some of M's contemporaries.

So far, starting from an actual occasion M, we find six loci, or types ofloci, defined purely in terms of notions derived from 'causal efficacy/ Theseloci are, M's causal past, M's causal future, M's contemporaries, the setof durations defined by M; and finally, taking any one such duration whichwe call D as typical, there is D's past, and D's future. Thus there are thethree definite loci, the causal past, the causal future,* and the contem-poraries, which are defined uniquely by M; and there are the set of dura-tions defined by M, and the set of 'durational pasts' and the set of 'dura-tional futures/ The paradox which has been introduced by the moderntheory of relativity is twofold. First, the actual occasion M does not, as ageneral characteristic of all actual occasions, define a unique duration;and secondly,! such a unique duration, if defined, does not include all thecontemporaries of M.

Strains 321

But among the set of durations, there may be one with a unique asso-ciation with M. For the mode of presentational immediacy objectifies forMf the actual occasions within one particular duration. This is the 'pre-sented duration/ Such a presented duration is an inherent factor in thecharacter of an 'enduring physical object.' It is practically identical withthe strain-locus. This locus is the reason why there is a certain absolutenessin the notions of rest, velocity, and acceleration. For this presented dura-tion is the spatialized world in which the physical object is at rest, at leastmomentarily for its occasion M. This spatialized world is objectified for Mby M's own conditioned range of feeling-tones which have been inheritedfrom the causal past of the actual occasion [489] in question, namely, ofM. Thus the presented duration is with peculiar vividness part of thecharacter of the actual occasion, A historic route of actual occasions,!each with its presented duration, constitutes a physical object.

Our partial consciousness of the objectifications of the presented dura-tion constitutes our knowledge of the present world, so far as it is derivedfrom the senses. Remembering that objectifications constitute the objec-tive conditions from which an actual occasion (M) initiates its successivephases of feeling, we must admit that, in the most general sense, the ob-jectifications express the causality by which the external world fashionsthe actual occasion in question. Thus the objectifications of the presentedduration represent a recovery by its contemporaries of a very real efficacyin the determination of M. It is true that the eternal objects which effectthis objectification belong to the feeling-tones which M derives from thepast. But it is a past which is largely common to M and to the presentedduration. Thus by the intermediacy of the past, the presented duration hasits efficacy in the production of M. This efficacy does not derogate fromthe principle of the independence of contemporary occasions. For the con-temporary occasions in the presented duration are only efficacious throughthe feeling-tones of their sources, and not through their own immediatefeeling-tones.

Thus in so far as Bergson ascribes the 'spatialization' of the world to adistortion introduced by the intellect, he is in error. This spatialization isa real factor in the physical constitution of every actual occasion belong-ing to the life-historyf of an enduring physical object. For actual occasionsin so-called 'empty space/ there is no reason to believe that any durationhas been singled out for spatialization; that is to say, that physical per-ception in the mode of presentational immediacy is negligible for suchoccasions. The reality of the rest and the motion of enduring physicalobjects depends on this spatializa- [490] tion for occasions in their historicroutes. The presented duration is the duration in respect to which theenduring object is momentarily at rest. It is that duration which is thestrain-locus of that occasion in the life-history of the enduring object.

CHAPTER VMEASUREMENT

SECTION I

[491] The identification of the strain-locus with a duration is only anapproximation based upon empirical evidence. Their definitions are en-tirely different. A duration is a complete set of actual occasions, such thatall the members are mutually contemporary one with the other. Thisproperty is expressed by the statement that the members enjoy 'unison ofimmediacy/ The completeness consists in the fact that no other actualoccasion can be added to the set without loss of this unison of immediacy.Every occasion outside the set is in the past or in the future of somemembers of the set, and is contemporary with other members of the set.According as an occasion is in the past, or the future, of some membersof a duration, the occasion is said to be in the past, or in the future, ofthat duration.

No occasion can be both in the past and in the future! of a duration.Thus a duration forms a barrier in the world between its past and its fu-ture. Any route of occasions, in which adjacent members are contiguous,and such that it includes members of the past, and members of the future,of a duration, must also include one or more members of that duration.This is the notion of a duration, which has already been explained (cf.Part II, Ch. IV? Sects. VIII and IX).

The definition of a strain-locus (cf. previous chapter) depends entirelyon the geometrical elements which arc the elements of geometric form inthe objectification of a nexus including the experient occasion in question.These [492] elements are (i) a set of points, within the volume of theregional standpoint of the experient occasion, and (ii) the set of straightlines defined by all the pairs of these points. The set of points is the 'seatof the strain; the set of straight lines is the set of projectors/ The com-plete region penetrated by the 'projectors' is the strain-locus. A strain-locus is bounded by two 'flat' three-dimensional surfaces. When somemembers of the seat have a special function in the strain-feeling, the pro-jectors which join pairs of these points may define a subordinate regionin the strain-locus; this subordinate region is termed the 'focal region/

The strain-loci in the present epoch seem to be confined to the con-temporaries of their experient occasions. In fact 'strain-loci7 occur as essen-tial components for perception in the mode of presentational immediacy.

B22

In this mode of perception there is a unique strain-locus for each suchexperient. Rest and motion are definable by reference to real strain-loci,and to potential strain-loci. Thus the molecules, forming material bodiesfor which the science of dynamics is important, may be presumed to haveunique strain-loci associated with their prehensions.

This recapitulation of the theories of durations and strain-loci bringsout the entire disconnection of their definitions. There is no reason, de-rivable from these definitions, why there should be any close associationbetween the strain-locus of an experient occasion and any duration includ-ing that occasion among its members. It is an empirical fact that mankindinvariably conceives the presented world as consisting of such a duration.This is the contemporary world as immediately perceived by the senses.But close association does not necessarily involve unqualified identification.It is permissible, in framing a cosmology to accord with scientific theory,to assume that the associated pair, strain-locus and presented duration, donot involve one and the same extensive region. From the point of view ofconscious per- [493] ception, the divergence may be negligible, though im-portant for scientific theory.

SECTION II

Thet notions which have led to the phraseology characterizing the 'pro-jected' sensa as 'secondary qualities' arise out of a fundamental differencebetween 'strain-loci' and their associated 'presented durations.' A strain-locus is entirely determined by the experient in question. It extends be-yond that experient indefinitely, although defined by geometrical elementsentirely within the extensive region which is the standpoint of the ex-perient. The 'seat' of the strain-locus, which is a set of points within thisregion, is sufficient to effect this definition of the complete strain-locus bythe aid of the straight lines termed the 'projectors.' These straight linesare nexus whose geometrical relations are forms ingredient in a strain-feeling with these nexus as data. Presentational immediacy arises fromthe integration of a strain-feeling and a 'physical purpose,' so that, by theCategory of Transmutation, the sensum involved in the 'physical purpose'is projected onto some external focal region defined by projectors.

It is to be noted that this doctrine of presentational immediacy and ofthe strain-locus entirely depends upon a definition of straight lines in termsof mere extensiveness. If the definition depends upon the actual physicaloccasions beyond the experient, the experient should find the actual phys-ical structures of his environment a block, or an assistance, to his 'projec-tion' to focal regions beyond them. The projection of sensa in presenta-tional immediacy depends entirely upon the state of the brain and uponsystematic geometrical relations characterizing the brain. How the brainis excited, whether by visual stimuli through the eye, or by auditory stimulithrough the ear, or by the excessive consumption of alcohol, or by hyster-

ical emotion, is completely indifferent; granted the proper excitement ofthe brain, the experient will per- [494] ceive some definite contemporaryregion illustrated by the projected sensa. The indifference of presentationalimmediacy to contemporary actualities in the environment cannot be ex-aggerated. It is only by reason of the fortunate dependence of the experi-ent and of these contemporary actualities on a common past, that presen-tational immediacy is more than a barren aesthetic display. It does displaysomething, namely, the real extensiveness of the contemporary world. Itinvolves the contemporary actualities but only objectifies them as condi-tioned by extensive relations. It displays a system pervading the world, aworld including and transcending the experient. It is a vivid display ofsystematic real potentiality, inclusive of the experient and reaching beyondit. In so far as straight lines can only be defined in terms of measurements,requiring particular actual occasions for their performance, the theory ofgeometry lacks the requisite disengagement from particular physical fact.The requisite geometrical forms can then only be introduced after exam-ination of the particular actual occasions required for measurement. Butthe theory of 'projection/ explained above, requires that the definition ofa complete straight line be logically prior to the particular actualities inthe extensive environment. This requisite has been supplied by the pre-ceding theory of straight lines (cf. Ch. Hit). The projectors do dependupon the one experient occasion. But even this dependence merely re-quires that component feelings of that occasion should participate incertain geometric elements, namely, a set of points, and the straight linesdefined by them, among their data. Thus, according to this explanation,presentational immediacy is the mode in which vivid feelings of contem-porary geometrical relations, with especial emphasis on certain 'focal' re-gions, enter into experience.

This doctrine is what common sense always assumes. When we see acoloured shape, it may be a real man, or a ghost, or an image behind amirror, or a hallucination; [495] but whatever it be, there it is—ex-hibiting to us a certain region of external space. If we are gazing at anebula, a thousand light-years away, we are not looking backward througha thousand years. Such ways of speaking are interpretative phrases,diverting attention from the primary fact of direct experience, observingthe illumination of a contemporary patch of the heavens. In philosophy,it is of the utmost importance to beware of the interpretative vagaries oflanguage. Further, the extent of the patch illuminated will depend en-tirely upon the magnifying power of the telescope used. The correlationof the patch, thus seen through the telescope, with a smaller patch, de-fined by direct 'projection' from the observer, is again a question of scien-tific interpretation. This smaller patch is what we are said to have seen'magnified' by the use of the telescope. What we do see is the bigger patch,and we correlate it with the smaller patch by theoretical calculation. Thescientific explanation neglects the telescope and the larger patch really

seen, and considers them as merely instrumental intermediaries. It con-centrates on the contemporary smaller patch, and finally deserts even thatpatch in favour of another region a thousand years in the past. This ex-planation is only one illustration of the way in which so-called statementsof direct observation are, through and through, merely interpretativestatements of simple direct experience. When we say that we have seena man, we may mean that we have seen a patch which we believe to be aman. In this case, our total relevant experience may be more than thatof bare sight. In Descartes' phraseology, our experience of the externalworld embraces not only an 'inspectio' of the 'realitas objective' in the pre-hensions in question, but also a 'judicium' which calls into play the totalityof our experience beyond those prehensions. The objection to this doctrineof 'presentational immediacy'—that it presupposes a definition of straightlines, freed from dependence on external actualities—has been removedby the production of such a definition in Ch. III.* [496] Of course thepoint of the definition is to demonstrate that the extensive continuum,apart from the particular actualities into which it is atomized, includes inits systematic structure the relationships of regions expressed by straightlines. These relationships are there for perception.

SECTION III

The Cartesian doctrine of the 'realitas objective attaching to presenta-tional immediacy is entirely denied by the modern doctrine of privatepsychological fields. Locke's doctrine of 'secondary qualities' is a halfwayhouse to the modern position, and indeed so is Descartes' own positionconsidered as a whole. Descartes' doctrine on this point is obscure, andis interpretable as according with that of the philosophy of organism. ButLocke conceives the sensa as purely mental additions to the facts of physi-cal nature. Both philosophers conceive the physical world as in essentialindependence of the mental world, though the two worlds have ill-definedaccidental relationships. According to the philosophy of organism, physicaland mental operations are inextricably intertwined; also we find the sensafunctioning as forms participating in the vector prehensions of one occa-sion by another; and finally in tracing the origin of presentational im-mediacy, we find mental operations transmuting the functions of sensaso as to transfer them from being participants in causal prehensions intoparticipants in presentationalt prehensions. But throughout the wholestory, the sensa are participating in nature as much as anything else. It isthe function of mentality to modify the physical participation of eternalobjects: the case of presentational prehensions is only one conspicuousexample. The whole doctrine of mentality—from the case of God down-wards—is that it is a modifying agency. But Descartes and Locke aban-don the 'realitas objectiva' so far as sensa are concerned (but for Descartes,cf. Meditation f,t "it is certain all the same that the colours of [497] which

this is composed are necessarily real"), and hope to save it so far as ex-tensive relations are concerned. This is an impossible compromise. It waseasily swept aside by Berkeley and Hume. (Cf. Enquiry, Sect. XII, Part I.fHume,t with obvious truth, refers to Berkeley as the originator of thistrain of argument.) The modern doctrine of 'private psychological fields'is the logical result of Hume's doctrine, though it is a result which Hume'as an agent' refused to accept. This modern doctrine raises a great diffi-culty in the interpretation of modern science. For all exact observation ismade in these private psychological fields. It is then no use talking aboutinstruments and laboratories and physical energy. What is really beingobserved are narrow bands of colour-sensa in the private psychologicalspace of colour-vis ion. The impressions of sensation which collectivelyform this entirely private experience 'arise in the soul from unknowncauses/ The spectroscope is a myth, the radiant energy is a myth, the ob-server's eye is a myth, the observer's brain is a myth, and the observer'srecord of his experiment on a sheet of paper is a myth. When,f somemonths later, he reads his notes to a learned society, he has a new visualexperience of black marks on a white background in a new private psycho-logical field. And again, these experiences arise in his soul 'from unknowncauses.' It is merely 'custom' which leads him to connect his earlier withhis later experiences.

AH exact measurements are, on this theory, observations in such privatepsychological fields.

Hume himself 'as an agent' refused to accept this doctrine. The con-clusion is that Hume's account of experience is unduly simplified. This isthe conclusion adopted by the philosophy of organism.

But one important fact does emerge from the discussion: that all exactmeasurements concern perceptions in the mode of presentational imme-diacy; and that such observations purely concern the systematic geometricforms of the environment, forms defined by projectors [498] from the'seat' of the strain and irrespective of the actualities which constitute theenvironment. The contemporary actualities of the world are irrelevant tothese observations. AH scientific measurements merely concern the sys-tematic real potentiality out of which these actualities arise. This is themeaning of the doctrine that physical science is solely concerned with themathematical relations of the world.

These mathematical relations belong to the systematic order of exten-siveness which characterizes the cosmic epoch in which we live. Thesocieties of enduring objects—electrons, protons, molecules, material bodies—at once sustain that order and arise out of it The mathematical rela-tions involved in presentational immediacy thus belong equally to theworld perceived and to the naturef of the percipient They are, at thesame time, public fact and private experience.

The perceptive mode of presentational immediacy is in one sense bar-ren. So far as—apart from symbolic transference—it discloses the con-

temporary world, that world, thus objectified, is devoid of all elementsconstitutive of subjective form, elements emotional, appreciative, pur-posive. The bonds of the objectified nexus only exhibit the definitenessof mathematical relations.

But in another sense this perceptive mode has overwhelming signifi-cance. It exhibits that complex of systematic mathematical relations whichparticipate in all the nexus of our cosmic epoch, in the widest meaning ofthat term. These relations only characterize the epoch by reason of theirfoundation in the immediate experience of the society of occasions domi-nating that epoch. Thus we find a special application of the doctrine ofthe interaction between societies of occasions and the laws of nature. Theperceptive mode in presentational immediacy is one of the defining char-acteristics of the societies which constitute the nexus termed materialbodies. Also in some fainter intensity it belongs to the electromagneticoccasions in empty space. From the point of view of a [499] single experi-ent, that mode discloses systematic relations which dominate the environ-ment. But the environment is dominated by these relationships by reasonof the experiences of the individual occasions constituting the societies.

It is by reason of this disclosure of ultimate system that an intellectualcomprehension of the physical universe is possible. There is a systematicframework permeating all relevant fact. By reference to this framework thevariant, various, vagrant, evanescent details of the abundant world canhave their mutual relations exhibited by their correlation to the commonterms of a universal system. Sounds differ qualitatively among themselves,sounds differ qualitatively from colours, colours differ qualitatively fromthe rhythmic throbs of emotion and of pain; yet all alike are periodicand have their spatial relations and their wave-lengths. The discovery ofthe true relevance of the mathematical relations disclosed in presentationalimmediacy was the first step in the intellectual conquest of nature. Accu-rate science was then born. Apart from these relations as facts in nature,such science is meaningless, a tale told by an idiot and credited by fools.For example, the conjecture by an eminent astronomer, based on measure-ments of photographic plates, that the period of the revolution of ourgalaxy of stars is about three hundred million years can only derive itsmeaning from the systematic geometrical relations which permeate theepoch. But he would have required the same reference to system, if hehad made an analogous statement about the period of revolution of achild's top. Also the two periods are comparable in terms of the system.

SECTION IV

Measurement depends upon counting and upon permanence. The ques-tion is, what is counted, and what is permanent? The things that arecounted are the inches on a straight metal rod, a yard-measure. Also thething [500] that is permanent is this yard-measure in respect both to its

internal relations and in respect to some of its extensive relations to thegeometry of the world. In the first place, the rod is straight. Thus themeasurement depends on the straightness and not the straightness uponthe measurement. The modern answer to this statement is that themeasurement is a comparison of infinitesimals, or of an approximation toinfinitesimals. The answer to this answer is that there are no infinitesimals,and that therefore there can be no approximation to them. In mathe-matics,! all phraseology about infinitesimals is merely disguised statementabout a class of finites. This doctrine has been conclusive mathematicaltheory since the time of Weierstrass in the middle of the nineteenthcentury. Also all the contortions of curvature are possible for a segmentbetween any end-points.

Of course, in all measurement there is approximation in our supposi-tions as to the yard-measure, t But it is approximation to straightness. Alsohaving regard to the systematic geometry of straight lines, and to thetype of approximation exhibited by the rod, the smaller the portion used,the more negligible are the percentage errors introduced by the defectsfrom straightness. But unless the notion of straightness has a definitemeaning in reference to the extensive relations, this whole procedure inpractical measurement is meaningless. There is nothing to distinguish onecontorted segment between end-points from another contorted segmentbetween those end-points. One is no straighter than another. Also anypercentage differences between their lengths can exist.

Again, the inches are counted because they are congruent and are end-on along the straight rod. No one counts coincident inches. The countingessentially is concerned with non-coincident straight segments. The nu-merical measure of length is the indication of the fact that the yard-measure is a straight rod divisible into thirty-six congruent inch-longsegments.

[50J] There is a modern doctrine that 'congruence' means the possibilityof coincidence. If this be the case, then the importance of congruencewould arise when the possibility is realized. Alternatively, the possibilitycould be of importance as a lure entering into the subjective aim. If thelatter alternative were true, congruence would play its part in the form ofa tendency of congruent bodies to coalesce, or to resist coalescence. Infact, there would be adversion to, or aversion from,t coalescence. Of coursethe suggestion is fantastic. Recurring to the former alternative, the invportance of the thirty-six inches along the yard-measure depends on thefact that they are not coincident and, until the destruction of the rod,never will be coincident. There is a realized property of the rod that it isthirty-six inches in length. Thus although 'coincidence' is used as a testof congruence, it is not the meaning of congruence.

We must now consider the use of 'coincidence' as a test. Congruence istested either by the transference of a steel yard-measure from coincidence

with one body to coincidence with another body, or by some optical meansdependent on the use of an optical instrument and on the congruence ofsuccessive wave-lengths t in a train of waves, or by some other vibratorydevice dependent on analogous principles.

It is at once evident that all these tests aref dependent on a direct in-tuition of permanence. This 'permanence' means 'permanence in respectto congruence'! for the various instruments employed, namely, the yard-measure, or the optical instruments, or analogous instruments. For exam-ple, the yard-measure is assumed to remain congruent to its previous self,as it is transferred from one setting to another setting. It is not sufficientto intuit that it remains the same body. Substances that are very deform-able preserve that sort of self-identity. The required property is that ofself-congruence. Minute variations of physical conditions will make therod vary slightly; also sense-perception is never absolutely exact. [502] Butunless there be a meaning to 'exactitude/ the notions of a 'slight variation'and of a 'slight defect from exactitude' are nonsense. Apart from such ameaning the two occasions of the rod's existence are incomparable, exceptby another experiment depending upon the same principles. There canonly be a finite number of such experiments; so ultimately we are reducedto these direct judgments.

However far the testing of instruments and the corrections for changesof physical factors, such as temperature, are carried, there is always a finaldependence upon direct intuitions that relevant circumstances are un-changed. Instruments are used from minute to minute, from hour to hour,and from day to day, with the sole guarantee of antecedent tests and ofthe appearance of invariability of relevant circumstances.

This 'appearance' is always a perception in the mode of presentationalimmediacy. If such perception be in any sense 'private' in contradistinctionto a correlative meaning for the term 'public/ then the perceptions, onwhich scientific measurement depends,t merely throw light upon the pri-vate psychology of the particular observer, and have no 'public' import.

Such a conclusion is so obviously inconsistent with our beliefs as tothe intercommunication of real actualities in a public world, that it maybe dismissed as a reductio ad absurdum, having regard to the groundworkof common experience which is the final test of all science and philosophy.A great deal of modern scientific philosophy consists in recurrence to thetheory of 'privacy' when such statements seem to afford a short cut tosimplicity of statement, and—on the other hand—of employment of thenotion of observing a public world when that concept is essential for ex-pressing the status of science in common experience. Science is either animportant statement of systematic theory correlating observations of acommon world, or is the daydream oi a solitary intelligence with a tastefor the daydream of publication. But [503] it is not philosophy to vacillatefrom one point of view to the other.

SECTION V

Finally, thet meaning of 'congruence' as a relation between two geo-metrical elements in a strain-locus must be considered. It will be sufficientto consider this meaning in reference to two segments of straight lines,and to treat all other meanings as derivative from this.

A strain-locus is defined by the 'projectors7 which penetrate any onefinite region within it. Such a locus is a systematic whole, independentlyof the actualities which may atomize it. In this it is to be distinguishedfrom a 'duration* which does depend on its physical content. A strain-locus depends merely upon its geometrical content. This geometrical con-tent is expressed by any adequate set of 'axioms* from which the systematicinterconnectionst of its included straight lines and points can be deduced.This conclusion requires the systematic uniformity of the geometry of astrain-locus, but refers to further empirical observation for the discoveryof the particular character of this uniform system. For example, the ques-tion as to whether a complete straight line be a 'closed' serial locus ofpoints or an 'open* serial locus, is entirely a question for such discovery.The only decision is to be found by comparing the rival theories in re-spect to their power of elucidating observed facts.

The only relevant properties of straight lines are (i) their completeness,(ii) their inclusion of points, (iii) their unique definition by any pair ofincluded points, (iv) their possibility of mutual intersection in a singlepoint. The additional axioms which express the systematic geometricaltheory must not have reference to length or to congruence. For these no-tions are to be derived from the theory. Thus the axioms must have ex-clusive reference to the intersection of straight lines, and to their inclusionor exclusion of points indicated by the intersections of other lines. Suchsets of axioms are [504] well known to mathematicians. There are manysuch sets which respectively constitute alternative geometrical theories.Also given one set of axioms constituting a definite geometrical theory,different sets of axioms can easily be obtained which are equivalent to eachother in the sense that all the other sets can be deduced from any one ofthem. AH such equivalent sets produce the same geometrical theory. Equiv-alent sets have their importance, but not for the present investigation. Wecan therefore neglect them, and different sets of axioms will mean sets ofaxioms which constitute incompatible geometrical theories.

There are many such sets, with a great variety of peculiar properties.There are, however, three such sets which combine a peculiar simplicitywith a very general conformation to the observed facts. These sets givethe non-metrical properties of the three geometrical theories respectivelyknown to mathematicians as the theory of Elliptic Geometry, of EuclideanGeometry, and of Hyperbolic Geometry.* It will serve no purpose to givethe three sets of axioms. But it is very easy to explain the main point of

difference between the theories, without being led too far from the philo-sophical discussion.

In the first place, a definition of a 'plane' can be given which is com-mon to all the three theories. The definition already given in Chapter IIIof this Part will suffice. But an alternative definition can be stated thus:If A, B, C be any three non-collinear points, and AB, BC, CA denote thethree complete straight lines containing,! respectively, A and B, B and C,C and A, then the straight lines which respectively intersect both membersof any pair of these three lines, not both lines at one of the corners A orB or C, pass through all the points constituting one plane, and all theirincident points are incident in the plane.

Thus a plane is defined to be the locus of all the points incident in atleast one of such a group of straight lines. The axioms are such that thisdefinition is equivalent to [505] the definition in Chapter III. Also theaxioms secure that any straight line, passing through two points in a plane,is itselft wholly incident in that plane. Also it follows from the definitionof a plane that a line I and a point P, not incident in I, are coplanar.

The distinction between the three geometrical theories can now be ex-plained by the aid of such a triplet, a point P, a line I not passing throughP, and the plane n in which P and I are both incident. Consider all thelines through P and incident in the plane jr.. Then in the Elliptic Geo-metrical Theory, all these lines intersect the line I; in the Euclidean Geo-metrical Theory, all these lines intersect the line f, with the exception ofone and only one line—the unique parallel to I through P; in the Hyper-bolic Geometrical Theory the lines through P in the plane are divisibleinto two classes, one class consisting of the lines intersecting f, the otherclass consisting of the lines not intersecting I, and each class with an in-finite number of members. Then it has been shown by Cayley and vonStaudt1 that the congruence of segments and the numerical measures ofthe distances involved are definable. The simplest case is that of EuclideanGeometry, In that case the basic fact is that the opposite sides of parallelo-grams are equal. A further complication is required to define congruencebetween segments which are not parallel. But it would serve no purpose toenter into the detailed solutions of this mathematical problem.

But the illustration afforded by the particular case of the congruence ofthe opposite sides of parallelograms! enables the general principle under-lying the notion of congruence to be explained. Two segments are congru-ent when there is a certain analogy between their functions in a systematicpattern of straight lines, which includes both of them.

The definition of this analogy is the definition of con- [5061 gruence interms of non-metrical geometry. It is possible to discover diverse analogieswhich give definitions of congruence which are inconsistent with each

1 Cf. Cayley's "Sixth Memoir On Quantics," Transactions of the Royal So-ciety, 1859; vonf Staudt's Geometrie der Lage, 1847; and Beitrage zur Geom-etrie der Lage, 1856.

332 The Theory of Extension

other. That definition which enters importantly into the internal consti-tutions of the dominating social entities is the important definition for thecosmic epoch in question.

Measurement is now possible throughout the extensive continuum. Thismeasurement is a systematic procedure dependent on the dominant so-cieties of the cosmic epoch. When one form of measurement has beengiven, alternative forms with assigned mathematical relations to the initialform can be defined. One such system is as good as any other, so far asmathematical procedure is concerned. The only point to be remembered isthat each system of 'coordinates' must have its definable relation to theanalogy which constitutes congruence.

SECTION VI

Physical measurement is now possible. The modern procedure, intro-duced by Einstein, is a generalization of the method of least action/ Itconsists in considering any continuous line between any two points inthe spatio-temporal continuum and seeking to express the physical prop-erties of the field as an integral along it. The measurements which arepresupposed are the geometrical measurements constituting the coordi-nates of the various points involved. Various physical quantities enter asthe 'constants' involved in the algebraic functions concerned. These con-stants depend on the actual occasions which atomize the extensive con-tinuum. The physical properties of the medium are expressed by variousconditions satisfied by this integral.

It is usual to term an 'infinitesimal' element of this integral by the nameof an element of distance. But this name, though satisfactory as a technicalphraseology, is entirely misleading. There can be no theory of the con-gruence of different elements of the path. The notion of coincidence doesnot apply. There is no systematic [507] theory possible, since the so-called'infinitesimal* distance depends on the actual entities throughout the en-vironment. The only way of expressing such so-called distance is to makeuse of the presupposed geometrical measurements. The mistake arisesbecause, unconsciously, the minds of physicists are infected by a presup-position which comes down from Aristotle through Kant. Aristotle placed'quantity' among his categories, and did not distinguish between extensivequantity and intensive quantity. Kant made this distinction, but consid-ered both of them as categoreal notions. It follows from Cayley's and vonStaudt's work (cf. loc. cit.) that extensive quantity is a construct. Thecurrent physical theory presupposes a comparison of so-called lengthsamong segments without any theory as to the basis on which this com-parison is to be made, and in ignoration of the fact that all exact observa-tion belongs to the mode of presentational immediacy. Further, the fact isneglected that there are no infinitesimals, and that a comparison of finitesegments is thus required. For this reason, it would be better—so far as

Measurement 333

explanation is concerned—to abandon the term 'distance' for this integral,and to call it by some such name as 'impetus/ suggestive of its physicalimport.2

It is to be noted, however, that the conclusions of this discussion involveno objection to the modern treatment of ultimate physical laws in theguise of a problem in differential geometry. The integral impetus is anextensive quantity, a length/ The differential element of impetus isthe differential element of systematic length weighted with the individualpeculiarities of its relevant environment. The whole theory of the physicalfield is the interweaving of the individual peculiarities of actual occasionsupon the background of systematic geometry. This systematic geometry ex-presses the most general 'substantial form' inherited throughout the vastcosmic society which \508] constitutes the primary real potentiality condi-tioning concrescence.3 In this doctrine, the organic philosophy is very nearto the philosophy of Descartes.

The whole argument can be summarized thus:

(i) Actual occasions are immovable, so that the doctrine of coincidenceis nonsense.

(ii) Extensive quantity is a logical construct, expressing the number ofcongruent units which are (a) non-overlapping, and (b) exhaustive of thenexus in question.

(iii) Congruence is only definable as a certain definite analogy of func-tion in a systematic complex which embraces both congruent elements.

(iv) That all experimental measurement involves ultimate intuitions ofcongruence between earlier and later states of the instruments employed.

(v) That all exact observation is made by perception in the mode ofpresentational immediacy.

(vi) That if such perception merely concerns a private psychologicalfield, science is the daydream of an individual without any public import.

(vii) That perception in the mode of presentational immediacy solelydepends upon the 'withness' of the 'body/ and only exhibits the externalcontemporary world in respect to its systematic geometrical relationshipto the 'body/

2 Cf. my book, The Principle of Relativity, University Press, Cambridge, 1922.

3 This theory of the derivation of the basic uniformity requisite for congruence,and thence for measurement, should be compared with that of two deeply in-teresting articles: (i) "The Theory of Relativity and The First Principles of Sci-ence/* and (ii) "The Macroscopic Atomic Theory/' Journal of Philosophy, Vol.XXV,f by Professor F. S. C. Northrop of Yale. I cannot adjust his doctrine ofa 'macroscopic atom' to my cosmological outlook. Nor does this norion seemnecessary if my doctrine of 'microscopic atomic occasions' be accepted. ButProfessor Northrop's theory does seem to be the only alternative if this doctrinebe abandoned. I regret that the articles did not come under my notice till thiswork had been finally revised for publication.

PART VFINAL INTERPRETATION

CHAPTER ITHE IDEAL OPPOSITES

SECTION I

[512] The chief danger to philosophy is narrowness in the selection ofevidence. This narrowness arises from the idiosyncrasies and timidities ofparticular authors, of particular social groups, of particular schools ofthought, of particular epochs in the history of civilization. The evidencerelied upon is arbitrarily biased by the temperaments of individuals, bythe provincialities of groups, and by the limitations of schemes of thought.

The evil, resulting from this distortion of evidence, is at its worst in theconsideration of the topic of the final part of this investigation—ultimateideals. We must commence this topic by an endeavour to state impartiallythe general types of the great ideals which have prevailed at sundry sea-sons and places. Our test in the selection,! to be impartial, must be prag-matic: the chosen stage of exemplification must be such as to compel at-tention, by its own intrinsic interest, or by the intrinsic interest of theresults which flow from it. For example, the stern self-restraint of the Ro-man farmers in the early history of the Republic issued in the great epochof the Roman Empire; and the stern self-restraint of the early Puritans inNew England issued in the flowering of New England culture. The epochof the Covenanters has had for its issue the deep impression which mod-ern civilization owes to Scotland. Neither the Roman farmers, nor theAmerican Puritans, nor the Covenanters, can wholly command allegiance.Also they differ from each other. But in either case, there is greatness there,greatly exemplified. In contrast to this example, we find the flowering timeof the aesthetic culture of ancient Greece, the Augustan epoch in Rome,the Italian Renaissance, the Elizabethan epoch in England, the Restora-tion epoch in England, \513) French and Teutonic civilization throughoutthe centuries of the modern world, Modern Paris, and Modern New York.Moralists have much to say about some of these societies. Yet, while thereis any critical judgment in the lives of men, such achievements can neverbe forgotten. In the estimation of either type of these contrasted examples,sheer contempt betokens blindness. In each of these instances, there areelements which compel admiration. There is a greatness in the lives ofthose who build up religious systems, a greatness in action, in idea and inself-subordination, embodied in instance after instance through centuriesof growth. There is a greatness in the rebels who destroy such systems:

337

they are the Titans who storm heaven, armed with passionate sincerity. Itmay be that the revolt is the mere assertion by youth of its right to itsproper brilliance, to that final good of immediate joy. Philosophy may notneglect the multifariousness of the world—the fairies dance, and Christ isnailed to the cross.

SECTION II

There are various contrasted qualities of temperament, which control theformation of the mentalities of different epochs. In a previous chapter(Part II, Ch. X) attention has already been drawn to the sense of perma-nence dominating the invocation 'Abide with Me/ and the sense of fluxdominating the sequel 'Fast Falls the Eventide/ Ideals fashion themselvesround these two notions, permanence and flux. In the inescapable flux,there is something that abides; in the overwhelming permanence, there isan element that escapes into flux. Permanence can be snatched only out offlux; and the passing moment can find its adequate intensity only by itssubmission to permanence. Those who would disjoin the two elementscan find no interpretation of patent facts.

The four symbolic figures in the Medici chapel in Florence—Michel-angelo's masterpieces of statuary, Day [514] and Night, Evening andDawn—exhibit the everlasting elements in the passage of fact. The figuresstay there, reclining in their recurring sequence, forever showing the es-sences in the nature of things. The perfect realization is not merely theexemplification of what in abstraction is timeless. It does more: it implantstimelessness on what in its essence is passing. The perfect moment is fade-less in the lapse of time. Time has then lost its character of 'perpetualperishing'; it becomes the 'moving image of eternity/

SECTION III

Another contrast is equally essential for the understanding of ideals—thecontrast between order as the condition for excellence, and order as stiflingthe freshness of living. This contrast is met with in the theory of educa-tion. The condition for excellence is a thorough training in technique.Sheer skill must pass out of the sphere of conscious exercise, and musthave assumed the character of unconscious habit. The first, the second,and the third condition for high achievement is scholarship, in that en-larged sense including knowledge and acquired instinct controlling action.

The paradox which wrecks so many promising theories of education isthat the training which produces skill is so very apt to stifle imaginativezest. Skill demands repetition, and imaginative zest is tinged with impulse.Up to a certain point each gain in skill opens new paths for the imagina-tion. But in each individual formal training has its limit of usefulness. Be-

yond that limit there is degeneration: The lilies of the field toil not,neither do they spin/

The social history of mankind exhibits great organizations in their al-ternating functions of conditions for progress, and of contrivances forstunting humanity. The history of the Mediterranean lands, and of west-ern Europe, is the history of the blessing and the curset of political or-ganizations, of religious organizations, of [SIS] schemes of thought, of so-cial agencies for large purposes. The moment of dominance, prayed for,worked for, sacrificed for, by generations of the noblest spirits, marks theturning point where the blessing passes into the curse. Some new principleof refreshment is required. The art of progress is to preserve order amidchange, and to preserve change amid order. Life refuses to be embalmedalive. The more prolonged the halt in some unrelieved system of order, thegreater the crash of the dead society.

The same principle is exhibited by the tedium arising from the unre-lieved dominance of a fashion in art. Europe, having covered itself withtreasures of Gothic architecture, entered upon generations of satiation.These jaded epochs seem to have lost all sense of that particular form ofloveliness. It seems as though the last delicacies of feeling require someelement of novelty to relieve their massive inheritance from bygone sys-tem. Order is not sufficient. What is required, is something much morecomplex. It is order entering upon novelty; so that the massiveness oforder does not degenerate into mere repetition; and so that the noveltyis always reflected upon a background of system.

But the two elements must not really be disjoined. It belongs to thegoodness of the world, that its settled order should deal tenderly with thefaint discordant light of the dawn of another age. Also order, as it sinksinto the background before new conditions, has its requirements. The olddominance should be transformed into the firm foundations, upon whichnew feelings arise, drawing their intensities from delicacies of contrast be-tween system and freshness. In either alternative of excess, whether thepast be lost, or be dominant, the present is enfeebled. This is only anapplication of Aristotle's doctrine of the 'golden mean/ The lesson of thetransmutation of causal efficacy into presentational immediacy is that greatends are reached by life in the present; life novel and immediate, butderiving its richness by its full inheritance from the rightly organized [S16]animal body. It is by reason of the body, with its miracle of order, thatthe treasures of the past environment are poured into the living occasion.The final percipient route of occasions is perhaps some thread of happen-ings wandering in 'empty' space amid the interstices of the brain. It toilsnot, neither does it spin. It receives from the past; it lives in the present. Itis shaken by its intensities of private feeling, adversion or aversion. In itsturn, this culmination of bodily life transmits itself as an element ofnovelty throughout the avenues of the body. Its sole use to the body is itsvivid originality: it is the organ of novelty.

SECTION IV

The world is thus faced by the paradox that, at least in its higher ac-tualities, it craves for novelty and yet is haunted by terror at the loss of thepast, with its familiarities and its loved ones. It seeks escape from time inits character of 'perpetually perishing/ Part of the joy of the new years isthe hope of the old round of seasons, with their stable facts—of friendship,and love, and old association. Yet conjointly with this terror, the presentas mere unrelieved preservation of the past assumes the character of ahorror of the past, rejection of it, revolt:

To die be given, or attain,Fierce work it were to do again.*

Each new epoch enters upon its career by waging unrelenting war uponthe aesthetic gods of its immediate predecessor. Yet the culminating fact ofconscious, rational life refuses to conceive itself as a transient enjoyment,transiently useful. In the order of the physical world its role is defined byits introduction of novelty. But, just as physical feelings are haunted bythe vague insistence of causality, so the higher intellectual feelings arehaunted by the vague insistence of another order, where there is no un-rest, no travel, no shipwreck: There shall be no more sea/

[517] This is the problem which gradually shapes itself as religionreaches its higher phases in civilized communities. The most generalformulation of the religious problem is the question whether the process ofthe temporal world passes into the formation of other actualities, boundtogether in an order in which novelty does not mean loss.

The ultimate evil in the temporal world is deeper than any specific evil.It lies in the fact that the past fades, that time is a 'perpetual perishing/Objectification involves elimination. The present fact has not the pastfact with it in any full immediacy. The process of time veils the past be-low distinctive feeling. There is a unison of becoming among things inthe present. Why should there not be novelty without loss of this directunison of immediacy among things? In the temporal world, it is the em-pirical fact that process entails loss: the past is present under an abstrac-tion. But there is no reason, of any ultimate metaphysical generality, whythis should be the whole story. The nature of evil is that the characters ofthings are mutually obstructive. Thus the depths of life require a process ofselection. But the selection is elimination as the first step towards anothertemporal order seeking to minimize obstructive modes. Selection is at oncethe measure of evil, and the process of its evasion. It meanst discardingthe element of obstructiveness in fact. No element in fact is ineffectual:thus the straggle with evil is a process of building up a mode of utilizationby the provision of intermediate elements introducing a complex structureof harmony. The triviality in some initial reconstruction of order expressesthe fact that actualities are being produced, which, trivial in their own

Ideal Opposites 341

proper character of immediate 'ends/ are proper 'means' for the emergenceof a world at once lucid, and intrinsically of immediate worth.

The evil of the world is that those elements which are translucent so faras transmission is concerned, in themselves are of slight weight; and thatthose elements [518] with individual weight, by their discord, impose uponvivid immediacy the obligation that it fade into night. 'He giveth his be-loved—sleep/

In our cosmological construction we are, therefore, f left with the finalopposites, joy and sorrow, good and evil, disjunction and conjunction—that is to say, the many in one—flux and permanence, greatness andtriviality, freedom and necessity, God and the World. In this list, the pairsof opposites are in experience with a certain ultimate directness of in-tuition, except in the case of the last pair. God and the World introducethe note of interpretation. They embody the interpretation of the cos-mological problem in terms of a fundamental metaphysical doctrine as tothe quality of creative origination, namely, conceptual appetition andphysical realization. This topic constitutes the last chapter of Cosmology.

Thus, when we make a distinction of reason, and con- [522] sider God inthe abstraction of a primordial actuality, we must ascribe to him neitherfulness of feeling, nor consciousness. He is the unconditioned actuality ofconceptual feeling at the base of things; so that, by reason of this pri-mordial actuality, there is an order in the relevance of eternal objects tothe process of creation. His unity of conceptual operations is a free crea-tive act, untrammelled by reference to any particular course of things. Itis deflected neither by love, nor by hatred, for what in fact comes to pass.The particularities of the actual world presuppose it; while it merely pre-supposes the general metaphysical character of creative advance, of whichit is the primordial exemplification. The primordial nature of God is theacquirement by creativity of a primordial character.

His conceptual actuality at once exemplifies and establishes the cate-goreal conditions. The conceptual feelings, which compose his primordialnature, exemplify in their subjective forms their mutual sensitivity andtheir subjective unity of subjective aim. These subjective forms are valua-tions determining the relative relevance of eternal objects for each occa-sion of actuality.

He is the lure for feeling, the eternal urge of desire. His particularrelevance to each creative act,f as it arises from its own conditioned stand-point in the world, constitutes him the initial 'object of desire' establish-ing the initial phase of each subjective aim. A quotation from Aristotle'sMetaphysics 1 expresses some analogies to, and some differences from, thisline of thought:

And since that which is moved and moves f is intermediate, there issomething! which moves without being moved, being eternal, sub-stance, and actuality. And the object of desire and the object of thoughtmove in this way; they move without being moved. The primary objectsof desire and of thoughts are the same. For the apparent good is theobject of appetite, and the real good is the primary object of rationalwish.f But desire is conse- [523] quent on opinion rather than opinionon desire; for the thinking is the starting-point. And thought is movedby the object of thought, and one of the two columns t of op-posites is in itself the object of thought; . . .Aristotle had not made the distinction between conceptual feelings andthe intellectual feelings which alone involve consciousness. But if 'con-ceptual feeling/ with its subjective form of valuation, be substituted for'thought/ 'thinking/ and 'opinion/ in the above quotation, the agreementis exact.

SECTION III

There is another side to the nature of God which cannot be omitted.Throughout this exposition of the philosophy of organism we have been

1 Metaphysics 1072a 23-32,t trans, by Professor W. D. Ross. My attentionwas called to the appositeness of this particular quotation by Mr. F. J. Carson.

In it there is no loss, no obstruction. The world is felt in a unison of im-mediacy. The property of combining creative advance with [525} the re-tention of mutual immediacy is what in the previous section is meant bythe term 'everlasting/

The wisdom of subjective aim prehends every actuality for what it can bein such a perfected system—its sufferings, its sorrows, its failures, its tri-umphs, its immediacies of joy—woven by Tightness of feeling into the har-mony of the universal feeling, which is always immediate, always many,always one, always with novel advance, moving onward and never perish-ing. The revolts of destructive evil, purely self-regarding, are dismissed intotheir triviality of merely individual facts; and yet the good they did achievein individual joy, in individual sorrow, in the introduction of needed con-trast, is yet saved by its relation to the completed whole. The image—andit is but an image—the image under which this operative growth of God'snature is best conceived, is that of a tender care that nothing be lost.

The consequent nature of God is his judgment on the world. He savesthe world as it passes into the immediacy of his own life. It is the judgmentof a tenderness which loses nothing that can be saved. It is also the judg-ment of a wisdom which uses what in the temporal world is mere wreckage.

Another image which is also required to understand his consequent na-turet is that of his infinite patience. The universe includes a threefoldcreative act composed of (i) the one infinite conceptual realization, (ii)the multiple solidarity of free physical realizations in the temporal world,(iii) the ultimate unity of the multiplicity of actual fact with the pri-mordial conceptual fact. If we conceive the first term and the last term intheir unity over against the intermediate multiple freedom of physicalrealizations in the temporal world, we conceive of the patience of God,tenderly saving the turmoil of the intermediate world by the completion ofhis own nature. The sheer force of things lies in the intermediate physicalprocess: this is the energy of physical production, God's r61e is not thecombat of productive force [526] with productive force, of destructiveforce with destructive force; it lies in the patient operation of the over-powering rationality of his conceptual harmonization. He does not createthe world, he saves it: or, more accurately, he is the poet of the world, withtender patience leading** it by his vision of truth, beauty, and goodness.

SECTION V

The vicious separation of the flux from the permanence leads to theconcept of an entirely static God, with eminent reality, in relation to anentirely fluent world, with deficient reality. But if the opposites, static andfluent, have once been so explained as separately to characterize diverseactualities, the interplay between the thing which is static and the thingswhich are fluent involves contradiction at every step in its explanation.Such philosophies must include the notion of 'illusion' as a fundamental

348 Final Interpretation

mary can [528] only be expressed in terms of a group of antitheses, whoseapparent self-contradictions depend f on neglect of the diverse categories ofexistence. In each antithesis there is a shift of meaning which converts theopposition into a contrast.

It is as true to say that God is permanent and the World fluent, as thatthe World is permanent and God is fluent.

It is as true to say that God is one and the World many, as that theWorld is one and God many.

It is as true to say that, in comparison with the World, God is actualeminently, as that, in comparison with God, the World is actual eminently.

It is as true to say that the World is immanent in God, as that God isimmanent in the World.

It is as true to say that God transcends the World, as that the Worldtranscends God.

It is as true to say that God creates the World, as that the Worldcreates God.

God and the World are the contrasted opposites in terms of whichCreativity achieves its supreme task of transforming disjoined multiplicity,with its diversities in opposition, into concrescent unity, with its diver-sities in contrast. In each actuality theref are two concrescent poles ofrealization—'enjoyment' and 'appetition/ that is, the 'physical' and the'conceptual.' For God the conceptual is prior to the physical, for theWorld the physical poles are prior to the conceptual poles.

A physical pole is in its own nature exclusive, bounded by contradiction:a conceptual pole is in its own nature all-embracing, unbounded by con-tradiction. The former derives its share of infinity from the infinity of ap-petition; the latter derives its share of limitation from the exclusiveness ofenjoyment. Thus, by reason of his priority of appetition, there can be butone primordial nature for God: and, by reason of their priority of enjoy-ment, there must be one history of many actualities in the physical world.

[529] God and the World stand over against each other, expressing thefinal metaphysical truth that appetitive vision and physical enjoyment haveequal claim to priority in creation. But no two actualities can be tornapart: each is all in all. Thus each temporal occasion embodies God, andis embodied in God. In God's nature, permanence is primordial and fluxis derivative from the World: in the World's nature, flux is primordial andpermanence is derivative from God. Also the World's nature is a pri-mordial datum for God; and God's nature is a primordial datum for theWorld. Creation achieves the reconciliation of permanence and flux whenit has reached its final term which is everlastingness—the Apotheosis ofthe World.

Opposed elements stand to each other in mutual requirement. In theirunity, they inhibit or contrast. God and the World stand to each other inthis opposed requirement. God is the infinite ground of all mentality, theunity of vision seeking physical multiplicity. The World is the multiplicity

350 Final Interpretation

existence. The function of being a means is not disjoined from the func-tion of being an end. The sense of worth beyond itself is immediatelyenjoyed as an overpowering element in the individual self-attainment. Itis in this way that the immediacy of sorrow and pain is transformed intoan element of triumph. This is the notion of redemption through suffer-ingf which haunts the world. It is the generalization of its very minorexemplification as the aesthetic value of discords in art.

Thus the universe is to be conceived as attaining the active self-expres-sion of its own variety of opposites—of its own freedom and its ownnecessity, of its own multiplicity and its own unity, of its own imperfectionand its own perfection. All the 'opposites' are elements in the nature ofthings, and are incorrigibly there. The concept of 'God' is the way inwhich we understand this incredible fact—that what cannot be, yet is.

SECTION VII

Thus the consequent nature of God is composed of a multiplicity ofelements with individual self-realization. It is just as much a multiplicityas it is a unity; it is just as much one immediate fact as it is an unrestingadvance beyond itself. Thus the actuality of God must also be understoodas a multiplicity of actual components in process of creation. This is Godin his function of the kingdom of heaven.

Each actuality in the temporal world has its reception into God's na-ture. The corresponding element in God's nature is not temporal ac-tuality, but is the transmutation of that temporal actuality into a living,ever-present fact. An enduring personality in the temporal world is a routeof occasions in which the successors with some peculiar completeness sumup their predecessors. The correlate fact in God's nature is an even morecomplete unity of life in a chain of elements for which succession does notmean loss of immediate unison. This element in God's nature inheritsfrom the temporal counterpart [532] according to the same principle as inthe temporal world the future inherits from the past. Thus in the sense inwhich the present occasion is the person now, and yet with his own past,so the counterpart in God is that person in God.

But the principle of universal relativity is not to be stopped at the con-sequent nature of God. This nature itself passes into the temporal worldaccording to its gradation of relevance to the various concrescent occasions.There are thus four creative phases in which the universe accomplishes itsactuality. There is first the phase of conceptual origination, deficient inactuality, but infinite in its adjustment of valuation. Secondly, there is thetemporal phase of physical origination, with its multiplicity of actualities.In this phase full actuality is attained; but there is deficiency in the soli-darity of individuals with each other. This phase derives its determinateconditions from the first phase. Thirdly, there is the phase of perfectedactuality, in which the many are one everlastingly, without the qualifica-

Index

Actual occasion (cont.)

tity, 18, 22, 73, 77, HI, 211; used tostress extensiveness, 77; excludes God,88

Actual world, 4, 25, 27, 33, 46, 59, 286:as datum, 4, 16, 65, 69, 72, 65, 87,154, 158, 211, 212, 230, 233, 286; andpropositions, 11, 194-95, 204, 265; asprocess, 22; definition of, 23, 28, 150;and efficient causation, 24-25, 169,178, 277; as determinate, 45; and God,47, 65, 93, 220; as relative, 59, 65-66,93, 210-11, 226, 284; conditions po-tentiality, 65, 129; as atomic, 67, 286;as nexus, 73, 77, 230, 238; as mine,76, 81; withness of, 81; knowledge of,81; order and chaos in, 86, 110-11;givenness of, 129; as ground of proba-bility judgments, 203; perspective of,210; objective immortality of, 230; inde-termination of, 284; divisibility of, 285-86

Adaptation, 83, 107, 163

Adequacy, xi, xii, xiv, 3, 6, 9, 11, 13, 15,239, 343

Adventure, 9, 14, 42, 78, 80

Adversion and aversion (valuation up anddown), 24, 32, 184, 234, 241, 247,248, 254, 261, 266, 277, 278, 291,328, 339

Aesthetic, 5, 39: interests, xii; emphasis,102; experience, 62, 183, 185, 212,279; supplement, 213; harmony, cate-gory of, 255; fact, 279; laws, 280; cul-ture, 337; gods, 340

Affirmation, 191, 243, 270, 273-74

Affirmation- negation contrast, 24, 243,256, 261, 267

Aggregates, 173, 286

Aim: at unity, 224; at contrast, 249;private, 290. See also Initial aim; Sub-jective aim

Alexander, Samuel, 28, 41

Algebra, 332

All, 208

All things flow, 208

Alternation, 187

Alternatives, II, 148, 161, 249, 278

Analogous occasions, 99, 250, 251-53

Analogy: and probability, induction, 49,201, 204, 205, 206-07; and congruence,97, 331, 333

Analysis, 4, 19, 22, 23, 51, 153, 160, 166,211, 235. See also Division

Animal body, 106: in perception, 63, 118—19, 169-70, 178-79, 311, 315; as partof environment, 64, 76, 119, 170, 234;theory of, 103; cell as, 103, 104; life of,108; order of, 180, 339. See also Body;Bodily

Animal faith, 48, 52, 54, 81, 142, 152

Animals, 107, 181

Anticipation, 27, 179, 204, 205, 278

Antitheses, 348

Any, 114, 162, 256, 257, 261

Appearance: mere, 18, 54, 152, 229, 347;world as, 49; and reality, 72

Appetition, 32-33, 51, 72, 83, 102, 150,154, 163, 184, 212, 341, 348: in God,48, 105, 207, 316, 347, 348

Applicability, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 14, 20, 93

Appreciation, 27, 47, 85, 212, 213, 311,327

A priori figleaf, 146

Aquinas, Thomas, 11, 108

Arbitrariness, 6, 7, 71, 91

Aristotelian: (primary) substance, xiii, 21,30, 50, 59, 79, 138, 157, 158; matter(primary substance) and creativity, 21,31; substantial form. 34

Aristotle, 10, 39: influence of, xi, 51, 84,159; and Aristotelian logic, 30, 51, 209;and substance-quality (subject-predicate)thought, 30, 137, 2Q9; and ontologicalprinciple, 40; and entities present inothers, 50; and final causes, 84; andforms, 96; and fluency, 209; andPlatonism, 209; on generation, 209;and quantity, 332; and golden mean,339; on God, 342, 343, 344

Arithmetic, as metaphysical, 198-99

Art, 9, 162-63 228, 280, 317, 339, 350:and God, 189; and morality, 317

Asiatic thought, 7

Association, 129, 175, 299

Ate, goddess of mischief, 244, 351

Atomicity, atomism, 27, 117, 235, 237:and final causation, 19; and continuity,extension, 36, 67, 72, 73, 123, 292; ofactuality, 35-36, 45, 61, 62, 77, HO,227, 235, 286, 307; of quantum theory,238, 309; and Zeno, 307

Atoms, 78, 95, 286, 333n

Attribute, 40, 77, 78, 159, 288, 309

Augustine, 14

Authentic perceptive feelings, 262, 264,269, 2701

Authority, 39

Index

Change (cont.)

ventures of, 35, 55; meaning of, 73,79, 80; of molecule, 80; in Cartesian-ism, 144; always obtains, 238; andorder, 339. See also Motion

Chaos: as non-social nexus, 72; absolute,92; creation out of, 95-96, 199; pure,111; borders of, 111; and triviality, 110,199; not evil, 112; of diverse epochs,112; zero, 115; arithmetic in, 199;occasions in, 199; of data, 248. See alsoDisorder

Chemical, 95, 106

Christianity, 342-43, 347

Civilization, xi, 9, 17, 337, 340

Clarity and distinctness, 8, 162, 173-74,236

Class, 46, 89, 228, 229

Coalescence, 26, 225

Cogredience, 125

Coherence: as ideal, 3, 5, 6, 128, 225,257, 349; theory, 190-91, 271; inactual entity, 224, 226

Coincidence, 328, 333

Colours, 44, 61, 64, 78, 162, 194, 326,327

Common sense: repressive, 9; and spe-cialism, imagination, 17; on experience,50; Locke's expression of, 51, 52; no-tions presupposed by, 52, 128, 129; onspace and time, 70, 72; objectivism of,72, 144, 158, 160; on knowledge inexperience, 161; on cause of sensa, 171;on presentational immediacy, 311, 324

Communication, 4

Comparative feelings, 254, 266, 270, 275-76

Comparison, 146, 164, 166

Compatibility: and contrariety, 148; forsynthesis, 148, 154, 223, 224, 240;judgment of, 274

Complete locus, 307

Complexity, 8, 80, 161, 227, 246: andatomism, 36; and intensity, 100, 279;of givenness and order, 100; and sim-plicity, 133; and knowledge, 161; ofuniverse, 166; of data, 232; and auton-omy, 255; definition of, 278

Composition, 58, 147

Compulsion, 175

Concavity and convexity, 307

Concept of Nature, The, 125«, 128n,243n, 287n

Concepts, 16, 55, 194, 242

Conceptual analysis, 247

Conceptual imagination, 248

Conceptualism, 40

Conceptual origination, 247

Conceptual Pole. See Mental pole

Conceptual prehension (feeling, valua-tion, reproduction, registration, recog-nition), 32-34, 44, 45, 49, 87, 164-65,189, 214, 239, 240-43, 248: definitionof, 23, 184, 232, 239, 240, 243; cate-gory of, 26, 33, 53, 101, 225, 246,248-49, 250, 251-52, 254, 260, 271,276, 277, 316; derived from physicalfeelings, 26, 247, 250, 260; mutual de-termination (sensitivity) of, 27, 221,235, 344; unconditioned, complete, 31,32-34, 247, 344, 345; as appetition,32, 33, 184, 341; connotations of, 33;pure and impure, 63, 184, 241, 313;originality in, 102, 105; negligible, 115;and Humian impressions, 160-63;blind, 161, 214, 241, 247, 343-44; andinternal determination, 164; conscious-ness not necessary for, 165, 241, 344:as source of emotion, 212; of subjectiveaim, 224; basic, 224, 244; 256; objecti-fication by, 225; negative, 226-27, 240;as primary feelings, 232, 239; as primarymental operations, 239, 240; as feelingsof negation, 243; novel, 244-45; derivedfrom other conceptual feelings, 247,248, 254 (see also Reversion); as pur-posive, 254; efficacy of, 254; and actualworld, 256; generality of datum, 257,275; concerns entire region, 285. Seealso Mental prehension; Valuation

Concern. 55

Concordance, 252

Concrescence, 7, 26, 41-42, 49, 84, 108,219, 220, 224-25, 232, 283, 316: asproduction of novel togetherness, 21;components of, 21, 47, 84; actualentity as, 22, 211, 212; eliminates inde-termination, 23, 85, 88; and final causa-tion, 24, 210; pre-established harmonyof, 27; freedom of, 47-48; as indi-vidualization of universe, 51, 165, 316;and subjective aim, 69, 87, 167, 245;absorbs data into privacy, 85; responsi-bility of, 88; as process of addition,151; as selective, 153-54; problem for,154, 283; cosmology in description of,167; one kind of fluency, 210; cate-goreal demands of, 237; dipolarity of,

Index

Cosmic epoch (cont.)ing characteristic of, 293, 332; straightand flat "loci in, 310; strain-loci in, 322

Cosmological argument, 93

Cosmology: motives of, xi; satisfactory,xii, 128, 143, 290, 316; seventeenth-century, xiv; Plato's, xiv, 93, 94; one-substance, 19, 110; monadic, 27; andunique seriality, 35; speculations of, 71and arbitrary factors in geometry, 91Newton's, 93, 94; general doctrine of94; of philosophy of organism, 103three misconceptions hampering, 156and concrescence, 167; Kant's, 190based on simple physical feelings, 238and physical purposes, 276; and vacuousactuality, 309; and scientific theory,323; last chapter of, 341; interpretationin, 341; as basis of religion, 349

Counting and measurement, 327

Creation, 85, 95-96, 223, 341, 348, 349

Creative act, 245, 247, 250

Creative advance, xiv, 21, 28, 45, 227, 277,346: into novelty, 35, 128, 222, 349;God's purpose in, 105; propositionsgrow with, 188, 259; nexus not de-stroyed in, 238; general notion of, 289;relation of nature as extensive com-munity to, 289; metaphysical characterof, 344; re-establishes itself, 347

Creativity: as ultimate, 7, 20; as inexplica-ble by forms, 20; as conditioned (char-acterized, qualified) by actuality, 20,29, 43, 84, 85, 87-88, 108, 164, 220,222, 225, 237, 244; universal of uni-versals, 21; as principle of novelty, 21;discussion of, 21; transcendence of,26, 43, 85, 87, 102, 237, 280; defini-tion of, 31-32; God and, 88, 225, 244,344; as universal throughout actuality,164; as fundamental fact, 211; transi-tion as, 211; as passing on, 213; asabstract possibility, 220; not an externalagency, 222; meaningless without crea-tures, 225; new impersonation of, 237;transition of, 244; effect of adversionand aversion on, 277; has character offinal and efficient causation, 277; su-preme task of, 348

Creatures, 20, 22, 32, 69, 80, 225, 227,255, 345, 351

Critical judgment, 178

Critical philosophy, 50, 173, 174, 175

Criticism, 10, 151, 268

Critique of pure feeling, 113Cumulation, 237, 238Custom, 326

Daily life, 156, 174

Datum (data), 23, 47, 52, 58, 86, 106,165, 203, 224, 230-31, 248: and pri-mary phase, 16, 104, 144, 154-55, 206;objectivity of, 40; primary, 44, 49, 159;as potentiality, 65, 113; as absorbed intosubject, 85, 153, 154, 164; order in,100, 106, 113; inherited from past,104, 116; limits and supplies, 110; andfreedom, 110, 115, 203; character of,110, 157; vector character of, 116, 117,120; includes bodily organs, 117-19;analytic consciousness of, 120; intui-tions as, 142; as decisions received,149-50; as objective content, 150, 152;found in past, 150, 233; involves actualentities (world), 153, 154, 211, 224,233, 235; as perspective, 154; com-plexity of, 153, 185, 246; as universal,159; modification of, 164; dead, 164;as environment under abstraction, 203;finitude of relevant, 206; as in being,233; as public side of prehension, 290.See also Initial datum; Objective datum

Dead, appropriation of, xiii

Decay, 188

Decision, 43: of subject-superject, 28;meaning of, 43; as meaning of actuality,43; as basis of givenness, 43, 47, 62;as basis of explanation, 46; and onto-logical principle, 46; as modificationof subjective aim, 47; God's, 47, 164;satisfaction as, 60; transcendent, 150.164; transmitted, 150, 154; received,150, 277, 284; immanent (immedi-ate), 163-64, 284; successive, 224; andindeterminations in initial aim, 224;adversion and aversion as, 254; in sub-jective aim, 277; and freedom, 284;relevance to contemporaries, 318

Deduction, 8, 10, 343

Definiteness: of experience, 4, 29, 240;of statement, 9; forms (potentialities,universal) of, 14, 20, 22, 34, 40, 158;definition of, 25; as exclusive limitation,45, 240; as final cause, 223; private, 290

Definition: of constructs, 3; of proposi-tions, II; of verbal expressions, 13; assoul of actuality, 223

Deity, divine, 40, 93, 94, 343

Index

Emotion (cont)

fied, 28, 106; transmission of, 114, 115;sensa as definiteness of, 114; quantita-tive, 116, 233-35; and sensation, 115,141, 162; and physical energy, 116,315; pulses (throbs) of, 116, 163, 327;blind, 162-63; as public and private,212-13, 290; and struggle for existence,226; qualitative, 233-34; pattern of,237, 273, 275

Emphasis, 47, 48, 102, 108, 110, 146,163, 313

Empiricism, 285: one side of philosophy,3-4; Lockian, Humian, sensationalist,50, 57, 145, 151, 153, 167, 171, 174,316; ultimate ground of, 256

Empty space: actual occasions in, 56, 92,99, 177, 199, 314, 319; and materialether, 78; within cell, 99, 105, 106; andstrains, strain-loci, 311, 319; and rest,319; and presentational immediacy,321; in brain, 339

End(s), 40, 83, 222, 224, 339, 349-50

Endurance: and Zeno, 68-69; undifferen-tiated, 77-79, 187; as repetition, 104,128, 136-37: and rhythm, vibration,279; passive, 309

Enduring: substance, 79; soul, 104; per-sonality, 119, 350-51; percipient, 270

Enduring objects, 99: definition of, 34-35, 109, 161; self-identity of, 55; rele-vance of power to, 56; distinct fromother societies, actual entities, 72; asreferent of personal pronoun, 75; elec-trons as, 92, 326; humans as, 92, 161;as restricted corpuscular society, 92,104; molecule as, 99, 326; living, 107,109, 177; transition of matter or char-acter, 109; with consciousness, knowl-edge, 161, 177, 270; inorganic, non-living, 173, 177; subjective aims orphysical purposes in, 187-88, 276, 279;simple, 198; intersection of, 199; andstrains, 311; contemporary occasions of,318; and strain-locus, 319; and pre-sented duration, 321; protons as, 326;material bodies as, 326

Energy: radiant, 109; forms of, 116, 120,239, 254; and emotion, 116, 315;transference of, 116-17, 238-39, 246;vector marks of, 117; quantity of, 117,238-39; origination of, 246, 285: physi-cal theory of, 254; complexity deter-

mines degree of, 255; fluent, 309; struc-ture of, 309

Enjoyment, 9, 41, 49, 51, 85, 159, 166,178, 262, 289, 340, 348, 350

Entirely living nexus, 103-5, 107

Entity (-ies): cannot be considered in iso-lation, 3, 28; synonymous with being,thing, 21, 211; and categories of exis-tence, 20; meaning of, 28, 43, 211, 243,224; use of term, 30; proper, 30, 247,224, 228; as felt by actualities, 41;self-identity of, 57, 225; two primarytypes of, 188; two pure types of, 188;impure types of, 188; two hybrid typesof, 188-89; four main types of, 188;originating in concrescence, 211; notabstractable from creativity, 213, 243;categoreal types of, 219; objective func-tioning of, 222-23; temporal, 276. Seealso Actual entity; Thing

Environment, 89, 90, 99, 110, 203-06,207, 234, 254, 264-65

Envisagement, 34, 44, 189

Epiphenomenal, 292

Epistemology, xii, 48-50, 52, 54, 73, 117

Epochal theory of time, 68, 283

Epochs, historical, 14, 15, 17, 338, 339,340. See also Cosmic epoch

Equations, 311

Error: logical, 30; in higher organisms,113, 168; and theory, 161; impossiblein pure perceptive modes, 168; in sym-bolic reference, 168, 172, 183; andprogress, 168, 187; arising below con-sciousness, 180, 271-72; God as sourceof, 189; in derivative judgment, 192;colour-blindness as, 253; some noveltyin, 253; in conscious perceptions, 262,268, 269; consciousness of, 270

Essence: of actual entity, 41; CriticalRealists' use of, 44; real, 53, 59-60,193; nominal, 60; abstract, 60; ofeternal objects, 115, 165, 315; specific,148

Eternal, 40, 189, 248, 345, 347

Eternal object(s), 40: as (pure) potential(for ingression), 22, 23, 40, 44, 164,184, 188, 214, 239, 290; as forms(determinants) of definiteness, 22, 23,26, 40, 149, 154, 158, 227, 238, 239,240, 241, 291, 312; as ultimate ele-ments. 22. 219: no novel. 22; ingressionof, 23, 31, 41, 45, 52, 59, 64, 86, 114,

Index

Experience (cont.)

143, 167; obvious facts of, 145; nakedand unashamed, 146; as primary meta-physical fact, 160; topsy-turvy explana-tion of, 162; purposeful, 162, 163;emotional, 162-63; and everlastingness,163; nothing apart from, 167; blind,178; of being one among others, 178;togetherness in, 189-90; occasion of,189, 190; stream of, 189, 190; throbof, 190; concordant, 206; integral, 208;elucidation of, 208; ultimate, 208; offuture, 215; complexity of, 267; objec-tive and subjective sides of, 277;aesthetic, 280; depth of, 318; direct,

16, 324-25

Explanation, 7, 96: as explaining away,

17, 145; of abstract from concrete, 20;categories of, 20, 22-26, 28, 166; anddecision, 46; based on vera causa, 77-78; scientific, 77-78, 324; philosophi-cal, 129, 250; elements in, 153; as ana-lysis of coordination, 153; make-believe,201

Expression, 96, 209

Extension, lower limit to, 206

Extensive abstraction, 97, 287

Extensive connection, 294-301: definingcharacteristic of extensive continuum,97-98; and perception, 168-69; onescheme of, 286-87; as starting-point,287; sui generis, 288; formal propertiesof, 288; primary relationship of physicalworld, 288-89; elimination of atomicityin, 292

Extensive continuum, xii, 61-82: Des-cartes and Newton on, xii, 76; not in-volve continuity of becoming, 35; asdatum, 62, 72-73, 76, 123; as realpotentiality, 62, 66, 67, 76; not prior toworld, 66; underlies whole world, 66,72; exemplified in all actualities, 67; asbasic limitation on abstract potentiality,80; as physical field, 80; quantum of,80; defining characteristic of, 97; atomi-zation of, 123, 124, 128; reason forcareful discussion of, 167; limitation tofinite region of, 206; standpoint in,283; as order of this epoch, 293; basedon divisibility of physical pole, 308;systematic structure of, 325; measure-ment possible throughout, 332

Extensiveness: spatial and temporal, 61,77, 80, 238, 283, 301; aboriginal poten-tiality of, 62; of actual entities, 77; as

basic fact, 91; grades of specializationof, 91, 92; due to divisibility of satis-faction, 69, 221; as indefinite divisi-bility, 285; as pervading generic form,287; derivation of, 287; of presentcosmic epoch, 326Extensive order, 286Extensive perspective, 58Extensive quantity, 97, 332, 333Extensive quantum, 283, 284, 307Extensive region, 168-70, 301, 310Extensive relationships: knowledge of, 61,122; as fundamental, 67, 288; external,286, 287, 309; internal, 286, 309; ascondition of transmission, 288; Des-cartes and Locke on, 288, 326; perma-nence of, 327-28Extensive scheme, 288, 318Extensive society, 96-97Extensive whole and part, 287, 288External world, 54-56, 62, 63, 116, 117,120, 140, 156, 158, 171, 176, 206,234, 313, 314, 321, 333Ezekiel, 85

Fact(s), 6,9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17, 20, 39-40, 42, 46, 51, 96, 129, 161-62, 188,219, 220, 276, 290, 338, 343

False propositions, 184-85, 186

Fatigue, tedium, 16, 239, 339

Feeler, 88, 222, 237

Feeling(s): Bradley's doctrine of, xiii;definition of, 23, 40-42; and Lockianideas, 25, 51-53; as positive prehen-sions, 26, 40-42, 142, 221; integrationof, 26, 232: mutual sensitivity (determi-nation) of, 27, 192, 221/223, 235,275, 344; intensity of, 27, 277-78;Descartes' use of, 41; of actual entities,49, 211, 230; vector character of, 55,87, 119, 231; of bodily actualities, 75,81; tone of, 85, 119, 120, 308; self-definition of, 85-86; subjective formsof, 85, 88, 211, 221, 232; aptness for,87; between data and feeler, 88; nar-rowness and width of, 110-12; con-formity of, 113; quantitative, 116; spe-cific forms of, 116; intensity of, 118,244; visceral and visual, 121; commonsense requires, 128; give immediacy,136, 155; compatibility of, 148, 223;blind, 161, 162, 163, 214; aesthetic,162; use of term, 164, 211; successive

- phases of, 164, 165-66; hierarchy of,

Index

God, 343-51: as non-temporal, 7, 40, 46;and ultimate, 7; and creativity, 7, 88,222, 225, 348-49; actual entity, 18, 40,46, 65, 87, 94, 110, 164, 244; andreasons of highest absoluteness, 19; andontological principle, 19; objectification(prehension) of, 31, 189, 207, 225,246, 316, 348; objective immortalityof, 32; reason for name, 31-32; andreligion, 31-32, 189, 207; satisfactionof, 32, 88: originates from mental pole,36, 75, 87, 224, 345, 348; mediatesbetween actuality and potentiality, 40,49; as creator, 47, 225, 346, 348; oftheologians, 47; and knowledge, 49,144, 190; goodness of, 49, 345; powerof, 49, 346; as included in actual world,65, 220; as source of novelty, 67, 88,108, 164, 247, 349; Descartes on, 74-75, 144, 158; compared with occasions,75, 87, 88, 110, 224; has no past, 87;threefold character of, 87-88; aim (pur-pose) of, 88, 100, 105, 345; source oforder, 88, 108, 244, 247, 347: as self-causing, 88, 222; and terms actualentity and occasion, 88; as individualfor own sake, 88; superjective natureof, 88; as transcended, 88, 222, 348;transcendence of, 88, 93, 95, 164, 348;as eternal, 93, 345, 349; immanence of,93, 111, 348; tenderness of, 105, 346;fulfillment of, 105; source of initial aim,108, 224, 244, 283; as principle of con-cretion (limitation), 164, 244; decisionof, 164; as macroscopic res vera, 167;and ethics, art, error, 189; secularizationof, 207; permanence of, 208, 346-48;relevance to conceptual valuations, 225,244; as creator, 225, 342; analogy toGreek and Buddhist thought of, 244;as goddess of mischief, 244, 351; func-tions of, 207, 244, 350; interventionof, 247; eternal objects not created by,257; source of physical law, 283; asmodifying agency, 325; interpretationin doctrine of world and, 341

—consequent nature of, 343-51: andtruth, 12; growth of, 12, 346; impar-tiality of, 13; results from prehensionsof world, 31, 345, 347; objective im-mortality of, 32, 351; harmonious, 88,349; intensity of, 88; as locus of im-partial nexus, 231

—primordial nature of, 343-51: non-

temporal, 7, 31, 46; relation to crea-tivity, 7, 32, 105, 225, 344; completionof, 13, 345, 347; as eternal, 13, 345;conceptual, 13, 31, 87, 207, 343; crea-ture, 31; source of order, 32, 107; im-manence of, 32; efficacious, 32, 349;deficient in actuality, 34, 343-44, 345,349, 350; and actual world, 44, 47, 105,344; eternal objects subsist in, 46;standard of intensity, 47; as macro-scopic fact. 47; freedom of, 47-48,344, 345; lure for feeling, source ofinitial aim, 67, 189, 344; subjectiveform of prehensions of, 88; seeks inten-sity, 105; basis of relevance of eternalobjects, 108, 257, 278, 344, 349; pre-hension of, 207

Good, 15, 33, 105, 338, 339, 346

Greatness, 337, 341

Habit, 140, 175

Hallucination, 324

Harmony: of thought, percepta, and sub-jective forms, 16; pre-established, 48,255; ideal of, 102; requirements of,111, 112; complex structure of, 340

Hebrew, 208, 343, 347

Hegel(ian), 11, 113, 166, 167, 210

Heraclitus, 208, 309

Hierarchy: of societies, 96-109, 192; ofcategories of feeling and thought, 166;patience for, 192

High-grade, 222, 254, 314, 315, 318

Historic route (individuality), 56, 119,161, 188

History, 10, 46-48, 111, 167, 227

Hold uP> 280

Homology, 127-28

Human body: and rest of universe, 118-19; as amplifier, 119; as involved inexperience, 122, 129, 234; and pre-sented locus, 126-28; as an actuality,287. See also Animal body; Body

Hume, xi, 11, 39, 83, 91: on ideas ofreflection, 40, 86-87, 160; skepticismof, 48-49, 51, 140; on impressions ofsensation, 49, 86-87, 157, 159-60, 162,242, 248, 315-16; on mind as pro-cess, 49, 54, 139-41, 151, 210; andLocke, 51, 73, 113, 128, 138-39, 147;retains medieval assumptions, 51, 130,141; retains subject-predicate categories,51, 138, 159-60; on substantial form,55; on causation, 57, 84, 123, 124,

Index

Indetermination(s): as conditioned po-tentiality, 23; of eternal objects, 29, 44,45, 149, 184, 256-57, 2*58; elimina-tion of, 45, 149, 154, 212, 224, 232;of transition, 207

Indication, theory of, 194-97

Indicative feeling, 258, 260, 261, 263,264, 266, 269, 270, 271, 272, 274

Indicative system, 194-95

Indirect perceptive feelings, 262, 268, 269,272

Individual actuality (unity of experience),15, 129, 198,211,245, 309, 318-19

Individuality, 45, 84, 152, 154, 289, 309

Individualization, 55-56, 115, 154, 225

Induction, Inductive judgment, 5, 83,199, 201, 203, 204-05, 207. See alsoProbability

Inert facts, 310

Inertia, 177

Inference, 3, 49, 64, 272, 274

Infinitesimals, 328, 332-33

Infinity, 202-03, 206, 247

Ingression, 29, 40, 41, 44, 52, 59, 64,155, 233: definition of, 23, 25; requiresobjectification, 149; as evocation ofdetermination, 149; and Locke's firstuse of idea, 149; positive and negative,290; potential, 290-91; three primarymodes of, 290-91; restricted and unre-stricted, 291

Inherence: of quality in substance, 29, 78,145, 158, 167, 232, 315; of subject inprocess, 224; of subjective form in feel-ing, 232; of quality in nexus, 315

Inheritance: of defining characteristic, 34,89; bodily, 109, 179; direct perceptionas, 119; intuition of, 167; physical andphysiological, 171, 180; route of, 180,181, 279; of initial aim, 244

Inhibition, 90, 109, 163, 213, 223, 237,263

Initial aim (basic conceptual aim, initialsubjective aim): towards depth, 105;inherited from God, 108, 224, 244,283; determines endurance, 128; simpli-fication, modification of, 224, 245; con-ditional alternatives in, 224; relevant toactual world, 225; best for that im-passe, 244; determines initial relevanceof eternal objects, 244; constitutes pri-mary phase of subject, 244; basis ofself-causation, 244-45

Initial datum(-a), 152, 221, 231, 232,237, 238, 240, 241: as multiplicity, 30,221, 230; treatment of, 224; diverseobjectifications of, 226; of primary feel-ings, 231; complexity of, 232; actualentity as, 236; as cause, 236; actualworld as, 286. See also Datum

Initiative, 102. See also Originality; Origi-nation

Inorganic, 98, 102, 103, 106, 177, 188

Insight, 4, 9, 15

Impectio, 49, 64, 76, 97, 325

Instability, 106

Instances, 194

Instant, 68

Integral feeling, 311

Integration, 26, 56, 69, 180, 211, 223,226, 232, 235, 245, 283: of physicaland conceptual prehensions, 58, 108,162, 164, 184, 214, 240-41, 248; initia-tive in, 101; directed by subjective aim,102; final, 119; involving presentationalimmediacy, 173, 311; in transmutation,227; at heart of concrescence, 227;phases of, 236; and reintegration, 247

Intellect, 79, 209, 214, 254, 321

Intellectual, 42, 56, 113, 156, 168, 214,251

—feelings, 187, 191, 247, 270, 271, 276,280: definition of, 266; two species of,266; main function of, 272; negligible,275; and consciousness, 277, 280, 344;haunted by everlasting order, 340; dis-tinct from conceptual feelings, 344

—supplement, 213-14

Intelligence, 168

Intensification, 56, 107, HI, 213: asGod's aim, 67, 88; effected by propo-sitions, 263

Intensity: minor, 15; as self-justifying, 16;in present and future, 27, 277-78:gradations of, 83, 84, 116; and order,83, 84-85, 98, 100, 339; heighteningof, 83, 272, 278, 279; and appetition,83; of God's consequent nature, 88;enfeeblement of, 93; and specialization,101; capture of, 105; sought by God,105, 249; derived from body, 105; andcontrasts, 109, 244, 277; reward ofnarrowness, 112; quantitative, 116-17,233-34, 332; of items of knowledge,161; and novel appetition, 184; subjec-tive forms of, 211; pattern of, 233, 234;

Index

Knowledge (cont.)

for theory of, 158; belongs to inter-mediate phase, 160; as subjective form,160-61; negligible without complexity,161; as capacity, 161; has same explana-tion as efficient causation, 190; ofnexus, 229; difficulties in theory of,243; Locke's view of, 274; limits of,276; of present world, 321; in scholar-ship, 338

Language: ambiguous in relation to propo-sitions, xiii, 11, 12, 13, 195, 260, 264;ordinary (literary) and philosophical, 4,11, 12, 13, 167, 174; as storehouseof knowledge, 5, 10, 11, 39; as ellip-tical, 13, 260; and undifferentiated en-durance, 77, 79; and substance-qualityconcept, 158; primitive, 159; and inter-preted presentational immediacy, 173;as example of symbolism, 182-83;Egyptian and Babylonian, 183; spoken,264; interpretative vagaries of, 324

Law(s), 14, 98: of cosmic epoch, 91, 98,116; as statistical, 92, 98, 106, 205,207; obedience to, 91, 98; interact withsocieties of occasions, 106, 204, 205,327; of consciousness, 162; as substi-tute for causation, 167; induction notderivation of, 204; for feelings in satis-faction, 231; God as basis of, 283;arbitrary, 292; as problem in differentialgeometry, 333; ultimate, 333

Least action, method of, 332

Leibniz, 19, 27, 47, 48, 80, 190, 251

Length, 333

Life: and novelty of appetition, 102, 104,178; not a defining characteristic, 104;bid for freedom, 104, 107; robbery, 105;clutch at vivid immediacy, 105; lurks ininterstices. 105-06: wandering of vividmanifestations of, 106; catalytic agent,106; not essentially social, 106-07;canalization of, 107-08; as gain of in-tensity, 107; centers of, 108; trigger-action of, 120; novel forms of energyin, 120; of enduring object, 161; andimportance of presented duration, 177,178; symbolism in higher grades of,183; as approach to consciousness, 311;order and novelty in, 339; selection re-quired for depths of, 340

Light, 36, 78-79, 163

Limitation: implies decision, 43, 164; ex-

clusive, 45; and incompatibilities, 149;God's role in, 164; in fluent things, 209;and subjective unity, 237

Living occasions, 102, 104, 109, 184

Living person: as enduring object, 107,109; defining characteristic of, 107; re-quires living, non-social nexus, 107; notin cells, vegetables, lower animals, 107;objectified in God's consequent nature,107n, 350; awareness of self as, 107;only partially dominant, 107, 109; inhigher animals, 107

Living Society (-ies): cell as, 99, 104; defi-nition of, 102, 103; and non-livingsocieties, 102, 104; subservient appa-ratus of, 103; requires food, 105-06;non-social nexus of, 105; causal aware-ness in lower, 176

Locke, John, xi, 11, 39, 60, 130: antici-pated philosophy of organism, xi, 54,123, 128, 147; cosmology of, xiv, 19,91; on power, 18, 57-58, 210, 213;on substance, 18-19, 54-60, 75, 79-80,228; on ideas, 19, 25, 41, 51, 52, 138,155, 213, 260; two substances of, 19; onperpetual perishing, 29, 81, 210; over-thrown by Hume, 51; inconsistency inhis epistemology, 51. 57, 113, 123, 128,138/143, 146, 147, 149, 152, 157, 210,242-43, 315; adequacy of, 51, 57,60, 145-46; inappropriate metaphysicalcategories of, 51; book title of, 51; onmind as cabinet, 53n, 54; on perceptionof exterior things (ideas of particularexistents), 54-56, 113, 117, 122, 138,141, 146, 152, 213, 237, 242; on sub-stantial form, 55; sensationalist, 57,146; and principle of relativity, 58; andontological principle, 58; and relational-character of eternal objects, 58; ana-logue to Plato, 60; systematized byHume, 73, 113, 128,' 147; reversesorder of perception, 113, 143, 173;and substance-quality metaphysics, 138,159; superior to Hume, 138; and mor-phology, 139-40; accepts sensationalistprinciple, 141, 157; introduces shiftinto philosophy, 144; followers of, 145;importance of, 145, 147; discards meta-physics, 145, 146-47, 153, 210; ana-lyzed mental operations alone, 151; andobjective content of experience, 152;introduced anti-rationalism, 153; on ex-perience as constructive, 156; successor

Index

Mentality (cont)

sitive experience, 248; as modifyingagency, 325

Mental operations: pure and impure, 33;and mind, 85, 213; proper place of,151; abruptness of, 184, 187, 189; pri-mary and derivative, 248; consciousnessnot essential to, 248; as basis of efficientcausation, 277; double office of, 277

Mental originality, 107-08

Mental (conceptual) pole, 45, 108, 240,308, 316: first two phases of, 26, 249;physical realization of, 32; determinessubjective forms, 70; enhancement of,101, 184; hybrid prehension of, 107;inseparable from physical pole, 108,239, 248; variation in importance of,177, 239; life as novelty in, 184; God'sorigination from, 224, 348; how oc-casions originate from, 224; as subjectdetermining itself, 248; out of time,248; not necessarily conscious, 277; sub-jective side of experience, 277; indi-visibility of, 285, 308; originative energyof, 285; as appetition, 348; as infinite,348

Mental prehension: in all actualities, 56;pure, 63; blind, 308. See also Concep-tual prehension

Mental progress, 254

Metaphors, 4

Metaphysical: systems, 8, 13, 14, 42; cate-gories, 8, 29; knowledge, 12; truth, 13,28, 35, 225, 348; principles, 21, 40,116-17, 167, 342, 343; character(istics),22, 90, 192, 220; stability, 40; gen-erality, 96, 222, 308; schemes based onKant or Hegel, 113; difficulties, 117,168; reasons, 133; fact, 157; capacities,193; propositions, 193, 197-99; reason-ing, 225: necessities, 288: reason, 340:doctrine of creative origination, 341;character of creative advance, 344

Metaphysicians, 237

Metaphysics: first principles of, 4; aim of,11, 219; novelty in, 12; as approxima-tion, 12, 13; and practice, 13, 151;success of, 14; haunted by abstract no-tions, 18; and religion, 42, 208; justifi-cation for, 42; motive for, 42; tasks of,84, 208; proper meaning of, 90; con-nects behavior and formal nature, 94;generalizes human experience, 112; gen-eralizes physics, 116-17; investigates

generic notions, 116; and classical the-ory of time, 125; Locke's avoidance of,145, 146-47; necessity of, 146; rule ofevidence, 151; and subjective experi-encing, 160; final question of, 189;thinness of modern, 208; complete prob-lem of, 209; of flux, substance, 209;and relevance of forms, 316. See alsoPhilosophy; Speculative philosophy

Method, philosophic, xiv, 3, 4-6, 8, 158

Microcosm, microcosmic, 47-48, 215

Microscopic, 128-29, 167, 214-15, 333n

Mill, John Stuart, 12

Milton, John, 95-96

Mind: Hume on, 49, 54, 138, 139-41,151, 159-60, 210; as process, 49, 54,138, 140, 151, 210; as subject withpredicates, 51; Locke on, 53-54, 213;Cartesian notion of, 54, 62, 108, 122,160, 246; detached, 56; Newton on,70, 71-72; with private ideas, 76; men-tal operations as, 85; lure for feeling asgerm of, 85; Aquinas on, 108; as en-during object, 109; replaced by actualentity, 141; greyness as qualifying, 159;intellectual operations as, 214; suggestsindependent substance, 214. See alsoBody-mind problem

Minima sensibilia, 124

Modes: Spinoza's, 7, 81; of implication,23; of expression, 96; of functioning,166

Molecular theory, 78, 94-95

Molecule: in steel bar, 16; peculiar toour cosmic epoch, 66; not actual occa-sion, 73; as nexus, 73, 287; as moving(changing) body, 73, 80; as event, 73,80; as enduring substance, 78; as his-toric route, 80; formed from atoms, 95;as society, 98; as enduring object, 99,326 (or society of); as structured so-ciety, 99; as subservient society, 104;its behaviour within animal body, 106;span of life of, 287; prehensions of, 323;and dynamics, 323

Monads, 19, 48, 80, 190

Monism: ultimate in, 7; Spinoza's, 7, 48,74, 81; static, 46; follows from subject-predicate thought, 137, 145, 190; onealternative for philosophy, 79; avoidedby principle of relativity, 148; Hegel's,210

Morality, xii, 15, 27, 42, 84, 105, 222,255, 317, 337, 343

Index

Novelty: in science, 10; in metaphysics,12; creativity as principle of, 21; pro-duction of, 21; creative advance into,28, 128, 187, 222, 349; inconceivabilityof, 40; and ordering of eternal objects,40, 164; emergence of, 46, 187; Godas source of, 67, 88, 164, 248, 349; asGod's instrument, 88; as basis of trans-cendence, 94; of subjective form, 102,164, 232, 233; originated by subjectiveaim, 102; conceptual, 102, 161; ofdefiniteness, 104; primordial nature in-different to? 105; possible, 161; andpure potentiality, 164; for God, 167,349; of appetition. 184; probability of,202, 203, 207; in phases of concrescence,224; proximate, 249; and reversion, 249,253; and transmutation, 269; and sys-tematic order, 339; and route of domi-nant occasions, 339; and loss, 340; inGod, 345; passage into, 349

Nunn, T. P., xii

Object(s): as topic of science, 16; fourmain types of, 52; actual entities as,56, 239; meaning of, 88, 239; Locke'stalk of, 139; universals strictly are, 152;and knowledge, 155-56; as form ofdefiniteness, 215; as transcendent, 215,239-40; necessary conformity to, 215;Kant on, 215n; functioning as, 220;components of datum become, 231; asimmanent, 239-40

Objectification, 49, 50, 52, 53, 116, 137,152,177, 180,206,210,235,245,246,291: definition of, 23, 25, 41; as con-verse of prehension, 24; eternal objectsin, 58, 120, 149, 155, 191; and power,58; causal, 58, 64; presentational, 58,61, 64, 321; as abstraction, 62, 63, 101,160, 210, 221, 238, 307; of contempo-raries, 63, 67, 310, 321; retains exten-sive relationships, 67; and givenness, 76,171; extensive continuum in, 76; assettled, 85; data of, 86; as efficientcause, 87; massive average, 101; im-mediate (direct), 112, 284, 307, 308;line of, 120; and repetition, 137, 139,155; primitive mode of, 141; andLocke's second use of idea, 149; andimmediacy, 155; relevant, 206; involveselimination, 210, 226, 274, 340; anddivisibility, 227; of actual world, 233;

as perspective of initial datum, 236;mediate (indirect), 284, 286, 307, 308

Objective actuality, 159

Objective content, 150, 152, 153, 155,160, 213

Objective datum, 164, 237, 240: of satis-faction, 26; in transmuted feeling, 27,160, 232; and negative prehensions, 41(pi); as actual world, 65, 83, 212, 230;as primary phase, 65; as settled, 83, 150;order in, 88 (pi.); complexity of, 106,210, 232; as perspective, 150, 221, 231(pi.), 236, 241; as real potentiality,150; as objective content, 150, 152;proposition as, 221; nexus as, 221, 291;diverse elements cannot coalesce in,225; particularities in, 228; as one,230-31; of various feelings, 232; notformless, 233; subjective form repro-duces pattern of, 233-34; a feeling as,236; as cause, 238; ingression in, 238,291; physical, 248; as contrast, 283.See also Datum

Objective diversity, category of, 26, 222,225, 227-28, 230, 271

Objective existence (objective), 45, 76,83, 215, 219, 237

Objective identity (unity), category of,26, 57, 165 (unity), 222-23, 225,227-28, 230, 231, 238, 249, 266, 271(unity)

Objective immortality: as relatedness ofactualities, xiii; attained in perishing,transcendence, 29, 60, 82, 223; condi-tions creativity, 31-32, 108; of super-ject, 45, 84, 245; enjoyment of, 56, 215,278; involves repetition, 137; of mutualprehensions, 230; of nexus, 230; sub-jectivity of cause retained in, 237; em-bodied in simple physical feelings, 238;as reason for transmission, efficientcausation, 245, 292; of God's concep-tual valuation, 247; everlasting, 347;requires God's primordial nature, 347;reconciled with immediacy, 351; finalapplication of, 351

Objective lure, 86: and subjective aim,87; definition of, 87, 185; and potentialdifference, 87; richness of, 89; propo-sitions as elements in, 187. See alsoLure for feeling

Objectivism, 158, 159

Objectivist principle, 160

Objectivity, 156

Index

Originality: of conceptual prehension,102; of response, 104; of living occa-sions, 106; canalization of, 107; con-ditioned by initial aim, 108; God asground of all, 108. See also Initiative

Origination: physical, 48; conceptual, 49;of energy, 117, 246; of feeling, 186,232, 249; negation of, 213; of actualentity, 224; of decisions, 232; as private,290, 310. See also Initiative

Originative phases, 115, 117, 122, 168,172, 177

Ovate regions, classes, 302-09

Overintellectualism, 141, 186

Overlapping, 296

Overstatement, 7

Parallelograms, 331

Participation, 20, 21, 40, 46, 95

Particularity: of religion, 15; of experience,43; of actualities, 55, 229-31; of propo-sitions, 197; of each entity, 225; twomeanings of, 229; of nexus, 229-31; ofcontrasts, 229, 230; and first three cate-gories, 230; of feelings, 237, 255

Particulars. 33-34, 41, 52-53, 57, 128,146-47, 152, 158, 194, 210, 229, 344:and universals, 20, 48-50, 158

Past: and present, 14, 105, 339; remote,63; as source of datum, 116, 150; per-ception of, 120; defined by causalefficacy, 123, 170, 319-20, 322; practi-cally common, 127, 169; of personal ex-perience, 129; as determinate beyond,163; not defined by presentational im-mediacy, 168; immediate, 178; as effi-cient cause, 210; conformity with powerof, 210; immortality, 210, 238; asnexus. 214; determined by immediatedecision, 284; durational, 320; treasuresof, 339; paradoxical attitude toward,340; present under abstraction, 340;inheritance of future from, 350

Pathology, 102, 109

Pattern, 192, 230-31, 245: as given, 44;sensa and, 114; as manner of contrast,115; as simple, 115; individual essenceof, 115; as complex, 115; as eternalobject, 120, 257; predicative, 194, 197,257, 280; two factors of, 233; qualita-tive, 233-35; of emotional intensity,233-35, 237, 240; emotional, 273, 275,280

Percepta, 180, 181, 242

Perception, xii, 3: sensationalist doctrineof, xiii, 52, 156 (see also Sensationalistprinciple; Subjectivist principle; Sensa-tionalism); confused, 27; visual, 36, 44,117, 121; Humian doctrine of, 48-49;Descartes' view of, 48-49; of actualentities, 49, 58, 122, 158; representativetheory of, 49, 54, 76; Locke's use of,52; and power, 58; ordinary meaning of,58; delusive, 64, 122; drops of, 68;crude (primitive), 81, 117, 119; ofcontemporary world, 81; sophisticated(higher grades of), 81, 117, 121; direct,81, 113, 116-17, 119, 124; problemsin theory of, 113, 117, 121; and causa-tion, 116, 173-75, 239, 290; commonelements of, 117; ultimate truth of ani-mal, 118; interplay of two pure modesof, 121, 168; human, 125, 168; asawareness of universal, 158-60; nega-tive, 161; positive, 161; as interpreta-tive, 168; heightening of, 213; memoryas physical, 239; blind, 287; fact of,290. See also Causal efficacy, perceptionin the mode of; Presentational im-mediacy; Representation; Symbolic ref-erence; Sense-perception

Perceptive feelings, 260, 261-63, 264,266, 268, 270: definition of, 261, 269;three species of, 262

—authentic, 262, 264, 268-69, 270

—unauthentic, 263, 268, 270, 272

Percipient: occasion, 63, 120, 145; final,119-20, 245, 312, 313, 319; memoriz-ing, 120; enduring, 270

Perfection, 47, 338, 345, 347, 348-49,350, 351

Periodicity, 327

Perishing: of immediacy, xiii, 29, 85; con-trasted with changing, 35; as objectiveimmortality, 81-82; everlastingness asdevoid of, 346, 347; and yet living,349, 351

—perpetual: meaning of, 29; Locke on,29, 146-47, 210; of absoluteness, 60;as attainment of immortality, 60; timeas, 81, 128, 210, 340; as transition,210

Permanence: of forms, 29; enhanced bywidth, 163; and flux, 167, 209, 338,341, 347, 348: as result of reproduction,238; in measurement, 327-29

Index

Physical pole (cont.)

308; finite, exclusive, 348; as enjoyment,348

Physical purposes, 256n: and Bergson'sintuition, 33, 280; subjective form of,184; definition of, 184, 266; initial,244; phase of, 248-49, 280; as com-parative feelings, 254, 275-80; moreprimitive than perceptive and intellec-tual feelings, 266, 272-73, 275; allactualities have, 276; eternal objectsand objective datum in, 276; explainendurance, 276; two species of, 276-80;explain rhythm and vibration, 276;blind, 308; reinforce conceptual feeling,316; and impressions of sensation, 316;in transmutation, 317; in presentationalimmediacy, 323

Physical realization, 341, 346, 348

Physical recognition (recollection), 260,261-64, 269, 270, 271, 272, 274

Physical time, 283, 288-89

Physical world, 238, 325

Physics (physical science, theory): andmetaphysics, xii, 4, 5, 116-17; Greekand mediaeval, 12; progress in, 14;relativity theory of, 35, 65, 125,126; atomism and continuity in, 35-36;and Descartes' view of space, 72; po-tential difference in, 87; and Newton,94, 96, 177; on chemical facts, 95;mathematical relations in, 98, 128, 231,326, 327; electromagnetic field as topicof, 98; seventeenth-century, 113; andepistemology, 113, 117, 119; on bodyand universe, 119; and straight lines,127; morphology in, 139-40; and the-ory of light, 163; and distinction of pastand future, 170; on cause of sensa, 171;vibration in, 187-88; scalar and vectorforms in, 212, 231, 238; investigatesaspects of simple physical feelings, 238;quantum theory of, 238-39, 254; andcontinuous transmission, 307; and ac-tion at a distance, 308; from material-ism to organism in, 309; geometricalpattern in, 312; form of energy in, 315;needs distinction of intensive and ex-tensive quantity, 332

Physiology, 5, 87, 103-04, 114, 118, 141,171, 174-75, 234, 312

Planes, 127, 306, 310, 319, 331

Plato, 21, 39, 83, 159: founder of West-ern thought, xi; dominance of his cos-

mology, xiv, 93; advance of philosophysince, 7; abiding appeal of, 20; foot-notes to, 39; and philosophy of orga-nism, 39, 44, 94-96; and limits ofrationalism, 42; forms of, 43-44, 46,96, 209, 291; modification of his real-ism, 50; analogue to Locke, 60; onmathematics, 62; inspired by Pythago-reans, 71; on perishing, 82, 84, 85; onpeculiar ideals, 84; and recent logical-mathematical discoveries, 91; comparedwith Newton, 93-96; poeticized byMilton, 95-96; and substance-qualitymetaphysics, 137; on permanence andflux, 209; his vision of heavenly per-fection, 209; subordinated fluency, 209;schools based on, 209; on reminiscence,242, 249; and straight lines, 302; prob-lem of, 346-47

Plenum, world as, 238

Pluralism, 18, 73-74, 78, 79, 137

Points, 287, 292, 299-332 passim

Position, 25, 195, 258

Possibility: of interconnection, xii; trans-cendent, 31; of division, 61-62; ofnovelty, 161; abstract, 220, 276 (seealso Eternal objects); of finite truth,220

Potential difference, 87

Potentiality: pure (abstract, general), 22,23, 40, 65, 66, 80, 149, 164, 184, 188,214, 239, 343 (see also Eternal ob-jects); impure, 22, 188 (see also Propo-sitions); and principle of relativity, 22,43, 212; real, 23, 27, 65-66, 67, 72-73,76, 80, 96, 123, 150, 168-69, 220,223, 267, 288, 308, 324, 326, 333;passes into actuality, 29, 308; con-trasted with actuality, 39-40, 148-49;correlate of givenness, 44, 133; meaningof, 45-46; unrealized, 46, 86; locus of,46; and continuity, 61, 62; datum as,65, 88, 113; in space-time, 70; as in-cluded in actuality, 72, 227, 290-91;and freedom, 133; retains message ofalternatives, 149; propositional, 187,267; in nature, 239; conceptuallyrealized in God, 343; forms of, 349

Power: and substance, 18-19, 56-58,79-80; and ontological principle, 18,79-80; of God, 49, 346; and enduringthings, 56; active and passive, 57; asincluding relation, 57-58; and objecti-fication, 58; and perception, 58; in act-

Index

Primary feelings, 231, 239, 241-42Primary substance, xiii, 21, 30, 50, 138,

157," 158Principia Mathematica, 149n, 198nPrinciple of Relativity, The, 333Principles of Natural Knowledge, The,

USn, 288nPriority, 54, 143, 162, 315Private: sensation, 18, 141, 234, 311, 315;subjective forms as, 22; synthesis, 85;and public, 151, 289-90, 310, 314, 316,317, 329; qualities, 160; ideal, 212; indi-vidual fact, 213; nothing purely, 212;immediacy, 213; eliminated by theoryof extensions, 292; psychological field,325, 326, 333Probability, 6, 167, 199-207, 268, 274.

See also InductionProcess, 128: description of, 7; as ex-periencing subject, 16; actual entitiesas, 21, 22, 41, 54, 140, 219, 227, 243,283; principle of, 23, 166, 235; genetic,26, 154; and ingression of forms, 39-40, 96, 154; of world, 39, 96, 340, 349;potentiality for, 43; as evaporation ofindetermination, 45, 150; mind as, 49,54, 138, 140-41, 151, 210; Hume'semphasis on, 54, 140; and product, 84,255; as basic notion, 128; as attainmentof end, 150; creative, 151; and under-standing, 153, 210; as essentially feel-ing, 153; correct order of, 156; repeti-tions of, 210; phases of, 212, 214-15;microscopic and macroscopic, 214-15;efficient and teleological, 214; andorganism, 214-15; of integration, 227;genetic, 230; and loss, 340. See alsoConcrescence; TransitionProgress, 14, 111, 187, 247, 254, 339Projection, 126, 172, 176, 177-78, 180,

310, 312, 314, 322-26, 330Proper entities, 30, 221, 224, 228Propositional feelings (prehensions): typeof comparative feeling, 164; form ofappetition, 184; and pure conceptualfeelings, 185, 313; origin of, 191, 261,263; definition of, 214, 256; conscious-ness, judgment not necessary for, 232,259, 242, 261, 263; as pure mentalfeeling, 241; arise in late phase, 247,260; analogous to transmuted feelings,253; arise from integration, 257, 261,264; two kinds of pure, 260, 261-62;

elimination involved in, 261, 263; asimaginative freedom, 261; as lure, 263;involved in comparative feelings, 266;involve evaluative hold up, 280; lie be-tween physical purposes and intellectualfeelings, 280; and Bergson's intuition,280; importance of, 280; as approach toconsciousness, 308

Propositional imagination, 274

Propositions, 22: and verbal statements,xiii, 11-13, 192-93, 195-97, 256, 268;truth and falsehood of, 8, 184-85, 186,256, 258-59, 261, 268, 271, 285; pre-suppose context, 11-12, 195; meta-physical, 11, 193, 197-99; as impureentities, 22, 185, 187, 188, 257; astheories, 22, 184; novel, 33, 188, 219,259; definition of, 24, 188, 196-97,257; lures for feeling, 25, 185, 186-87,224, 259, 273, 280; and judgments, 25,184-85, 186-87, 189, 191, 192-93,259; as indeterminate, 29, 257, 258,263; subject-predicate form of, 30, 159;include demonstratives, 43; as objects,data, 52, 184, 189, 221, 243; present inactual entities, 147; consciousness notnecessary for, 184, 186, 263; generaland singular, 186, 196; universal, 186,188; locus of, 186, 195; realizationof, 186, 197, 267; logical subjects of,188, 193, 258-59; and judging sub-jects, 193, 196-97; and eternal objects,197, 256-57, 258; compared withactual entities, feelings, nexus, 196-97,258-59; metaphysical, 197-99; incom-plete phase as, 224, 237, 247, 261; self-consistency of, 224; mere potentialityof, 224; not a class, 228; tales thatmight be told, 256; partially abstractfrom actual entities, 256, 258; intensifyor inhibit, 263; objective probability of,268; in coordinate division, 285

Protons, 66, 78, 79, 91, 92, 98, 99, 326

Psychology, xiii, 5, 18, 103, 141, 268, 325,326

Publicity, 22, 151, 289-90, 310, 314, 317,

_ 329

Pure conceptual (mental) prehension(feeling), 33, 63, 184, 241

Pure physical prehension (feeling): asopposed to impure, 33, 63, 214, 242,316; as opposed to hybrid, 245, 250,251-52, 308

Index

Reminiscence, 242, 249

Repetition, 133-37, 139, 140, 148, 155,210, 253, 279, 338

Representation, 53, 54, 76, 144, 237

Reproduction, 91, 92, 237, 238: concep-tual, 26, 249

Responsibility, 47, 222, 224, 255

Responsive phase. See Phase, first

Rest, 319, 321, 323

Res vera(e), xiii, 22, 29, 68, 69-70, 74-75, 128, 137, 166, 167

Reversion (category of), 26, 101, 104, 246,247, 249-50, 251-53, 254-55, 260,261, 262, 263, 269, 272, 277-79; asabolished, 250; double, 252; and physics,254, 277, 278-79

Rhythm, 78-79, 213, 327

Sampling, 202-03, 206

Santayana, George, 48-49, 52, 54, 81,142-43, 152, 158

Satisfaction, 40, 89, 153, 164, 219-21, 227, 232-33, 235, 280, 292-93and subjective aim, 19, 87, 255; definition of, 25, 26, 211-12, 283; God's 3288; unity of, 32, 115, 185, 235; subjective form of, 41, 247, 267; exclusiveness of, 44, 45; as determinate, 48, 85149, 154-55; subjectivity of, 52, 160as superject, sentiri, efficient cause, useful, 60, 84, 85, 166, 188, 219, 220292-93; temporal halves of, 69; divisibiltty of, 69, 220-21, 238, 283-86292-93; intensity of, 83, 84, 92-93100, 101, 111-12, 115, 116, 119; andorder, 84, 110; differences in, 84, 111and notion of substance, 84; and individuality. 84, 154: no consciousness of85; novelty in, 102, 232; depth of, 105110-12; narrowness, width, trivialityand vagueness in, 110-12; quantitative.116; and Kant's apparent objective content, 155; transitoriness of, 163; as twodimensional, 166; as contentment ofcreative urge, 219; morphology of, 220genetic analysis of, 220, 235; objectivedatum of, 225, 235; two laws for, 231integrates simple physical feelings, 237withness of body in, 312; and God'scompletion, 347

Scalar, 116, 177, 212

Scheme of thought, xiv, 3-4, 8, 9, 14, 39,337, 339

Science, 11, 15, 39, 100, 264: special,xiv, 9-10, 11, 17, 116; first principlesof, 8, 10; and philosophy, 9-10, 15-17,116-17, 329; progress in, 14, 61, 71;and religion, 16, 42; theory of, 17, 169,274, 323; of dynamics, 35, 72, 101,173, 323; motive for, 42; and undif-ferentiated endurance, 77-78; explana-tion (interpretation) in, 77-78, 324,326; observation, measurement, 127,169, 329: induction in, 129, 204: andautonomy, 245; and mathematical rela-tions, 327; and publicity, 333. See alsoPhysics

Science and the Modern World, 11 n, 189,204

Seat, 310-11, 312-14, 322, 323, 326

Secondary qualities, 63-64, 78, 113, 122,323, 325

Self, 150, 154: -correction, 15; -justifica-tion, 16; -creation, 25, 47, 69, 85, 289;-functioning, 25; -diversity, 25; -iden-tity, 25, 55, 57, 78, 79, 225, 227;-consistency, 26; -experience, 57; -defi-nition, 85-86; -causation, 88, 150, 222,244; -production, 93, 224; -preservation,102; -consciousness, 107; -analysis, 107;-formation, 108, 308; -enjoyment, 145,289; -construction, 179; -realization, 222;-revelation and -transcendence, 227;-criticism, 244; -constitution, 244; -de-termination, 245, 255; -restraint, 337;-attainment, 350

Sensa: as forms of emotion, 114, 115, 116,314-15; as simple and complex, 114,115; as eternal objects, 114, 120, 291;functions of, 114, 119, 121, 314-15,325; zero width of, 114, 115; meta-physical definition of, 114; individualand relational essences of, 115, 314-15; as forms of energy, 116; types of,119; enhancement, change in characterof, 120; effect presentational immedi-acy, 121, 124; and presented locus, 124,126-27; and wave-lengths, 163; dona-tion of, 171, 176; well-marked, 176;projection of, 176, 310, 323-24; physi-cal feeling of, 316; participate in nature,325

Sensation, 141, 157, 172: private, 141,142, 158-59, 234

Sensationalism, sensationalist doctrine,52-53, 57, 74, 128, 135, 141-42, 145-46, 147, 155, 156, 190: rejection of,

Index

Strain (-feeling) (cont.)

318, 322: definition of, 310; geometri-cal interest in, 310; not require life,311; and enduring objects, 311; straightlines ingredient in, 323

Strain-locus, 126, 128, 322, 330: defini-tion of, 319; as four-dimensional, 319;and presented duration, 321, 322-23;real and potential, 323

Stream of experience, 189, 190

Structured societies, 99-109: definition of,99, 103; examples of, 99, 102; domi-nant members of, 102; democratic, 108

Stubborn fact, xiii, xiv, 43, 128-29, 219,239

Subject, 41, 45, 59, 182: as topic of re-ligion, 16; and feelings, 23, 88, 221—22, 223-24, 231, 232, 233, 235, 236,311; actual entity as, 23, 25, 28, 56,87, 221-22; as superject, 28, 29, 45,47, 69, 83, 84, 88, 151, 155, 166,222, 223, 232, 233, 241, 245, 255,289; never experiences twice, 29; assubstance, 84, 157; meaning of, 88;ultimate, 118, 120, 180; prehending,141, 258-64 passim, 268, 269; judging,191, 200, 203, 258; and experiencedfact, 195: entertaining, 266; as privateside of actual entity, 289; feels itself,315; triple character of, 316. See alsoLogical subjects

Subjective aim: determinant of subjectiveforms, 19, 27, 235, 275; and finalcausation, 19, 24, 87, 104, 210, 277;definition of, 25; and reversion, 26, 102;as twofold, 27, 85, 277; at intensity,27, 249, 277, 278; modification, self-creation of, 47, 69, 167, 224, 241, 244;phases of, 47; initial phase of, 67, 224,244, 283, 344, 347 {see also Initialaim); indivisibility of, 69; and super-ject,' 69, 114; lure for feeling, 85, 328;germ of mind, 85; and objective lure,87; God's, 88, 344; directs integration,102, 224, 308; categoreal conditions of,128; and Hegelian idea, 167; threepossibilities for, 187-88; and ontologi-cal principle, 244; due to mental oper-ations, 277; and subjective harmony,278, 279

Subjective end, 224

Subjective form(s), 16, 85-86, 88, 89,141, 154, 155, 157, 168, 211, 226,231-35, 249, 311: determination of,

19, 70, 106, 164, 192, 235, 244-45,285; as private, 22, 233, 290; noveltyin, 22, 102, 164, 232, 233; definitionof, 23, 52, 85, 221; examples of, 24,25, 86, 192, 234, 311; consciousness as,23, 53, 162, 236, 241; of conceptualfeelings as valuational, 27, 33, 240-41,

246, 247, 248; and subject-predicateproposition, 30; mutual sensitivity of,42, 221; of satisfaction, 41, 154, 235,283, 285; of negative prehensions, 41,226, 237; and eternal objects, 85-86,233, 241, 290, 291; partial conformityof, 85, 104, 106, 108, 164, 233, 235,237, 241, 244, 246, 275, 291, 315, 316;of physical purpose, 184; judgment as,190; as inhering in feeling, 232; em-bodies pragmatic aspect, 233; qualita-tive and quantitative factors of, 233-34;absent in first phase, 234; of preposi-tional feeling, 261, 263; of coordinatedivision, 285; as epiphenomenal, 292;omitted by presentational immediacy,327

Subjective harmony (category of), 27,235, 241, 247, 249, 254-55, 261, 267,279Subjective immediacy, 25, 29, 155Subjective intensity (category of), 47,

247, 277, 278, 279

Subjective unity (category of), 26, 219,222-25, 226-27, 230, 231, 235, 237,240, 246, 247, 248, 249, 255, 283-84

Subjective valuation, category of, 246

Subjectivism: Cartesian, 80, 160, 309;solipsist, 152, 158

Subjectivist bias, 159, 166

Subjectivist doctrine, 189, 190: reformed,189, 190

Subjectivist principle, 29: regarding datum,157, 158, 160; reformed, 157, 160,166, 167; regarding reality, 166, 167,191

Subjectivity, 15, 40, 155, 237-38

Subject-predicate, xiii, 7, 13, 30, 49, 51,54, 56, 75, 137, 145, 159, 222

Subordinate (sub-) societies, 99-100, 103,104

Sub-region, 284, 285, 287-88

Subsistence, 46

Substance, 25, 29, 40, 77, 81, 136: actualentity as? xiii, 19, 41, 58, 75? 78;Descartes on, xiii, 6, 48, 50, 59, 74, 75,80, 84, 108, 122, 144-45, 159, 160,

Index

Transmutation (category of), 63, 65, 77,101-02, 111-12, 250-54, 262, 269,272, 279, 280, 291, 292, 311, 313, 314,317, 323: defintition of, 27, 251; andmaterial bodies, 101; and functions ofsensa, 114, 325; of causal efficacy intopresentational immediacy, 119, 339; ofconceptual origination into physicalworld, 164, 246; as physical feeling, 232,253; and consciousness, 236; simplifies,250, 253, 317; analogies to, 253; anderror, 253; effected by propositions,263; in strain, 310; in God, 350

Triangle, 291

Triviality, 110, 111, 254, 277, 285, 340-41, 346

Truth, 14, 16, 39, 159, 264, 342: andfalsehood, 8, 11, 223, 256, 258, 261,273; of propositions, 8, 184, 186, 259,268; possibility of finite, 11, 220; andGod, 12-13, 189, 346; pragmatic mean-ing of, 181; and value, 185; phase asproposition seeking, 224; -value of meta-physical propositions, 197; adds to in-terest, 259; coherence as, 271; attentionand inattention to, 275

Ultimate, the, 7, 20, 21, 342

Unauthentic perceptive feelings, 263, 268,270, 272

Unconscious, subconscious, 52, 54, 186,187, 242, 338

Understanding, 52, 153, 251

Uniformity, 112, 333n

Unifying control, 107, 108

Unison of becoming (immediacy), 124,126, 128, 320, 322, 340, 345-46, 350,351

Unity: of actual entities, 22, 45, 47, 150,211, 212, 286, 348; real, 22, 224, 229;of a multiplicity, 30, 46; of experience,108, 113,' 128; of satisfaction, 115,211; of a datum, 210; of aesthetic ap-preciation, 212; propositional, 224, 236;universe's genetic, 286; ultimate, ever-lasting, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350; ofvision, 348-49. See also One

Universality, 4

Universal 14, 21, 43, 55, 57, 128, 146,151-52, 158, 190, 229, 230, 273: andparticulars, 20, 48-50, 56, 158; eternalobjects mis-described as, 48, 149, 158;eternal objects as, 184, 283

Universe, 22, 26, 47, 89, 94, 95, 166, 225:

essence of, 4; rationality of, 4; includedin each actuality, 28, 44, 80, 148, 154,165, 223, 245, 316; not abstractablefrom an entity, 28, 192; solidarity of,40, 56, 164, 220; as static, 46, 222; po-tentiality of, 46, 223; prehension of, 56;as one and many, 57, 167, 228, 167;evolving, 59, 88; freedom inherent in,88; knowledge about, 119, 121, 122,327; actuality of, 200; as organism, 215;novelty in, 222, 231; creativity of, 225,346, 350. See also World

Unrest, 28, 29, 32, 340

Urge, 129, 219, 228, 239, 285

Vacuous actuality, xiii, 29, 167, 309

Vagueness, 65, 76, 81, 111-12, 116, 120,121, 163, 176, 178, 237, 253

Valuation, 19, 24, 108, 187, 254: pri-mordial, 40, 244; and reality, 142; assubjective form of conceptual feelings,240, 247, 248, 311, 313; qualitativeand intensive, 241; three characteristicsof, 241; up and down, 241, 247, 248,278 (see also Adversion and aversion);eternal principles of, 248: important inhigh-grade organisms, 254; and con-ceptual feelings, 254. See also Concep-tual prehension

Value, 84, 104, 185, 228

Vector(s), 55, 87, 117, 119, 120, 151,177, 180, 212, 213, 231, 237-38, 309,315, 316, 317, 319, 325: meaning of,19, 116, 163; and scalar quantities, 177;all things as, 309

Vegetables, 33, 98, 107

Velocity, 321

Vera causa, 77, 119

Verification, 8, 10

Vibration, 79, 94, 163, 188, 239, 277,279

Viscera, 118, 121, 141

Vision, 33, 117, 118, 121, 167, 212, 214,346, 347, 348, 349

Volume, 300-01, 313, 322

Von Staudt, Karl G.C., 331, 332

Wave-lengths, 163, 327

Waves, 36, 98

Weierstrass, K.W.T., 328

Whewell, William, 12

Whole and part 96, 287, 288, 292

Width, 110-12, 114, 163, 166, 279

Words, 182

Macmillan edition. In such a case we have not actually introduced a change,but have simply made this new edition conform to one of the original editions(in this case Cambridge).

The external sources cited as the basis for some of the changes have beenidentified in the Editors' Preface.

* xi.2 The bracketed number in the text indicates the exact place at which

the corresponding page began in the 1929 Macmillan edition.

t xi.14 inserted 'the' before 'scheme' (M v.17)—As explained above, thefact that there is a reference to only the Macmillan edition (M) meansthat this corrected edition follows Cambridge at this point.

t xi.16 inserted comma after 'part' (M v.20) to conform to parallels in theprevious and following paragraphs (as Cambridge did)—Series of intro-ductory phrases (e.g., "In the first case, ... in the second case, . . .")were quite often punctuated inconsistently. We have made the punc-tuation consistent at these points without further notation.

* xi fn.l Whitehead used the thirtieth edition of Locke's Essay, which was

printed for Thomas Tegg in London in 1846 by James Nichols. In the"Advertisement" at the front, Nichols says that this edition "is nearlyan exact reprint of the sixth"; however, he also says that the sixthedition was "carelessly executed," and that in his edition "considerablepains have been bestowed on the punctuation." The punctuation of thisedition differs considerably from that of the editions preferred today.In those few places where the quotations in Cambridge and Macmillandiffered from this edition, we have brought them into conformitywith it.

t xii.8 deleted comma after 'cosmology' (M vi.25; C vi.15); changed 'bring'to'brings' (M vi.26; C vi.16)

f xii.25 changed 'them' to 'their' (M vii.IO)

t xiv.20 decapitalized 'the' (M x.3)

t xvii.26 decapitalized 'between' (M 3.22; C v.25)—We have made the cap-italization in the Table of Contents consistent without further notation.

t xviii.18 inserted comma after 'namely' (M 4.8; C xii.7)

t xviii.37 changed 'Giveness' to 'Givenness' (M 57.11)

t xix.10 inserted comma after 'Determined' (M 57.20)

t xix.22 italicized 'Essay' (M 57.32; C xiii.l)

** xx. 11 It might be supposed that 'Lure of Feeling' is an error, since White-head usually writes 'lure for feeling'; however, the text corresponding tothis entry in the Table of Contents has 'lures of feeling' (88.3).

t xx.13 inserted comma after'Environment' (M 58.29)

t xx.32 changed 'Trivialty' here and in following line . to 'Triviality'(M 59.8, 9)

t xx.35 changed 'Co-ordination' to 'Coordination' (C xiv.ll)—Macmillanusually did not hyphenate 'coordination' and 'coordinate'; Cambridgealways did. We have, usually without further notation, written thesewords without the hyphen.

t xxi.7 changed 'Amplifyer' to 'Amplifier' (M 59.23)

t xxii.23 changed comma after 'Feeling' to colon (M 60.40; C xv.37)

f xxii.31 changed semicolon after 'Misconceptions' to colon (M 61.8)

f xxiii.5 changed 'Propositions' to 'The Propositions' (M 61.23)

* xxiii.29 'Samples' is evidently used here as a verb.

t xxiii.35 changed comma after 'Spatialization' to semicolon and comma after'Fluency' to colon (M 62.14; C xvii.3)

t 18.2 While correcting proofs, Whitehead changed the title of this chapterfrom "The Categorical Scheme" to "The Categoreal Scheme." Mac-millan, unlike Cambridge, did not change the running heads accord-ingly. We have made these changes without further notation.

f 1832 capitalized 'Cartesian' (M 28.11)

f 18.34 Macmillan inserted the abbreviations 'Bk./ 'Ch/ and 'Sect/ intothis reference, the first one to Locke's Essay within the body of thework (C 25.8). For the edition used, see the note for xi fn.l.

f 18.35 put quoted words in double instead of single quotation marks(M 28.14-15; C 25.8-9)

i 19.40 changed 'MonodoZogy' to 'Monadology9 (M 29.28; C 26.19)—Thischange was made by Whitehead throughout his Macmillan copy. Wehave incorporated this correction without further notation.

f 20 fn.2 added Tress' (M 30 fn.2)

$ 21.1 capitalized 'Category' (M 31.8)—Both editions were hopelessly in-consistent in the matter of capitalizing references to particular cate-gories. There are three major types of references involved: (1) Expres-sions such as 'fourth category of explanation' and 'ninth categorealobligation' were usually not capitalized, but occasionally were—e.g.,'fourth Category of Explanation/ (2) Whitehead often used Romannumerals to refer to the categoreal obligations. Such references in thepresent chapter were uncapitalized—e.g., 'category (iv)'—in conformitywith the fact that the Roman numerals were not capitalized in theinitial listing of the categoreal obligations in this chapter. Later in thebook, the Roman numerals were capitalized, in conformity with thepresentation of the categoreal obligations in Part III. The word 'cate-gory' preceding the Roman numeral was also capitalized—e.g., 'Cate-gory IV/ However, when the term 'categoreal condition' was used, itwas left uncapitalized, even though the Roman numeral was capitalized—e.g., 'categoreal condition IV.' (3) In references to 'the Category of theUltimate,' and to particular categoreal obligations which designate themby name (e.g., 'the Category of Transmutation'), either the name ofthe category, or both it and the term 'category' (or 'categoreal condi-tion'), were very frequently capitalized. In a couple of places (here and247.27), Cambridge capitalized the entire reference which Macmillanhad left partially or wholly uncapitalized. On the basis of these prece-dents, and of the high frequency with which instances of this third typewere already capitalized, we capitalized (without further notation) theremaining instances of this third type. However, there was no similarjustification for bringing consistency into the references of the first andsecond types.

* 21.14 In the margin of his Macmillan copy, Whitehead wrote: " 'Poten-

tiality' is closely allied to 'disjunctive diversity/ "

* 21.18 In the margin of his Macmillan copy, Whitehead wrote: "cf. p. 47/'

The reference is to 31.29 of this corrected edition.

+ 22.17 changed period after 'Prehension' in previous line to comma and in-serted 'or Patterned Entities.' (M 33.6; C 29.28)—This change wasmade by Whitehead in his Macmillan copy.

i 22.29 inserted 'in disjunctive diversity' (M 33.21; C 30.7)—This changewas made by Whitehead in his Macmillan copy.

* 22.35 In the margin of his Macmillan copy, Whitehead wrote: "cf. Plato's

Sophist 247 i.e. disjunctive diversity is potentiality."f 22.36 deleted comma after 'actuality' (M 33.30; C 30.15)t 23.4 deleted comma after 'concrescence' (M 34.7; C 30.27)

t 36.39 took Tarts' out of single quotation marks (M 5428; C 50.11)

t 39.13 inserted 'the' before 'European' (M 63.3; C 53.15)

t 39.28 changed writing' to 'writings' (M 63.23)

** 40.13 It has been suggested that 'orderings' should read 'ordering/ Evi-dence for this is provided by the fact that the Table of Contents has itin the singular. However, the content of the previous sentence in thetext, along with the use of 'such' (which normally takes a plural noun),supports the text as it is.

* 40fn.l Whitehead would have, of course, been using their 1911-12 trans-

lation, not their 1931 corrected edition, which most scholars today use.t 41 fn.6 took 'for' out of italics (M 65 fn.6)t 42.1 changed 'from' to 'form' (M 66.35)—This change was included on

the list entitled "Misprints."t 42.7 deleted comma after 'theory* (M 67.4; C 57.10)

* 42 fn.7 The quotation is from p. 455.

** 43.23 It has been suggested that 'decision' should read 'decisions.'

* 43.29 In British usage, 'eat' can express the past tense.t 44.24 changed 'be' to 'the' (M 70.24)

t 44.25 decapitalized 'he' (C 60.27)— Cambridge capitalized occurrences of'he' and 'him' referring to God; Macmillan did not. We have followedMacmillan's convention without further notation.

* 44.32 In the margin of his Cambridge copy, Whitehead wrote: "Thus con-

sciousness is a factor in the subjective form of the prehension of dataas given. Cf. pp. 344, 369, on the 'affirmation-negation contrast.' "These pages correspond to pp. 371-72 and 399 of the Macmillan editionand to pp. 243 and 261 of this corrected edition.

* 44.39 In the margin of his Cambridge copy, Whitehead wrote: "Law of

Excluded Middle."

* 45.28 In the margin of his Cambridge copy, Whitehead wrote: "i.e. the

'Satisfaction' is always objective. It never feels itself."t 46.12 inserted closing quotation mark after 'God' (M 73.12)t 46.15 changed 'efficacity' to 'efficacy' (M 73.16; C 63.12)—Both editionssometimes had the archaic form 'efficacity' instead of 'efficacy.' Thelist entitled "Misprints" drew attention to this discrepancy in referenceto Macmillan 184 (120 of this corrected edition); Cambridge changed'efficacity' to 'efficacy' at 316.39. We have changed the remaining in-stances to 'efficacy' without further notation.t 46.24 put quotation mark before 'the' here and in preceding line instead of

before 'multiplicity' and 'class' (M 73.28-29)t 47.17 deleted 'only' after 'illustrated' (M 74.38; C 64.31)—The presenceof 'only' produced a contradiction between this sentence and the follow-ing one. This 'only' was perhaps transposed by the typist from thefollowing sentence.t 49.33 italicized 'Meditations IV and 'IIV (M 78.24)

* 50.4 The quotation is from Shakespeare's A Midsummer-Night's Dream,

Act III.f 50.6 changed 'commonsense' to 'common sense' (M 79.3)f 50.28 deleted parentheses around 'A substance' (M 79.30; C 69.16)—

They (or brackets) are not needed, since this is not a direct quotation.

* 50fn.l3 As stated in the note for 40 fn.I, Whitehead was using the

1911-12 Haldane and Ross translation; this sentence was completely

retranslated in their 1931 corrected edition,t 51.5 changed 'on7 to 'Concerning7 (M 80.17; C 70.2)t 51.28 capitalized 'Concerning7 (M 81.9; C 70.29)

t 75.21 changed period after 'conceive it' to comma (M 116.29; C 104.9)t 76.9 changed well' to 'dwell' (M 117-31)—This change was made by

Whitehead in his Macmillan copy.t 76.9 put both passages in double instead of single quotation marks (M

117.29-31; C 105.7-9)t 76.41 changed 'exemplication' to 'exemplification' (M 118.33)t 76fn.8 decapitaiized 'the9 (M 118 fn.8; C 105 fn.l)t 77.18 changed 'synonomously' to 'synonymously' (M 119.23)t 78.34 changed 'adventure' to 'adventures' (M 121.23; C 108.35)f 80.1 changed 'substance' to 'substances' (M 123.19; C 110.28)—This,

incidentally, is a place where correcting the punctuation in quoted

material required adding italics.f 80.5 inserted comma after 'substance' (M 123.25)

t 80.24 put 'nexus' in single instead of double quotation marks (M 124.13)t 82.8 changed 'the' to 'a' (M 126.31: C 114.2)

t 82 fn.9 inserted '28A'; changed W to TlatoW (M 126 fn.9; C 113 fn.l)t 83.17 changed comma before 'disorder' to semicolon (M 127.21; C

115.20)t 84.15 put 'final causes' in quotation marks (M 128.36; C 116.28)t 85.9 changed double to single quotation marks (M 130.12-13; C 118.2)

—This is not a direct quotation: 'It' is not in the quoted passage,t 85 fn.l inserted '10' after 'xxxvii (M 131 fn.l; C 118 fn.l)

* 86.15 Whitehead used The Philosophical Works of David Hume, in four

volumes, published in 1854 by Little, Brown and Company, Boston,and by Adam and Charles Black, Edinburgh. The punctuation of theTreatise in this edition differs considerably from that in editions of theTreatise which are now more commonly used. In those few places wherethe quotations in Cambridge and Macmillan differed from this edition,we have brought them into conformity with it.

t 86.30 changed 'of to 'or' (M 132.25)

t 86.38 changed 'has never' to 'never has' (M 132.34; C 120.17)

t 86.42 changed 'between' to 'betwixt' (M 133.3; C 120.22)

f 86.44 deleted 'to' before 'raise' (M 133.6; C 120.24)

f 87.4 changed 'instances' to 'instance' (M 133.11)

t 87.35 deleted hyphen in 'threefold' (M 134.15)

t 87.45 changed 'an unity' to 'a unity' (M 134.28)

* 88.3 See the note for xx.II.

t 88.6 changed 'This' to 'His' (M 134.35; C 122.9)-Whitehead's hand-written 'H' is such that it could appear to a typist to be 'TV; cf. thenotes for 139.34 and 225.36.

t 88.9 put closing quotation mark after 'nature' instead of after 'superjective'(M 135.2; C 122.13) to conform to parallels above

t 88.13 changed 'goal' to 'goad' (M 135.8; C 122.18)-In agreement withmost other scholars consulted, we do not think that the expression 'goaltowards novelty' makes sense. Also, the presence of 'goal' in the text iseasily intelligible as a mistranscription of Whitehead's handwriting. Anobjection to this change might be that the use of the word 'goad' in thiscontext is incompatible with Whitehead's conception as to how Godinfluences the world, i.e., by presenting ideals which serve as lures forfeeling. It is, however, quite normal to say that one person goads anotherto action when the former insistently presents the latter with an attrac-tive ideal.

** 89.35 It has been suggested that 'a' should be inserted before 'man.'

f 111.42 changed semicolon after 'character' to comma (M 170.35)

f 113.6 changed 'experiental' to 'experiential' (M 172.27); deleted comma

after 'attained' "(M 172.27; C 158.16)} 113.11 deleted 'as' after 'aesthetic' (M 172.33)—This occurrence of 'trans-cendental aesthetic/ unlike the other two in the immediate context, wasneither capitalized nor put in quotes. The other two clearly name a partof the Critique, whereas this occurrence can be regarded as a referenceto its content. On this reading, it is possible that the deleted 'as'was a mistranscription from an V originally completing the word'aesthetics.'

* 113.20 In his Macmillan copy, Whitehead underlined 'responsive con-

formity of feeling' and wrote "cf. p. 53" in the margin. The referenceis to pp. 35-36 of this corrected edition; cf. the note for 36.1.t 113.34 deleted comma after 'question* (M 173.25; C 159.12)t 114.24 changed 'for' to 'from' (M 174.34^t 114.42 changed 'show' to 'shows' (M 175.20; C 161.5)t 115.34 deleted comma after 'feelings' (M 176.29; C 162.11)t 116.41 changed 'experiment' to 'experient' (M 178.20-21; C 163.37)t 117.35 changed 'anything' to 'any thing' (M 179.33; C 165.10)t 117 fn.l inserted 'Bk.I/ (M 179fn.l; C 165 fn.l)—The references to theTreatise were not uniform: sometimes 'Treatise' was omitted; sometimesthe Part; and always the Book. We have, without further notation,brought all footnote references to the Treatise into standard form.

* 117 fn.2 The italics in this quotation were also (as in the one before it)

not in the original.

t 118.8 inserted hyphens in 'such-and-such' here (M 180.14-15; C 165.25-26) and in lines 10 and 18 (M 180.16-17 & 27-28; C 165.28, 166.2)

t 118.11 changed 'though' to 'through' (M 180.19)—This change was in-cluded on the list entitled "Misprints."

t 118.23 deleted comma after 'conclusion' (C 166.9)

t 118.29 inserted 'to us' (M 181.4; C 166.13)

f 119.36 changed 'nexus' to 'nexus' (M 182.32: C 168.2)—This change wasmade by Whitehead in his Macmillan copy.

t 120.1 changed 'gives' to 'give' (M 183.6; C 168.11)

t 120.6 changed 'vector-character' to 'vector character' (M 183.12-13; C168.17) to conform to the usual spelling

f 120.19 changed %' (M 183.29) and 'S' (C 168.35) to 'S/-This changewas made by Whitehead in his Macmillan copy.

+ 121.11 changed 'be' to 'have been' and inserted 'a' before 'missile' (M185.1; C 170.6)

t 121.30 inserted dash after 'immediacy (M 185.27)

t 121 fn.4 changed 'of to 'cf.' (M 185 fn.4; C 170 fn.l)—This change wasmade by Whitehead in his Macmillan copy.

t 121 fn. 5 changed 'Meaning and Importance' to 'Meaning and Effect';changed 'Macmillan' to '(New York: Macmillan, 1927; CambridgeUniversity Press, 1928)' (M 185 fn.5; C 170 fn.2)-Parentheses wereintroduced to distinguish clearly the data relating to the lectures fromthat referring to the publications. It might be inferred that 'Meaningand Importance' was used in the title of the lectures; however, White-head's letter to the University, and the announcement in the Univer-sity's newspaper, had the following as the announced topic: "SymbolicExpression, Its Function for the Individual and for Society."

t 123.42 changed 'ways' to 'way' (M 189.5; C 174.2)—The following sen-

was responsible for the Index, it was not done with great care—e.g.,the important footnote on p. 333 was not indexed. Also, it is noteworthythat the Cambridge edition had the '-scopic7 and '-cosmic' occurrencescorrectly indexed.f 131.21 changed 'colored' to 'coloured' (M 200.2)f 131.24 changed 'change' to 'chance' (M 200.4; C 183.34)f 131.25 changed 'would' to 'should' (M 200.5; C 18335)t 132.1 changed 'the' before 'substance' to 'a' (M 200.25; C 184.19)

* 132 fn.7 For the edition quoted, see the note for 86.15.

f 133.10 deleted comma after 'freedom' (M 202.19; C 186.5)

* 133.16 The italics are Whitehead's.

t 134.27 deleted 'that' before 'this' (M 204.17; C 187.37)f 134.29 changed single to double quotation marks (M 204.20-21; C 187.40-188.1)

* 134.41 These latter italics are also Hume's.

t 135.3 deleted 'by' before 'the nature' (M 205.5; C 188.19)t 135.29 changed single to double quotation marks; changed 'Ideas' to 'theIdea'; and decapitalized 'external' (M 206.5-6; C 189.18-19)

* 135 fn.9 The passage to which Whitehead refers does not come at the end

of the Appendix in some editions of the Treatise, e.g., that of Selby-Bigge, but is followed by other material. The last three sentences ofthe edition Whitehead used (see the note for 86.15) read: "The seconderror may be found in [Bk.I, Part III, Sect. VII], where I say, that twoideas of the same object can only be different by their different degreesof force and vivacity. I believe there are other differences among ideas,which cannot properly be comprehended under these terms. Had I said,that two ideas of the same object can only be different by their differentfeeling, I should have been nearer the truth."

t 137.7 moved closing bracket from after 'time' to after 'such' (M 208.2;C 191.13)

f 137.20 changed 'endeavor' to 'endeavour' (M 208.20)

* 138.15 Whitehead used an edition (cf. the note for xi fn.l) based on

Locke's English arrangement of the introductory material, not one basedon Coste's French translation. In editions following Coste's arrange-ment, such as that of Campbell Fraser, the reference here would be'Introduction, 8.'t 138.18 changed '6 and T to '6' (M 20936; C 193.8)-Although thequoted material is only from Sect. 6, Whitehead perhaps wanted todraw attention to some material in Sect. 7.

* 138 fn.l 3 Whitehead means that the italics throughout the remainder of

this paragraph are his.t 13934 changed 'thence' to 'hence' (M 212.1); changed 'This' to 'His'

(M 212.2; C 195.7)—Cf. the note for 88.6.t 139 fn.l5 changed footnote to its present reading from 'Cf. treatise, Bk.

Ill, Sects. V and VI' (M 211 fn.l5; C 194 fn.l)t 139 fn.16 put 'Transcendental Logic in quotation marks and changed

'Intro. I' to 'Introduction, Sect. Y (M 211 fn.16; C 195 fn.l) for the

sake of consistencyt 14038 changed 'founded in' (M 213.25) and 'founded on' (C 196.27) to

'found in't 141.8 changed 'reflections' to 'reflection' (M 214.2-3)

* 142.23 The quotation is from Scepticism and Animal Faith, Chs 7=f 142.27 changed 'in' to 'is' (M 216.11)

t 1433 decapitalized 'books' (M 216.35; C 199.29)—References elsewhereto the books of Locke's Essay are not capitalized.

which is the "subjectivist principle"—which is "mitigated" by Descartes7use of "realitas objectiva" We could have achieved the same effect bychanging 'sensationalist principle" to 'sensationalist doctrine/ since thesensationalist doctrine includes the subjectivist principle and hencewould likewise be mitigated by one who sometimes referred to real ob-jects. But we thought it more likely that Whitehead intended 'subjec-tivist principle/ For one thing, that is the term used in the previoussentence. Also, the inadvertent substitution of 'sensationalist' for 'sub-jectivist' seems more likely than the substitution of 'principle' for'doctrine/ especially given the previous paragraphs.f 158.29 changed 'generalization' to 'generalizations' (M 240.17: C 221.9)

to conform to the following sentence and to 159.17t 158.43 inserted comma after 'is' (M 240.36)t 159.10 deleted comma after 'experiences' (M 241.14; C 222.4)f 159.36 inserted comma after'muddle' (M 242.10)f 159.42 inserted single quotation mark before 'realitas' (M 242.17)f 160.6 deleted comma after 'mind' (M 242.30; C 223.19)f 160.9 changed 'an' to 'a' (M 242.33)

* 160.19 The quotation is from the Treatise, Bk. I, Part I, Sect. I.

r 160.26 moved comma from outside to inside the quotation marks (M

243.17)f 161.29 changed exclamation point to question mark (M 245.2)t 161.37 inserted 'in' after 'is' (M 245.13)t 162.6 changed comma to semicolon (M 245.28)t 163.2 changed 'feelings' to 'feeling' (M 247.6)t 163.4 inserted comma after 'world' (M 247.8^f 163.22 changed 'are' to 'is' (M 247.32)

t 164.4 inserted comma after 'prehensions' (M 248.27; C 229.9)t 164.27 put 'conformal' in quotation marks (M 249.19; C 230.3)t 164.35 changed 'earlier' to 'latter' (M 249.29; C 230.12)—'Latter' is used

instead of'later' to conform to 165.36 and 166.5.f 165.14 inserted comma after 'example' (M 250.22)t 166.2 changed 'synthetized' to 'synthesized' (M 251.28)** 166.36 This is clearly not a reference to the "subjectivist principle" as

denned in the opening section of this chapter at 157.28-29; the same is

true of the reference at 167.13. For one thing, the definition on 157

is of a principle which Whitehead rejects, whereas these latter two

references are to a principle which he accepts.** 167.13 See the note for 166.36.

t 167.17 changed 'presentation' to 'presentational' (M 253.29)t 167.31 changed all four instances of 'res veroey on this Daze to lres verae'

(M 254.10, 14, 28)t 167.37 changed 'conscresence' to 'concrescence' (M 254.18)t 171.2 changed 'sense' to 'sensa' (M 259.19; C 240.13)t 171.3 changed 'justaposition' to 'juxtaposition' (M 259.20-21)

* 171 fn.l The words 'sensation7 and 'reflection7 were italicized in the

original.t 172.35 changed 'grey-colour' to 'grey colour' (M 262.8)t 172.37 changed 'sensation' to 'sensations' (M 262.10-11)f 173.12 decapitalized 'dynamics' (M 262.37; C 243.27)f 173.15 inserted comma after 'always' (M 263.2)f 173.16 changed 'interpretive' to 'interpretative' (M 263.4)f 173.28 deleted commas after 'problem' and 'perception' (M 263.17-18)f 174.9 took 'Critiques' out of single quotation marks and italicized it (M

264.14; C 245.2) for the sake of consistency

t 174.15 changed 'behavior' to 'behaviour' (M 264.22) to conform to theusual spelling of both editions

t 175.7 changed 'are' to 'is' (M 265.29; C 246.15)

t 175.27 deleted comma after 'dogma' (M 266.19)

t 175.29 inserted comma after 'Besides' (M 266.21)

t 176.22 changed 'experience' to 'experiences' (M 267.30)

t 176.23 italicized 'hand' (M 26732; C 248.15) to correspond to 'eye'

t 176.35 deleted 'to' after 'descend' (M 268.10; C 248.29)-The discussionwas already about 'organic being.'

t 177.9 deleted'comma after 'definition' (M 268.34)

t 177.40 changed 'spatiatization' to 'spatialization' (M 269.34)

t 179.12 changed 'produce' to 'produces' (M 271.38)—This change was in-cluded on the list entitled "Misprints."

f 179.23 changed 'principle' to 'principal' (M 272.15)

f 179.25 changed 'sensations' to 'sensation' (M 272.16-17; C 252.32)

t 179.26 changed 'discernable' to 'discernible' (M 272.18)

t 179.32 changed 'conjectually' to 'conjecturally' (M 272.26)

t 179.45 changed 'experiental' to 'experiential' (M 273.4)

M80.7^ changed 'are' to 'is' (M 273.13; C 253.27)

** 180.11 Some have suggested that 'construed' should be changed to 'con-structed/ but we believe that the text is correct as it stands.

t 180.13 deleted comma after 'organs' (M 273.21; C 253.34)

f 181.9 inserted 'with' before 'which' (M 274.32)

t 181.15 inserted 'as' after 'far' (M 275.4)

f 181.42 changed 'percept' to 'percepta' and deleted comma after 'symbols'(M 276.2)—The first change was made by Whitehead in his Macmillancopy.

f 181.44 changed 'precipient' to percipient' (M 276.6)

t 182.28 inserted comma after 'word'^M 277.3)

t 182.38 deleted 'of after 'suggest' (M 277.16)

t 184.33 italicized 'Logic' (M 281.10)

t 184.35 inserted 'a' after 'is' (M 281.13)

t 185.42 changed 'in' to 'is' (M 282.29)

t 185.44 inserted 'a' before 'new' (M 282.31)

f 187.10 inserted comma after 'of (M 284.25)

f 187.13 changed 'a non-conformal proposition is' to 'non-conformal proposi-tions are' (M 284.29-30)—As usual, the change made by Cambridgewas an improvement, since the following sentence uses the plural pro-noun.

f 187.17 inserted comma after 'entities' (M 284.34; C 264.26)

f 187.22 inserted 'of before 'feeling' (M 2853)

t 18732 inserted '(i),' after 'Either' and changed 'satisfaction' to 'satisfac-tions' (M 285.16)

f 187.43 changed 'data. But' to 'data, but' (M 28531)

f 188.27 inserted comma after 'entities' (M 286.31)

f 18839 deleted comma after 'entity' (M ?«79; C 26634)

f 189.9 decapitalized 'the' (M 287.27; C 267.14)^

* 189.12 The word 'abrupt was not italicized in Science and the ModernWorld, but Whitehead evidently wanted it stressed here.

f 189.14 inserted 'graded' before 'envisagernent' (M 28734; C 267.19)

f 189.18 changed 'VI' to 'IF (M 288.1)

f 189.20 inserted comma after 'hand' (M 288.4; C 267.25)

f 190.27 changed both instances of 'illusioriness' to 'illusoriness' (M 289.30,

31)f 190.44 inserted 'a' before 'proposition' (M 290.14; C 26934)

t 191.15 changed 'experiment' to 'experient' (M 29036; C 270.18)t 191.21 deleted comma after 'suspension' (M 291.5)t 191.36 inserted 'a' before 'feeling' (M 291.26; C 2*71.6)** 191.43 Whitehead's sentence can lead to confusion as to which of thetwo senses is the 'latter.' Some scholars have thought a change to benecessary. But we believe that the text is correct, with the 'latter' sensebeing the one introduced second in the previous paragraph, i.e., in thesentence at 191.37-40.t 192.22 changed 'on' to 'in' (M 292.28; C 272.7)t 192.40 deleted comma after 'background' (M 293.13; C 272.28)t 193.15 inserted comma after 'include' (M 294.2)t 193 fn.l changed 'Ch. VI' to 'Ch. V (M 293 fn.l; C 273 fn.l)t 196.26 inserted 'a' between 'of and 'more' (M 298.34; C 278.6)t 197.6 deleted comma after 'direct' (M 299.28)

t 197.19 inserted hyphen in 'judgment-feelings' (M 300.7; C 279.14) —Cambridge always printed this expression without the hyphen; Mac-millan sometimes inserted it. In bringing consistency into the text,which we have done without further notation, we chose to use thehyphen, since 'judgment' is not an adjective.f 197.21 changed 'terms' to 'term' (M 300.10)t 197.39 inserted hyphen in 'truth-value' (M 300.33)t 198.20 deleted commas after 'analogous' and 'simple' (M 301.27; C 280.31-

32) to conform to similar passages* 198 fn.2 The asterisk in this footnote is not ours, but is part of the refer-ence to Principia.f 200.27 inserted comma after 'Thus' (M 305.2)

t 201.27 changed 'next section' to 'next two sections' (M 306.17; C 285.13)—Whitehead evidently added one more section than he had intendedwhen writing this passage; cf. the note for 206.35.t 201.30 changed 'relevant' to 'relative' (M 306.21; C 285.16)f 201.34 inserted comma after 'reason' (M 306.27)

t 202.10 changed 'as to which set—favourable or unfavourable—the proposi-tion belongs' to the present reading (M 307.16-17)t 202.36 deleted comma after 'overcome' (M 308.12)t 202.41 deleted comma after 'ground' (M 308.19)t 202.43 inserted 'an' after 'have' (M 308.21; C 287.13)f 203.13 changed 'these' to 'there' (M 309.2)t 203.21 deleted comma after 'induction' (M 309.13)t 204.18 changed 'derivation' to 'divination' (M 310.28; C 289.15)t 206.19 inserted comma after 'depend' (M 313.32)

f 206.21 changed 'require that exact statistical calculations are' (M 313.35)and 'require exact statistical calculations to be' (C 292.14) to thepresent readingf 206.32 deleted comma after 'theory' and inserted commas after 'which'

and 'me' (M 314.10)t 206.35 changed 'two' to 'three' (M 314.13; C 292.29)-Cf. the note for

201.27.f 207.5 changed brackets around 'by (hi)' to commas (M 314.31; C 293.8)t 208.9 changed 'banquetting' to 'banqueting' (M 317.11; C 295.10)t 208.25 deleted comma after 'flow' (M 317.32; C 295.31)t 208.29 inserted 'that with which' after 'as' (M 318.3)t 209.22 changed 'difference' to 'different' (M 319.3)t 210.7 italicized 'concrescence' (M 320.4; C 297.36)—It is parallel with

'transition' (and both terms are put in quotation marks in the followingparagraph).

t 211.9 put quotation mark before 'the' instead of before 'novel' (M321.26)

** 211.24 It has been suggested that 'relative' ought to read 'relatively/but we believe that this change would be incorrect.

f 211.25 deleted comma after 'concrescence' (M 322.10; C 300.1)

f 211.30 deleted comma after 'alien' (M 322.17; C 300.7)—This changewas made by Whitehead in his Macmillan copy.

** 212.37 It might be thought that the twofold reference in this paragraphto the 'principle of relativity/ which is the fourth category of explana-tion (and is often referred to as such), as the third metaphysical prin-ciple is erroneous. However, it is possible that this paragraph wasincorporated from Whitehead's GifFord Lectures (which were greatlyrevised and expanded for publication)- and that this reference reflectsa numbering used therein for some of his metaphysical principles, suchas the ontological principle, and the principles of process and of rela-tivity; compare 22.35-40, 23.26-29, and 24.35-39 with 149.37-40 and166.27-42.

t 213.11 inserted closing quotation mark after 'passing on' (M 324,30)

t 213 fn.l changed 'II, XXI, 1' to 'Essay, II, XXI, 3' (M 325 fn.l; C 302fn.l)

t 214-5 changed 'negations' to 'negation' (M 326.2)

t 214.6 deleted comma after 'irrelevance' (M 326.3)

t 214.26 inserted 'of before 'the full' (M 326.28; C 304.14)

f 214.29 changed 'rnascroscopic' to 'macroscopic' (M 326.32)—This changewas included on the list entitled "Misprints."

t 214.35 changed 'in' to 'is' (M 327.4)

f 215.21 changed 'rnascroscopic' to 'macroscopic' (M 327.38)

t 215.26 changed '2d' to '2nd' (M 328.6)

t 219.8 changed 'genetic-theory' to 'genetic theory' here and in line 11(M 334.38, 335.4)

t 219.15 changed 'already-constituted7 to 'already constituted' (M 335.9)

t 219.37 changed 'objective' to 'objective' (M 336.1)

t 220.3 inserted 'a' before 'given' (M 336.6; C 310.13)

I 221.25 changed 'datum' to 'data' (M 338.16; C 312.20)

** 222.35 When Whitehead was writing this material he evidently had notyet formulated the ninth categoreal condition, that of 'Freedom andDetermination' (cf. 27.41). However, although there are six categorealconditions beyond the three discussed in the present chapter, we havelet 'five' stand, since 'Freedom and Determination' is not discussed asa categoreal condition in the following material; cf. 248.6 and the notefor 278.6.

f 224.31 changed 'in' to 'into' (M 343.3; C 317.3)

t 224.32 deleted comma after 'process' (M 343.5; C 317.5)

f 225.18 inserted comma after 'But' (M 344.8)

f 225.21 put 'creativity' on previous line in quotation marks (M 344.9); put'temporal creatures' in quotation marks (M 344.10; C 318.8)

t 225.36 changed 'There' to 'Here' (M 344.30; C 318.25)—Cf. the notefor 88.6.

f 226.6 inserted comma after 'entities' (M 345.12; C 319.8)

j 226.32 changed 'phrase' to 'phase' (M 346.8)

f 226.40 deleted comma after 'itself (M 346.17; C 320.11)

t 227.36 This paragraph was originally preceded by the paragraph which nowcloses this section.

t 228.5 inserted hyphen in 'class-theory' (M 348.20)

f 228.7 inserted 'Bk.I,' (M 348.23; C 322.14)

t 228.16 This paragraph originally appeared two paragraphs higher, i.e., priorto the paragraph beginning 'The third category. . . .'

t 229.43 changed 'are' to 'is' (M 351.3; C 324.28)

t 230.24 deleted comma after 'percipient' (M 351.36; C 325.23)

t 231.39 changed 'constitutions' to 'constitution' (M 353.36; C 327.21)

t 232.10 changed 'is' (M 354.18) and 'in a' (C 328.4) to 'in'-This is aplace where the Cambridge editor "miscorrected" the text; Whiteheaduses this and similar expressions (i.e., without an article) several times,e.g., in the latter part of the same sentence.

f 232.29 changed commas after 'entity' and 'object' to semicolons (M355.5, 6)

** 233.22 Many scholars have thought that some of the instances of 'quali-tative' in this paragraph should have been 'quantitative,' but we believethe text to be correct. To see how two types of pattern are involved,the reader will be aided by mentally inserting 'quantitative' before each'intensive.'

f 233.34 changed 'iself to 'itself (M 356.35)

t 234.19 inserted 'is' after 'which' (M 357.35; C 331.16); deleted 'displays'after 'tone quality' (C 331.17)—This is another place at which theCambridge editor "miscorrected" the text.

t 234.21 changed comma after 'separate' to dash (M 358.1; C 331.19)

t 235.29 changed 'determinations' to 'determination' (M 359.33; C 333.10)

t 237.27 deleted comma after 'effect' (M 363.12; C 336.5)

t 239.3 inserted comma after 'Further' (M 365.25)

f 240.11 deleted comma after 'conceptual' (M 367.16; C 340.2)

t 241.2 inserted comma after 'object' (M 368.24)

t 242.23 changed 'this' to 'his' (M 370.30; C 343.13)

t 242.27 took 'e.g.' out of italics (M 370.35)

t 242.41 inserted 'Bk.I,' (M 371.15; C 343.32-33)

t 242.43 changed single to double quotation marks (M 371.15-18)

t 244.25 moved take-out quotation mark from after 'society' (M 373.29;C 344.29) to end of sentence

t 245.37 deleted comma after 'simple' (M 375.26; C 347.19)

t 247.42 deleted comma after 'chapter' (M 378.34)

* 248.6 Cf. the notes for 222.35 and 278.6.

t 248.14 inserted 'of before 'the nexus' (M 379.18; C 351.2)—Cf. 26.36.

* 250.10 In his Macmillan copy, Whitehead underlined 'The Category of

Reversion is then abolished' and wrote "cf. p. 40" in the margin. The

reference is to p. 26 of this corrected edition.t 251.13 deleted commas after 'one' and 'same' (M 384.3; C 355.15-16)t 253.9 changed 'cf. Ch.V, and also' to 'Ch.V; cf. also' (M 386.38; C 358.8)t 254.2 changed 'transmuted' to 'transmitted' (M 388.11; C 359.15)t 254.42 changed 'subject' to 'subjective' (M 389.25)** 255.19 It has been suggested that 'Aesthetic Harmony' should be changed

to 'Subjective Harmony,' but this expression seems to be simply an

alternative way of referring to Categoreal Obligation VII. (This is one

of the places where we added the capitalization; cf. the note for 21.1.)% 255.26 This paragraph was originally followed by the two paragraphs which

now appear prior to the last paragraph of Section V of the following

chapter; cf. the note for 264.15.

t 256.32 changed 'seventeenth' to 'eighteenth* (M 392.10-11; C 363.6)f 256fn.l deleted comma after 'Cf.' (M 391 fn.l)

t 257.29 In his Cambridge copy, Whitehead indicated that '(qua possi-bility)' should be inserted in the text after 'referent' (M 393.17;C 364.9).t 257.36 inserted comma after 'eternal object' (M 393.25; C 364.17);

changed 'nexus' to 'nexus' (M 393.26; C 364.18)t 259.5 inserted 'a' before 'datum' (M 395.24; C 366.13)t 259.27 deleted comma after 'subjects' (M 396.16; C 367.4)t 261.10 changed 'predicate' to 'predicative' (M 398.31; C 369.16)t 261.43 This paragraph was originally preceded by the paragraph which now

appears prior to the last paragraph of this section.+ 262.44 This paragraph originally appeared as the second paragraph of this

section.t 263.10 deleted comma after 'feeling' (M 401.32; C 372.11)t 264.15 This and the following paragraph originally appeared at the end ofChapter III of this Part. The correct location of these two paragraphsis less obvious than that of those moved in Section VII of Chapter Iand Section IV of Chapter IV, but they seem to fit here better thananywhere else.f 265.5 changed 'are' to 'is' (M 404.16; C 374.26)

t 265.26 deleted 'as well as "immortality," and' after 'Athenianism' andput 'mortality' in quotation marks (M 405.5, 6; C 375.16, 17)—Thedeletion was made by Whitehead in his Cambridge copy,t 267.4 deleted comma after 'respectively' (M 407.18; C 377.16)t 267.21 changed comma after first 'feelings' to semicolon (M 408.4; C 378.1)

—This change was included on the list entitled "Misprints."f 268.2 inserted 'the' after 'all' (M 40834; C 378.28)t 268.37 deleted comma after 'feelings' (M 410.5; C 379.33)f 270.42 put 'suspense-form' in quotation marks (M 413.11; C 382.32)t 271.16 changed 'imaginative feelings' to 'imaginative feeling' (M 413.34;

C 383.18)t 271.18 changed 'doctrine' to 'datum' (M 413.36; C 383.19)—The datumof a propositional feeling is a proposition, and a proposition is what isconstituted by logical subjects and a predicative pattern. This is one ofthose errors most easily explainable as due to the typist's misreading ofWhitehead's handwriting.f 271.18 changed 'indicative feelings' to 'indicative feeling' (M 413.36;

C 383.20)t 271.19 inserted 'the' before 'physical' (M 413.37; C 383.21)t 272.21 put 'physical recollection' in quotation marks (M 415.25; C 385.3)f 272.22 inserted comma after 'imaginative feeling' (M 415.26; C 385.3)t 272.23 put 'intuitive judgment' in quotation marks (M 415.27-28;

C 385.5)t 272.24 put 'indicative feeling' in quotation marks (M 415.29)t 272.36 deleted comma after 'other' (M 416.8)t 272.45 changed 'more' to 'mere' (M 416.19; C 385.33)f 274.6 deleted comma after parentheses (M 418.8)t 274.27 changed 'practice' to 'predicate' (M 418.33; C 388.4)t 275.36 deleted comma after 'subject' (M 420.30; C 389.34)t 276.16 changed 'physical' to 'conceptual' (M 421.25; C 390.25)t 276.23 deleted comma after 'developed' and changed 'required' to 're-quires' (M 421.34; C 390.34)t 276.38 changed 'according' to 'accorded' (M 422.16; C 391.16)—The

word 'according' would suggest, contrary to Whitehead's position, thatthe conceptual valuation is completely determined by the physical feel-ing. It would also prevent this sentence from speaking to the issue thatdominates the rest of the paragraph, which is how, in a physical pur-pose, the fate of a physical feeling is determined by the conceptualvaluation given (accorded) to it. Whitehead does, in other places, stressthat the conceptual valuation is partly determined by the physical feel-ing; but that is not the topic of this paragraph.t 277.12 deleted comma after 'phase' (M 423.3; C 392.1)f 277.22 inserted comma after 'subjective aim' (M 423.18; C 392.15) toconform to the parallel in the first part of the sentence and to avoid thefalse suggestion that there might be a subjective aim which is not "thefinal cause"t 277.42 changed 'subject' to 'subjective' and inserted 'at' before 'intensity'(M 424.6 & 7: C 393.2 & 3^ to conform to 27.30-31

t 278.6 deleted 'final' after 'this' '(M 424.17; C 393.11)—As mentioned inthe note for 222.35, Whitehead evidently added the ninth categoryafter writing this section; cf. also the note for 278.35.

f 278.31 changed 'Category IV to 'Category V (M 425.11; C 394.4)

t 278.35 changed 'this final category' to 'Category VIII' (M 425.16-17;C 394.9)-Cf. the note for 278.6.

t 278.36 changed 'had' to 'has' (M 425.17; C 394.10)

f 279.33 changed 'are' to 'is' (M 426.35; C 393.23)

t 279fn.l inserted 'Sect. VII' (M 427 fn.I; C 395 fn.l)

t 280.34 inserted comma after 'Also' (M 428.17)

t 283.2 changed 'CO-ORDINATE' to 'COORDINATE (C 401.2)-Cf.the note for xx.35.

f 283.26 changed 'soZjdo' to 'soZido' (M 434.23)

f 284.39 deleted comma after 'separate' (M 436.10; C 403.21)

t 286.17 changed 'Ch. VIII, Sects. IV to IX' (M 438.22-23) and 'Ch.VIII, JJ IV to VI' (C 405.28) to 'Ch. IV, Sects. IV to IX'-ChapterVIII has only six sections, so the Macmillan reference is clearly errone-ous, and the subject at issue is not discussed in the sections cited byCambridge.

t 286.19 deleted commas after 'sense' and 'influences' (M 438.23-24;C 405.29-30)

t 286.26 deleted comma after 'plan' (M 438.34)

t 286.39 italicized 'Qa Q2' and changed 'either' to 'other' (M 439.13-14)

t 287.1 inserted comma after 'as' (M 439.21)

t 287.3 changed 'purpose' to 'purposes' (M 439.23)

t 287.8 inserted 'the' before 'morphological' and changed 'structure' to 'struc-tures' (M 439.29; C 406.32-33)

t 287.15 changed 'taken in by my' to 'taken by me in my' (M 439.38)

t 287.17 deleted comma after 'point' (M 440.3; C 407.8)

t 287.30 capitalized 'Part' (M 440.19; C 407.23)

t 287 fn.2 changed 'Lajuna's' to 'Laguna's' (M 440 fn.2)

t 288.17 inserted comma after 'Also' (M 441.22)

t 290.2 changed 'an' to 'a' (M 444.1)

f 290.22 changed comma after 'fact' to semicolon (M 444.27)

t 291.25 capitalized 'Platonic' (M 446.11; C 413.7)

t 291.26 changed 'VIII' to 'IV (M 446.14; C 413.9)

t 294.26 changed semicolon to colon (C 416.31)

$ 294.34 We have followed Macmillan, as against Cambridge, in italicizingthe numbers of Definitions and Assumptions here (C 417.6) and below.

f 296.1 These diagrams were on p. 451 of the Macmillan edition.

t 296.22 changed '15' to '13' (M 452.37}

f 297.1 changed 'Iff to '14' (M 453.1) '

f 297.7 deleted '1/ after 'Definition 6/ (M 453.9; C 419.34)

t 297.11 changed 'IT to '19 (M 453.14)

f 297.14 changed '18' to 'Iff (M 453.17)

t 297.15 changed '19' to 'IT (M 453.19)

t 297.17 changed '20' to '18' (M 453.21)

t 298.1 inserted 'and' before '(ii)' (M 454.18-19; C 421.4)

f 298.23 changed period after lB' to comma (M 455.9)

t 298.33 changed comma after 'A/ to semicolon (M 455.23; C 422.7)

t 298.35 changed comma after 'A2' to semicolon (M 455.25; C 422.9)

f 298.42 changed '2V to '19' (M 455.34)

t 299.3 changed 'IT to '20' (M 456.3)

t 299.10 deleted comma after 'belones' (M 456.12; C 422.32)

t 299.13 changed '23' to '2V (M 456.15)

f 299.14 deleted comma after 'element' (M 456.16; C 422.36)

t 299.15 changed '24' to '22' (M 456.18)

f 299.16 deleted comma after 'element' (M 456.19; C 432.2)

t 299.17 changed '19 to '23' (M 456.21)

t 299.23 changed l2ff to '24' (M 456.28)

f 299.33 changed 'satisfied' to 'satisfies' (M 457.3-4)

t 299.41 changed 'definitions' to 'definition' (M 457.13)

t 300.7 changed '27' to '29 (M 457.26)

f 300.8 changed colon after 'end-points' to semicolon (M 457.27; C 424.10)

f 30030 changed '28' to 'Iff (M 458.18)

t 300.40 changed '33' (M 459.33) and '3J' (C 426.11) to '27—This As-sumption appears to have been added after the text was otherwise com-pleted; it came at the very end of the chapter in both editions. Sinceit refers explicitly to Definition 23, it has been relocated directly afterthis Definition.

f 301.4 changed '29' (M 459.3) and '27 (C 425.20) to '28'

t 301.8 changed '30' (M 459.8) and '28' (C 425.24) to '29'

f 301.10 changed '3V (M 459.11) and '29' (C 425.27) to '30'

t 301.12 changed '32' (M 459.14) and '30' (C 425.30) to '3V

t 301.20 Neither edition had a new paragraph at this point (M 459.25;C 426.3), but it is clearly desirable.

t 301.25 This paragraph was originally followed by Assumption 33, whichhas been changed to Assumption 21 and moved to the appropriate place,

X 301.26 Whereas Cambridge placed this paragraph at this point in the text,Macmillan had it (under the heading "Corrigenda") at the very backof the book, after the Index, with an indication that it belonged onpage 459. The page references in the paragraph were to 504 and 463 ofthe Macmillan edition. We took each 'i.e.' out of italics (M 544.5, 19).

t 302.12 changed single to double quotation marks (M 460.17-18; C 427.16-

17)f 302.18 deleted comma after 'imply' (M 460.25)t 302.27 changed single to double quotation marks (M 461.6-7; C 427.32-

33)I 303.30 inserted comma after 'words' (M 462.19)f 304.17 changed 'Ch. Ill' to 'Ch. IP (M 463.18); changed 'Ass. 33' (M

463.19) and 'Ass. 31' (C 430.8) to 'Ass. 27'* 304.25 See the added paragraph on p. 301.t 304.38 changed 'These' to 'There' (M 464.9)

412 Editors' Notes

t 305.8 changed 'relatively' to 'relating' (M 464.24)

f 306.19 changed lies' to 'lie' (C 433.7)—Whitehead has consistently been

using the subjunctive.f 306.21 changed '6' to '6.V (M 466.26)f 306.39 changed 'lies' to 'lie' (C 433.32)f 309.2 changed 'become' to 'becomes' (M 470.23)t 309.18 deleted comma after 'bodies' (M 471.8; C 437.21)t 311.8 inserted comma after 'case' (M 473.28; C 440.22) to conform to

parallel two sentences abovet 311.35 changed 'realisation' to 'realization' (M 474.24)f 314.7 inserted hyphen in 'high-grade' (M 478.9)t 314.39 inserted hyphen in 'life-history' (M 479.14; C 446.4) to conform

to other occurrencest 315.20 changed colon after 'physics' to semicolon (M 480.8; C 446.35)t 316.22 inserted comma after 'forms' (M 481.32: C 448.18)t 317 fn.l placed commas around 'Symbolism' in place of Cambridge's pa-rentheses; changed comma after 'New York' to colon; added '1928'; and

put publication data in parentheses (M 482 fn.l; C 449 fn.l)—Cf. the

note for 121 fn.5.t 319.2 inserted comma after 'example' (M 485.24)f 319.8 changed semicolon after 'world' to comma (M 485.38)f 319.27 changed '-dimensioned' to '-dimensional' (M 486.20)t 319.33 took reference out of italics (M 486.28); changed 'VI' to 'VIII'

(M 486.28; C 453.10)—The reference is to Part II, Ch. IV, Sect. VIII.f 319.43 changed 'parts' to 'pasts' (M 487.4; C 453.23)t 320.1 deleted comma after 'occasions' (M 487.5; C 453.23); inserted

comma after 'S' (M 487.5)t 320.22 deleted comma after 'M' (M 487.33; C 454.14)t 320.26 inserted comma after 'views' (M 487.37)t 320.38 changed 'present' to 'future' (M 488.15; C 454.33)f 320.44 inserted comma after 'secondly' (M 488.22; C 455.2)t 321.3 deleted comma after 'M' (M 488.26)t 321.13 inserted comma after 'occasions' (M 489.3)t 321.35 inserted hyphen in 'life-history' (M 489.31)t 322.16 deleted comma after 'future' (M 491.19)t 323.20 changed The' to 'The' (M 493.4)i 324.21 changed 'previous chapter' to 'Ch. IIP (M 494.26; C 460.16)-

Whitehead evidently ended up with one more chapter in Part IV than

he had intended when writing this passage.t 325.15 changed 'the previous chapter' to 'Ch. Ill' (M 495.38; C 461.27) —

Cf. the note for 324.21.t 325.36 changed 'presentation' to 'presentational' (M 496.28)f 325.43 italicized 'Meditation I' (M 496.36-37)

t 326.3 changed 'Part I, Sect. XII' to 'Sect. XII, Part I' (M 497.4; C 462.29)f 326.4 inserted comma after 'Hume' (M 497.5)t 326.16 inserted comma after 'When' (M 497.21)t 326.42 changed 'natures' to 'nature' (M 498.16; C 464.2)f 328.8 changed 'In-mathematics' to 'In mathematics' (M 500.10-11)t 328.14 inserted hyphen in 'yard-measure' here, at 328.27, and at 329.8 & 9

(M 500.18 & 37; M 501.29 & 31)f 328.36 inserted comma after 'from' (M 501.9; C 466.29)f 329.3 inserted hyphen in 'wave-lengths' (M 501.23)t 329.5 inserted 'are' after 'tests' (M 501.26)— This change was included on

the list entitled "Misprints."

Editors' Notes 413

t 329.7 deleted comma after 'congruence' (M 501.28; C 467.9)

t 329.30 changed 'depend' to 'depends' (M 502.21)

t 330.2 inserted 'the' before 'meaning' (M 503.4; C 468.21)

f 330.12 changed 'inter-connections' to 'interconnections', (M 503.16)

* 330.42 See the added paragraph on p. 301.

t 331.7 inserted comma after 'containing' (M 504.29)

t 331.16 deleted comma after 'line' and changed 'itself is' to 'is itself(M 505.2-3)

t 331.36 deleted comma after 'parallelograms' (M 505.29; C 471.7)

t 331 fn.l took 'Sixth Memoir on Quantics' out of italics and put it in quota-tion marks; changed 'Trans. R.S.' to 'Transactions of the Royal Society';and decapitalized 'von' (M 505 fn.l; C 470 fn.l)

f 333 fn.3 inserted comma after 'measurement' in second line (M 508 fn.3);changed 'Vol. XXIV to 'Vol. XXV (M 508 fn.3; C 473 fn.l)

t 337.14 inserted comma after 'selection' (M 512.17; C 477.17)

f 339.6 deleted comma after 'curse' (M 514.36; C 479.33)

* 340.11 Mathew Arnold's poem, "Resignation/' which was written as advice

to his sister, begins with the following two lines in italics:To die be given us, or attain!Fierce work it were, to do again.These lines are presented as sentiments expressed by pilgrims on theway to Mecca. Whitehead evidently quoted these lines (imperfectly)from memory, and they clearly conveyed a different message to himfrom the one implied by the title of Arnold's poem.t 340.38 deleted 'the' after 'means' (M 517.26; C 482.20)t 341.8 inserted comma after 'therefore' (M 518.4)f 342.3 inserted 'SECTION I' (M 519.3)i 343.9 changed 'theistic idolatrous' to 'idolatrous theistic' (M 520.26;

C 485.21)f 344.20 inserted comma after 'creative act' (M 522.24)t 344.25 changed 'mover' to 'moves' (M 522.30; C 487.23)f 344.26 changed ' a mover' to 'something' (M 522.31; C 487.24)+ 344.29 inserted 'move in this way; they move without being moved. The

primary objects of desire and of thought' (M 522.33; C 487.26)t 344.31 changed 'desire' to 'wish' (M 522.35; C 487.28)t 344.33 deleted 'side' after 'one' and changed 'list' to 'two columns' (M

523.3; C 487.30)t 344 fn.l changed '1072' to '1072a 23-32' (M 522 fn.l; C 487 fn.l)t 345.9 inserted comma after 'Thus' (M 523.26)t 346.21 deleted comma after 'nature' (M 525.25; C 490.10)** 346.35 In his Macmillan copy, Whitehead crossed out 'leading' and wroteboth "persuading" and "swaying" in the margin. No change was madein the text, partly because Whitehead did not clearly specify a sub-stitute.f 347.1 capitalized 'Platonic' (M 526.18; C 491.3)f 348.2 changed 'self-contradiction' to 'self-contradictions' (M 528.2);

changed 'depends' to 'depend' (C 492.21)f 348.20 changed'these' to 'there' (M 528.24)'

f 349.7 changed colon after 'forms' to semicolon (M 529.29; C 4947)t 350.6 deleted comma after 'suffering' (M 531.7; C 495.20)—This changewas made by Whitehead on Mrs. Greene's typescript.